An empirical analysis of the demand for houses durables and nondurables

A standard neoclassical model of intertemporal choice is applied to households' demand for nondurables, durables and houses, so that particularly the role of credit rationing is stressed. Empirical analysis is performed with Finnish quarterly data. The main result of the study is that relative prices are of little significance, whereas credit rationing is found to play an important role, affecting both the desired levels of demand and the speed of adjustment.     

Industry equilibrium with outside financing and moral hazard: Implications for market integration

In this paper, we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that (1) firms need outside financing and (2) they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks. We characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing, where firms choose not to take risks, and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing. In both cases, we show that competition increases and prices decline as markets integrate. However, in markets with credit rationing there is typically more exit, a smaller decline in prices and, most strikingly, the market value of the industry increases rather than decreases.     

商业银行信贷配给对中国房地产业波动的影响*

商业银行信贷配给控制中国房地产业信贷规模和结构,造成供给和需求的规模与结构扭曲,影响货币政策和财政政策的调控效果,容易引起房地产业波动。本文通过构建信贷配给模型,测算不同波动时期当中,商业银行信贷配给程度的变化趋势,以及对房地产业的影响。实证结果显示,信贷配给程度的变化与房地产业波动显著相关,信贷配给改变了投资和消费在推动房地产产出过程中的结构,并制约路径依赖对产出的影响,同时影响财政政策和数量型货币政策稳定房地产业的效果。本文认为,可以通过逐渐弱化商业银行在房地产金融市场中的垄断地位,丰富房地产信贷供给层次和结构,以及加强信贷供给监督来缓解信贷配给的消极作用。     

农地确权、信贷配给释缓与农村金融的深度发展*

作为一项基础性、制度环境层面的变革，农地确权帮助更多农户进入金融市场、促进农村金融宽度意义上的“量”变作用已经初步显现。但是，它是否可以提高农户贷款数量，缓解信贷配给并促进农村金融深度意义上的“质”变？这是一个重要但鲜有研究的问题。本文从供给、需求、交易成本、价格、风险配给等角度，分析了农地确权缓解信贷配给、促进农村金融深度发展的理论机理，并通过有序多分类变量回归及倾向得分匹配方法进行实证分析。研究表明，农地确权对农户金融参与深度的影响主要表现为：因降低信息成本而缓解价格配给，因弱化农户的损失规避心理而缓解风险配给；同时，数量配给和交易成本配给的释缓作用尚未充分显示。     

Credit rationing and capital accumulation with investment and consumption loans revisited

A simple model is developed to evaluate the roles of credit rationing and government policies of financial repression in the process of capital accumulation. In the model, credit rationing on both investment and consumption loans decreases as capital accumulates but increases as the government imposes policies of financial repression to a greater extent. While a reduction in credit rationing on consumption loans impedes capital accumulation, such a reduction on investment loans facilitates it. We find that developing countries may be trapped at a low-capital-stock steady state while developed countries converge to a high-capital-stock steady state. Instead of adopting policies of financial liberalization, interestingly, this paper finds that policies of financial repression may enable developing countries to escape the development trap.     

Is Rationing an Option for Approaching Healthcare Services Provision? The Case of the Greek Cardiac Patients

This paper attempts to address some of the issues surrounding rationing of healthcare services, with application to Greece’s delivery of cardiac services. To this end, first, we provide highlights of the current debate concerning rationing worldwide and critically discuss them. Following that, an empirical analysis of the way ‘key’ stakeholders perceive rationing issues in Greece, is performed. Findings indicate that rationing is a highly disputed approach, subject to individualistic interpretations and moral issues. At policy level, it becomes evident that rationing is a mixture rather than a single policy concern, depending on a complicated range of locally-based reconciliation made at various levels of interested parties. Hence, no universal formula exists to fit all countries’ healthcare systems and further case-by-case research, is required.     

Credit rationing and the adjustment of the loan rate: An empirical investigation

In this paper, models of credit rationing are analyzed using quarterly data on domestic bank loans of four countries. First, models of temporary (dynamic) credit rationing are considered. The price (interest rate) equation proposed by Bowden is estimated assuming equal and unequal adjustment speeds under excess demand and supply conditions. Second, the stability of the interest-rate equation is tested. We motivate this test by the fact that permanent (supply-side equilibrium) credit rationing implies instability of this regression relationship. Statistically significant credit-rationing effects are found for the countries considered, with the exception of the U.S.     

