An Inframarginal Analysis of the Ricardian Model

This paper shows that a 2 × 2 Ricardian model has a unique general equilibrium, and the comparative statics of the equilibrium involve discontinuous jumps. If partial division of labor occurs in equilibrium, the country producing both goods would impose a tariff, whereas the country producing a single good would prefer unilateral free trade. If complete division of labor occurs in equilibrium, both countries would negotiate to achieve free trade. In a model with three countries, the country which does not have a comparative advantage relative to the other two countries, and/or which has low transaction efficiency, may be excluded from trade.     

Comparative Advantage and Economies of Scale: When Does Ricardo Dominate Smith?

This paper develops a two-country, two-sector (X and Y) model of international trade. One country has comparative advantage in the increasing returns Y-sector. The direction of trade depends on the relative size of the countries and the relative strength of economies of scale and comparative advantage. An equilibrium where the smallest country exports the Y-good and the largest country loses from trade is possible. A dynamic equilibrium where the X-sector is subject to learning by doing locks in the initial pattern of specialization. Yet, there may be few welfare gains from protecting the X-sector in the small country.     

Trade Sophistication Indicators: Balancing Diversity and Specialization

Motivated by the important role of trade in driving and reflecting economic transformation, we focus on the export structure of two small export-oriented economies, Ireland and Finland 2000–2009, from the perspective of the sophistication of both economies’ exports, i.e., the extent to which high-value products characterise each country’s export profile. The Product Space method is used as the basis of our comparison of the economies in terms of their sectors, activities, and structural transformation of the economies. The method focuses attention on the estimated density of the product space as evident in patterns of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in goods exports. The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector, as a significant export sector for both economies, is examined specifically to investigate its further export potential.     

TOURISM AND INDUSTRIAL AGGLOMERATION

Tourism generates considerable income and employment in host countries and regions, which substantially improves local economies. Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector remains the most important part in regional and national economies. This paper investigates their interdependence through a general‐equilibrium analysis. On the one hand, a tourism boom is pro‐industrialization because the income generated by tourism attracts more manufacturing firms and, on the other hand, de‐industrialization for attracting labour from the manufacturing sector. We clarify conditions of trade balances in three sectors. The welfare analysis clarifies conditions for the smaller country to be better off, and conditions for the equilibrium to be optimal.     

Factor Endowments,Democracy, and Trade Policy Divergence

We develop a stochastic model of electoral competition in order to study the economic and political determinants of trade policy. We model a small open economy with two tradable goods, each of which is produced using a sector‐specific factor (e.g., land and capital) and another factor that is mobile between these tradable sectors (labor); one nontradable good, which is also produced using a specific factor (skilled labor), and an elected government with the mandate to tax trade flows. The tax revenue is used to provide local public goods that increase the economic agents’ utility. We use this general equilibrium model to explicitly derive the ideal policies of the different socioeconomic groups in society (landlords, industrialists, labor, and skilled workers). We then use those ideal policies to model the individual probabilistic voting behavior of the members of each of these socioeconomic groups. We use this model to shed light on how differences in the comparative advantages of countries explain trade policy divergence between countries as well as trade policy instability within countries. We regard trade policy instability to mean that, in equilibrium, political parties diverge in terms of the political platforms they adopt. We show that in natural resource (land)–abundant economies with very little capital, or in economies that specializes in the production of manufactures, parties tend to converge to the same policy platform, and trade policy is likely to be stable and relatively close to free trade. In contrast, in a natural resource–abundant economy with an important domestic industry that competes with the imports, parties tend to diverge, and trade policy is likely to be more protectionist and unstable.     

Vertical specialization in North–South trade: Industrial relocation,wage and welfare

This paper presents a North–South trade model with vertically linked industries and examines how declining costs of trade across stages of production encourage vertical specialization and affect wages and welfare. As trade costs fall below a threshold, the production of all final goods relocates to the South and vertical specialization emerges. In some industries, production of intermediate goods also relocates against comparative costs because of benefits of co‐location, and further declines in trade costs lead to reshoring. A country may temporarily lose from falling trade costs, but both countries can be better off after trade costs fall sufficiently.     

Uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a tariff retaliation model

This paper considers uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium of a tariff retaliation model. The approach to the problem is geometrical and reminiscent of the analysis for the free trade competitive equilibrium. If the countries have constant elasticity of substitution utility functions, some simple conditions can be used to prove uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the tariff retaliation game. The welfare effects of endowment changes are analyzed in terms of the standard terms of trade and volume of trade effects. If the elasticity of substitution of one of the countries is sufficiently high, immiserizing growth will not occur.      

