RISK MEASURES: RATIONALITY AND DIVERSIFICATION

When there is uncertainty about interest rates (typically due to either illiquidity or defaultability of zero coupon bonds) the cash‐additivity assumption on risk measures becomes problematic. When this assumption is weakened, to cash‐subadditivity for example, the equivalence between convexity and the diversification principle no longer holds. In fact, this principle only implies (and it is implied by) quasiconvexity. For this reason, in this paper quasiconvex risk measures are studied. We provide a dual characterization of quasiconvex cash‐subadditive risk measures and we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for their law invariance. As a byproduct, we obtain an alternative characterization of the actuarial mean value premium principle.     

DEFAULT AND SYSTEMIC RISK IN EQUILIBRIUM

We develop a finite horizon continuous time market model, where risk‐averse investors maximize utility from terminal wealth by dynamically investing in a risk‐free money market account, a stock, and a defaultable bond, whose prices are determined via equilibrium. We analyze the endogenous interaction arising between the stock and the defaultable bond via the interplay between equilibrium behavior of investors, risk preferences and cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We find that the equilibrium price of the stock experiences a jump at default, despite that the default event has no causal impact on the underlying economic fundamentals. We characterize the direction of the jump in terms of a relation between investor preferences and the cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We conduct a similar analysis for the market price of risk and for the investor wealth process, and determine how heterogeneity of preferences affects the exposure to default carried by different investors.     

DEFAULT RISK INSURANCE AND INCOMPLETE MARKETS1

This paper uses the existence of secondary markets for debt instruments with default risk (e.g. corporate bonds) to define default insurance along the lines of financial economics. It examines whether, in the case of several risk-neutral measures, characteristics of default can be uniquely determined by the prices of contracts involving default-prone securities.     

OPTIMAL CAPITAL AND RISK TRANSFERS FOR GROUP DIVERSIFICATION

Diversification is at the core of insurance and other financial business. It constitutes an important issue in the preparation of the new Solvency II framework for the regulation of European insurance undertakings. In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for a legally enforceable capital and risk transfer which optimally accounts for the designated group diversification benefits. We also provide a consistent valuation principle which is compatible with any prior valuation method. This makes our framework fully flexible and universally applicable. A first simple numerical example illustrates the practicability of our proposal.     

INCORPORATING RISK AND AMBIGUITY AVERSION INTO A HYBRID MODEL OF DEFAULT

It is well known that purely structural models of default cannot explain short‐term credit spreads, while purely intensity‐based models lead to completely unpredictable default events. Here we introduce a hybrid model of default, in which a firm enters a “distressed” state once its nontradable credit worthiness index hits a critical level. The distressed firm then defaults upon the next arrival of a Poisson process. To value defaultable bonds and credit default swaps (CDSs), we introduce the concept of robust indifference pricing. This paradigm incorporates both risk aversion and model uncertainty. In robust indifference pricing, the optimization problem is modified to include optimizing over a set of candidate measures, in addition to optimizing over trading strategies, subject to a measure dependent penalty. Using our model and valuation framework, we derive analytical solutions for bond yields and CDS spreads, and find that while ambiguity aversion plays a similar role to risk aversion, it also has distinct effects. In particular, ambiguity aversion allows for significant short‐term spreads.     

ON SURRENDER AND DEFAULT RISKS

This paper examines certain types of saving institutions or insurance companies that are subject to surrender and default risks, in a stochastic interest rate context. In the setting under study, investors are endowed with an option to surrender. The goal of the paper is to study how this option impacts the default risk of the issuing company and the value of the contracts it issues. Surrender risk has been extensively studied in arbitrated markets, using trees or least‐squares Monte Carlo methods for valuations, although practitioners often rely on econometric methods. We deal with surrender risk in a third way, assuming policyholders have sets of information and preferences that differ from those of financial market agents, but without relying on econometric methods. In particular, policyholders are supposed to be only partially rational (at least in the financial sense). This is done by modeling surrender risk through a Cox process correlated to the assets and interest rate dynamics. The paper provides formulas for the dynamics of the assets of the issuing firm (these dynamics drive the default time of the company), and for the valuation of liabilities and equity. A numerical illustration is provided.     

