The forward method as a solution refinement in rational expectations models

This paper generalizes the standard forward method of recursive substitution to a general class of linear rational expectations models with potentially multiple fundamental solutions. It is shown that the existence and uniqueness of the well-known forward solution are preserved in a general context. We also propose a key property embedded in the forward solution - the no-bubble condition - as an economically sensible solution refinement in the class of fundamental solutions. In the literature, the no-bubble condition has been assumed to rule out non-fundamental bubble solutions. We show that the forward solution is the only rational expectations equilibrium satisfying the no-bubble condition and consequently, it is the most relevant fundamental solution within the class of fundamental equilibria. Several economic examples are provided where the fundamental solutions obtained by other solution methods and refined by other solution selection criteria violate the no-bubble condition.     

Estimation and solution of linear rational expectations models using a polynomial matrix factorization

A method to solve and estimate multivariate linear rational expectations models is described. The method is based on an iterative factorization of the polynomial matrix that describes the lags and expected leads in the model. Our experience is that the method works well in a variety of applications where other methods are either difficult or expensive to use.     

The structure of ARMA solutions to a general linear model with rational expectations

A parameterc characterization is provided for the complete class of stationary and non-stationary ARMA solutions, generated by the fundamental exogenous innovation, to a general linear univariate model with rational expectations. The dimension of the solution space of ARMA parameters is given and shown to be generically equal to the maximum period forward over which expectations are formed. The validity of deleting common factors in non-stationary ARMA processes is discussed, and specific solution choices often recommended are shown to be ‘common factor’ solutions.     

Estimation of the monetary model of exchange-rate determination under rational expectations

This paper develops a sticky-price version of the monetary model of exchange-rate determination under rational expectations. The reduced-form difference equation for the exchange rate has two roots which lie on either side of unity. In the solution the stable root is solved backwards and the unstable forwards. The model is estimated by the full-information maximum-likelihood method on deutsche mark-dollar data. The results are supportive of the rational-expectations restrictions.     

Identification of rational expectations models

This paper deals with the problem of the identification of simultaneous Rational Expectations (RE) models. In the case of RE models with current expectations of the endogenous variables, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the global identification are derived explicitly in terms of the structural parameters and the linear homogenous identifying restrictions. It is shown that in the absence of a priori restrictions on the processes generating the exogenous variables and the disturbances, RE models and general distributed lag models are ‘observationally equivalent’. In the case of RE models with future expectations of the endogenous variables, a general solution that highlights the ‘non-uniqueness’ problem and from which other solutions such as forward or backward solutions can be obtained, is derived. It is shown that untestable and often quite arbitrary restrictions are needed if RE models with future expectations are to be identifiable. Certain order conditions similar to those obtained for the identification of RE models with current expectations are also derived for this case.     

Dangers of commitment under rational expectations

Within a New Keynesian framework, interest rate rules that respond to public expectations lead to determinate and expectationally stable solutions for any level of commitment, as shown by Waters (Macroecon Dyn 13(4):421–449, 2009). That paper also demonstrates gains to commitment, under least square learning, though over-commitment can lead to some very poor outcomes for some parameter values. This paper shows an identical outcome under rational expectations. The optimal level of commitment is unchanged if there are observation errors in the policymaker’s knowledge of public expectations, which is not the case under learning. However, if there is sufficient policymaker uncertainty about the parameter values, partial commitment is best.     

Are employment decisions based on rational expectations?

Conventional employment functions with partial adjustment to output fitted to quarterly data tend to have positively autocorrelated residuals, to imply implausibly high returns to scale and almost always fail tests for parameter stability. The hypothesis of this paper is that mis-specified expectations are the main cause of these findings and rational and adaptive expectations models are compared. Further, employment is conditioned not on output but on variables which firms can more reasonably take as exogenous. ‘Disequilibrium’ features of labour markets are introduced by making adjustment costs depend upon current and expected labour market tightness.One of the implications of rational expectations is that the revision between points in time t and $\text{t ? 1}$ in the expected value of any variable should be independent of any information available before t and serially uncorrelated. Given a model of a forward looking firm whose hiring decisions are subject to quadratic adjustment costs, an appropriately transformed employment equation can be derived which has a very similar structure to the Koyck transformed employment equation which corresponds to adaptive expectations. Maximum likelihood estimation of the adaptive expectations form gives parameter estimates for quarterly British data for the manufacturing sector which are so unreasonable that this hypothesis can be rejected. Maximum likelihood estimation of the rational expectations form would involve modelling the stochastic processes of all the driving variables. However, conditional upon one parameter, consistent estimates of the remaining parameters can be obtained by OLS and these accord well with economic theory. This is the direct evidence in favour of the rational expectations hypothesis. However, it can also explain why the adaptive expectations form gives such poor results and why conventional employment functions give the unsatisfactory results referred to above. Further, rational expectations provides an explanation for the common finding, particularly in the context of employment and the demand for durable goods, of implausibly low or wrong signed levels effects in more general quarterly time series models with lagged dependent variables.     