Liberalizing Services Trade In APEC: A General Equilibrium Analysis with Imperfect Competition

The paper studies services-sector trade liberalization in the Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum using a global, multicountry, multisector applied general equilibrium model with an imperfectly competitive service sector. Reducing the service sector's nontariff barriers is modeled by eliminating the possibility for oligopolistic firms to price-discriminate between client countries within APEC and lowering the fixed costs of the firms doing service exporting business. The results suggest that services trade liberalization reinforces existing sectoral trade balances. Increase in demand for intermediate services tends to reinforce rather than counteract the role of primary factors in determining sectoral comparative advantage. The western APEC members received the greatest welfare gains from services trade liberalization, while the developing economies gained more if only tariffs were eliminated.     

International Economies of Scale and the Gains from Trade

In this paper, we present a two-country trade model with external economies of scale that emerge on an international level but are partially localized in each country. First, we show that the larger country exports the good produced in an industry with external economies of scale in the trading equilibrium. Second, we investigate the welfare effects of trade for the following two cases: (I) the case where external economies are completely localized in autarky; (II) the case where external economies are internationally effective in autarky. In case (II), it is shown that trade can be welfare-decreasing for both countries.     

Does Preferential Trade Benefit Poor Countries? A General Equilibrium Assessment with Nonhomothetic Preferences

We develop a Ricardian model of trade with nonhomothetic preferences to analyze preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among countries of different stages of economic development. The richer a country is, the more likely will PTAs improve its terms of trade, also when it is a non‐member. Rich non‐member countries are also less likely to incur welfare losses from PTAs. PTA membership only guarantees welfare gains for countries that are too poor to import the goods rich countries produce. For all other countries, the welfare effects of joining PTAs depend on the world income distribution and on the strength of comparative advantages.     

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER ALTERNATIVE TRADE REGIMES*

How does openness affect economic development? This question is answered in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy, where countries have technological differences that are both sector neutral and specific to the investment goods sector. Relative to a benchmark case of trade in credit markets only, consider (i) a complete restriction of trade and (ii) a full liberalization of trade. The first change decreases the cross‐sectional dispersion of incomes only slightly, and produces a relatively small welfare loss. The second change, instead, decreases dispersion by a significant amount, and produces a very large welfare gain.     

Globalization,rigidities and national specialization: a dynamic analysis

The paper extends the ‘dynamic’ economic geography technique to analyze the evolution of national specialization as trade costs decrease. As agglomeration economies arise, due to the decrease of trade costs, countries could benefit from specializing in one sector. Nevertheless, the sector of specialization, as well as the speed of relocation of factors towards this sector, depends crucially on the costs of relocating factors and on comparative advantages. Labor market rigidities and comparative advantages contribute to lock a country in its current specialization pattern slowing relocation of factors. The model is consistent with some stylized facts on specialization and labor market rigidities in OECD countries.     

Status-Seeking, Catching-Up, and Comparative Statics in a Dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin Model

This paper examines a two‐country dynamic general equilibrium model with status‐seeking agents. We show that the introduction of status‐seeking behavior brings about new properties in equilibrium dynamics. While there exists a continuum of steady states in the standard dynamic models, the present framework demonstrates that, under some conditions, there uniquely exists an incompletely specialized steady state, which is locally saddle‐point stable. Therefore, catching‐up and overtaking phenomena seen in economic development can be explained, and comparative statics analysis also is made possible. Our comparative statics analysis illustrates, for example, that trade pattern is determined in the Heckscher–Ohlin manner; the patient country acts just like a capital abundant one to export the capital‐intensive good. Furthermore, as distinct from the existing literature, the present study shows that the existence of an incompletely specialized steady state can be ensured even if the two countries conduct different policies.     

Fragmentation, Engel's Law, and Learning

This paper outlines the conditions under which trade is beneficial for a developing country's growth. A developing country suffers from two disadvantages: low income and a comparative disadvantage in the production of modern manufactured goods—goods which allow a high rate of human capital accumulation through learning by doing. Low income together with Engel's law imply that developing countries consume and produce very few modern goods in autarky and hence grow slowly. With international fragmentation of production, a developing country may find comparative advantage in the production of some stages of modern goods despite an absence of comparative advantage in the production of modern goods under “100% local content.” More resources can then be allocated to the modern goods sector leading to greater learning externalities and hence growth under free trade than in autarky.     

