MONETARY POLICY IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY: THE CASE OF MALAYSIA

This paper provides a case study to characterize the monetary policy regime in Malaysia, from a medium‐ and long‐term perspective. Specifically, we ask how the Central Bank of Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), has structured its monetary policy regime, and how it has conducted monetary and exchange rate policy under the regime. By conducting three empirical analyses, we characterize the monetary and exchange rate policy regime in Malaysia by three intermediate solutions on three vectors: the degree of autonomy in monetary policy, the degree of variability of the exchange rate, and the degree of capital mobility.     

CREDIT POLICY STRESS IN THE WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

This paper examines credit policy stress in the West African Economic and Monetary Union and provides evidence that a regional credit policy would not suit all the countries that are members of this currency union. Some countries obtain a higher volume of domestic credit when policy is conducted at a domestic level than they would in the context of a single regional policy. Furthermore, there are differences in the country‐specific reaction function to changes in the economic environment. To show the inappropriateness of a regional credit policy within the West African Economic and Monetary Union area, we compute credit stress indicators both for the countries and for the region taken as a whole. The stress indicators represent the gap between the optimal policies conducted at country and regional levels. Our study covers the period from 1980 to 2007.     

THE CYCLICALITY OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1994

This paper uses a structural vector‐autoregression approach to discuss the cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy in South Africa since 1994. There is substantial South African literature on this topic, but much disagreement remains. Though not undisputed, there is growing consensus that monetary policy has contributed to the remarkable stabilisation of the South African economy over this period. The evaluation of the role of fiscal policy in stabilisation has been less favourable and there is little evidence that a countercyclical fiscal stance was a priority over this period. This paper considers these issues in an empirical framework that addresses some of the shortcomings in the literature. Specifically, it constructs a structural model in contrast with the reduced form models typically used in the South African literature, incorporates the dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal shocks on the demand side and supply shocks on the other, and avoids controversy over “neutral” base years and the size of fiscal elasticities. The model confirms the consensus on monetary policy, finding it to have been largely countercyclical since 1994. On fiscal policy, this paper finds evidence of pro‐cyclicality, especially in the more recent period, though the policy simulations suggest that the pro‐cyclicality of fiscal policy has had little destabilising impact on real output.     

ESTIMATING MONETARY POLICY RULES FOR SOUTH AFRICA

The paper combines the estimation of the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) with the theoretic modelling of optimal monetary policy in South Africa. The idea that monetary policy is not only interested in optimal monetary conditions but also in external stability, provides the basis for the analysis. The paper introduces the concept of the MCI and estimates the relative influence of interest rates and exchange rates on the output gap. The estimated weights are 1.9:1. This estimation results is used to specify operating target rules for South African monetary policy.     

ESTIMATING SARB'S POLICY REACTION RULE

This paper uses a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to estimate the South African Reserve Bank's (SARB) policy reaction rule. We find that the SARB has a stable rule very much in line with those estimated for Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand. Relative to other emerging economies the policy reaction function of the SARB appears to be much more stable with a consistent anti inflation bias, a somewhat larger weight on output and a very low weight on the exchange rate.     

MODELLING INFLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: A MULTIVARIATE COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS

We employ an expectations augmented Phillips curve framework to investigate the link between inflation, unit labour costs, the output gap, the real exchange rate and inflation expectations. Using multivariate cointegration techniques, we find evidence consistent with mark‐up behaviour of output prices over unit labour costs. Most importantly, we find that the mark‐up in the South African economy is much higher than in the U.S. For South Africa we find a markup of about 30 per cent: three times as high as the 10 per cent markup found for the U.S.     

PRICE FLEXIBILITY IN THE COMMON MONETARY AREA

This paper examines the presence of flexibility within the common monetary area (CMA) as compared to a selected group of Southern African Development Co-operation (SADC) countries. The study tests for the readiness of SADC countries towards macroeconomic convergence and monetary unification. The methods followed examine the concept of (relative) purchasing power parity and test for the speed of adjustment of prices after a shock. The results suggest that the level of price flexibility is high within the CMA as opposed to the control group. The implication is that the CMA arrangement has managed to foster price flexibility among its member countries. Furthermore, Botswana could be a potential candidate for a monetary union with the CMA group.     

STAGFLATIONARY CONSEQUENCES OF PRUDENT MONETARY POLICY IN A UNIONIZED ECONOMY

Stylised models of the policy game between monetary policy makersand the private sector have suggested that discretionary policyregimes suffer from an inherent inflationary bias and that pre-commitmentto a target rate of inflation may be desirable. This paper showsthat in the presence of labour unions, the monetary policy gamecan lead to radically different results: a central bank thatis completely indifferent to the level of inflation may obtainoutcomes with high employment rates and zero inflation while‘prudent’, inflation-averse, central banks generatestagflation with positive inflation and low rates of employment.     

