Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China

Corporate governance issues arising from concentrated ownership structure in emerging economies have received growing attention. Adopting a principal–principal perspective, this paper employs structural equation modeling to evaluate the independent and interdependent effects of internal governance mechanisms in enhancing firms’ value in China. Based on a 3-year dataset covering 304 publicly listed companies over 2003–2005, our findings suggest that ownership concentration has the most significant governance effect and has impacted negatively on firm performance. Furthermore, the governance role of the board of directors and supervisory boards is found to have been hindered by ownership concentration, rendering them unable to improve firm performance at present.     

Clear and present danger: Planning and new venture survival amid political and civil violence

Many entrepreneurs in developing economies face unstable environments due to violence and civil unrest. Yet, we know very little about how environments characterized by high levels of political and civil violence affect new venture processes and survival. Moreover, it is unclear whether standard theories about organizational strategy, such as planning, hold true in such environments. We explore these issues using a sample of 730 new ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001. We find that political and civil violence decreases firm survival, increases the benefits of incremental (operational) planning, and decreases the benefits of comprehensive (strategic) planning. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Behind organizational slack and firm performance in China: The moderating roles of ownership and competitive intensity

Extensive studies of the organizational slack–performance relationship offer mixed findings in developed economies while little research attends to transition economies. Replicating and extending earlier work by Tan and Peng (2003), this study examines the relationship between organizational slack and firm performance in China and focuses on the moderating effects of firm ownership and competitive intensity. Empirical findings based on longitudinal data from 60,945 firms during 1998–2002 suggest that the impact of organizational slack on performance is stronger for private enterprises than for SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises. Furthermore, industry competitive intensity positively moderates the effect of organizational slack on performance. In a three-way interaction effect, the moderating effect of competitive intensity on the organizational slack–performance relationship is weaker in SOEs than in private enterprises and foreign invested enterprises.     

The role of informal institutions in corporate governance: Brazil,Russia, India,and China compared

This paper argues that the role of informal institutions as well as formal ones is central to understanding the functioning of corporate governance. We focus on the four largest emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, and China—commonly referred to as the BRIC countries. Our analysis is based on the Helmke and Levitsky framework of informal institutions and focuses on two related aspects of corporate governance: firm ownership structures and property rights; and the relationship between firms and external investors. We argue that for China and some states of India, “substitutive” informal institutions, whereby informal institutions substitute for and replace ineffective formal institutions, are critical in creating corporate governance leading to enhanced domestic and foreign investment. In contrast, Russia is characterized by “competing” informal institutions whereby various informal mechanisms of corporate governance associated with corruption and clientelism undermine the functioning of reasonably well set-out formal institutions relating to shareholder rights and relations with investors. Finally Brazil is characterized by “accommodating” informal institutions which get around the effectively enforced but restrictive formal institutions and reconcile varying objectives that are held between actors in formal and informal institutions.     

Multiple agency perspective,family control,and private information abuse in an emerging economy

Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how family control affects private information abuses and firm performance in emerging economies. We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies of multiple agency perspectives and argue that family ownership and control over the board increases the risk of private information abuse. This, in turn, has a negative impact on stock market performance. Family control is associated with an incentive to distort information disclosure to minority shareholders and obtain private benefits of control. However, the multiple agency roles of controlling families may have different governance properties in terms of investors’ perceptions of private information abuse. These findings contribute to our understanding of the conflicting evidence on the governance role of family control within a multiple agency perspective.     

Acquisition of organizational capabilities and competitive advantage of IJVs in transition economies: The case of Vietnam

Using Vietnam as the context, the study empirically examines how the competitive advantage of international joint ventures (IJVs) in transition economies is affected by the acquisition of resources from foreign partners and of local market-based resources. Our study contributes to the nascent literature on IJVs in transition economies by producing several novel and interesting findings. First, it demonstrates the need to modify certain arguments of the resource-based view (RBV) when applied to IJVs in transition economies. This paper shows that the peculiar market characteristics of transition economies serve as an imitation barrier turning even property-based resources into sources of sustainable competitive advantage. Second, the positive impact of knowledge-based resources on the IJV’s competitiveness seems to be significantly enhanced as the ownership by the foreign parent increases. Lastly, competitive advantage of IJVs appears to be strengthened when the transfer of property-based resources is complemented by that of knowledge-based resources, and when the transfer of internal, firm-specific resources is complemented by that of external, market-based ones. We believe that these findings make significant, incremental theoretical and empirical contributions to both the RBV and IJV literatures.

