Bank liquidity risk and monetary policy. Empirical evidence on the impact of Basel III liquidity standards

We extend the literature on the bank lending channel in two aspects. First, rather than following the literature by analyzing the impact of banks’ liquidity (measured via their asset portfolio) on monetary policy transmission, we study the role of banks’ actual liquidity risk, as measured by the Basel III liquidity regulations. Second, we investigate the effect of complying with the Basel III liquidity standards on monetary policy transmission. We use highly detailed bank-level data from Luxembourg for the period 2003q1--2010q4. Our findings are that monetary policy transmission works its way through small banks that also have a large maturity mismatch, as measured by the Net Stable Funding Ratio. In contrast, large banks with a small maturity mismatch increase their lending following a monetary policy shock, which confirms existing results that Luxembourg’s banks are liquidity providers to the European market. Based upon in-sample predictions and upon simulated data from an optimization model that takes the banks’ business models into account, we conclude that the bank lending channel will no longer be effective once banks adhere to the new Basel III liquidity regulations.     

银行顺周期性文献述评

本文对国内外有关银行顺周期性的文献进行了初步梳理。银行顺周期性在2008年国际金融危机后引起了广泛关注,对其发生机理,学术界从不同视角进行了解读。现行的监管体系由于更多地关注银行机构微观层次的稳健性而对宏观层面的风险关注不够。虽然最新的巴塞尔资本协议进行了有针对性地改进,但其实际效果如何仍有待检验。目前,对银行顺周期的讨论仍存在分歧,有待进行更深层次的研究。     

Study on the Capital Regulatory Reform and Capital Adequacy Ratio——Analysis on Listed Commercial Bank in China Based on Basel Ⅲ

根据巴塞尔国际银行资本监管原则的发展进行跟进式研究,一直是中国银行业监管发展过程中的一个重要领域.本文对巴塞尔协议资本监管的历史演进与巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的资本监管改革进行归纳,在此基础上分析了我国商业银行的资本充足率.按照巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的扣除项要求,以我国上市商业银行为样本对资本充足率进行了重新测算.研究表明:尽管当前我国上市商业银行有一半已经达到了巴塞尔协议Ⅲ一级资本充足率的要求,但是长期内面临资本补充压力.文章最后提出相关对策建议.     

Bank intermediation activity in a low-interest-rate environment

This paper investigates how a prolonged period of low-interest rates affects bank intermediation activity. We use data for 113 large international banks headquartered in 14 major advanced economies during the period 1994–2015. We find that low-interest rates induce banks to shift their activities from interest-generating to fee-related and trading activities. This rebalancing is stronger for low capitalised banks. Banks also moderately adjust their funding structure, away from short-term market funding towards deposits. We observe a concomitant decline in the risk-weighted asset ratio and a reduction in loan-loss provisions, which is consistent with signs of evergreening.     

The dynamic of bank lending channel: Basel regulatory constraint

This article analyzes the impact of monetary policy on bank behavior under the Basel I regulatory framework using a dynamic model with monopolistic competition. There are two main objectives. First, we theoretically predict the dynamic model of bank lending channels under the Basel I regulatory constraint. Second, we empirically analyze the situation in Malaysia by using panel data on 23 commercial banks in the period of 1999 to 2007 by using General Method of Moments. The empirical results show that market rates on loans and policy rates are important influences on average rates of banks' loans. This has an implication that Malaysian banks have the power to set their own prices on loans as they are influenced by the change in the market rate and policy rate. We also have proven that the previous period of spread risk weighted loans and securities is statistically significant and correlated with the average loan rate, whereas risk weighted securities is also statistically significant and correlated with the average time deposit rate in both periods. This shows that the role of risk-weighted assets under the Basel I is important in influencing the optimal rates on loans and time deposits.     

金融危机对巴塞尔新资本协议和商业银行风险管理的挑战

正在影响着世界的金融危机,在考验商业银行自身的风险管理能力的同时,也挑战了全球银行业赖以为标准的巴塞尔新资本协议。本文旨在从危机爆发的原因出发,封新资本协议关于银行的风险管理方面的规定进行分析,以及在金融全球化的大环境下,中国的银行业应该如何应对危机。     

论商业银行全面风险管理体系的构建

理论研究和实践经验均表明银行建立全面风险管理体系已是时代发展的必然趋势.本文在剖析全面风险管理的内涵和解读<新巴塞尔协议>对银行业风险管理影响的基础上,针对我国商业银行风险管理中存在的风险管理流程不规范、治理结构不健全等问题,提出规范全面风险管理流程,营造适宜外部环境,完善公司治理,加强内部基础设施建设等构建全面风险管理体系的思路.     

