资本约束、风险管理与商业银行成长

基于资本必须覆盖风险命题的要求,银行的风险管理能力决定了银行的资本规模和资本的配置,银行资本管理实质上等价于风险管理,资本约束实质上就是风险约束。资本软约束是制约中国商业银行成长的主要障碍之一,但仅仅致力于资本充足率问题的解决并不能保证我国商业银行的可持续成长,风险约束是制约我国商业银行成长的瓶颈。只有从制度、技术和经营战略等方面入手,不断提高风险管理能力,建立以资本约束为核心的业务增长模式和资源配置方式,尽快实现成长模式由资金约束到资本约束的转变,中国商业银行才能在效益、质量和规模协调发展的基础上实现持续成长。     

资本约束、风险管理与商业银行成长

基于资本必须覆盖风险命题的要求，银行的风险管理能力决定了银行的资本规模和资本的配置，银行资本管理实质上等价于风险管理，资本约束实质上就是风险约束。资本软约束是制约中国商业银行成长的主要障碍之一，但仅仅致力于资本充足率问题的解决并不能保证我国商业银行的可持续成长，风险约束是制约我国商业银行成长的瓶颈。只有从制度、技术和经营战略等方面入手，不断提高风险管理能力，建立以资本约束为核心的业务增长模式和资源配置方式，尽快实现成长模式由资金约束到资本约束的转变，中国商业银行才能在效益、质量和规模协调发展的基础上实现持续成长。     

Corporate governance,SFAS 157 and cost of equity capital: evidence from US financial institutions

This study examines the association between fair value measurements and the cost of equity capital under different fair value valuation methods, and assesses the impact of corporate governance on this relationship for US financial firms. We find that firms’ cost of equity capital is negatively associated with more verifiable fair value assets and positively related to less verifiable fair value assets. Furthermore, the positive association between less verifiable fair value assets and the cost of equity capital is mitigated under better corporate governance. The differential impact between more and less verifiable assets becomes smaller for firms with stronger governance. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on fair value regulation by investigating the economic consequences of adopting Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (SFAS 157) and the importance of audit committee financial expertise on fair value reporting. We also provide evidence on the importance of board independence, internal control strength, auditor industry specialists, and audit committee financial experts in fair value reporting.     

借助资本市场发展我国商业银行的策略探讨

商业银行与资本市场之间存在一种既竞争又融合的关系.本文首先分析了当前我国资本市场的发展现状,在此基础上重点讨论了资本市场的发展对商业银行构成的挑战和机遇:资本市场的发展分流了商业银行信贷客户和存款资金,使商业银行面临更大的经营风险和竞争压力;同时,资本市场的发展有利于商业银行负债业务、资产业务和表外业务的拓展、资产质量的改善和资产结构优化.作者最后提出了借助资本市场发展商业银行的具体策略,包括负债业务证券化、积极争取同业存款、创新信贷业务品种、大力拓展表外业务、信贷资产证券化、银行资本证券化、完善信息技术系统建议、加快人才培养和创新市场营销等.     

Time Patience and Specialization Patterns in the Presence of Asset Trade

Specialization patterns in an open-economy two-sector growth model with endogenous capital accumulation are examined in the presence of free international lending and borrowing. Without free international lending and borrowing it is known that, whereas the less (time-)patient country decumulates real capital, the more patient country accumulates real capital and eventually specializes in a capital-intensive industry. However, free trade of international financial assets causes a dramatic change in long-run specialization patterns. In this case the less patient country may well specialize in the capital-intensive industry and the more patient country in the labor-intensive industry.     

How Do People Cope with Natural Disasters? Evidence from the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995

This paper investigates the coping strategies employed by victims of the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake in 1995. Using a unique household data set, we show that households that held a large amount of collateralizable assets before the catastrophe and were free from a binding borrowing constraint were able to maintain their consumption levels by borrowing. In contrast, households subject to a binding borrowing constraint before the disaster were unable to borrow to cope with the losses inflicted by the earthquake. On the other hand, both types of households relied on private transfers, depending on the extent of the damage.     

