Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia

In a centralized federation, in which tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal government, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities. In this article, we test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federation. Russia's regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspected of tax auditing manipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s, increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the federal centre. Our findings confirm the existence of strategic tax collection for the Yeltsin period; the results for the Putin period are however ambiguous.     

Turnout and Closeness: Evidence from 60 Years of Bavarian Mayoral Elections

One prediction of the calculus of voting is that electoral closeness positively affects turnout via a higher probability of one vote being decisive. I test this theory with data on all mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria between 1946 and 2009. Importantly, I use constitutionally prescribed two‐round elections to measure electoral closeness and thereby improve on existing work that mostly uses ex post measures that are prone to endogeneity. The results suggest that electoral closeness matters: a one standard deviation increase in closeness increases turnout by 1.27 percentage points, which corresponds to 1/7 of a standard deviation in this variable. I also evaluate how other factors such as electorate size or rain on election day affect turnout differentially depending on the closeness of the race. While rain decreases turnout on average, this effect is mitigated in close elections, as indicated by a positive interaction effect of the two variables.     

The Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Federal Systems: The Political Economy of NIMBY

This paper offers a new political economy explanation for thepervasive problem of siting hazardous waste treatment facilitiesin federal system. We first show that a decentralized systemyields the first-best waste treatment capacity level and that acentralized structure gives rise to free-riding behavior amonglocal jurisdictions. In our model, each community seeks toinfluence the central government through political contributions.This leads to suboptimal levels of treatment capacity. Thecapacity is increasing in the compensation level if the marginalbenefit of treatment capacity is sufficiently large, and in thegovernment's weight on aggregate social welfare relative tolobbying activities. The centralized system can replicate thedecentralized system with a sufficiently high compensation level.Since compensation has proved difficult, a centralized systemfaces greater obstacles than a decentralized system.     

It's the Economy Stupid: Macroeconomics and Federal Elections in Australia

In this paper we examine the impact of macroeconomic conditions on Federal electoral performance in 20th-century Australia. We find that the electorate penalizes a government for high inflation and high unemployment relative to trend. Real GDP growth and real wage growth were not found to have a systematic relationship with incumbent vote share at the Federal level. We also examine the voteshare of the Federal incumbent in three electorates: the safe Liberal seat of Kooyong, the safe Labor seat of Melbourne Pans, and the swinging seat of Latrobe. We find some evidence that unemployment affects electoral outcomes in the swinging seat, but no macroeconomic variables affect outcomes in the safe seats.     

Electoral uncertainty and financial volatility: Evidence from two‐round presidential races in emerging markets

We study how the predictability and the decisiveness of electoral outcomes affect financial volatility. We argue that traders’ optimal investment strategies depend on their ability to make accurate electoral forecasts and the prospective losses associated with placing a bet on the wrong candidate. Using a triple difference‐in‐difference approach and data from two‐round presidential elections in five Latin American countries between 1999 and 2018, we find that financial volatility is greatest in the days immediately following unpredictable, decisive, elections. Postelectoral volatility also occurs following predictable, indecisive elections. The effect of learning the identity of the winning candidate on financial volatility is null when the election is unpredictable and indecisive, as well as when the election is decisive, but the outcome is predictable. These findings offer insights into investors seeking to hedge price risk around elections. They also have important implications regarding the relationship between public opinion polls and postelectoral financial volatility.     

The Proportionality of Electoral Systems: Electoral Welfare and Electoral Inequality

This paper argues that measuring the degree of proportionality in an electoral system is equivalent to measuring the degree of electoral inequality, defined in terms of inter-party differences in the seats-to-votes ratio. It proposes an index of the degree of electoral inequality which is based on Atkinson's (1970) index, applied originally to measuring income inequality. This index satisfies all the criteria proposed in the literature for evaluating measures of electoral proportionality. In addition, such an Atkinson-type index of electoral inequality can also be given a welfarist interpretation by directly relating its value to the level of electoral welfare. Under such an interpretation, the disproportionality in an electoral system may be interpreted as being the result of the system imputing voting shares to the different political parties which are different from their actual voting shares. The larger this difference, the greater the degree of disproportionality in the system. The use of this index is illustrated by an application to the outcomes of Irish General Elections from 1923 till 1997.     

The STARRT trial: a cost comparison of optimal vs sub-optimal initiation of dialysis in Canada

Abstract

Background:

Sub-optimal transitioning of patients from chronic kidney disease (CKD) to end stage renal disease (ESRD) may result in poor clinical outcomes and increased healthcare costs. The objectives of this study were to estimate the average total cost per patient who requires initiation of renal replacement therapy (RRT) stratified by status at initiation; optimal (RRT initiation as an outpatient with an arterio-venous [AV] Fistula, Graft or Peritoneal Dialysis [PD] catheter), and sub-optimal (RRT initiation as an inpatient and/or via central venous catheter [CVC]).