Conformity,political participation,and economic rewards: The case of Chinese private entrepreneurs

Using institutional and resource dependence theories as the conceptual framework, this study identifies three forms of conformity—political, economic, and social—that can affect the level of private entrepreneurs’ formal political participation in a transition economy. Data from a 2004 national-wide survey of 3,012 private firms in China show that political conformity (indicated by membership in the ruling party), economic conformity (amount of taxes paid), and social conformity (amount of charity donated) are each antecedents to private entrepreneurs’ formal political participation. Moreover, political conformity negatively moderates the relationship between social conformity and private entrepreneurs’ formal political participation—for party members, a lesser amount of charity is associated with higher levels of political position as compared to non-party members. We also found that the rewards of formal political participation have institutional boundaries: political participation can indeed bring private entrepreneurs economic rewards such as a greater amount of loans from state banks but not from shareholding and underground banks.     

Recognition of entrepreneur’s social ties and firm innovation in emerging markets: explanation from the industrial institutional environment and survival pressure

Despite the extensive attention to the role of entrepreneurs’ business or political ties, few studies have distinguished the basis of those social ties. The aim of this study is to explore the different roles of the entrepreneurs’ personalized and formal social ties on the firms’ innovation performance. Based on renqing and formal rules, this study extends the social ties’ typology into four categories, namely, transactional business ties, transactional political ties, guanxi business ties, and guanxi political ties. Using data collected from 209 Chinese firms, we further identify the distinctive contributions of the different ties on the entrepreneurial firm’s innovation performance under different institutional environments and entrepreneurs’ survival pressure. This paper will help researchers and managers better understand the function of social ties in innovation in emerging markets, such as China.

     

Managerial ownership and the role of privatization in transition economies: The case of China

Within transition economies, a popular tactic for revitalizing large and inefficient stateowned enterprises (SOEs) is to privatize them. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence related to this issue is equivocal. This study, therefore, explores more deeply what the relationship may be between privatization efforts of SOEs and their financial performance in transition economies. Specifically, we seek to better understand whether privatization reforms per se, or other corporate governance mechanisms that complement or substitute for this effort, are most effective. Using a panel sample of Chinese state-owned public firms over an eight year period from 1999 to 2006, we find that managerial ownership has a more significant impact on firm performance than privatization does. This finding suggests that internal incentives to managers may be more effective than external market mechanisms in economies transitioning from centralized planning to market control. Our results are robust using a wide variety of performance measures and different model specifications.     

How entrepreneurs leverage institutional intermediaries in emerging economies to acquire public resources

Research summary: Governments in emerging economies often use institutional intermediaries to promote entrepreneurship, and bridge the void between ventures and public funding. While prior literature describes what institutional intermediaries do, it leaves open how intermediaries support different types of entrepreneurs. By comparing science park and non‐science park firms in Beijing and across China, we distinguish which entrepreneurs benefit from certification versus capability‐building through the introduction of two new constructs: skill adequacy and context relevance. Broadly, our study adds insights at the nexus of emerging economies and entrepreneurship research, and to the tie formation and institutional intermediaries literatures. Managerial summary: A key dilemma facing entrepreneurs is how to finance their ventures. While entrepreneurs in developed economies can seek VC or angel investment, entrepreneurs in emerging economies often need to pursue potential government funding opportunities. Our study highlights three strategies for acquiring government funding. Well‐connected entrepreneurs can leverage their political ties to acquire such funding. Less‐connected entrepreneurs can leverage science parks that in emerging markets are designed to help governments to identify promising ventures. For returnees whose ample experience abroad may not fit with local ways of doing business, gaining science park admission can certify quality and so ease the path to government funding. For technically skilled local entrepreneurs who lack business skills, science parks can help build such skills, which then ease the path to government funding. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are emerging economies less efficient? Performance persistence and the impact of business group affiliation

