Rue the ROOs: Rules of origin and the gains (or losses) from trade agreements

ABSTRACT

This article provides three-good, three-country examples of trade in both intermediate inputs and final goods. These show the adverse effects that rules of origin (ROOs) can have, even in a world where every country has a free trade agreement (FTA) with every other country. ROOs may cause ubiquitous FTAs to yield a level of welfare, for everyone, that is worse than if there were no FTAs at all, and all trade were subject to common nondiscriminatory tariffs. Thus, the move to an ever increasing number of FTAs may be reducing world welfare.     

Dumping in a product differentiated reciprocal trade industry emitting global pollution

By modeling an international industry where developed and developing countries’ firms reciprocally trade differentiated goods under global pollution and the incomplete internalization of the pollution externality, we examine the firms’ dumping and anti-dumping duty (ADD). We assume that the product quality, pollution emissions, and consumer's pollution internalization are worse in the developing country. We find, among others, that the developing country's firm always conducts dumping, but the developed country's firm only does so under a certain condition and that if the two countries’ internalization degrees of the pollution externality are the same, the firms’ dumping disappears, regardless of product qualities and units of pollution emissions. We also show that a rise in the developed (developing) country's ADD decreases (increases) global pollution and that a rise in a country's ADD always decreases its rival country's welfare, but there is the possibility that it also reduces its own welfare in a certain case.     

Anti‐dumping duty circumvention through trade rerouting: Evidence from Chinese exporters

We study the evasion of US anti‐dumping duties by some Chinese exporters through trade rerouting via third countries or regions. Using detailed monthly trade data reported by China and the US Customs during the period of 2002–06, we find that US anti‐dumping actions against China lead to a stronger positive correlation between US imports from third countries and Chinese exports to the same third countries. Such a positive correlation is more pronounced for the products subject to anti‐dumping duties (treatment groups) than similar products not subject to these duties (control groups). The evidence is stronger for less‐differentiated products whose certificates of origins are easier to be modified and is stronger for third countries where the rerouting cost is low. These findings are consistent with a trade rerouting story, rather than a simple story of trade diversion (i.e., increase in some third countries' imports from China) and trade deflection (i.e., increase in some third‐country exports to the US). We also rule out other alternative stories, consider prior production in third countries and concurrent anti‐dumping actions against China or third countries, pay a particular attention to the many zero trade flows in the monthly level data and check the robustness to using an alternative control group and quarterly data, etc.     

Parallel trade with an endogenous market structure

This paper sets up a two‐country model in which there is one domestic manufacturer authorising its product to a distributor in the foreign country. The distributor can sell the product not only to its own market (i.e., the foreign market) but also back to the domestic market. The latter is called parallel trade (PT). The paper investigates the effects of PT on the profits of the manufacturer and social welfare if the domestic market structure is endogenously determined. It is found that PT should be encouraged rather than banned as it increases not only the profits of the manufacturer but also the welfare of both the domestic and the foreign countries.     

Bilateral trade wars

The paper constructs a three-country, two-good general equilibrium model to analyze the welfare effects of bilateral trade wars. The presence of a third country (or a number of countries) pursuing free trade policies alters several results based on a two-country framework: Regardless of whether tariffs or quotas are used, bilateral trade wars need not eliminate trade between the two retaliating countries; even a “small” retaliating country can win a bilateral trade war; and quotas can be welfare-superior to tariffs under bilateral retaliation.     

Why parallel trade may raise producers' profits

This paper shows that a manufacturer may benefit from parallel trade. In addition to an intuitive condition about the effect of demand shocks, this occurs when competitive retailers must order inventories before they know the realization of demand and for products whose sale value drops at the end of the demand period. For these types of products, letting retailers trade unsold inventories generally results in larger orders placed with the manufacturer and higher manufacturer profit. The model provides a simple explanation as to why the volume of parallel trade is now very large and accepted by manufacturers for some products such as automobiles, clothes, toys, consumer electronics, musical recordings, cosmetics and perfumes.     

