Option introduction and insider trading in the NASDAQ/NMS equity market

This paper investigates and supports the hypothesis that insiders have an incentive to shift their informed trading activities when options initially are listed for a firm. Firm size is found to be related to the level of insider trading activity. There is a significant decrease in insider equity-market volume for the smallest third of firms, a significant increase in insider-equity market volume for the middle third of firms, and a significant decrease in insider equity-market volume for the largest third of firms. This supports the hypothesis of a difference in the degree of impact on equity volume upon option introduction based upon firm size. This research provides additional evidence of informed trading activities when option introduction, insider trading, and firm size are considered simultaneously.     

Corporatisation and Corporate Governance in China's Economic Transition

China has sought to improve enterprise performance not through privatisation as in other transition economies, but through corporatisation as means of improving corporate governance. Actual governance practices of corporatised Chinese firms are however seriously defective, characterized by excessive power of CEOs, insider control and collusion, lack of safeguards for minority shareholders and weak transparency. These shortcomings are attributable to factors such as cultural and political traditions, uncompetitiveness of markets, poor legal enforcement, weak debt and equity markets, but above all to continued state dominance in ownership and control of the corporate sector and listed companies. Corporatisation, nevertheless, has created a regime conducive to implementing measures for improving corporate governance.     

Insider trading and performance of seasoned equity offering firms after controlling for exogenous trading needs

Insiders trade not only because they have private information about their companies but also because of other exogenous reasons. Therefore, it is important to control for exogenous trading needs in empirical studies regarding insider trading. Lee (1997) shows that insider trading is not closely related to the long-term performance of primary seasoned equity offering firms. This paper examines whether the results hold after controlling for exogenous needs to trade by using an inequality test with instrumental-variables technique.     

Insider ownership and firm performance in Taiwan's electronics industry: a technical efficiency perspective

This paper applies agency theory to explore the relationship between insider stock ownership and firm performance, particularly in terms of technical efficiency. Insiders are further classified into executives, outside directors, and large shareholders to conduct a detailed study. Six‐year (1996–2001) panel data of 416 Taiwanese listed electronics firms are examined by the stochastic production frontier approach. It is observed that raising the executive‐to‐insider holding ratio first causes a decrease and then an increase in technical efficiency, forming a U‐shaped relationship. However, the board‐to‐insider holding ratio is negatively associated with technical efficiency. The results indicate that equity ownership of top officers in high‐tech firms should be encouraged to enhance firm productivity. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of corporate antitakeover provisions on long-term investment: empirical evidence

This paper's empirical results indicate that the average effect of antitakeover provisions on subsequent long‒term investment is negative. The interpretation of these results depends on whether one thinks that there was too much, too little, or just the right amount of long‒term investment prior to the antitakeover provision adoption. We use agency theory to devise more refined empirical tests of the effects of antitakeover provision adoption by managers in firms with different incentive and monitoring structures. Governance variables (e.g. percentage of outsiders on corporate boards, and separate CEO/chairperson positions) have an insignificant impact on subsequent long‒term investment behavior. However, consistent with agency theory predictions, managers in firms with better economic incentives (higher insider ownership) tend to cut subsequent long‒term investment less than managers in firms with less incentive alignment. Furthermore, managers in firms with greater external monitoring (due to higher institutional ownership) also tend to cut subsequent long‒term investment less than managers in firms with less external monitoring. Thus, the decrease in subsequent long‒term investment is significantly less for firms where the managers have greater incentives to act in shareholders' interests. Finally, there are interesting effects of the control variables. First, high book equity/market equity firms cut total long‒term investment more. Second, firms that were takeover targets or rumored to be takeover targets cut long‒term investment more. These results suggest that inefficient firms cut long‒term investment more when an antitakeover provision is adopted. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership structure and post-issue operating performance of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings in Thailand

This paper investigates the post-issue operating performance of companies that conducted seasoned equity offerings (SEO) in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) during the period 1991 to 1994. It is documented that SEO firms exhibited declining operating performance after the offering. Further, there is a negative relation between inside ownership concentration and postissue operating performance decline. In support of the signaling effect, the ratio of issue proceeds to pre-issue equity also negatively relates to post-issue operating performance. Further, the negative relation between issue proceeds and operating performance decline is intensified among SEO firms with high insider ownership concentration. The finding offers evidence in support of agency conflicts and information asymmetry and suggests that the two factors are operating simultaneously.     