By drawing a theoretical distinction between the persistence of superior and poor performance, we reconcile the conflicting predictions of the ‘revisionist’ and accepted views on the persistence of firm performance in emerging economies. Using a sample of manufacturing firms in the United States and India, we show that superior firm performance in emerging economies persists only as much as developed economies in line with the revisionist argument. We also provide evidence consistent with the accepted view that poor firm performance persists longer in emerging economies compared to developed economies. Further exploration of the latter shows that, contrary to predictions of extant theories, firms in emerging economies that are affiliated with an MNC or a business group have a greater persistence of poor performance than firms that are unaffiliated with these intermediate governance structures, and hence would be better off operating at arm's length. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of relational ties paradox on financial and non-financial consequences of servitization: Roles of organizational flexibility and improvisation

Drawing from relational governance and dynamic capabilities literature streams, we develop a conceptual model in which business and political ties are antecedents of organizational flexibility, which in turn are related to organizational improvisation and, ultimately, financial and non-financial firm performance. We test our model using a data collected from 302 Turkish senior managers. We find positive direct and indirect impacts of business ties on organizational improvisation, and negative direct and indirect impacts of political ties on organizational improvisation. We find organizational improvisation significantly related to several indicators of firm performance. Our results provide clarity on relational governance and firm performance. The intermediate variables of organizational flexibility and improvisation shed light on equivocal findings regarding the effects of business and political ties on firm performance.     

Technology and the Size Distribution of Firms: Evidence from Dutch Manufacturing

Empirical studies have shown that the size distribution of firms can be described as a Pareto distribution. However, these studies have focused on large firms and aggregate statistics. Little attention has been placed on the role of technology in shaping firm size distributions. Using a comprehensive dataset of manufacturing firms and the Community Innovation Survey from the Netherlands, the paper investigates the relationship between firm size and technology. It shows that technological factors shape the distribution of firm size, suggesting that the Pareto law is not an invariant property and that technology can constrain the “self-organising” character of industrial economies.     

Firm‐specific knowledge resources and competitive advantage: the roles of economic‐ and relationship‐based employee governance mechanisms

The resource‐based view of the firm emphasizes the role of firm‐specific resources, especially firm‐specific knowledge resources, in helping a firm to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. However, the deployment of firm‐specific knowledge often requires key employees to make specialized human capital investments that are not easily redeployable to other settings. Thus, in the absence of effective safeguards and trust building devices, employees with foresight may be reluctant to make such specialized investments. This study explores both economic‐ and relationship‐based governance mechanisms that might mitigate this underinvestment problem. Effective use of these governance mechanisms enables a firm to obtain greater performance from its efforts to deploy firm‐specific knowledge resources. Empirical results further support these key arguments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Supporting new product commercialization through managerial social ties and market knowledge development in an emerging economy

While it has been advocated that the generation and application of market knowledge shape marketing capabilities to commercialize new products, the weak institutional environment makes access to critical market knowledge challenging in emerging economies. Critically, managerial social ties with business and political institutions may complement the firm’s market orientation (MO) to obtain market knowledge that is not available in the open market in emerging economies. This study draws attention to the differential roles of business and political ties in complementing or inhibiting the effects of market orientation on exploratory and exploitative marketing capabilities in one of the “Next Eleven” emerging economies, Iran. The results help firms operating in emerging economies to identify the conditions under which business and political ties help to overcome institutional limitations, complement market-oriented efforts, and successfully commercialize new products.     