Trade in tourism services: Explaining tourism trade and the impact of the general agreement on trade in services on the gains from trade

The article addresses two questions related with tourism as a service trade. Can tourism be explained as other export activities? Does service liberalisation have a positive or negative impact on tourism receipts in destination countries? Previous research has either focused on the demand side factors (i.e. factors of demand in the origin countries) or on tourism as a long-run factor of economic growth. The research shows that a complementary perspective such as that offered by trade in a supply side perspective can render additional insights towards understanding tourism. This approach can explain why countries have absolute and comparative advantage. Another finding is that tourism as an export can be explained by some of the same destination factors that explain other service exports. Using different panel estimators the importance of supply side factors that are to some extent exclusive to tourism are demonstrated: the general price competitiveness of the destination, tourism infrastructure and the provision of safety. The econometric models also confirm the relevance of other conventional explanatory factors of trade in services such as GDP per capita and internet usage. The last part of the article analyses the welfare gains from trade under the general agreement on trade in services (GATS). The revenue (tourism receipt) effect is decomposed into a volume (arrival) and price effect. Results suggest that liberalisers under the GATS gained especially from a volume effect with average higher growth rates in the number of arrivals. There is also found to be a positive effect on the average income earned per tourist from being a liberaliser.     

Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

Trade and the gains from trade with imperfect competition

A simple two-country model is constructed in order to show how imperfect competition can form a basis for trade. Under the assumption of Cournot-Nash behaviour, it is demonstrated that trade will lead to a bilateral welfare improvement when countries are identical in all respects. When countries differ in size, trade will always increase total world real income, but the large country may experience a welfare loss. Increasing returns to scale in the production of the monopolized good complicates the situation further, but it generally remains true that trade increases world real income.     

Gains from trade in used goods: Evidence from automobiles

I investigate the welfare effects of trade liberalization by exploiting a natural policy experiment in the economy of Cyprus. A 1993 law relaxed import restrictions on used vehicles and enabled the importation of second-hand Japanese automobiles into the country. This led to a dramatic shift of consumer purchases from new to used cars and a substantial expansion of the overall market. Welfare gains computed from a structural demand system average $2000 per purchaser per year over a four-year period after the policy change. The findings are suggestive of the potential for substantial gains from liberalizing trade in used goods.     

A strategic and welfare theoretic analysis of free trade areas

We construct a three-country model to determine how the formation of free trade areas (FTAs) affects optimal tariffs and welfare. We find that, at constant rest of the world (ROW) tariffs, the adoption of internal free trade induces union members to reduce their external tariffs below the Kemp-Wan [J. Int. Econom. 6 (1976) 95-97] level, and causes ROW's terms of trade to improve and its welfare to rise. When ROW also behaves optimally, its policy response to the formation of the FTA is to raise tariffs. Generally, FTA members prefer to liberalize internal trade partially and find regional integration appealing only if their collective size is sufficiently large. We also demonstrate how FTAs may undermine the attainment of global free trade.     

US trade wars in the twenty‐first century with emerging countries: Make America and its partners lose again

In a context of rising protectionist rhetoric, this paper looks at the potential impact of trade wars initiated by a change in US trade policies. We use a static multicountry, multisector general equilibrium model to evaluate six modalities of three potential trade wars—for a total of 18 scenarios—between the USA and China, between the USA and Mexico, and a combination of the two previous conflicts. In each case, we evaluate various forms of trade retaliation by the US partner(s): the same level of import duty as the one imposed by the USA , an import duty that minimises welfare loss, a duty that minimises terms‐of‐trade deterioration, a duty that generates the same amount of collected revenue, and finally a Nash equilibrium. We conclude that there is no scenario in which the US government augments its domestic welfare or GDP . There may be sectoral gains in value added in the USA , but they are small and to the detriment of other sectors. While losses for China are relatively small, potential losses for the Mexican economy are significant. There are also free riders of these trade wars. Finally, the way in which trade retaliations are designed matters greatly.     

Trade deflection and trade depression

This is the first paper to empirically examine whether a country's use of an import restricting trade policy distorts a foreign country's exports to third markets. We first develop a theoretical model of worldwide trade in which the imposition of antidumping and safeguard tariffs, or “trade remedies,” by one country causes significant distortions in world trade flows. We then empirically test this model by investigating the effect of the United States' use of such import restrictions on Japanese exports of roughly 4800 products into 37 countries between 1992 and 2001. Our estimation yields evidence that US restrictions both deflect and depress Japanese export flows to third countries. Imposition of a US antidumping measure against Japan deflects trade, as the average antidumping duty on Japanese exports leads to a 5-7% increase in Japanese exports of the same product to the average third country market. The imposition of a US antidumping measure against a third country depresses trade, as the average US duty imposed on a third country leads to a 5-19% decrease in Japanese exports of that same product to the average third country's market. We also document the substantial variation in trade deflection and trade depression across different importing countries and exported products.     

