Bank Capital Regulation,Economic Stability,and Monetary Policy: What Does the Academic Literature Tell Us?

This paper surveys academic research exploring the macroeconomic and monetary policy implications of the Basel I and Basel II systems of risk-based capital requirements. This research indicates that regulatory tightening of capital ratios can generate aggregate shocks, that capital regulation can enhance the procyclicality already inherent in banking, and that capital requirements can influence macroeconomic outcomes and alter the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The paper offers suggestions for future avenues of research on the interplay between bank capital regulation, the economy, and monetary policymaking. Although any errors are my own, I received very helpful comments on earlier versions from Kenneth Kopecky, John Pattison, and Jack Tatom. I am grateful for research support from Networks Financial Institute.     

Soft budget constraints, bank capital, and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper investigates the effect of monetary policy in a situation where soft budget constraint problems prevail in the economy and the bank faces a capital requirement. Under these circumstances, an expansionary monetary policy may increase quantity of bank lending without improving the quality and thus may not stimulate economic activity. On the other hand, in order to solve the problem of soft budget constraint problems and to improve the quality of bank lending, the quantity of bank lending should be decreased. Central authorities need to keep this tradeoff in mind when exercising monetary policy and injecting public funds.     

Bank capital and lending: Evidence of nonlinearity from Indonesia

This paper studies the transmission of bank capital shocks to loan supply in Indonesia. Using bank data for the period 2001:Q1 to 2018:Q4, we estimate dynamic panel data models of bank lending. We find nonlinear effects of capital on loan growth. Specifically, the response of weakly capitalized banks to changes in their capital positions is larger than that of strongly capitalized banks. This non-linearity implies that not only the level of capital but also its distribution across banks in the system affects the transmission of shocks to aggregate lending. Likewise, the effects of bank recapitalization on loan growth depend on banks’ starting capital positions and the size and distribution of capital injections.     

我国风险投资领域引入商业银行资金的可能性及运作模式探讨

我国风险投资业发展至今,风险资本来源单一逐步成为阻碍其进一步发展的因素。同时,我国商业银行面对日益激烈的外来竞争,也存在开拓新业务、增加收益来源、确保资本保值增值的需求。文章通过对比国内外现有的商业银行参与风险投资的实践,提出了切合我国实际的运作模式,以推动     

制度环境、制度创新与银行资本结构优化目标

银行资本结构优化目标是银行资本理论需要探讨的重要问题.从政府关于商业银行改革的目标出发,我国商业银行的资本结构优化应针对转轨时期的制度环境,以制度创新为重点确立三大目标,即安全经营目标、国有资本相对控股下的治理优化目标和基于经济资本的价值最大化目标.     

Bank runs, information and contagion in the panic of 1893

Contagious bank runs, which spread to both solvent and insolvent banks, should not occur if bank-specific information is provided regularly to the banking public. By mitigating the information asymmetry between banks and depositors, information should restrict runs to insolvent banks. However, official bank statements collected from quarterly reports to local newspapers in Kansas demonstrate that runs did become contagious in the 1893 panic even in an information-rich banking system. Important differences between national and non-national banks were also found, which suggests the maturity of the regulatory system may have played an important role in the panic.     

Central Bank Independence,Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio

Using a theoretical model in which the degree of central bank independence affects the degree of inflation persistence and therefore the speed of disinflation, this paper suggests that sacrifice ratios are lower when central bank independence is higher. Empirical tests, using estimates of sacrifice ratios based on disinflation episodes for 18 OECD countries during the 1960–90 period, show that this result also holds empirically. This finding seems to be consistent with the credibility hypothesis by pointing out that an independent central bank may produce a credibility bonus.     

我国商业银行盈利性、增长性和充足性分析

资本硬约束下如何更好地协调盈利性和安全性成为我国商业银行急需解决的问题。本文以银行资本充足率为主线,对银行的盈利性、增长性和充足性三者之间的内在联系进行了理论上和实证上的系统性分析。笔者认为三因素存在着相互制约的内在联系,特别值得提出的是,目前我国商业银行一直存在着由高增长带来的“规模情结”,这不仅不利于保证安全性和流动性,也将在追求短期盈利性的同时导致资本约束瓶颈。     

央行和商业银行视角下存款准备金率的实证分析

本文分别从央行货币政策调控目标和商业银行对存款准备金率容忍度的视角出发,利用参数法和神经网络模型对存款准备金率进行实证分析。研究发现,央行近年来多次上调存款准备金率主要是为了对抗通货膨胀以及回收货币流动性。在不考虑银行容忍度下,参数模型给出的目标存款准备金率为23%,而在考虑了存款准备金率对银行的负面影响后,根据神经网络模型得出2011年上半年合理的存款准备金率应为21.34%,与当前21.5%的实际存款准备金率相符。说明央行在货币调控时考虑到了银行的容忍度,是符合宏观审慎性原则的。而模型的敏感性分析表明,未来存款准备金率仍旧存在上调的区间与上调的可能性。     

央行运用冲销工具的成本和影响研究

央行票据冲销外汇占款的微观成本在2004—2010年为盈利,从国内角度来说,央行使用央行票据冲销流动性的微观成本高于存款准备金率的微观成本。央行票据和存款准备金率对宏观经济的影响利弊共存,但就冲销流动性的效果而言,央行票据使用更为灵活,存款准备金率的冲销力度更大。     