Some results on an additive hazards model

In the present paper, we study the analytical properties of an addictive hazards model. The ageing properties of the baseline random variable and the induced random variable are compared. Various stochastic orders that relate these two variables are also explored.     

The effects of input control in a simple scheduling model

Input control is a generic procedure for smoothing production workload by delaying work during intervals of heavy load. While input control techniques have several practical benefits, they also have an inherent disadvantage. By restricting the set of jobs available for scheduling, an input control procedure removes some of the scheduling options that would otherwise be available. This paper examines the impact of such a procedure in a simple simulation model.The simulation model represents a production shop in a simplified way, as a single machine, but the production control system has three distinct parts. The first part assigns due-dates to customer orders, taking into consideration the size of each job and the workload in the shop. The second part is a job releasing rule that implements input control. The third part is a priority dispatching procedure that is aimed at meeting due-dates. By representing this three-part control system the model provides an opportunity to explore the interdependence between input control and other control procedures.Reinforcing previous research, the simulation experiments confirm that modified due-date priorities perform more effectively than other basic priority rules when performance is measured by average tardiness. Moreover, the experiments indicate that performance under the modified due-date regime is never improved by the use of input control. On the other hand, with dispatching rules that rely on shortest-first or critical ratio priorities, the experiments indicate that input control is sometimes advantageous. The effects of input control on scheduling performance thus appear to be somewhat complicated, and further experiments were designed to explore some of the relationships involved. The principal finding, however, provides a warning that input control can be counterproductive.     

Testing rational expectations by the use of overidentifying restrictions

A simple econometric test for rational expectations in the case in which unobservable, rationally expected variables appear in a structural equation is presented. Using McCallum's instrumental variable estimator as a base, a test for rational expectations per se and a joint test of rational expectations and hypotheses about the structural equation are presented. The new test is shown to be a new interpretation of Basmann's test of overidentifying restrictions. As an illustration, the hypothesis that the forward exchange rate is the rationally expected future spot exchange rate is tested and rejected.     

On the local stability of the solution to optimal control problems

New conditions for the local stability of optimal control problems are presented. The conditions are an extension of the results of a previous study focusing on the solution to problems solvable using calculus of variations. A comparison is made between the conditions introduced here and those presented in the literature. It is shown that our condition is roughly as powerful as the one presented by Sorger (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 148 (1990) 191) but it is easier to check.     

On the impossibility of insider trade in rational expectations equilibria

Existing no trade results are based on the common prior assumption (CPA). This paper identifies a strictly weaker condition than the CPA under which speculative trade is impossible in a rational expectations equilibrium (REE). As our main finding, we demonstrate the impossibility of speculative asset trade in an REE whenever an insider is involved who knows the asset's true value. To model insider trade as an equilibrium phenomenon an alternative equilibrium concept than the REE is thus required.     

The role of beliefs in inference for rational expectations models

This paper discusses inference for rational expectations models estimated via minimum distance methods by characterizing the probability beliefs regarding the data generating process (DGP) that are compatible with given moment conditions. The null hypothesis is taken to be rational expectations and the alternative hypothesis to be distorted beliefs. This distorted beliefs alternative is analyzed from the perspective of a hypothetical semiparametric Bayesian who believes the model and uses it to learn about the DGP. This interpretation provides a different perspective on estimates, test statistics, and confidence regions in large samples, particularly regarding the economic significance of rejections in rational expectations models. A suggestive application to the equity premium puzzle is examined.     