Formation of interdependent regional trade agreements and production networks

Production networks (PNs) can be defined as a determinant of trade partnership. Deepening PNs may generate positive welfare effects and lead to a proliferation in the formation of interdependent regional trade agreements (RTAs). This paper theoretically develops the link between PNs and the formation of RTAs and empirically investigates the link by applying a qualitative choice model estimation methodology (probit) with panel data that covers bilateral country‐pairs among 147 countries between 2000 and 2010. We find that the RTA formation has been strongly driven by deepening PNs between members as well as with third countries. We also find that production network‐driven RTA interdependence is member specific.     

Is FTA/EPA effective for a developing country to attract FDI? The knowledge‐capital model revisited

To prepare an answer to the question of how a developing country can attract foreign direct investment (FDI), this paper explored the factors and policies that may help bring FDI into a developing country by utilising an extended version of the knowledge‐capital model. With a special focus on the effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) or an economic partnership agreement (EPA) between a pair of market and non‐market countries, simulations with the model revealed the following: (i) although FTA/EPA generally tends to increase FDI to a developing country, the possibility of improving welfare through increased demand for skilled and unskilled labour decreases as the size of the country grows; (ii) a developing country may suffer severe welfare losses through FTA/EPA if the availability of skilled labour is extremely limited; and (iii) a developing country can enhance welfare gains from a FTA, and it is even possible to recover the welfare effects from negative to positive, by making the arrangement an EPA.     

A reappraisal of strategic trade policies with the endogenous mode of competition under vertical structures

This paper examines the endogenous choice of competition mode with strategic export policies in vertically related markets when each upstream firm located in each country determines the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximizing generalized Nash bargaining. We show that (i) choosing Cournot (Bertrand) competition is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms when goods are substitutes (complements), which leads Pareto superior regardless of the nature of goods under the optimal trade policies; (ii) irrespective of rival’s competition mode, the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under Cournot competition and an export tax under Bertrand competition; and (iii) trade liberalization may give rise to changes of competition mode and increase of social welfare.     

The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

Cross-border production sharing and exchange-rate sensitivity of Mexico's trade balance

Increasing patterns of international trade occur in the form of cross-border production sharing – the dispersion of separate blocks of an integrated production process across different nations. In the case of ‘standard’ or ‘ordinary’ trade, imports are destined for use in the importing country, and exports are largely produced within the country. However, with production sharing, imported parts and components are destined for inclusion in the country's exports. A depreciation of a nation's currency raises its exports. At the same time, imported components become more expensive, which partly offsets the expansionary effect of the depreciation on exports. Using a simple theoretical framework, this paper shows that production networks lower the sensitivity of a country's trade balance to changes in exchange rates. The empirical examination finds Mexico's Maquiladora trade balance to be unresponsive to changes in both, its real effective as well as its real peso-dollar rates, while that for non-Maquiladora category is significantly responsive, in confirmation with the theorized hypothesis.     

Productivity, terms of trade and the ‘home market effect’

This paper analyzes the international transmission and welfare implications of productivity gains and changes in market size when macroeconomic adjustment occurs both along the intensive margin of trade (changes in the relative price of existing varieties of tradable goods) and the extensive margin (creation and destruction of varieties). We draw a distinction between productivity gains that enhance manufacturing efficiency and gains that lower the cost of firms' entry and of product differentiation. Countries with lower manufacturing costs have higher GDP but supply their products at lower international prices. Instead, countries with lower entry costs supply a larger array of goods at improved terms of trade. Output growth driven by demographic expansions, as well as government spending, is associated with an improvement in international relative prices and firms' entry. While trade liberalization may result in a smaller array of goods available to consumers, efficiency gains from deeper economic integration benefit consumers via lower goods prices. The international transmission mechanism and the welfare spillovers vary under different asset market structures, depending on trade costs, the elasticity of labor supply, and consumers' taste for varieties.     

Overlapping free trade agreements and international trade: A network approach

In our work, we have analysed the effect of the hub‐and‐spoke nature of free trade agreements (FTA s) on trade. Contrary to previous analyses, we have considered the effects of the country's position in the FTA network on the bilateral trade of the hub country. We have conducted an in‐depth analysis of the global network of FTA s, focusing particularly on its evolution in the last 15 years. We have utilised a panel data set covering the period 1960–2010 to investigate the effects of the hub‐and‐spoke on trade. Our results show that the countries that are more connected to FTA s export more than those that are less involved, although not all the partner countries you can connect with are the same. An increase in the number of spokes that have no link between them has, on average, a negative effect on the trade of the hub, which indicates that signing FTA s with every country is not the optimal strategy for increasing trade. However, if we consider the way new FTA s change the relative position of a country, we can see that if new FTA s make the country more central or less constrained in the network, these new agreements have a strongly positive and significant pro‐trade effect.