HOW DOES FOREIGN BANK OWNERSHIP IN THE BANKING SECTOR AFFECT DOMESTIC BANK BEHAVIOUR? A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how foreign bank ownership in the banking sector affects domestic bank behaviour and whether this relationship depends on the economic and financial conditions of the host country. This paper contains 795 individual banks in 39 countries covering the period 1999–2006. Foreign ownership is calculated using bank level data as a proxy for the degree of foreign bank ownership in the banking sector. First, we find that foreign bank ownership is associated with a decrease in both the profitability and overhead expenses of the domestic bank after applying the system panel Generalized Method of Moments model. Second, a lower level of economic development of the host country enhances the positive effects of foreign bank ownership on the income, profit and cost of domestic banks. Third, financial development plays an important role in determining the effect of foreign bank ownership. Fourth, while the use of aggregate foreign ownership data may provide us with a big picture, it may not explain why individual banks in the same country perform differently, which this study will answer.     

Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

REFORMING BANK CAPITAL REGULATION: USING SUBORDINATED DEBT TO ENHANCE MARKET AND SUPERVISORY DISCIPLINE

In 1988 the Basel Capital Accord introduced minimum risk-weighted capital requirements for internationally active banks. In recent years there has been a growing realization that there are significant problems with the capital guidelines. As financial firms have become more sophisticated and complex they have effectively arbitraged the requirements and have become so good at it that the regulations have essentially ceased being a safety and soundness issue for supervisors and have become more of a compliance issue. Indeed, the Basel Committee is now evaluating reforms to the capital accord and is considering various means to improve the risk-capital relationship and to increase the role of market discipline. The authors argue that many of the problems that currently exist can be addressed, and some additional benefits not previously possible under the current capital guidelines can be realized, by increasing the role of subordinated debt in the bank capital structure. The authors discuss the potential benefits and offer a capital reform proposal that would improve both market and supervisory oversight. This should lead to more prudent risk management behavior by the larger, more complex banking organizations, resulting in a safer industry with less potential for systemic problems.     

Earnings management behaviors under different economic environments: Evidence from Japanese banks

This paper investigates Japanese banks' earnings management behavior under three distinct economic environments: (1) high-growth with asset price bubble economy (1985–1990); (2) stagnant growth with financial distress economy (1991–1996); and (3) severe recession with credit crunch economy (1997–1999). Using bank balance sheet information of 78 Japanese banks, we find that earnings management behavior by Japanese banks differ considerably across the three periods. Our results indicate that banks used security gains as a means to manage earnings throughout all three periods. We also find that banks used loan loss provisions to manage earnings; however, this behavior is only prevalent during the first two periods. Due to the fact that banks faced record-high non-performing loans during the latter severe recession period, banks on average may have been restrained from using loan loss provisions to smooth income and/or to replenish regulatory capital. Consistent with previous studies, we find that the Japanese banks significantly lowered their lending with increased provisions.     

Leverage Ratio and Central Bank Operations in the Euro Area

Using estimates of the Basel III leverage ratio (LR), we show that banks in the euro area were largely in compliance with the preliminary 3 per cent threshold already in 2013 and that they continued improving their ratio up to an average of 4.7 per cent in 2016. Contrary to predictions that the new requirement might interfere with the implementation of monetary policy, the evidence shows that, in a context of extraordinary monetary policy stimulus, this conflict has not materialized. First, the LR discourages participation in central bank refinancing operations only to a very limited extent and for a specific category of banks. Second, the surge in central bank reserves created by the Asset Purchase Programme has not prompted banks to deleverage by reducing other asset classes. Finally, although banks' balance sheets report a decrease in outstanding repos and reverse repos, the overall activity outside reporting dates does not seem to have decreased as much.     

Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord - banks’ choice of loan rating system

Summary. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is proposing to introduce, in 2006, new risk-based requirements for internationally active (and other significant) banks. These will replace the relatively risk-invariant requirements in the current Accord. The new requirements for the largest bank will be based on bank ratings of the probability of default of the borrowers. There is evidence that the choice of loan ratings which are conditional on the point in the economic cycle could lead to sharp increases in capital requirements in recessions. This makes the question of which rating schemes banks will use very important. The paper uses a general equilibrium model of the financial system to explore whether banks would choose to use a countercyclical, procyclical or neutral rating scheme. The results indicate that banks would not choose a stable rating approach, which has important policy implications for the design of the Accord. It makes it important that banks are given incentives to adopt more stable rating schemes. This consideration has been reflected in the Committees latest proposals, in October 2002.Received: 25 October 2003, Revised: 27 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D58, E44, G28. Correspondence to: Dimitrios P. TsomocosThe authors are grateful to Pamela Nickell for carrying out some of the calculations and Nicola Anderson, Charles Goodhart, Andy Haldane, Glenn Hoggarth, Nobu Kiyotaki, William Klein, Alistair Milne, William Perraudin, Hyun Shin, Paul Tucker, seminar participants at the Bank of England XI European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, INSEAD, LSE, the University of Oxford and especially H.M. Polemarchakis for helpful comments and remarks. However, all remaining errors are ours. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England, and the Bank of Spain.     

