Price equilibrium in address models of product differentiation: unit-elastic demand

Summary. I present a class of address models of product differentiation with unit-elastic individual demand and show the existence of Nash equilibrium in prices under assumptions on utility functions and the taste and income heterogeneity across consumers. This paper complements the work by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991, Econometrica), who analyze unit demand models of product differentiation. Received: December 28, 1998; revised version: September 5, 2001     

An Example of Nonexistence of Three-Community Equilibrium

In this paper I provide an example of sorting equilibrium nonexistence in a three‐community model of the type introduced in Caplin and Nalebuff (1997; Journal of Economic Theory 72, 306–342). With two communities, such an example has been shown to exist only when the dimension of the policy space is even. It turns out, however, that with three communities existence may fail regardless of whether the policy space dimension is odd or even. This suggests that the original odd/even dichotomy can, at least in part, be explained by the evenness of the number of communities.     

A remark on a utility representation theorem of Rader

Summary In this note we consider some problems involved in proving the existence of a continuous real-valued utility function representing a preference relation. We claim that there is an error in the classical Rader proof of the existence of an upper semicontinuous utility function. We also pose some open questions regarding some problems in utility theory.The work for this paper was begun while I was visiting the Department of Applied Economics at the University of Cambridge in 1992. I thank the Department for its hospitality. I should also like to thank A. F. Beardon for some extremely valuable discussions about the general nature of utility functions.     

The origin of utility: Sexual selection and conspicuous consumption

This paper proposes an explanation for the universal human desire for increasing consumption and the associated propensity to trade survival opportunity off conspicuous consumption. I argue that this desire was moulded in evolutionary times by a mechanism known to biologists as sexual selection, whereby an observable trait – conspicuous consumption in this case – is used by members of one sex to signal their unobservable characteristics valuable to members of the opposite sex. It then shows that the standard economics problem of utility maximisation is formally equivalent to the standard biology problem of the maximisation of individual fitness, the ability to pass genes to future generations, and thus establishes a rigorous theoretical foundation for including conspicuous consumption in the utility function.     

The benefits of in-kind government programs

In this paper I present a methodology to calculate the benefits of in-kind programs such as public housing which restrict consumption of some goods to the levels offered by the government. Most previous studies begin with an a priori specification of the direct utility function. I begin with the ordinary demand function and then integrate demand to recover the indirect utility function and the expenditure function. I argue that this approach gives additional flexibility in choosing a functional form which best describes the data. I then use this methodology to estimate the benefits of the U.S. government's Section 8 housing program.     

Aggregation of Utility and Equivalence Scales: A Solution to the Pangloss Critique

Definitions of equivalence scales are usually based on a household utility function. This may be founded on an assumption of the household maximizing a welfare function of individual utilities. Basing inter-household comparisons of welfare on this approach is fallacious because households put different weight on the utility of the various household members, a weighting that does not necessarily correspond to an ethically sound aggregation of utility. This is called the Pangloss critique. To solve the problem, I suggest keeping the model of household behavior, but to introduce a new function to aggregate the household members' utilities. Equivalence scales based on this approach are shown to have desirable properties.     

Environmental Valuation with Imperfect Information The Case of the Random Utility Model

This paper considers welfare analysis with therandom utility model (RUM) when perceptions ofenvironmental quality differ from objectivemeasures of environmental quality. Environmental quality is assumed to be anexperience good, so that while perceptions ofquality determine choices, ex postutility is determined by objective quality. Given this assumption, I derive a measure ofthe welfare impact of changes in environmentalquality, and I show how this new welfaremeasure differs from the traditional welfaremeasure developed by Hanemann (1982). This newwelfare measure provides an approach tomeasuring the value of information aboutenvironmental quality within the framework ofthe random utility model.     

Collective Action and the Institutionalist Approach to Financial Regulation

Drawing on the institutionalist approach to a capitalist economy as a money economy, I regard financial regulation and supervision as a collective action problem. I argue that, given the basic characteristics of such an economy, a financial system may be considered as a public utility and financial stability as a public good. I then maintain that the provision of the latter could not rely on private market mechanisms, such as self-regulation and price-directed incentives. As capitalism develops through more financialized forms, new institutions and regulatory rules must be designed to reframe the market’s boundaries in order to consolidate systemic stability, which is a basic condition for continuous and sustainable economic relations in society. I then suggest a precautionary-principle-based macro-prudential approach to financial regulation in order to ensure a sustainable provision of finance and financial stability that is consistent with the characteristics of a money economy.     

