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1.
By shedding light on market imperfections and the congestion of public goods, we show that free entry in a market equilibrium will lead to excessive entry relative to the social optimum. Moreover, by specifying a generalized congestion function, it is also shown that different fiscal policies, including labor income tax, capital income tax and government expenditure, play a distinct role in terms of remedying market distortions. Specifically, optimal income taxes decrease with the degree of market imperfections in order to remove the monopoly inefficiency, while they increase with the degree of congestion in order to remedy the adverse externality caused by congestion distortion. Since a higher degree of increasing returns to an expansion in the variety of intermediate goods is found to intensify the congestion effect of government infrastructure expenditure, the optimal rule of government expenditure proposed by Barro (1990) should be modified.  相似文献   

2.
We employ a model with both market production and home production to show that, ignoring administrative costs and indirect effects (such as rent-seeking), even if both the home and the market sectors have the condition of increasing returns and there are no pre-existing taxes, it is still efficient to tax the home sector to finance a subsidy on the market sector to offset the under-production of the latter due to the failure of price-taking consumers to take account of the effects of higher consumption in reducing the average costs and hence prices, through increasing returns or the publicness nature of fixed costs. Within market production, it is efficient to subsidise more the sector with a higher fixed cost, a lower elasticity of substitution between goods (higher value of diversity), and a lower degree of importance in preference, which all increase the degree of increasing returns.  相似文献   

3.
The paper discusses efficiency issues in the public provision of environmental services, in particular waste water treatment. It is shown that in the face of increasing, respectively decreasing returns to scale the zero profit constraint of a cost minimizing public firm induces underinvestment, respectively overinvestment in public capacity compared with efficient allocation between public purification and effluent control by private polluters. X-inefficiency of the public firm counter-acts the inefficiency in allocation arising from overinvestment, and it reinforces the inefficiency in allocation in case of underinvestment in public purification capacity. As subsidy can bring down the user's charge imposed on sources, but it will also increase X-inefficiency. The subsidy counteracts underinvestment but reinforces overinvestment in public capacity.  相似文献   

4.
Fiscal Policy, Congestion, and Endogenous Growth   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We devise an endogenous growth model with private and public physical capital, and human capital, which allows for relative and absolute congestion. According to empirical evidence, long-run growth is invariant to fiscal policy. Despite its complexity, the dynamics of the market economy and the centralized economy are analyzed in detail. We show that an increase in absolute congestion reduces the long-run growth rate of output. In contrast, relative congestion does not affect long-run growth. In the absence of congestion, it is optimal to use lump-sum taxation, and with congestion it is optimal to also tax income.  相似文献   

5.
This paper studies how congestion in the public health sector can be used as both an in‐kind and in‐cash redistributive tool. In our model, agents differ in productivity and they can obtain a health service either from a congested public hospital or from a noncongested private one at a higher price. With pure in‐kind redistribution, agents fail to internalize their impact on congestion, and the demand for the public hospital is higher than optimal. When productivities are not observable but the social planner can assign agents across hospitals, the optimal congestion is higher than in the full information case in order to relax incentive constraints and foster income redistribution. Finally, if agents can freely choose across hospitals, the optimal subsidy on the private hospital price may be negative or positive depending on the relative importance of redistribution and efficiency concerns. In this case, redistribution is limited if the quality of the public facility depends on the number of users.  相似文献   

6.
What are the economic rationales for the public subsidy of private health insurance? Inducing more people to purchase private cover has the potential to create a positive fiscal externality, as it frees up the limited public beds and other public resources for people who cannot afford private health insurance. Investigating this quantitatively, based on short‐run demand estimates, we find that the subsidy cannot be justified on the basis of this externality effect alone. We estimate that the optimal subsidy is actually negative, that is, a tax on private health insurance premiums. On the other hand, the externality does finance some of the costs. We then consider a long‐run dynamic version, consistent with the government's stated rationales for the reforms. In this context, the subsidy might be justified, or at least largely offset, by the fiscal externality. We then discuss other rationales for a subsidy and implementation issues.  相似文献   

7.
This paper sets up a monopolistic competition model featuring the returns to production specialization. Some novel results are derived from the analysis. First, the effect of a fiscal stimulus on consumption may be positive or negative, depending crucially upon whether the production function is characterized by increasing or decreasing returns to production specialization. Second, following a fiscal expansion, increasing returns to specialization lead to a positive linkage between real wages and aggregate output, while decreasing returns to specialization result in a negative relationship between real wages and aggregate output. Third, a fiscal expansion may raise social welfare, provided that the degree of increasing returns to production specialization is sufficiently large.  相似文献   