A revealed preference test of rationing

This paper derives a revealed preference test for utility maximization under rationing and can detect, for which goods rationing is binding without specifying a functional form or imposing rationing constraints prior to estimation. For UK data from 1920–55, we find evidence of utility maximization under rationing with rationing binding for food and other services. Estimated virtual prices exceed observed food prices by 16.5% in 1947 and observed prices of other services by 10.9% in 1952.     

On the theory of effective demand under stochastic rationing

The concept of effective demand under stochastic manipulable quantity rationing is shown to be compatible with the existence of nontrivial equilibrium. It is argued that stochastic rationing is unavoidable for any satisfactory definition of effective demand. Moreover, manipulability of the rationing mechanism is necessary for reasons of logical consistency, at least if the distribution over realisations for each agent depends on his own action and on the aggregate values of demand and supply only. In that case, anonymous stochastic rationing schemes reduce to those random functions, the mean value function of which is the uniform proportional rationing mechanism.     

Credit rationing or overlending? An exploration into financing imperfection

Small and new firms are deemed to be unable to obtain sufficient bank loans. This idea finds a strong theoretical support in credit rationing theory. However, this is vigorously challenged by De Meza and Webb (1987, 2000) suggesting that firms can benefit from an excess of credit, i.e. overlending. Credit rationing or overlending? The contribution of this empirical article is twofold: to our knowledge, it is the first to make an attempt in measuring the relative importance of these two types of financing imperfection and to explore factors leading to one or the other. We exploit a rich panel data set on the access to bank credit for new French businesses during the mid-1990s. Our results show that credit rationing was not highly spread among French new firms. The story told by De Meza and Webb (1987) appears to be a much more realistic model. In addition, we identify factors, linked to the starter, the project or the industry, that are closely associated with credit rationing and/or overlending. Most factors enter into a consistent relation: when they are positively (negatively) associated with credit rationing, they are negatively (positively) associated with overlending.     

Financial constraints and unemployment equilibrium

The aim of this paper is to show that a robust determination of unemployment equilibria can be based on the integration of credit rationing into a general equilibrium model. We first review some of the Keynesian macroeconomic models. We show that the problems bequeathed by Keynes’ legacy are only partially solved by the strand of the new Keynesian economics based on market imperfections and endogenous rigidities. In order to overcome these problems we refer to credit rationing. In particular, we build a simple general equilibrium model in which prices are–in principle–perfectly flexible and credit rationing implies unemployment equilibria.     

The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification

Summary We consider credit rationing in an environment with adverse selection and costly state verification. The presence of costly state verification permits debt contracts to emerge under conditions that we specify. When debt contracts are observed, so is credit rationing. This rationing occurs even if it is possible for rationed borrowers to bid up expected returns to lenders and hence is voluntary. We also show how the adverse selection and costly state verification problems interact and investigate how improvements in information gathering technology impact on the extent of credit rationing.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. We have benefitted from comments on an earlier draft of this paper by Franklin Allen, Charlie Calomiris, V. V. Chari, Ed Green, Craig Holden, Jeff Lacker, George Pennachi, Neil Wallace, Anne Villamil, and an anonymous referee and from discussions with Edward Prescott.     

Do Banks Ration Credit to New Enterprises? And Should Governments Intervene?

Do banks deny credit to new start–ups? The presumption that they do has motivated government intervention in several forms, including publicly backed loan guarantee schemes in the UK and elsewhere. This paper presents an overview of the modern theory and evidence of credit rationing, and concludes that the case for credit rationing is weak. Ultimately, theoretical arguments for or against credit rationing are inconclusive, so evidence is needed to decide the issue. The evidence is not supportive of the view that credit rationing is an important or widespread phenomenon.     