Insider Trading, Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms

We document positive association between earnings management and insider selling after the fiscal year‐end for Hong Kong firms. This positive association is especially evident before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Our findings suggest that Hong Kong executives manage reported earnings to maximize their private benefits from insider selling. Additionally, we find that a higher proportion of independent directors (INED) on corporate boards moderate the positive association between insider selling and earnings management. Stricter monitoring of earnings management by INED is especially evident when no member of the family with majority ownership is present on corporate boards as a director. This suggests that the presence of family members with majority ownership on corporate boards significantly reduces INED's monitoring effectiveness. Our findings suggest that strict regulations are needed to control insider trading, and independence of corporate boards is important for monitoring of earnings management associated with insider trading. Furthermore, appointment of family members with majority shareholdings should be avoided to enhance independence and to monitor effectiveness of corporate boards.     

Insider econometrics: A roadmap with stops along the way

For the past twenty five years, economists have been building theories of the optimal management of firms. For example, economic models suggest that under some conditions, piece rate pay raises performance, and under other conditions, promotions tournaments raise performance. Some of these theories have been tested, others have not. Economists are now using new empirical research tools, that we label “insider econometrics,” to test the impact of management practices on productivity: to model how much productivity changes; to model why management practices raise productivity; and to examine which firms benefit and why from alternative management practices. The methodology we describe is “insider” because it uses inside knowledge and data from within firms. It is “econometrics” because the methodology is often the application of treatment effects methods to modeling changing management practices within firms. However, the methods and challenges of insider econometrics are unique, and we identify several key features that are important in undertaking empirical studies of workers' productivity. Now that more firms are keeping data on employees, it is time to improve our analysis of the empirical study of the productivity of workers within firms.     

Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis

The paper investigates the relationships among CEO incentive contracts, manager ownership, charter value, and bank risk taking. We analyze whether the presence and magnitude of incentive contracts induce CEOs of financially distressed firms and firms with high manager ownership to take unprofitable risks that shift wealth from debtholders to equity holders. Our sample focuses on banks that had both the incentive and opportunity to shift risks, and compares them with those that did not. We compare weak and strong banks in periods when the banks’ principal creditor, the FDIC, was a lenient and then a stringent monitor. The evidence is consistent with bonus compensation inducing CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debtholders only if they do not have large insider ownership. The evidence is also consistent with these contracts rewarding CEOs for their effort to manage unforeseeable risk albeit not their ability. Low charter value banks with high managerial ownership took profitable risk during the lenient regulatory period.     

国有股权参股与家族企业全要素生产率

家族企业在我国经济中占有相当大的比重,如何有效提升家族企业全要素生产率受到了社会各界的广泛关注.本文以2014～2019年沪深A股上市家族企业为研究样本,探究了国有股权参股家族企业对其全要素生产率的影响.研究发现,国有股权参股有利于提升家族企业全要素生产率,且主要通过缓解融资约束、增加创新投入、提高治理水平这三条路径作...     

An investigation of causality between insider transactions and stock returns

Prior research shows that corporate insiders engage in profitable transactions by trading securities of their own firms. The main purpose of this study is to examine whether insider transactions and stock returns have causality relationships at the firm level for a sample of 2,521 firms during the period 1988 to 1998. We find a large impact of stock returns on subsequent insider transactions at both the aggregate and firm levels. The impact appears to be negative which suggests that insiders buy after stock price decreases and sell after stock price increases. Our findings on the predictive content of insider transactions for subsequent stock returns are primarily consistent with prior literature. We observe a positive but weak relationship between insider transactions and future stock returns.     

Templates for financial control? Management and employees under the private equity business model

The term ‘private equity business model’ (PEBM) refers to private equity investors that delist publicly quoted firms, managing them as private equity‐controlled portfolio firms. But how and in what form do these investors diffuse a preferred template for the PEBM in portfolio firms? Is diffusion codified, institutionalised or merely tacit? What is the difference between these forms of diffusion? As a method of financial control, how is diffusion evident for managers and workers? Theoretically, while ‘financialisation’ is a contemporary pressure on the British economy, there is a ‘disconnection’ between competitive pressures for financialisation and the diffusion of practices to manage these pressures in portfolio firms. Forty‐two interviews in eight portfolio firms and five associated private equity firms concludes that potentially transformative and decisive restructuring for managers and workers is more evident than a defined template.     