The older the more valuable: Divergence between utility and dollar values of life as one ages

While the utility value of life may decrease monotonically with age, the dollar value may increase dramatically until a fairly old age (by ten-fold to age 60 for one plausible set of parameters). Crucial for this result is a high enough real rate of interest (e.g. 4–5%) which makes accumulation desirable, leading to a lower marginal utility of money when one gets older, explaining the divergence. This divergence raises perplexing questions as to which value of life should be used and whether the old should be taxed and the young subsidized.I am grateful to Ross Parish for stimulation and to Keith McLaren and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclassical growth model

This paper provides a counterexample to the simplest version of the redistribution models considered by Judd (1985) in which the government chooses an optimal distortionary tax on capitalists to finance a lump-sum payment to workers. I show that the steady-state optimal tax on capital income is generally non-zero when the capitalists’ utility is logarithmic and the government faces a balanced-budget constraint. With log utility, agents’ optimal decisions depend solely on the current rate of return, not any future rates of return or tax rates. This feature of the economy effectively deprives the government of a useful policy instrument because promises about future tax rates can no longer influence current allocations. When combined with a lack of other suitable policy instruments (such as government bonds), the result is an inability to decentralize the allocations that are consistent with a zero-limiting capital tax. I show that the standard approach to solving the dynamic optimal tax problem yields the wrong answer in this (knife-edge) case because it fails to properly enforce the constraints associated with the competitive equilibrium. Specifically, the standard approach lets in an additional policy instrument through the back door.     

Thoreau's economic philosophy

Abstract

This paper provides an encompassing portrayal of Thoreau's economic thought. It is analyzed against the background of the history of economic thought and the economic thinking of his time. Thoreau's economic thought is an extensive examination of the ideas of classical political economy, and particularly of Jean-Baptiste Say, and it is a fundamental critique thereof. Thoreau recognizes that some aspects and foundations of the modern conception of the economy lead to an alienation of the human being from itself as well as to an alienation from nature. I demonstrate that this critique is a result of Thoreau's specific approach to the economy, which, based on his particular understanding of the human being and his philosophy of nature, seeks the meaning of the economy for human life and for nature. In this philosophical approach, which I characterize as an economic philosophy, Thoreau's deeper defiance of classical political economy and his original place within the history of economic thought are grounded. It leads Thoreau to an alternative conception of an economy of moderation, which is identified and described in detail. I conclude with considerations on the potential meaning of Thoreau's thought for current economic research.     

Quantifying nontariff barriers in Ukraine: a comprehensive trade cost approach

Great strides have been made recently in the theoretical approach to quantifying nontariff barriers. Modifying an approach proposed by Novy (2013), this article attempts to understand the extent of nontariff barriers between Ukraine and its major trading partners in goods by fashioning a new approach to trade in services as well. I provide the first comprehensive estimates of ad valorem equivalents of the nontariff measures that exist in Ukraine.     

The set of sunspot equilibria in economies with incomplete financial markets: variable asset prices

Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1). Moreover, the map from states o f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium. Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000     

Pareto and contemporary economic theory

This paper provides explanations for Pareto’s apparently contradictory approach to demand theory in simultaneously insisting that measurability of utility is not needed to explain the equilibrium of consumers in competitive markets, and embracing concavifiability and thus measurability of utility when this implies restrictions on consumers’ behavior such as the law of demand. It also treats his method of calibrating an aggregate demand function by employing his law of income distribution, so as to reproduce “Gregory King’s law”. Finally, some disputed issues are dealt with concerning the nature of Pareto’s contributions to welfare economics. (JEL: B13, D11, D60).     

“Price Levels and Economic Growth: Making Sense of Revisions to Data on Real Incomes”: A Comment

In his recent paper, Ravallion (2013) proposes a new method to predict changes in purchasing power parities (PPPs), arguing that a model that includes economic growth and exchange rate movements is superior to the standard approach of using inflation differences. In this comment, I argue that his test is wrong and I show that with a correct specification of the test, there is no robust and stable relationship between changes in PPPs and economic growth while the usefulness of the standard approach is confirmed. I also suggest an approach that could be more helpful to understand changes in PPPs.     