Does ownership matter in private equity? The sources of variance in buyouts' performance

We study the impact of ownership on firm performance in an unexplored governance context: private equity (PE) firms and the buyouts in which they invest. We employ a multiple‐membership, cross‐classified, multilevel model on a unique database of 6,950 buyouts realized by 255 PE firms between 1973 and 2008 in 77 countries. The results document a significant PE firm effect (4.6%), the importance of which grows as time passes. We then study three contingencies that increase the importance of the PE firm effect: (1) value addition vs. selection strategies; (2) developed vs. emerging economies; and (3) economic downturns. Our findings shed new light on the sources of variance in buyouts' performance. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Development of Trust: A Study of Interfirm Relationships in Vietnam

The radical political and economic reforms sweeping through former socialist countries during the last decade have opened rich opportunities for privately owned businesses to emerge and develop. Since the market institutions and infrastructures in these countries are largely underdeveloped, private firms in transition economies rely extensively on interfirm partnerships. This raises the question of how—in the absence of institutions that legitimate markets, contracts, and private property—managers of new business ventures develop new relationships. This paper addresses this issue through analysis of multiple subcontracting relationships formed at a private garment company in Vietnam. This analysis suggests that firms in transition economies develop interfirm trust in ways that are quite different from their counterparts in more highly developed economies.     

Inter‐temporal economies of scope,organizational modularity,and the dynamics of diversification

The question of whether corporations add value beyond that created by individual businesses has engendered much debate in recent years. Some of this debate has focused on the pros and cons of related vs. unrelated diversification. A standard explanation of the benefits of related diversification has to do with the ability to obtain intra‐temporal economies of scope from contemporaneous sharing of resources by related businesses within the firm. In contrast, this paper deals with inter‐temporal economies of scope that firms achieve by redeploying resources and capabilities between related businesses over time, as firms exit some markets while entering others. The transfer of resources due to market exit distinguishes our treatment of inter‐temporal economies of scope from standard intra‐temporal economies of scope. In addition, these inter‐temporal economies can benefit from a decentralized and modular organizational structure. This ability to obtain inter‐temporal economies of scope via organizational modularity and recombination suggests that corporations do not necessarily need a high degree of coordination between business units in order to benefit from a strategy of related diversification. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Export channel structure in a newly industrialized economy

Using data from the Hong Kong electronics industry, this paper studies the “make” or “buy” decisions associated with export channel strategies (Peng, Zhou, & York, 2006). Findings show that the integrated channels (the “make” decision in transaction cost theory) play a more important role on exporting than the market governance channels (the “buy” decision, i.e., buying channel services from local export intermediaries). In addition to manufacturers’ integrated channels, from the buyers’ standpoint, we find two active integrated channels, namely, (1) the buying offices of firms from developed economies which are located in Hong Kong and (2) the regular visiting buyers of firms from developed economies. These two export channels are integrated channels from the buyers’ standpoint. They are not found in the export distribution structure of developed economies. This paper explains the development and the importance of these buyers’ channels in newly industrialized economies. It also examines the similarities and dissimilarities of export behavior between manufacturing firms in developed and newly industrialized economies, using Hong Kong as an example.

Do foreign entrepreneurs benefit their firms as managers?

Research summary: The entrepreneurship literature has extensively studied an individual's decision to found a new venture, but it has little to say about the individual's choice to operate this venture personally or hire an agent. This decision is particularly challenging for foreign entrepreneurs, who, in addition to traditional factors, such as agency costs and personal preferences, need to take into consideration the benefits and liabilities of foreignness. Using novel data on foreign entrepreneurial firms and instrumenting for the owner‐manager choice with a visa policy change, we find that managing foreign entrepreneurs significantly improve firm performance. Our results further suggest that foreign owner‐managers reduce operating costs but have no effect on the firm's productivity and growth. Managerial summary: Immigrants represent a significant part of the population in the United States and Europe and are often more entrepreneurial than local nationals. However, a person starting a firm in a foreign country faces unique challenges. One important choice that a foreign entrepreneur has to make is whether to operate the firm personally or hire a local agent. Foreign entrepreneurs are often believed to be worse managers because they have limited local knowledge and skills. However, our results point to the contrary: We find that managing foreign entrepreneurs significantly improve firm performance by decreasing firms' operating costs. This happens because foreign owner‐managers often have access to unique resources, higher work incentives, and superior management skills acquired at home. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.