企业股权结构与股权转让效率——以中国大陆A股上市公司为例

通过对中国大陆A股上市公司股权转让数据的分析表明,企业股权转让更容易发生在股权较为分散的公司中,但是股权转让后的企业效率并没有明显的改善,公司控制权的转移往往对企业绩效产生负面的影响。由此可见,通过鼓励企业股权结构分散化并对控制权私人收益加以必要的管制,对提高股权转让的效率将起到非常重要的作用。     

Determinants and Consequences of a Voluntary Turn Away from IFRS to Local GAAP: Evidence from Switzerland

Abstract

We examine determinants and consequences of a turn away from International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), thereby exploiting a unique feature of the Swiss setting in which listed firms are allowed to switch from IFRS to Swiss GAAP, all else being equal. We posit that net benefits of IFRS are less for small firms with higher insider ownership. In addition, we predict that the net benefits of IFRS are not constant over time because of changes in IFRS and/or changes in firm-specific circumstances. To the extent that the switching firms’ costs of IFRS reporting outweigh its benefits, we do not predict adverse capital-market effects after a switch. Consistent with predictions, we find that (a) small firms with higher insider ownership and fewer foreign investor holdings are more likely to switch, (b) increasing reporting costs as well as changes in firm-specific circumstances affect switching propensity, (c) switching firms substantially reduce their disclosures after they switch, and (d) switching firms neither experience a decrease in liquidity nor negative announcement returns. Overall, our findings are important for standard setters and securities regulators in shaping (future) reporting requirements for listed firms.     

Do Managers Trade on Public or Private Information? Evidence from Fundamental Valuations

Using accounting-based (residual income) valuations, this study examines the extent to which abnormal returns after insider share trades are explained by private information versus mispricing of public information. For a sample of insider trades in the Netherlands (1999–2008), I find that managers' share purchase decisions are associated with positive future abnormal returns as well as equity undervaluation. Even though undervaluation results in predictable price increases, positive abnormal returns following purchases persist after controlling for fundamental valuations. Thus, this study provides evidence on the sources of managers' personal trading gains and suggests that positive abnormal returns after insider share purchases reflect both private information and managers' responses to market mispricing of public information.     

How agglomeration affects alliance governance and innovation performance: The role of cluster size

We investigate how the size of the geographic cluster in which a firm is located influences its governance choice between equity and non-equity alliances and subsequent innovation performance. We argue that firms located in larger clusters tend to form non-equity alliances rather than equity alliances because the communication and control benefits of cluster membership, which increase with cluster size, reduce in-cluster firms' need to form equity alliances. We also claim that the effect of this preferential use of non-equity alliances on innovation becomes stronger when firms are located in larger clusters. Our arguments are supported by a panel analysis of alliances formed by US-listed semiconductor firms.     

Privatisation,corporate control and employment growth: Evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996–2002

Using data on Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change. Privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth; in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Being privatised has a positive impact on employment but this is concentrated within a range of 3–6 years after privatisation. There are no systematic differences in employment response to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. Employment in state firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these results we infer that the behaviour of state firms is affected by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints.     

The consequences of private equity acquisitions for employees: new evidence on the impact on wages,employment and productivity

There is growing controversy on the HR consequences of private equity acquisitions, especially when the existing management team is replaced. Much of the debate thus far has centred on the use of limited panels of case studies and industry surveys. This article, in contrast, uses both in‐depth interviews with relevant stakeholders and objective company data to compare firms subject to private equity acquisitions against a control group of non‐acquired firms. Our interviews provide insights into key issues that are investigated in the subsequent empirical analysis. Our core findings are that firms subject to a specific type of private equity acquisition – institutional buyouts – are associated with job losses, lower wages and lower productivity. This evidence is consistent with the notion that this type of private equity acquisition has negative employment consequences without any corresponding improvement in productivity.     

Largest shareholder and dividend policy around the world

This paper examines the interaction between the largest shareholder and dividend policy in a sample of 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 countries. We find that firms are more likely to pay dividends when profitability is high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited or when the largest shareholder is not an insider. Further, the magnitude of dividend payout tends to be smaller when the largest shareholder is either an insider or a financial institution. It is also apparent that largest shareholding and dividend payout are related and that, consistent with the extant literature, legal system does matter in dividend policy decisions.     

Determinants of the stock price reaction to leveraged buyouts

This paper investigates the determinants of leveraged buyout activity through the use of an abnormal return premium from the time of the first announcement through the final trading day. Consistent with the free. cash flow theory, firms with either high free cash flow or low Tobin’s q have higher abnormal returns. However, the returns to firms with both high free cash flow and low Tobin’s q are lower than firms with just one of these characteristics. Firms which substantially increase leverage and management buyouts with high insider ownership prior to the buyout have lower abnormal returns. Firms with lower risk, and therefore greater debt capacity, have higher abnormal returns.