A unified model of entrepreneurship dynamics

We develop an incomplete-markets q-theoretic model to study entrepreneurship dynamics. Precautionary motive, borrowing constraints, and capital illiquidity lead to underinvestment, conservative debt use, under-consumption, and less risky portfolio allocation. The endogenous liquid wealth-illiquid capital ratio w measures time-varying financial constraint. The option to accumulate wealth before entry is critical for entrepreneurship. Flexible exit option is important for risk management purposes. Investment increases and the private marginal value of liquidity decreases as w decreases and exit becomes more likely, contrary to predictions of standard financial constraint models. We show that the idiosyncratic risk premium is quantitatively significant, especially for low w.     

The Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence from U.S. Firms

When firms borrow from multiple concentrated creditors such as banks they appear to differentiate their allocation of borrowing. In this paper, we put forward hypotheses for this borrowing pattern based on incomplete contract theories and test them using a sample of small U.S. firms. We find that firms with more valuable and more homogeneous assets differentiate borrowing more sharply across concentrated creditors. Moreover, borrowing differentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to firms' informational transparency. The results suggest that the structure of credit relationships is used to discipline creditors and entrepreneurs, especially during corporate reorganizations.     

External constraints and endogenous growth: Why didn't some countries benefit from capital flows?

Empirical evidence on the growth benefits of capital inflows is mixed. The growth benefits accruing from capital inflows also appear to be larger for high savings countries. We explain this phenomenon using an OLG model of endogenous growth in open economies with borrowing constraints that can generate both positive and negative growth effects of capital inflows. The amount an economy can borrow is restricted by an endogenous enforcement constraint. In our setting, with physical capital and a pay-as-you-go pensions system, the steady state is unique. However, it can either be constrained or unconstrained. In a constrained economy, opening up to equity and FDI inflows can be bad for growth because it makes the domestic interest rate too low, which endogenously tightens borrowing constraints. Agents decrease savings and investment in productivity-enhancing activities resulting in lower growth. Results are reversed in an unconstrained economy. We also provide a quantitative analysis of these constraints and some policy implications.     

How collateral laws shape lending and sectoral activity

We demonstrate the central importance of creditors’ ability to use movable assets as collateral (as distinct from immovable real estate) when borrowing from banks. Using a unique cross-country micro-level loan data set containing loan-to-value ratios for different assets, we find that loan-to-values of loans collateralized with movable assets are lower in countries with weak collateral laws, relative to immovable assets, and that lending is biased toward the use of immovable assets. Using sector-level data, we find that weak movable collateral laws create distortions in the allocation of resources that favor immovable-based production and investment. An analysis of Slovakia's collateral law reform confirms our findings.     

控制权冲突、资本配置决策与投资组合选择

本文以长期股权投资和固定资产的投资组合选择为研究对象,从控制权私利的视角探讨了大股东自利性动机对资本配置决策的作用机理,并进行了相应的数值模拟。研究发现：（1）固定资产投资规模与长期股权投资高状态收益存在负相关关系,而长期股权投资规模则与其高状态收益概率正相关;（2）大股东自利性动机驱使下的资本配置决策偏离了分散持股时的资本配置水平,偏离程度会随着现金流权与控制权分离度的增加而展现出非线性变化态势。上述研究结论为当前有关加强上市公司大股东财务决策监管的政策导向提供了重要的经验启示。     

New Keynesian models, durable goods, and collateral constraints

Econometric evidence suggests that, in response to monetary policy shocks, durable and non-durable spending co-move positively, and durable spending exhibits a much larger sensitivity to the shocks. A standard two-sector New Keynesian model with perfect financial markets is at odds with these facts. The introduction of a borrowing constraint, where durables play the role of collateral assets, helps in reconciling the model with the empirical evidence.     

The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment

We develop a two-tiered agency model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent-seeking, division managers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra compensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of "socialism" in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones.     

Two-stage capital budgeting,capital charge rates,and resource constraints

We study two-stage, multi-division budgeting mechanisms that allocate scarce resources among divisions using capital charge rates. Each divisional manager observes private sequential project information and competes for scarce resources over two stages. The optimal capital charge rates in our two-stage setting can be quite different from those that arise in a single-stage setting. If the firm faces a resource constraint at only the second stage, a less severe constraint can imply more first-stage project initiation, which can lead to higher second-stage capital charge rates. If resources are constrained at both stages, a decrease in the severity of the constraint at just one stage decreases the capital charge rate at that stage but increases the capital charge rate at the other stage because each constraint affects the intensity of competition at both stages. This result holds regardless of whether the scarce resources are fungible or non-fungible across stages.     