Methods:

Data from the Study To Assess Renal Replacement Therapy (STARRT), a Canadian, multi-centre, 6 month retrolective study (n?=?339), were used for this analysis. Unit costs for resources were obtained from participating hospitals, the literature, and/or standard costing sources. The analysis was performed from the perspective of healthcare payors and reported in 2011 Canadian Dollars (CAD). A propensity score technique was applied to control for potential confounders between the two groups.

Results:

Two hundred of the eligible patients for analysis (61.9%) were sub-optimally and 123 (38.1%) were optimally prepared. For this analysis, 106 “matched” pairs were used. The average total cost per patient was estimated to be $63,225 (with a 95% CI ranging from $58,663–$67,958) for the sub-optimally initiated patients, and $39,260 (with a 95% CI ranging from $35,683–$43,007) for the optimally initiated patients (p?<?0.001).

Limitations:

Costs were calculated utilizing a conservative approach, using the cheapest available prices for medications and other resources. Assumptions had to be made for the costing of dialyses.

Conclusion:

The results of this study indicate, after adjusting for potential confounders, that optimally initiated patients for RRT have significantly lower healthcare-associated costs compared to sub-optimally initiated patients.     

Taxes, Transfers, and Voter Behavior in U.S. Midterm Elections

The effects of changes in per capita real GDP, real taxes and real government transfer payments on midterm congressional election outcomes during the 1946–2002 period are examined. Voters are found to take all of these, except taxes and transfers at the state and local government levels, into account in casting their ballots. However, the weights they place on each are found not to be the same. Consequently, the common practice of summarizing the economic conditions faced by voters through disposable income seems to be inappropriate. Also, omission of tax and transfer variables from the vote equation, and using vote swing rather than vote share as the dependent variable is found to result in underestimation of the coefficient of per capita GDP growth.     

Determinants of County-Level Voting Patterns In the 2012 and 2016 Presidential Elections

ABSTRACT

County-level data are used to estimate the incumbent-party share of the two-party vote in the 2012 and the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections. Using a ‘seemingly unrelated estimation’ procedure the regression results for the two elections show that there were some clear differences in the size of marginal effects for several key covariates. For example, income inequality, the size of the black male and black female populations, the size of the Hispanic male population and percent of the population with a college degree all had significantly larger coefficients in 2016 than in 2012, producing a larger marginal effect in favour of the Democratic candidate’s vote share. On the other hand, counties with increased poverty rates and counties located on the periphery of urban centres had a significantly larger marginal effect favouring the Republican’s vote share in 2016 compared to 2012. Finally, the regression results show that the effects of third-party vote shares, though not statistically different across the two elections, had a positive impact on the Democratic vote share in both elections.     

美国政府对联邦土地及其附属资源的管理模式

美国宪法确立了联邦政府对其拥有的土地及附属自然资源的专属管理权,但这种专属管理权的行使不可能排斥州和地方政府的参与。联邦政府与州政府以及地方政府在对联邦土地及附属自然资源的管理上,实际实行的是联邦政府主导的合作型联邦制。在保证联邦政府对联邦土地管理最终决定权的前提下,联邦政府通过制定法律和签订协议的形式与州和地方政府分享权力,以便对联邦土地及附属自然资源进行富有成效的管理。     

Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Electoral Competition Games: The Hybrid Case

This paper analyzes the traditional unidimensional, two‐party electoral competition game when parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. In spite of having discontinuous payoffs, this game, referred to as the hybrid election game, is shown to be payoff secure and reciprocally upper semi‐continuous. Conditional payoffs, however, are not quasi‐concave. Hence, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (psne ) is ensured only if parties have homogenous interests in power. In that case, an equilibrium not only exists, but it is also unique. Instead, if parties have heterogeneous motivations, depending upon the relationship between the electoral uncertainty, the aggregate opportunism, and its distribution across parties, a psne may or may not exist. The mixed extension, however, is always better reply secure. Therefore, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does indeed exist.     