OPTIMAL INVESTMENT IN CREDIT DERIVATIVES PORTFOLIO UNDER CONTAGION RISK

We consider the optimal portfolio problem of a power investor who wishes to allocate her wealth between several credit default swaps (CDSs) and a money market account. We model contagion risk among the reference entities in the portfolio using a reduced‐form Markovian model with interacting default intensities. Using the dynamic programming principle, we establish a lattice dependence structure between the Hamilton‐Jacobi‐Bellman equations associated with the default states of the portfolio. We show existence and uniqueness of a classical solution to each equation and characterize them in terms of solutions to inhomogeneous Bernoulli type ordinary differential equations. We provide a precise characterization for the directionality of the CDS investment strategy and perform a numerical analysis to assess the impact of default contagion. We find that the increased intensity triggered by default of a very risky entity strongly impacts size and directionality of the investor strategy. Such findings outline the key role played by default contagion when investing in portfolios subject to multiple sources of default risk.     

ARBITRAGE‐FREE BILATERAL COUNTERPARTY RISK VALUATION UNDER COLLATERALIZATION AND APPLICATION TO CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS

We develop an arbitrage‐free valuation framework for bilateral counterparty risk, where collateral is included with possible rehypothecation. We show that the adjustment is given by the sum of two option payoff terms, where each term depends on the netted exposure, i.e., the difference between the on‐default exposure and the predefault collateral account. We then specialize our analysis to credit default swaps (CDS) as underlying portfolios, and construct a numerical scheme to evaluate the adjustment under a doubly stochastic default framework. In particular, we show that for CDS contracts a perfect collateralization cannot be achieved, even under continuous collateralization, if the reference entity’s and counterparty’s default times are dependent. The impact of rehypothecation, collateral margining frequency, and default correlation‐induced contagion is illustrated with numerical examples.     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONSTANT RELATIVE RISK AVERSION AND VASICEK INTEREST RATES1

We consider a pure exchange economy consisting of a single risky asset whose dividend drift rate is modeled as an Omstein-Uhlenbeck process, and a representative agent with power-utility who, in equilibrium, consumes the dividend paid by the risky asset. Endogenously determined interest rates are found to be of the Vasicek (1977) type the mean and variance of the equilibrium stock price are stochastic and have mean-reverting components A closed-form solution for a standard call option is determined for the case of log-utility. Equilibrium values have interesting implications for the equity premium puzzle observed by Mehra and Prescott (1985)     

CREDIT SPREADS, OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND IMPLIED VOLATILITY WITH ENDOGENOUS DEFAULT AND JUMP RISK

We propose a two-sided jump model for credit risk by extending the Leland–Toft endogenous default model based on the geometric Brownian motion. The model shows that jump risk and endogenous default can have significant impacts on credit spreads, optimal capital structure, and implied volatility of equity options: (1) Jumps and endogenous default can produce a variety of non-zero credit spreads, including upward, humped, and downward shapes; interesting enough, the model can even produce, consistent with empirical findings, upward credit spreads for speculative grade bonds. (2) The jump risk leads to much lower optimal debt/equity ratio; in fact, with jump risk, highly risky firms tend to have very little debt. (3) The two-sided jumps lead to a variety of shapes for the implied volatility of equity options, even for long maturity options; although in general credit spreads and implied volatility tend to move in the same direction under exogenous default models, this may not be true in presence of endogenous default and jumps. Pricing formulae of credit default swaps and equity default swaps are also given. In terms of mathematical contribution, we give a proof of a version of the "smooth fitting" principle under the jump model, justifying a conjecture first suggested by Leland and Toft under the Brownian model.     

ARBITRAGE AND FREE LUNCH WITH BOUNDED RISK FOR UNBOUNDED CONTINUOUS PROCESSES

We give two examples showing that for unbounded continuous price processes, the no-free-lunch assumption and the existence of an equivalent martingale measure are not equivalent. In fact it turns out that the notion of an equivalent local martingale measure is natural in this context.     