Adaptation and Mitigation in Long-term Climate Policy

The paper analytically explores the optimal allocation of investments into mitigation and environmental adaptation against climate change damages at a macroeconomic level. The economic-environmental model is formulated as a social planner problem where adaptation and abatement investments are separate decision variables. The existence of a unique steady state is proven. A comparative static analysis of optimal investments leads to essential implications for associated long-term environmental policies. It is shown that the optimal policy mix between adaptation and mitigation is lower for countries with higher economic efficiency for all applicable parameter ranges. Data calibration and numerical simulations are provided to estimate practical validity of theoretical outcomes.     

Price rigidities and institutional variations in markets with posted prices

Summary An exchange economy with price rigidities and rationing is considered. The rationing systems allowed are very general. Several characterizations of the set of constrained equilibria are given, and new equilibrium existence results are provided. More specifically, well-known properties like the existence of equilibria without rationing of the numeraire commodity, and the existence of supply and demand constrained equilibria without rationing on the market of at least one commodity follow as special cases from the theorems proved. Finally it is shown that the equilibrium correspondence is upper semi-continuous, while it is continuous on a residual set of points. In order to prove these results a new continuity result for the budget correspondence is given.The author would like to thank Dolf Talman, Gerard van der Laan, Jan van Geldrop, and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper. The author is financially supported by the Cooperation Centre Tilburg and Eindhoven Universities, The Netherlands. This research is part of the VF-program Competition and Cooperation.     

Credit Rationing, Group Lending and Optimal Group Size

I develop a model of credit rationing with effort unobservable by lenders where borrowers can choose among projects of different riskiness. In such a set-up rationing that can be relaxed if borrowers put up physical collateral arises. Group lending proves to be a possible means to relax rationing and improve efficiency when physical collateral is not available. The optimal size of groups is here analysed as a function of social factors. It turns out that groups can be neither too small nor too large because in both cases the effectiveness of social sanctions on behaviour is too low to offset the negative effect on effort due to profit sharing and free riding. Individual sensitivity to social sanctions is the crucial element determining whether groups can be formed or not.     

The demand for mortgage finance in the united kingdom

This paper examines the rationing behaviour of building societies in the United kingdom. Mortgage rationing is defined as the use of non-interest rate terms to allocate available funds and the empirical results indicate that the adjustment of such terms is significant in determining the demand for mortgage finance. In contrast with previous studies, the demand side of the mortgage market is disaggregated between first-time house buyers and existing owner-occupiers.     

Credit rationing as a (temporary) suboptimal equilibrium with imperfect information

Jaffee and Russell (1976) characterized partial rationing as a contract rate and contract size below those of the no-rationing equilibrium. Their non-price rationing here obtains as a suboptimal equilibrium for a risk-averse rate-setting intermediary with marginal increasing cost and a monopolistically competitive loan demand. The temporary (dis)equilibrium corresponds to a dominated strategy, and the wider class of models of which J-R's solution is but a singular case is touched upon.     

Credit rationing, interest rates and capital accumulation

A simple endogenous growth model is developed to characterize credit rationing through the capital accumulation process. The model shows that credit rationing on investment loans decreases as capital accumulates and the enforcement cost decreases. We find that the evolution of the interest rate factor (lending interest rate/depositing interest rate) has a similar pattern to the credit rationing probability. However, simulations show that the evolution of the interest rate spread through the capital accumulation process depends on the degree of the enforcement cost. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider fifty-two countries, at different stages of development, over the period 1995–2005. We confirm the theoretical findings relative to the evolution of the interest rate spread and interest rate factor with capital accumulation. These results suggest that, for economies endowed with costly contract enforcement, the interest rate factor could be a better proxy of credit rationing than the interest rate spread.     

Analysing rationing policies: drought and its effects on urban users’ welfare (Analysing rationing policies during drought)

The aim of this paper is to study the impact on consumers of rationing policies implemented during water shortages. Water scarcity gives rise to the need for rationing, and various methods, including supply cutoffs, can be used. A model is devised to quantify the welfare losses associated with qualitive and quantitive restrictions. Based on virtual prices and using the consumer surplus as a welfare measurement, welfare variations for different users have been calculated. To achieve the aim, information relative to Seville (Spain) has been used, analysing the drought period that took place in the first half of the 1990s. It has been possible to observe the main source that led to welfare losses for each kind of user.