The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation and Welfare Composition of Spending on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from US Gubernatorial Elections between 1978 and 2006

This study attempts to make a contribution to the field of spending aspects of fiscal policy and their impacts on electoral outcome. Due to varying degrees of financial responsibilities and commitments to provide public goods and services, US state governments serve as a perfectly natural laboratory to test the electoral significance of fiscal policies. We adopt a probit model, with several specifications, to determine significant impacts of fiscal consolidation and increases in welfare spending on US gubernatorial elections from 1978 to 2006. The analyses show that voters are more concerned about the increase in debt than current budget deficits. An increase in welfare spending is negatively associated with reelection. Moreover, the impact of taxation on gubernatorial elections turns out to be insignificant. In particular, findings suggest that the political business cycle model does not hold true in US gubernatorial elections. Expansionary fiscal policy right before the election may not have crucial impacts on the chances of an incumbent winning the election.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems

The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not yet considered federal structures. In this paper, we show how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes, regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.     

The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View

Government centralization is not a law of nature. It can be explained on the one hand by the endeavor of locally elected representatives of national assemblies to form tax and expenditure cartels, on the other hand by the constitutional power of the federal government to take over state tax legislation and to act as a cartel enforcer. A case study provides empirical evidence and moreover shows that such cartels generate a higher tax level and perform badly in interregional equalization of per capita income. The relevance of constitutional power for explaining centralization seems to be confirmed in various countries.     

Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization

The decentralization of fiscal authority to lower level jurisdictions contributes to the efficient delivery of public services, but conflicts with national objectives. This paper argues that the system of fiscal relations, including both the grant structure and institutions for policy coordination, are necessary for achieving the full benefits of fiscal decentralization while preserving national efficiency and equity objectives. The case for decentralization is recounted, along with the ways it can impinge upon efficiency and equity in the national economy. These adverse effects can be mitigated by appropriate fiscal transfers, both equalizing and conditional, and suitable measures of policy harmonization.     

加拿大政府的科技政策、管理与科技计划

自20世纪末,加拿大联邦政府科技政策出现重大变化。首先加强了联邦政府在科技政策方面的战略规划,提出了中长期科技发展政策和战略目标,成立国家科技与创新委员会,向内阁政府提供科技政策建议,定期发布国家科技与创新国情咨文。与此同时．加强了政府各部门之间的协调力度,将国内科技政策的制定和协调统归加拿大工业部负责。并由其负责协调实施重大国内科技专项计划,强化了政府一研究机构一企业的产学研结合。大力扶持加拿大企业的技术创新体系建设。     

Pawns Take Queen: The Destabilizing Effects of Regional Parties in Europe

Regional parties encourage government instability in Europe because they make extreme demands on governments for regional autonomy. These demands are different from the demands other parties make and are also more difficult to accommodate, because they require national governments to relinquish decision-making authority over certain issues, whereas the demands of other parties only require government to adjust their policies in some direction. Regional parties are also unlikely to compromise their demands because they do not have the tools available to them that other types of parties have. I support this argument through a statistical analysis of twenty-four democracies in Europe, showing that the presence of regional parties in government increases government instability and that the saliency of autonomy issues affects stability only if it is mediated through regional parties. JEL classification: A, C Regions are defined as the political regions of a country – that is, the level of government directly below the national level of government in a country.     

An Empirical Analysis of a Regional Dutch Disease: The Case of Canada

While there has been extensive research on the Dutch Disease (DD), very little attention, if any, has been devoted to the regional mechanisms through which it may manifest itself. This is the first empirical attempt to research a ‘regional DD’ by looking at the local and spatial impacts of resource windfalls across Canadian provinces and territories. We construct a new panel dataset to examine separately the key DD channels; namely, the Spending Effect and the Resource Movement Effect. Our analysis reveals that the standard DD mechanisms are also relevant at the regional level; specifically, we find that: (a) Resource windfalls are associated with higher inflation and a labour (capital) shift from (to) non-primary tradable sectors. (b) Resource windfalls in neighbouring regions are associated with a capital (labour) shift from (to) non-primary tradable sectors in the source region. (c) The (spatial) DD explains (51  %) 20  % of the adverse effects of resource windfalls (in neighbouring regions) on region-specific non-mineral international exports (in the source region), and does not significantly affect domestic ones.     

Tactical distribution in local funding: The value of an aligned mayor

Using Chile as a case study for understanding tactical distribution under extensive controls on expenditure, this paper examines whether political motives affect the allocation of funds from the central government to localities. Collecting local-level data of two infrastructure funding programs and using the voting gap percentage between the coalition candidate and opposition competitors in a Sharp Regression Discontinuity methodology, we find causal evidence in favor of three hypotheses: (i) a coalition criterion influences the funding allocation to the local level; (ii) an electoral cycle exists in local funding; and (iii) the degree of coalition targeting varies based on a locality's history of coalition alignment. In sum, the central government regards politically aligned mayors as valuable electoral assets, especially in municipalities historically aligned with the coalition.