我国商业银行核心竞争力理论与实证浅析

在我国加入WTO后,伴随着向外资银行全面开放日期的日益临近,我国银行业将面临严峻的考验。如何在激烈的竞争中求得生存,是我国各商业银行必须正视的问题。我国商业银行要想在竞争中取胜,首先必须提高自身的核心竞争力。本文对我国商业银行的核心竞争力从理论和实证上进行了分析,并对如何提高我国商业银行核心竞争力提出了建议。     

利率市场化的潜在风险与策略选择

利率市场化并非全部自由化 ,我国利率市场化面临较大的潜在风险 ,应选择渐进式的改革模式 ,在步骤上应重点突破 ,循序渐进。     

BILATERAL COUNTERPARTY RISK UNDER FUNDING CONSTRAINTS—PART I: PRICING

This and the follow‐up paper deal with the valuation and hedging of bilateral counterparty risk on over‐the‐counter derivatives. Our study is done in a multiple‐curve setup reflecting the various funding constraints (or costs) involved, allowing one to investigate the question of interaction between bilateral counterparty risk and funding. The first task is to define a suitable notion of no arbitrage price in the presence of various funding costs. This is the object of this paper, where we develop an “additive, multiple curve” extension of the classical “multiplicative (discounted), one curve” risk‐neutral pricing approach. We derive the dynamic hedging interpretation of such an “additive risk‐neutral” price, starting by consistency with pricing by replication in the case of a complete market. This is illustrated by a completely solved example building over previous work by Burgard and Kjaer.     

GREED,LEVERAGE, AND POTENTIAL LOSSES: A PROSPECT THEORY PERSPECTIVE

This paper quantifies the notion of greed, and explores its connection with leverage and potential losses, in the context of a continuous‐time behavioral portfolio choice model under (cumulative) prospect theory. We argue that the reference point can serve as the critical parameter in defining greed. An asymptotic analysis on optimal trading behaviors when the pricing kernel is lognormal and the S‐shaped utility function is a two‐piece CRRA shows that both the level of leverage and the magnitude of potential losses will grow unbounded if the greed grows uncontrolled. However, the probability of ending with gains does not diminish to zero even as the greed approaches infinity. This explains why a sufficiently greedy behavioral agent, despite the risk of catastrophic losses, is still willing to gamble on potential gains because they have a positive probability of occurrence whereas the corresponding rewards are huge. As a result, an effective way to contain human greed, from a regulatory point of view, is to impose a priori bounds on leverage and/or potential losses.     

A STRUCTURAL RISK‐NEUTRAL MODEL FOR PRICING AND HEDGING POWER DERIVATIVES

We develop a structural risk‐neutral model for energy market modifying along several directions the approach introduced in Aïd et al. In particular, a scarcity function is introduced to allow important deviations of the spot price from the marginal fuel price, producing price spikes. We focus on pricing and hedging electricity derivatives. The hedging instruments are forward contracts on fuels and electricity. The presence of production capacities and electricity demand makes such a market incomplete. We follow a local risk minimization approach to price and hedge energy derivatives. Despite the richness of information included in the spot model, we obtain closed‐form formulae for futures prices and semiexplicit formulae for spread options and European options on electricity forward contracts. An analysis of the electricity price risk premium is provided showing the contribution of demand and capacity to the futures prices. We show that when far from delivery, electricity futures behave like a basket of futures on fuels.     

A NONZERO‐SUM GAME APPROACH TO CONVERTIBLE BONDS: TAX BENEFIT,BANKRUPTCY COST,AND EARLY/LATE CALLS

Convertible bonds are hybrid securities that embody the characteristics of both straight bonds and equities. The conflicts of interest between bondholders and shareholders affect the security prices significantly. In this paper, we investigate how to use a nonzero‐sum game framework to model the interaction between bondholders and shareholders and to evaluate the bond accordingly. Mathematically, this problem can be reduced to a system of variational inequalities and we explicitly derive the Nash equilibrium to the game. Our model shows that credit risk and tax benefit have considerable impacts on the optimal strategies of both parties. The shareholder may issue a call when the debt is in‐the‐money or out‐of‐the‐money. This is consistent with the empirical findings of “late and early calls.” In addition, the optimal call policy under our model offers an explanation for certain stylized patterns related to the returns of company assets and stocks on call.