A Lagrangean approach to the limit theorem on the core of an economy

Conclusion It is shown that an allocation which remains in the core under replication gives rise to an utility allocation with the following property: The utility level of no class can be increased without decreasing the utility level of at least one other class even if the number of consumers is allowed to vary continuously. An examination of the first order conditions the corresponding maximum problem with constraints leads to the conclusion that the allocation can be sustained by a price vector as a competitive equilibrium. This is the limit theorem on the core, proved in this paper with a simple Lagrangean technique.The notion of Pareto efficiency with a variable number of consumers proves useful for other purposes as well. For an extensive discussion of that point the reader is referred to Schweizer (1981).Ours, of course, is not the first calculus approach to the limit theorem [see e. g. L. Johansen (1978)]. But, as far as I know, the method of differentiating the Lagrangean simply with respect to the number of consumers is novel and leads to a straightforward proof of the theorem which can be reproduced in class-rooms even at the undergraduate level.The author wants to thank Joseph Greenberg and Werner Hildenbrand as well as an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Perspectives from the Happiness Literature and the Role of New Instruments for Policy Analysis

After having been ignored for a long time by economists, happinessis becoming an object of serious research in 21st century economics.In Section 2 we sketch the present status of happiness economics.In Section 3 we consider the practical applicability of happinesseconomics, retaining the assumption of ordinal individual utilities.In Section 4 we introduce a cardinal utility concept, whichseems to us the natural consequence of the happiness economicsmethodology. In Section 5 we sketch how this approach can leadto a normative approach to policy problems that is admissiblefrom a positivist point of view. Section 6 concludes. (JEL codes:B21, B41, D63, I31, I38)     

Social contracts for real moral agents: a synthesis of public reason and public choice approaches to constitutional design

Citizens in contemporary democratic societies disagree deeply about the nature of the good life, and they disagree just as profoundly about justice. In building a social contract theory for diverse citizens, then, we cannot rely as heavily on the theory of justice as John Rawls did. I contend that Rawlsian liberals should instead focus on developing an account of constitutional choice that does not depend on agreement about justice. I develop such an account by drawing on the contractarian approach to constitutional choice pioneered by public choice theorists, especially James Buchanan. With some modifications, public choice can help identify mutually justifiable constitutional rules based on the extent to which these constitutional rules produce appropriate laws under normal conditions. This new, synthetic approach to constitutional choice also helps to explain the moral significance of contractarian agreement for the public choice theorist.     

Modelling the world wool market: A hybrid approach

We present a model of the world wool market that merges two modelling traditions: the partial-equilibrium commodity-specific approach and the computable-general-equilibrium approach. The model captures the multistage nature of the wool production system, and the heterogeneous nature of raw wool, processed wool and wool garments. It also captures the important wool producing and consuming regions of the world. We illustrate the utility of the model by estimating the effects of tariff barriers on wool products using partial- and general-equilibrium solutions. We find that either solution generates similar wool industry results, whereas the macroeconomic effects differ significantly with the partial-equilibrium estimates significantly overestimating the benefits of the tariff changes.     

Excess supply equilibria

This paper addresses a fundamental problem in economic theory: How can there be equilibria of the economic system where some commodity is in excess supply, yet that commodity's relative price shows no tendency to fall? Of course, the principal example of such a phenomenon is an economy experiencing a prolonged period of involuntary unemployment of the labor force during which there is no significant change in the real wage.In the following pages, I shall describe a two-commodity, general equilibrium model that has a continuum of unemployment equilibria, one for any given unemployment rate. The important feature of this model is that workers establish their wage rates in an attempt to maximize expected utility. The information upon which these wage setting decisions are based is provided by actual labor market transactions.Despite the voluntary nature of the wage setting decision, I shall argue that each equilibrium of this economy exhibits involuntary unemployment in the Keynesian sense. For there will always be another equilibrium with a lower real wage, a higher level of employment, and at which (at least when workers are risk neutral) each worker achieves a higher level of expected utility.