Vertical Product Differentiation When Quality is Scarce: The Case of n > 2 Firms

This paper describes a model of vertical product differentiation in which more than two firms compete in quality and price. Quality is of fixed supply, so firms participate in an auction to attain it. Firms then simultaneously choose prices. The paper determines equilibrium bids in the quality auction and the Bertrand equilibrium prices. In equilibrium one firm attains all the units of quality, but pays a price such that it, like the minimum-quality firms, earns zero profits. Aggregate welfare is computed, and is shown to decrease as competition increases.     

Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information

We model non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers, assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms' respective products and each firm has private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm's price reveals its respective product quality. We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the associated outputs, and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety. If horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently great then equilibrium prices and profits are higher under incomplete information about quality than if quality were commonly known. Thus, while signaling imposes a distortionary loss on a monopolist using price to signal quality, duopolists may benefit from the distortion as it can reduce competition. Finally, average quality is lower since signaling quality redistributes demand towards low-quality firms.     

Market structure in congestible markets

This paper analyses market structure of industries that are subject to both positive and negative network effects. The size of a firm determines the quality of its product: when network effects are positive, a larger firm is of higher quality; when the effects are negative, a larger firm's product is of lower quality. Consumers have heterogeneous preferences towards quality (firm size), and firms compete in prices. Equilibria are characterised: for example, in any asymmetric equilibrium, it must be that congestion is not too severe. One consequence of this feature is that an increase in the number of firms in the industry can raise individual firms’ profits. Two factors can bound the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium without fixed costs: expectations, and the ‘finiteness’ property (Shaked and Sutton, Review of Economic Studies 49 (1982) 3–13, Econometrica 51(5) (1983) 1469–1483) of price competition.     

Credence Goods,Misleading Labels,and Quality Differentiation

Due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms, consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes. Using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation, we examine how consumers’ overestimation of the quality of intermediate-quality products affects firms’ incentives to improve product quality. The firms non-cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity. Irrespective of the nature of second stage competition, Bertrand or Cournot, we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate-quality firm, and motivates it to raise its product’s quality. In response, the high-quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit. Overall, average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves, which raises consumer surplus. Social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities.     

Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment

We study incentives to vertically integrate in an industry with vertically differentiated downstream firms. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs negatively affects quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical integration) scenario. The decrease in quality invesment by both firms softens competition among downstream firms. By integrating first, a firm always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits. A fully integrated industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration.     

Enforcing Domestic Quality Dominance through Quotas*

We study duopoly competition between a domestic and a foreign firm who first choose their quality and then compete in prices in the domestic market. As is well known, the free‐trade equilibrium exhibits quality differentiation and indeterminacy of the quality leader. We show that an import quota can enforce, as the unique subgame‐perfect equilibrium outcome, the quality ranking that favors the domestic producer and thereby can increase domestic welfare.     

ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF COLLUSION IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY WITH A CARTEL AND A FRINGE

We discuss the effects of the existence of non‐colluding (fringe) firms on cartel sustainability. We obtain, using trigger strategies, that with product differentiation collusion is always more easily sustained when firms compete in prices than when firms compete in quantities. This is true basically because (i) price competition is more intense than quantity competition, and (ii) fringe firms exacerbate the fact that cartel firms have more incentives to deviate from the agreement under quantity competition. This result reverses previous findings where, in the absence of fringe firms, product differentiation plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of price or quantity competition in sustaining collusion.     

A dual economy model of endogenous growth with R&D and market structure

This paper develops a dual economy endogenous growth model to consider the effects of market structure and innovation on the rate of growth of an economy. There is an innovative goods sector where firms consistently invest in research and development to produce new products within a framework of monopolistic competition. Firms in the traditional goods sector produce a homogenous good, compete in a form of oligopoly (quantity competition), and seek to reduce their production costs. It is shown that growth is increasing in the market power that firms in the innovative goods sector obtain but decreasing in the equilibrium number of firms in the traditional goods sector.     

Corporate social responsibility and strategic relationships

We analyze a delegation game relevant to the conduct of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in which the firm’s owner offers the manager a contract consisting of firm profit and social welfare. We derive three results that distinctly differ from existing findings. First, CSR decisions are strategic complements for firms. Second, with simultaneous CSR decisions, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost, despite the fact that firms compete in a Cournot duopoly. Finally, with sequential CSR decisions, unlike the follower firm, the leader firm never exhibits CSR. However, the follower firm can enjoy a profit equal to that derived by the leader in a Cournot–Stackelberg game.     

Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets

Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable. Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: September 22, 1999     

Tax Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets with Environmentally Conscious Consumers

This paper analyses the effects of tax competition on environmental product quality, pollution and welfare in a two-country, vertically differentiated, international duopoly, in which consumers are environmentally conscious. The firm in each country chooses first the environmental quality of its product (which reflects the emissions generated in the production process) and then the price. In equilibrium one country will be more polluted than the other because firms choose different levels of environmental quality of their products. We find that a country’s optimal commodity tax is higher if the domestic firm is the more polluting supplier. Furthermore, non-cooperative commodity tax rates are inefficiently high in equilibrium. This is because, in this framework with environmentally aware consumers, commodity taxes affect the choice of firms regarding their emissions. Therefore, a domestic tax reduction not only raises the profits of the foreign firm but also lowers its emission levels, resulting in higher welfare for the other country. We also analyse the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative commodity and emission taxes with border tax adjustments. With these two policy instruments available, commodity taxes are higher.     

TIME TO MARKET AND IMPATIENT CUSTOMERS

We analyse the decision of firms about when to launch their products on the market when they produce differentiated goods and compete on prices. We find two subgame perfect equilibria: one in which the high‐quality firm holds its leadership in quality, and another in which the low‐quality firm leapfrogs its rival. When the initial level of differentiation is high enough, the low‐quality firm always launches first. Finally, we extend this model to analyse commercial piracy. We obtain that pirates are highly unlikely to launch the illegal copy first because they would bear a higher penalty and a higher risk of being detected.     

FREE VERSUS SECOND‐BEST ENTRY IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC NETWORKS

This paper endogenizes the number of firms in an industry with positive network effects, complete incompatibility, and firms that compete in quantity. To this end, we compare two possibilities: free entry and second‐best number of firms (the one that maximizes social welfare). We show that with business‐stealing competition, free entry yields, in general, more firms than the socially optimal solution. In addition, we find that by the nature of the industry with firm‐specific networks, total production may be greater or lower under free entry than with a regulator; moreover, some industries attain their maximum social welfare with a monopoly.     

Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome

We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.     

我国制造企业“服务增强”的实证研究及政策建议

通过"服务"增强制造企业竞争力、形成服务差异化竞争已成为全球化竞争和知识经济背景下我国制造企业的重要战略选择。本文在界定"制造企业服务增强"微观层面概念和阐述其表现形式的基础上,提出国内制造企业的服务增强具有明显的"质量弥补"特征;随后通过问卷调查获取国内制造业的大样本数据,针对基于要素替代的质量弥补以及服务差异化竞争对绩效的影响展开实证研究;最后,指出国内制造业服务增强存在的不足和问题,提出相应的对策建议。本文对企业管理实践者和政策制定者都有较强的启发意义。     

垂直差异化与合谋稳定性关系分析

市场行为中的默契合谋能使企业获得超额利润,现存的关于生产同质品和差异化产品的经验性研究经常能发现默契合谋的证据.在现实经济的默契合谋行为中,不同的成本结构适用于不同的经济环境或者不同的行业、产业分析,也直接影响着合谋和背离合谋所得的利润,对合谋稳定性有着重要的影响.在垂直差异化的不同成本(固定成本、可变成本)结构下,企业参与竞争的不同竞争类型(古诺竞争和伯川德竞争)对合谋稳定性的影响也是有差异的.     

Monopolistic competition and optimum product selection: Why and how heterogeneity matters

After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality properties of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the availability of an appropriate and parsimonious framework to deal with firm heterogeneity. Within this framework we show that non-separable utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous firm heterogeneity cause the market equilibrium to err in many ways, concerning the number of products, the size and the choice of producers, the overall size of the monopolistically competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the existing literature, we also show that the extent of the errors depends on the degree of firm heterogeneity. In particular, the inefficiency of the market equilibrium is largest when selection among heterogenous firms is needed most, that is, when there are relatively many firms with low productivity and relatively few firms with high productivity.     

On intrabrand and interbrand competition: The strategic role of fees and royalties

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals. When the number of downstream firms is endogenous, each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm. This result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments. We discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per-unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives.     

Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

This study examines a timing game in a mixed duopoly wherein public and private firms compete by taking account of the increasing marginal cost of both firms, as well as partial foreign ownership of the private firm. This study finds that if the private firm has a strong cost advantage over the public firm, public leadership is a risk dominant equilibrium irrespective of foreign ownership ratio. This result means that the cost difference between the public and private firms matters in selecting the risk-dominant equilibrium of the timing game. Additionally, if the private firm has only a weak cost advantage over the public firm, then private leadership (public leadership) is the risk dominant equilibrium if the foreign ownership ratio is (not) small.     

Product quality,advertising intensity and market size

We develop a model of product differentiation in which firms strategically compete in product quality and advertising intensity. Products exhibit a combination of vertical and horizontal differentiation. A consumer’s utility has a stochastic relationship with quality, but they are more likely to prefer a higher quality good. Consumers face a trade-off between higher quality goods and price. Increased competition leads to less advertising, but may result in higher or lower quality products offered in the market.