The existence of rational expectations equilibria in a large economy with noisy price observations

Non-revealing rational expectations equilibria exist in microeconomic pure exchange economies in which a continuum of uninformed agents have suitably distributed noisy price observations. Slight dispersion in the prices observed by the subset of uninformed consumers is the key condition for continuity (and smoothness) of aggregate excess demand, although individual demands are discontinuous. It leads to equilibria in which markets approximately clear in a strong sense. The equilibria are obtained by applying a fixed point argument to state-dependent excess demand functions.     

Examining bias in estimators of linear rational expectations models under misspecification

Most rational expectations models involve equations in which the dependent variable is a function of its lags and its expected future value. We investigate the asymptotic bias of generalized method of moment (GMM) and maximum likelihood (ML) estimators in such models under misspecification. We consider several misspecifications, and focus more specifically on the case of omitted dynamics in the dependent variable. In a stylized DGP, we derive analytically the asymptotic biases of these estimators. We establish that in many cases of interest the two estimators of the degree of forward-lookingness are asymptotically biased in opposite direction with respect to the true value of the parameter. We also propose a quasi-Hausman test of misspecification based on the difference between the GMM and ML estimators. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, we show that the ordering and direction of the estimators still hold in a more realistic New Keynesian macroeconomic model. In this set-up, misspecification is in general found to be more harmful to GMM than to ML estimators.     

Full information estimation and stochastic simulation of models with rational expectations

A computationally feasible method for the full information maximum-likelihood estimation of models with rational expectations is described in this paper. The stochastic simulation of such models is also described. The methods discussed in this paper should open the way for many more tests of the rational expectations hypothesis within macroeconomic models.     

Theoretical tests of the rational expectations hypothesis in economic dynamical models

This paper examines different theoretical stability tests of infinite-horizon rational expectations equilibria. These ‘tests’ have different status: two of them express that the considered equilibrium is ‘isolated’ [neither (non-sunspot) equilibria (test 1) nor (well-behaved) sunspot equilibria exist in a neighbourhood (test 2)] and two of them are learning criteria [either standard ‘evolutive learning’ (test 3) or game-theoretical ‘eductive’ learning (test 4)]. Surprisingly, these four tests select the same steady state equilibria in the class of one-dimensional one-step-forward looking economic models. The extension of this equivalence theorem to n-dimensional and then more complex systems is discussed.     

The design of feedback rules in linear stochastic rational expectations models

This paper is concerned with optimal and sub-optimal feedback rules for linear stochastic continuous time models with rational expectations. We consider four types of feedback rules: (1) the optimal but time-inconsistent rule which is available if the controller is able to commit himself or herself; (2) quasi-optimal and time-inconsistent rules of the form w = Dy where w is the vector of instruments, y the state vector and D a matrix of constants possibly with constraints; (3) the optimal time-consistent rule which is also linear in y; (4) ‘over-stable’ rules which have ‘too many’ stable roots. We show that rules of type (1) can be expressed and implemented as a form of integral control, all except type (2) satisfy certainty equivalence and that rules of type (4) will always be inferior to the optimal rule (1). These results are demonstrated in two illustrative examples.     

Expectation formation of older married couples and the rational expectations hypothesis

This paper tests the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis regarding retirement expectations of older married American couples, controlling for sample selection and reporting biases. In prior research we found that individual retirement expectation formation was consistent with the Rational Expectation hypothesis, but in that work spousal considerations were not analyzed. In this research we take advantage of panel data on expectations to test the RE hypothesis among married individuals as well as joint expectations among couples. We find that regardless of whether we assume that married individuals form their own expectations taking spouse's information as exogenous, or the reports of the couple are the result of a joint expectation formation process, their expectations are consistent with the RE hypothesis. Our results support a wide variety of models in economics that assume rational behavior of married couples.     

Formulating wald tests of the restrictions implied by the rational expectations hypothesis

In this paper, we examine the small sample properties of alternative formulations of Wald tests of non-linear restrictions implied by the rational expectations hypothesis. A Monte Carlo analysis is presented as well as an example using Canadian aggregate time series data. The evidence indicates that Wald test results are extremely sensitive in small samples to the way in which the non-linear restrictions in such models are parameterized, with a multiplicative form yielding tests of most accurate size. Least squares degrees of freedom adjustments also improve the sample performance of the tests.