Vertical integration to mitigate internal capital market inefficiencies

We argue that vertical integration creates operational links between divisions in a conglomerate, which aligns divisional interests, thereby reducing internal competition between divisions. As a result, vertical integration improves the capital allocation efficiency of the internal capital market (ICM). We measure ICM efficiency by innovation output and capital expenditure (CAPX) deviation, and present evidence that higher levels of vertical integration are associated with higher ICM efficiency. Our results are robust to a number of endogeneity tests and the use of alternative measures of vertical integration and ICM efficiency.     

Intangible capital,relative asset shortages and bubbles

Purely technological factors can be a fundamental force behind the emergence of asset price bubbles in developed economies. We analyze an economy in which the production technology utilizes both physical and intangible capital, where the latter cannot be used as collateral for borrowing. Technological change, in the form of increased importance of intangible capital in production, sharpens the borrowing constraints of entrepreneurs, leading to a scarcity of high-yield assets relative to low-yield ones. This can create the conditions for asset bubbles. Additionally, due to the financial frictions, standard dynamic efficiency tests are not valid, and bubbles are not Pareto improving.     

融资流动性对商业银行资产配置行为的动态影响

使用14家上市银行2007~2013年季度数据建立面板向量自回归(PVAR)模型,运用脉冲响应函数分析融资流动性对银行资产配置行为的动态影响。研究结果表明：存款成本和银行间融资成本的上升,会激励银行增加风险资产,减少流动性储备,不利于银行防范结构性流动性风险;存款流失会削弱银行贷款扩张的动力,提升流动性偏好;同业融资依赖性的上升短期内可以改善银行资产的流动性,长期则会加大资金借短贷长的问题,为流动性危机埋下隐患。     

Strategic judgment proofing

A liquidity‐constrained entrepreneur raises capital to finance a business activity that may harm bystanders. The entrepreneur raises senior (secured) debt to shield assets from the tort victims in bankruptcy. For a fixed level of borrowing, senior debt creates better incentives for precaution taking than either junior debt or outside equity. The entrepreneur's level of borrowing is, however, socially excessive. Giving tort victims priority over senior debtholders in bankruptcy prevents overleveraging but leads to suboptimal incentives. Lender liability exacerbates the incentive problem even further. A limited seniority rule dominates these alternatives. Shareholder liability, mandatory liability insurance, and punitive damages are also discussed.     

Optimal monetary policy in an economy with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk

This study investigates an incomplete markets economy in which the saving behavior of a continuum of infinitely lived agents is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints. Agents can use two types of assets (interest bearing IOUS and money) to smooth consumption. Money is valued because of a timing friction in the bond market. In particular, the bond market closes before agents observe their idiosyncratic productivity shock. I find that the Friedman rule is not optimal for this economy. The results indicate that the optimal allocation has a rate of inflation of 10%, and a positive amount of private credit held by the government. A positive inflation rate transfers resources from agents with big endowments to those holding bonds which improves risk sharing, and therefore, welfare. However, for higher rates of inflation, agents economize on money holdings, offsetting the insurance effects, and causing a reduction in welfare. Furthermore, higher rates of inflation discourage agents from borrowing, and the endogenous lower bound on bond holdings is higher than the exogenous borrowing limit. High rates of inflation, therefore, exacerbate frictions in the bond market.     

基于VECM模型的信贷约束、家庭债务与中国宏观经济波动分析

采用1997~2013年家庭债务、贷款价值比与 GDP 增长率等变量数据,在借鉴 Kim 的模型基础上,构建 VECM 模型,检验了信贷约束、家庭债务与中国宏观经济波动之间的关系。结果表明：短期内宽松的借贷约束促进了家庭债务的增加,从而推动经济增长,但从长期来看,宽松的借贷约束会导致家庭债务过高,阻碍长期经济增长;与居民消费率、家庭债务等变量相比,贷款价值比、利率对宏观经济波动的影响较大。因此,政府决策部门应制定合理的消费金融政策,居民应通过优化家庭资产组合,以实现家庭债务的可持续性增长,从而促进经济增长。