知识经济时代管理会计的新领域—智力资本

本文在分析注册会计师验资诉讼败诉原因的基础上 ,针对司法界与会计界就验资报告的真实性、合法性界定在认识方面的分歧 ,提出了解决分歧的思路 ,并论述了注册会计师在验资诉讼案中如何维护自己的权益 ,尽可能减少损失的方法。     

高管团队特征与银行绩效的关系研究——基于银行创新的中介效应

基于28个上市银行2009—2018年的非平衡面板数据,构建固定效应模型和中介效应模型,实证研究高管团队特征、银行创新以及银行绩效三者之间的互动关系.研究结果表明,银行创新在高管团队平均年龄、平均任期与经营绩效的关系中起到部分中介效应,中介效应占比分别为27.21％ 和55.32％.银行创新能力在高管平均学历、女性高管占比与银行绩效之间的中介效应不显著.按照产权性质进行分组研究,发现国有银行与非国有银行创新能力所发挥的中介效应存在差异.     

零售商、商业银行和银联关系研究

国内近来频频发生商家拒绝消费者刷卡消费事件,文章从成本和收益对比的角度探讨了银商冲突的本质和原因,并提出现阶段银行卡利益分配机制适度向受理方倾斜,有利于缓解银商冲突,有利于银行卡产业进入良性循环。     

我国审计失败的成因与对策探讨

本文认为审计失败的成因主要在于资本市场对高质量审计的需求不足,公司治理结构不完善,以及注册会计师行业的不规范。因此,我们的对策是完善资本市场、健全公司治理、规范注册会计师行业。     

银行卡收费问题的博弈分析与对策建议

文章首先从完全且完美信息动态博弈假设出发给出了银行卡收费博弈模型,并运用逆推归纳法得出不同前提条件下的博弈均衡状态,然后采用有限理性和进化博弈对银行卡收费的合理性进行分析,得出以下基本结论：银行卡收费是有限理性的银行通过长期反复博弈、学习和调整策略的结果,所有的银行最终都会进行银行卡收费;目前一些中小银行为了追求规模经济效益实施免费只是短期的行为,从长期发展的角度看银行卡收费将是必然选择。     

Categories and causes of bank distress during the great depression, 1929–1933: The illiquidity versus insolvency debate revisited

During the contraction from 1929 to 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This essay analyzes chronological patterns in aggregate series constructed from that data. The analysis demonstrates both illiquidity and insolvency were substantial sources of bank distress. Periods of heightened distress were correlated with periods of increased illiquidity. Contagion via correspondent networks and bank runs propagated the initial banking panics. As the depression deepened and asset values declined, insolvency loomed as the principal threat to depository institutions.     

银行挤兑模型、外部性与对策取向

银行特定的资产负债结构强化了银行的易受挤兑性,作为典型的具有负外部性的部门,其一旦出现挤兑给各市场主体带来严重的负面影响.信息不对称是导致存款人挤兑及挤兑均衡蔓延的主因,使得存款人挤兑不仅引起存款人的损失,还会影响到其他银行,甚至影响到借款人,导致货币紧缩,经济停滞.文章采用Diamond-Dybving模型分析银行遭受挤兑的原因,指出存款人挤兑的经济金融效应,并在此基础上提出相应的对策建议.     

中间品进口多样化、企业创新与工资水平

基于2000-2006年中国制造业企业数据库以及进出口海关数据库的匹配数据引入企业创新机制效应检验中间品进口多样化的工资溢出效应。研究表明中间品进口多样化、企业创新均能显著提高企业的工资水平。进一步考察企业的出口状态、所有制结构及企业所属地区差异后发现中间品进口多样化对出口企业、外资企业以及东部地区企业的工资影响更为显著。分位数回归结果进一步显示中间品进口多样化及企业创新对工资分布高分位企业的工资影响更为显著。基于中介效应模型的传导机制检验，认为中间品进口多样化通过节约成本、提升生产率及企业创新影响中国制造业企业工资水平的利润共享机制存在。在控制成本效应及生产率效应两种机制之后，企业创新成为中间品进口多样化作用于企业工资的新机制。     

Separation of ownership and control for Chinese listed firms: Effect on the cost of debt and the moderating role of bank competition

This research investigates the effect of the separation between firm ownership and control on the cost of debt, with attention to the moderating role of state ownership and bank competition. We make use of a sample of 1744 Chinese A-share firms for the years 2011–2017. We find that separation between ownership and control is positively associated with the cost of debt. This is consistent with the view that separation of control from ownership allows controlling shareholders to engage in tunneling and other behaviors that increase the risk of default. State ownership weakens this positive link because government debt guarantees mitigate the risk of default. Greater competition in the banking industry generally reduces the cost of debt for non-state enterprises while having no effect for state enterprises. At the same time, greater bank competition amplifies the positive effect of ownership and control separation on debt cost for non-state enterprises as banks must still cover the higher default risk. Finally, the global financial crisis raised the cost of debt for non-state enterprises but had no effect for state enterprises.