CAPITAL MOBILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A PANEL DATA APPROACH

In this paper we are primarily concerned with assessing the degree of capital mobility in sub‐Saharan Africa. Using the methodology as proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980)—later termed the “Feldstein‐Horioka puzzle”—we test the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility against the alternative of imperfect capital mobility. Following Vamvakidis and Wacziarg (1998) and Isaksson (2000), provision is made in our model to show the dependency of the lesserdeveloped countries on international finance and aid and how a more open economy contributes towards improving the level of capital movement in these countries. We also assess the change in the degree of capital mobility over the time period in an effort to see whether institutional and political changes have been successful. We show that, compared to the region, South Africa is, to a large extent, more developed and should therefore play a leading role in the “African Renaissance”. Stationary panel data estimation techniques are applied to a sample of 36 sub‐Saharan African countries over the time period 1980–2000. The benefits of using one‐way error component models are derived from simultaneously employing time and cross‐section dimensions of the data, resulting in a substantial increase in the degrees of freedom. The fixed and random effects models enable us to acknowledge country heterogeneity within the panel, making provision for differences across countries like capital control policies, financial and capital market structures and exchange rate regimes.     

OPTIMAL PRE-COMMITMENT IN MACROECONOMIC POLICY: A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF FISCAL POLICY

The version of the paper published in Oxford Economic Papers(Volume 42, October 1990, pp. 695–714) erroneously omittedthe figures. This note presents the figures and briefly describesthe results they show. The paper proposed a new solution to the problem of time inconsistency.A subgame-perfect trigger strategy equilibrium was presentedin which the public expected the government to renege on itsoriginally announced policy at some later date. The government'spre-commitment to its announced policy was determined endogenouslyas part of the equilibrium. The equilibrium was illustrated using Blanchard's (1985) modelof fiscal policy. I examined the [political] problem of maintainingaggregate consumption while reducing the level of governmentdebt. The problem of time inconsistency arises in this contextbecause the government has an incentive to renege on its promiseto raise future taxes. Numerical solutions of the model showedthat the government would renege after a period that dependedon its expected tenure and preferences. Figures 1 to 4 showthe behavior of the economy under policies with no pre-commitment([t₀t^*) = 0), a moderate period of precommitment ([t₀t^*) = 33.5),and a long period of pre-commitment ([t₀t^*) = 140.2). Figure 1 shows that governments with greater credibility willprefer to push the costs of falling consumption further intothe future. This is achieved by adopting policies that promiseto raise future revenues while cutting current taxes so thatthe fall in the value of government debt is offset by the risein human wealth [see Figures 2 and 4]. One important consequenceof these policies is that the level of government debt risesduring much of the period of pre-commitment. Figure 5 is used in the appendix to prove proposition 1     

MONETARY POLICY GAMES AND COALITIONS IN A TWO-COUNTRY MODEL WITH UNIONISED WAGE SETTING

We show that in interdependent, unionised economies co-operationbetween wagesetters at home and abroad improves both their ownpositions and social welfare relative to universal Nash playMoreover, a move from all-round Nash play to co-operation betweenhome and foreign unions and between home and foreign policymakersmay produce Pareto improvements, or outcomes that are preferableto Nash play for the coalition as a whole However, intra-nationalcoalitions may lack the support of unions Such coalitions unambiguouslyimprove the policymakers' position However, in an interdependentworld, they do not necessarily make the unions better off relativeto other regimes     

IMPACT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH OF DIFFERENTIAL POPULATION GROWTH IN AN ECONOMY WITH HIGH INEQUALITY

The economic growth of South Africa has been disappointing over the last quarter century. This note addresses a conceptual problem that arises because of composition effects. Two important features of the South African economy are, first, its extreme inequality (primarily between the white population and the African population). Additionally, the African population has been growing rapidly, while the white population has experienced a declining share. This note derives an explicit equation for the impact of inequality and population-growth differences on the growth of per capita GDP. It shows that the combination of divergent population growth and high inequality can lead to an apparent drag on measured economic growth even though the components, and a more adequate measure of economic welfare, are growing at a healthy rate.     

AID AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE DEBATE, THE CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD

The article discusses the emerging literature and debates on aid, within the context of expected increases in aid flows to the continent. The trends in ODA flows indicate a reversal in aid flows to the continent since 2000, with subsequent increases in aid intensity and dependence. Although the more recent literature on aid is doubtful if aid only spurs growth in a in a good policy environment, the aid‐institutional debate indicates a clear aid‐institutional paradox, especially relating to the macroeconomic effects, the fiscal response, the absorptive capacity and the good governance aid debates. The literature further indicates that aid could serve as a barrier to vulnerable societies. From the donors' perspective, it is evident that quantity of aid does not imply quality and that the ultimate responsibility lies with recipient governments to ensure more efficient absorption of aid.     

INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH IN THE COMMON MONETARY AREA OF THE SACU COUNTRIES

We investigate the interest rate pass‐through in the four Common Monetary Area (CMA) countries of the South African Customs Union (SACU). We employ an empirical pass‐through model that allows for thresholds, asymmetric adjustment, and structural changes. We show that CMA bank lending markets exhibit quite some degree of homogenization as the pass‐through is often fast and complete. Deposit markets are somewhat more heterogeneous by showing differing degrees of interest rate stickiness and asymmetric adjustment. Policy makers should therefore be concerned about imperfect competition which may be at the heart of the remaining cross‐country differences in monetary transmission in the CMA.