统计测量法在商业银行操作风险管理中的运用

本文通过几年的摸索与实践,运用计量统计学原理和风险管理理念,尝试说明如何通过对商业银行上万家分支机构操作风险事件的抽样调查统计分析,在解决巴塞尔银行监管委员会(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision)有关操作风险高级计量法中数据不足问题的同时,推论出商业银行整体风险状况,并从中得出对企业集团层面系统性风险分析结论的方法,既解决了巴塞尔委员会操作风险高级计量法与商业银行操作风险管理暨内部控制脱节的问题,又弥补了内审理论中未能向检查人员提供如何从若干个点的问题推导出系统性总体结论的缺陷。     

Capital requirements and business cycles with credit market imperfections

The business cycle effects of bank capital regulatory regimes are examined in a New Keynesian model with credit market imperfections and a cost channel of monetary policy. Bank capital increases incentives for banks to monitor borrowers, thereby raising the repayment probability, and excess capital generates benefits in terms of reduced regulatory scrutiny. Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined, and the model is calibrated for a middle-income country. Simulations of a supply shock show that, depending on the elasticity that relates the repayment probability to the bank capital–loan ratio, the Basel II regime may be less procyclical than a Basel I regime.     

Enforcing the 1988 Basel Capital Requirements: Did it Curtail Bank Credit in Emerging Economies?

We examine whether the enforcement of bank capital asset requirements (CARs) curtailed the supply of credit in emerging economies. Preliminarily, we identify 16 emerging economies that – according to official and impartial reports – enforced the 1988 Basel standard during the 1990s. Then we perform our twofold econometric analysis. In the former part, we use macro data to test whether, controlling for economic fundamental variables, the enforcement brought about a slowdown in aggregate credit in these countries vis-a-vis other emerging economies. We find some support for our hypothesis. In the latter part, we employ individual bank data to better identify the 'capital crunch' effect of the enforcement. Here, we find that CAR enforcement – according to the 1988 Basel standard – significantly curtailed credit supply, particularly at less well-capitalized banks. The two empirical parts together suggest that the CAR enforcement did curtail aggregate credit in the examined emerging countries and that this result is rooted in the attempt by under-capitalized banks to reduce their loans. We argue that among developing countries – where banks are often the only source of financial intermediation – the positive effect of higher capital requirements, represented by the reduction of poor quality lending, may be offset by their negative impact on bank liquidity and on the level of economic activity. Hence, our results suggest that particular care is required to avoid potential negative macroeconomic effects when phasing in new and higher capital requirements in emerging economies.
(J.E.L.: G18, G21, G28)     

Ownership structure,size, and interest income substitution by banks: An exploratory study in the Indian context

This study explored how emerging economy banks are rebalancing their interest income and non-interest income to ensure stability. We set our study in India during the period 2005–2017. Interestingly, we observe that time–series correlation of interest income growth and non-interest income growth for public sector banks as well as for private banks is on the negative side. We applied panel vector auto regression and generalised method of moments methodology. This study found that when bank interest income falls, they try to increase their non-interest income to offset their losses to a certain extent, and the trend is increasing. Public sector banks are overall substituting non-interest income for a reduction in the margin, and there is an increasing trend for this substitution. Based on the size of banks, it has been found that change in non-interest income in the subsequent year due to change in interest income in the previous year is there for large banks, whereas no such significant change has been found in case of small banks.     

Bank lending and interest on excess reserves: An empirical investigation

This paper econometrically tests for effects on bank lending of the Federal Reserve’s policy of paying interest on excess reserves (IOER). Following the 2008 financial crisis, US banks decreased their loan allocations and increased holdings of excess reserves. A model of bank asset allocation shows that when the rate of IOER is higher than other short-term rates, banks will switch from zero excess reserves to a regime with higher excess reserves and lower lending. Using a sample of panel data on US banks from 2000 through 2018, we find evidence of a switch to a positive excess reserve regime in the post-crisis period. Controlling for market interest rates, loan demand, and economic activity, we find that IOER accounts for the majority of the decline in bank lending after the financial crisis.     

Bank size,competition and risk in the Turkish banking industry

This paper investigates the impact of bank size and competition on earnings volatility and insolvency risk using quarterly data for commercial banks operating in the Turkish banking industry for the period 2002Q1–2012Q2. The main result of the paper indicates that bank size and earnings volatility are negatively related, suggesting that larger banks are less risky. The results also indicate that competition measured by the Boone indicator increases earnings volatility. The results further suggest that higher capitalized banks, banks with a higher share of non-interest income in total income and efficient banks face lower earnings volatility. Finally, insolvency risk measured by Z-score and bank size are positively related, suggesting that larger banks are more stable.     

信用风险模型的新发展与商业银行风险管理

信用风险是商业银行面临的主要风险之一,其直接影响商业银行持续经营的能力。《新巴塞尔资本协议》鼓励商业银行在进行信用风险管理时更多地使用内部模型,这意味着建立有效的信用风险模型应成为商业银行的重要任务。中国银行业要健康、稳定地发展,需要借鉴西方信用风险模型,对风险进行科学管理。