8.
地区差距、要素流动与财政分权   总被引:37,自引:0,他引:37  
张晏  龚六堂 《经济研究》2004,39(7):59-69
本文在财政分权框架下引入不完全人口流动和内生劳动供给选择 ,针对两个不对称的地方经济 ,研究了政府的最优税收、最优公共支出和最优转移支付政策。我们发现了零中央政府收入税和逆向财政缺口 ,在有限政策工具的约束下 ,对应性转移支付也具有缩小区域差距的功能。不同级别政府间的服务竞争和税收竞争极大地影响了个人和政府的最优决策 ,拥挤效应和实际禀赋效应放大了通常意义上的收入效应水平。人口流动和财政分权提高了低生产力地区的福利 ,数值模拟分析结果表明高生产力、高禀赋地区对低生产力、低禀赋地区存在隐性的区域间收入再分配 ,中央政府的干预措施一般具有协调区域发展、补贴低生产力低禀赋地区的性质。结合我国东西部的经济现实 ,我们认为中央政府应该打破已有的利益分配格局 ,优化转移支付资金的结构 ,提高财政政策效率  相似文献   

9.
The expanding literature on fiscal decentralization (FD) emphasizes the role of institutional mechanisms for FD's welfare effects. We analyze the welfare effects of FD in case of a fiscal transfer mechanism that punishes inefficiency in tax collection and compensates for local income deficiency. In addition, a portion of transfers is earmarked for investment. Given a level of FD and these rules, the representative local government chooses its tax collection effort to maximize local utility. The solution of the model reveals that the stricter the redistributive rule, the higher are steady-state fiscal efficiency and welfare. While the effectiveness of the redistributive parameters increases with centralization of the revenue pool, it decreases with the tax rate. Both welfare and income distribution, on the other hand, improve with the degree of revenue centralization and the tax rate. Besides, fiscal efficiency and redistribution decrease with investment-earmarked transfers.  相似文献   

10.
This paper considers simple rules for federal fiscal transfers that automatically redistribute funds among member states of a monetary union to counteract adverse idiosyncratic shocks. The transfer rules target regional differences in nominal GDP, consumption spending, labor income, and fiscal deficits. Targeting regional fiscal deficits is the only rule that reduces consumption fluctuations and that promotes interregional consumption risk sharing, but the overall welfare effect is negative. In contrast, targeting regional differences in labor income yields the largest welfare gains, but it also yields the largest fluctuations in consumption and real GDP. It is demonstrated that the welfare gains primarily stem from reducing the allocative inefficiency of input factors caused by nominal rigidities. The optimal transfer rule essentially implies a combination of consumption spending and labor income targeting, and it primarily targets the allocative inefficiency of factor inputs at the cost of lower interregional consumption risk sharing.  相似文献   

11.
财政补贴改革刍论   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
财政补贴是国家宏观调控的杠杆之一,但是,目前补贴不规范,财政补贴数额大、项目繁杂,补贴效果‘异化’,加大了社会不公。为了强化财政补贴杠杆功能,提高财政补贴效益,必须按照建立公共财政的要求,本着满足公共需要原则、弹性补贴制度原则和补贴方式间接化原则,改变“一刀切”和补贴刚性的局面,确保采暖费收支合理化,取消肉食、副食品、粮食等价格补贴,改革国有企业的亏损补贴制度。  相似文献   

12.
When young individuals face binding debt constraints, their human capital investments will be insufficiently financed by private creditors. If generations overlap, then a well-designed fiscal policy may be able to improve human capital investments by replacing missing capital markets with an intergenerational transfer scheme. The optimal (balanced budget) fiscal policy in this context entails the joint provision of an education subsidy for the young and a pension program for the old, financed with a tax on those in their peak earning years. We demonstrate, however, that the desirability of such a cradle-to-grave policy depends crucially on the assumption of an exogenous debt constraint. If debt constraints arise endogenously for reasons of limited commitment, then the optimal (balanced budget) fiscal policy looks radically different. Furthermore, we find that cradle-to-grave type policy interventions may actually lead to lower levels of human capital investment as altered default incentives induce private creditors to contract the supply of student loans by an amount greater than the subsidy. In some cases, the constrained-optimal policy entails zero intervention. These results highlight the importance of taking seriously the reasons for why debt constraints exist.  相似文献   

13.

Competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal if returns to scale are not constant, except in special and accidental circumstances. This result is demonstrated using a classical production model; it holds quite generally and independently of all other sources of Pareto inefficiency, such as externalities, imperfect information and quantity constraints. It establishes a general and ubiquitous basis for critique of the 'invisible hand' ideology, which still dominates both the textbooks and wider reaches of social thought.  相似文献   

14.
Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via Nash bargaining, which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. In this paper, we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). We show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential. If lump sum monetary transfers are available, a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria. The Friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set, but higher inflation rates are also possible. When lump-sum monetary transfers are not available, equilibrium allocations are generally not first-best. Nevertheless, fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains. Money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities, and the Friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power.  相似文献   

15.
Summary. This paper devises a fiscal policy by means of which the first-best optimum equilibrium is attained as a market equilibrium in the Uzawa-Lucas model when average human capital has an external effect on productivity. The optimal policy requires the use of a subsidy to investment in human capital which can be financed by a tax on labor income. Lump-sum taxation is not required to balance the government budget either in the steady state or in the transitional phase. Physical capital income should not be taxed. Alternatively, the optimal growth path can be attained by means of a subsidy to human capital. Received: March 21, 2002; revised version: September 4, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through PNICDYIT grant SEC2002-03663 is gratefully acknowledged.  相似文献   

16.
Summary. This paper generalizes Segerstrom [5], a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth through quality improvements in which innovation and imitation are modeled as the outcomes of research and development (R&D) races. Specific factors introduced into the technologies of both R&D activities achieve diminishing returns to scale in R&D. The comparative-static results of subsidies to R&D activities depend on the degree of diminishing returns to scale in R&D. When there is (is not) a sufficient degree of diminishing returns to R&D, a subsidy to innovative activity increases (decreases) innovative activity. Received: July 8, 1994; revised version: June 9, 1997  相似文献   

17.
Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership.  相似文献   

18.
Drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions involves numerous specific actions in each sector of the economy. The costs and abatement potential of these measures are interdependent because of sectoral linkages. For instance, the carbon footprint of electric vehicles depends on the electricity mix. This issue has received large attention in the literature on Life Cycle Assessments (LCA). This paper analyzes how life cycle considerations should be integrated into policy design. We model a partial equilibrium with two vertically connected sectors, an upstream (e.g. electricity) and a downstream (e.g. transportation) one. In each sector, a dirty and a clean technology are available. The clean downstream technology consumes the upstream good and may thus shift emissions to the upstream sector. Our main contribution is to detail how optimal subsidies on clean technologies should incorporate life cycle emissions when carbon pricing is limited. The optimal downstream subsidy should be corrected for all external costs generated in the upstream sector, not only unpriced pollution but also the fiscal externality due to the subsidy to the clean upstream technology. We also analyze the joint optimization of upstream and downstream policies. The upstream subsidy should not incorporate features of the downstream sector, whereas the downstream optimal subsidy depends upon the upstream sector characteristics. All results are illustrated using a calibrated example of the electrification of passenger cars.  相似文献   

19.
We study optimal fiscal policy in a stock‐flow model of the environment within an endogenous growth framework, where some pollutants have a lasting impact on environmental quality which is restored through abatement expenditure, while others dissipate and hence, have a short‐term effect on the environment. All pollutants, however, affect the productivity of a public good negatively. Given that short‐term pollution, although it dissipates, is irreversible in this sense, a government cannot ignore its negative effects since this type of pollution lowers the productivity of all inputs. We find that a larger negative effect of short‐term pollutants as well as a higher congestion effect of private capital leads to corrective fiscal policies with higher optimal income tax and abatement expenditure rates, which have favorable growth consequences. Interestingly, we find that the rate of short‐term pollution does not affect optimal fiscal policy while that of the long‐term pollution does.  相似文献   

20.
We develop a closed economy model to study the interactions among sovereign risk premia, fiscal limits, and fiscal policy. The fiscal limits, which measure the government's ability to service its debt, arise endogenously from dynamic Laffer curves. The state-dependent distributions of fiscal limits depend on the growth of lump-sum transfers, the size of the government, the degree of countercyclical policy responses, and economic diversity. The country-specific fiscal limits imply that the market perceives the riskiness of sovereign debt issued by different countries to be different, which is consistent with the observation that developed countries are downgraded at different levels of debt. A nonlinear relationship between sovereign risk premia and the level of government debt emerges in equilibrium, which is in line with the empirical evidence that once risk premia begin to rise, they do so rapidly. Nonlinear simulations show that fiscal austerity measures that aim to balance the government budget in the short run fail to contain the default risk premium, even with sizeable cuts in government purchases; but a long-term plan for fiscal reform, if it credibly changes the market's expectation about future fiscal policies, can alleviate the rising risk premium.  相似文献   

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