On the Neutrality of Profit Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly

This paper investigates the neutrality of profit taxation in a mixed oligopoly where one (partially) public firm competes with private firms. We find that the neutrality of a profit tax is robust under a general cost and a general demand function as long as the degree of privatization is endogenously determined. This result is also true when product heterogeneity is considered under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. By contrast, if the degree of privatization is exogenously given, the profit tax neutrality holds only in the cases where the public firm is fully privatized or fully state-owned; otherwise, the neutrality breaks down.     

国际多市场寡头条件下的贸易政策和产业政策

国际多市场寡头是Bulow( 1 985)提出的多市场寡头概念在国际贸易领域的自然延伸。在本文中 ,市场之间联系的纽带是本国企业具有规模收益递减的生产技术。本文的主要结论是 ,第一 ,如果本国企业与外国企业在外国市场进行价格竞争 ,那么 ,最优干预组合包括国内生产补贴与出口税 ,它们对本国福利的作用是一致的。第二 ,如果本国企业与外国企业在外国市场进行数量竞争 ,那么 ,最优干预政策组合包括国内生产补贴与出口补贴 ,它们作用于本国福利的方向是不一致的 ,这时 ,本国政府用国内生产补贴执行反托拉斯职能 ,用出口补贴执行利润转移职能。第三 ,作为模型的一个应用 ,本文论证了出口退税政策会加剧国内市场的扭曲 ;而且它不一定能够提高本国福利。     

国有银行控股比例与管理授权——基于混合寡占模型的研究

本文结合中国银行业竞争日趋激烈的现实背景,从国有银行股份制改革和管理授权入手构建了银行业混合寡占、国有银行混合持股的两阶段古诺竞争模型,分析国有银行为达到既定目标如何选择国有控股比例及适当的管理激励合同。研究表明,国有银行会选择利润收益合同作为占优管理授权,而放弃相对表现激励合同;当国有银行将最大化社会福利作为目标时,国有银行成为市场垄断者,私有银行被挤出市场;仅在利润收益激励合同下,国有银行将最大化利润和消费者剩余之和作为目标。     

Merger profitability in mixed oligopoly

We analyse merger profitability in a mixed-oligopoy Cournot model. The “merger paradox” is qualified by showing that there are profitable gains for the firms participating in a horizontal merger that is not a merger to a monopoly. In particular, it is shown that merger sustainability depends on both, the privatization degree of the mixed firm and the number of non-merging firms.      

Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets

We investigate the optimal behavior of a public firm in a mixed market involving private firms and one public firm. Existing works show that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is suboptimal when the number of firms is given exogenously. We allow free entry of private firms and find that, in contrast to the case with the fixed number of firms, welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Furthermore, we find that mixed markets are better than pure markets involving no public firm if and only if the public firm earns nonnegative profits.     

Corrective Taxes under Oligopoly with Inter-Firm Externalities

Pollution externalities between polluters should be taken into account in the design of corrective taxes. When the externalities are substantial and/or the number of polluters is large, the effluent levies on these firms do not necessarily result in a deadweight loss. Consequently, the second-best tax exceeds the marginal social cost of pollution. A more general rule is that the tax rate should be greater than the marginal social cost of pollution if and only if a marginal increase in the tax rate results in opposite effects on the changes of equilibrium emission level and output.     

Partial Privatization in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly

A model of differentiated mixed oligopoly is developed to systematically discuss the welfare consequences of partial privatization of a public firm. We analytically derive the optimal degree of partial privatization not only in the short run with restricted entry but also in the long run with free entry. It is shown that the short-run optimal policy is non-monotonic in the degree of love of variety, while the optimal degree of privatization is monotonically increasing in the consumer's preference for variety in the long run.      

Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products

We determine optimal privatization in a symmetric differentiated duopoly when the public firms do not bear the full cost of production and hence their objective functions differ from the government’s objective function. In the social optimum firms will generally have mixed ownership, and it will depend on the type of uncovered cost, the degree of substitutability of the two products and the output decision rule of the partially public firms. Different types of mixed duopoly emerge, ranging from both firms being partially privatized, to one being fully privatized. We also derive an optimal tax-subsidy scheme as a substitute for privatization.      

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors: the Linear Demand Case

We introduce foreign private firms into the model of Pal (1998) and investigate the impact of the introduction of foreign private firms on the endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly in the linear demand case. We find that the public firm chooses to be a follower of all domestic private firms and that the public firm chooses not to be a leader of all foreign private firms, which is in contrast to Matsumura (2003).     

Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly

This paper explores the optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international duopolistic market. We show that when the government is able to control the environmental tax and the extent of privatization, the optimal environmental tax is lower than the standard Pigouvian level. We also show that the optimal level of privatization of state-owned enterprises is partial privatization. Further, the optimal level of privatization is inversely dependent on the cleanup cost of past environmental contamination.     

Can privatization be a catalyst for environmental R&D and result in a cleaner environment?