Predator–prey dynamics in general equilibrium and the role of trade

We examine the implications of trade in an economy with two interrelated natural resources, focusing on the case of a simple predator–prey relationship. We derive a three-sector general equilibrium model where production functions are linked via the ecological dynamics of the natural system. Under autarky, this economy exhibits a steady-state equilibrium that overexploits the prey stock, reducing the linked predator population and overall welfare in the absence of harvesting controls. When two economies engage in trade, differences in the dynamics of the two resource systems can become the basis for comparative advantage. In this case, the predator–prey relationship leads to a source of comparative advantage in harvesting prey for a country with a lower autarky steady-state proportion of predators to prey. This feature has not been noticed in the literature and leads to a counterintuitive implication: free trade can help conserve predator and prey stocks in the country with the higher autarkic steady-state proportion of predators to prey. To illustrate the relevance of our analytic findings, we present the stylized empirical example of the effect of Chinook salmon imports on killer whale populations.     

International Trade and Manufacturing Employment: Is India following the Footsteps of Asia or Africa?

The Indian manufacturing sector has rapidly increased its integration with the world economy since the 1991 trade reforms. We examine whether trade integration created or destroyed jobs in the Indian manufacturing sector, and compare India's employment outcomes with four other countries—Bangladesh, Kenya, South Africa, and Vietnam. We find that the impact of international trade on manufacturing employment seems to be similar to those found for the two African countries rather than the two Asian countries, a surprising result for a country with an apparent comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing goods, and a large excess supply of unskilled labor.     

Preferences,Country Bias,and International Trade

The paper analyzes international trade in a Ricardian world where consumer preferences exhibit country bias. In particular, consumers differentiate between identical physical goods by country of manufacture. In contrast to the classical Ricardian model, the pattern of international specialization in production depends on the preference structure. Possible equilibrium configurations include ones where both countries specialize incompletely and trade in both commodities, as well as situations where the pattern of specialization and trade is the reverse of that in the classical Ricardian world. Both interindustry and intraindustry trade can occur simultaneously, though there are no market imperfections or scale economies.     

Managerial versus Production Wages: Offshoring,Country Size,and Endowments

We explore the role of trade in differentiated final goods as well as offshoring of tasks for inequality both within and between countries, emphasizing the distinction between managerial and production labour. We extend Grossman and Rossi‐Hansberg (2012), where task trade is driven by external economies of scale, by considering asymmetric endowments. Identifying possible equilibrium patterns of task trade, we find little scope for two‐way trade if endowments are asymmetric. Our numerical simulations identify non‐monotonicities between the level of offshoring and measures of within‐country as well as between‐country inequality.     

考虑港口收费管制的进出口贸易竞争研究

考虑港口的收费管制因素,建立了进出口贸易竞争模型。该模型由一个出口国和两个进口国组成,且各国都拥有一个港口,位于出口国的两家公司均向两个进口国销售商品,并在各个进口国展开市场竞争（古诺竞争或伯川德竞争）,各贸易国的港口根据其是否存在价格管制确定港口收费。针对进出口公司的每种竞争模式,得到了不同的港口收费管制组合下各贸易国的港口收费、港口利润和社会福利,并将竞争均衡结果进行了比较。研究发现： （1）在进出口公司古诺竞争模式下,若三个贸易国的港口都无收费管制（有收费管制）且进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,各贸易国的社会福利和港口利润均更高; （2）在进出口公司伯川德竞争模式下,若进出口产品的差异较大 （小）,则出口国的港口利润主要取决于港口收费 （贸易量）,而进口国恰好相反; （3）当进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,进出口公司在古诺 （伯川德）竞争模式下各贸易国的社会福利、港口利润以及港口使用费都更高。     

The Energy-Bias of North–South Technology Spillovers: A Global,Bilateral, Bisectoral Trade Analysis

We examine variations in the South–North ratios (emerging vs. industrialized countries) of energy and labor intensities driven by imports. We use the novel World input-output database that provides bilateral and bisectoral data for 40 countries and 35 sectors for 1995–2009. We find South–North convergence of energy and labor intensities, an energy bias of import-driven convergence and no robust difference between imports of intermediate and investment goods. Accordingly, trade helps emerging economies follow a ‘green growth’ path, and trade-related policies can enhance this path. However, the effects are economically small and require a long time horizon to become effective. Trade-related policies can become much more effective in selected countries and sectors: China attenuates labor intensity via imports of intermediate goods above average. Brazil reduces energy intensity via imports of intermediate and investment goods above average. Production of machinery as an importing sector in emerging countries can immoderately benefit from trade-related reductions in factor intensities. Electrical equipment as a traded good particularly decreases energy intensity. Machinery particularly dilutes labor intensity. Our main results are statistically highly significant and robust across specifications.