In this paper we explore whether privatization helps to catalyze a firm's environmental research and development (ER&D) and improve environmental quality. By defining ER&D as the effort undertaken by a firm to reduce its pollution per unit of output, we find in a duopoly framework that privatization cannot catalyze both public and private firms’ ER&D efforts simultaneously; it can increase one but decrease the other firm's investment, or it may even lower both firms’ ER&D investments. Moreover, when production causes severe environmental damage, or the imposition of environmental taxes poorly internalize the pollution externality, privatization may result in a poorer environment. For the sake of having a cleaner environment, policy-makers can impose higher environmental taxes on a highly polluting industry when it is being privatized.     

Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly

Consider an oligopolistic industry where firms have access to the same technology but are asymmetrically informed about the environment. Even though it is commonplace to think that in this context superior information leads to higher profits, we find that under Cournot competition this is not generally the case: It holds when firms' technology exhibits constant returns to scale, but it does not necessarily hold otherwise. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13.     

Piecemeal Multilateral Environmental Policy Reforms under Asymmetric Oligopoly

We develop a general two‐country model with oligopolistic interdependence in which a fixed number of firms make their output and emission decisions simultaneously. We examine the effect of multilateral reforms of emission taxes on global emission levels. With sufficient asymmetry in pollution intensities between the two countries, a proportional multilateral increase in emission tax rates can increase global emission levels. However, a multilateral equal increase of emission tax rates unambiguously reduces global emission levels. We also consider the case of free entry and exit of firms, and find a rule of multilateral reforms which unambiguously lowers total emission levels.     

Privatization and optimal share release in the Chinese banking industry

This paper establishes a mixed oligopoly model to explore how the government determines the percentage of shares of the state-owned banks to be released to foreign investors under the goal of seeking to maximize social welfare. The theoretical model finds that the release of shares of state-owned banks to foreign investors will reduce the outputs of the state-owned banks. The direction of the change in the profitability of the state-owned banks depends on the percentage of the shares released. The direction of the changes in the levels of social welfare also varies. If the gap in production efficiency between the state-owned banks and private banks is not large enough, we can be certain that a partial release of shares is the government's best policy.     

寡头垄断行为模型的统一：推测变量法

推测变量法是哈佛学派SCP范式的理论基础。本文利用推测变量法对一些典型寡头垄断模型进行了统一,本质地 揭示了这些模型的差异但是推测变量取值范围的不同,并指出在实际运用推测变量法中所应注意的问题。     

Bilateral Oligopoly,Private Information,and Pollution Permit Markets

We analyze the effects of strategic behavior and private information in pollution permit markets in which all firms have market power. The market is characterized by supply-function equilibria. Firms submit net supplies for permits and a market maker determines the market-clearing price. Net supplies depend on abatement cost functions, which in turn depend on private information parameters. We calculate the increase in aggregate abatement costs due to strategic behavior and private information and show that private information attenuates the effects of strategic behavior.      

中国环境税制现状、问题及对策研究

环境污染已经成为当今世界面临的共同问题,制约着经济的发展,威胁着人类的生存。实施环境税则是解决这一问题的有效措施之一。本文介绍了环境税的理论基础,分析了中国环境税制度现状及存在的问题,认为中国现行有关环境保护的税费政策,由于存在缺少以保护环境为目的的专门税种、现有涉及环保的税种中有关环保的规定不健全、考虑环境保护因素的税收优惠单一等问题,其力度和系统性不足以形成对环境的保护。并对中国环境税制度建设对策进行了探讨,提出了在将部分排污费改为环境污染税,征水污染税、二氧化硫税和垃圾税,使其成为中国环境税的主体税种的基础上,调整现行资源税和消费税,构建中国环境税收体系的对策。     

试论我国环境刑事政策

我国正在建设“资源节约型、环境友好型”社会。“两型”社会的建设目标就是保护环境和资源。这就需要我们运用各种手段,采取各种措施,加大保护环境资源的力度。政策手段是一个主要的调控杠杆,环境刑事政策作为运用刑法手段控制环境违法行为和惩治环境犯罪的策略和方针,近年来在环境资源保护方面发挥的作用越来越大。环境刑事政策既是刑事政策,也是环境政策,既是立法政策、司法政策,也是执行政策,理论上对环境刑事政策进行研究,可以指导决策机关制定符合“两型”社会建设需要的方略,进而更好地运用刑事手段保护环境和资源。     

Demand-Creating R&D in a Symmetric Oligopoly

Spillovers with demand-creating research and development (R&D) activities are investigated by revisiting a widely employed market share rivalry demand structure. Positive technological spillovers may inflict positive or negative side effects on rivals and this has important implications for the effects on innovative efforts of loose or tight R&D cooperation in symmetric oligopolies. A comparison with the effects that apply with linear demand structures and implications for empirical research are also touched upon.     

寡占市场下的广告成因探究

依照微观经济学和产业组织理论,高度集中产业市场中的寡头厂商往往会在价格变量上形成暗中或默契的价格串谋,使产业市场处在一种“准完全垄断”的状态。广告是企业主要的非价格竞争变量之一,重复博弈的结果使得寡头厂商能够走出囚徒困境(放弃产品的广告宣传),而垄断利润的存在导致第三方潜在进入的威胁,在位寡头厂商必然会联合起来进行抵制,通过广告串谋提高市场进入壁垒。