中国城镇失业保险的供求矛盾及对策研究

失业保险是指个人在失去工作或等待就业期间能从政府或社会得到保证基本生活需要的物质帮助。我国的失业保险制度从无到有逐渐发展壮大到今天,虽然已初步形成体系,但伴随着我国失业人口的与日俱增,现行的失业保险供给远远满足不了实际需求,在政府资金缺口的约束下,这一供求矛盾还将继续存在甚至有扩大的趋势。将失业保险制度的创新与促进就业的政策措施相结合,对于解决城镇失业保险的供求矛盾,实现标本兼治有着重要的意义。     

Labor unemployment risk and firm risk

This paper examines the effect of labor unemployment risk on firm risk. Using unemployment insurance benefits as a proxy for unemployment risk, we find an economically significant positive relation between unemployment risk and firm risk. This positive relation is more pronounced for firms that are more labor-intensive, have a higher layoff propensity and are more financially constrained. While existing literature that employs corporate policy measures such as debt and cash holdings suggests an opposite relationship, our paper presents evidence that the effects stemming from earnings management, earnings quality and reporting quality appear to dominate.     

Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare?

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity in preferences for leisure. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. JEL Code J64 · J65 · J68     

A life-cycle model of unemployment and disability insurance

A general equilibrium life-cycle model is developed, in which individuals choose a sequence of saving and labor supply faced with search frictions and uncertainty in longevity, health status and medical expenditures. Unemployed individuals decide whether to apply for disability insurance (DI) benefits if eligible. We investigate the effects of cash transfer and in-kind Medicare component of the DI system on the life-cycle employment. Without Medicare benefits, DI coverage could fall significantly. We also study how DI interacts with reforms of Social Security and Medicare and find that DI enrollment amplifies the effects of reforms.     

Individual savings accounts for social insurance: rationale and alternative designs

Using Danish data, we find that about three-fourths of the taxes levied to finance public transfers actually finance benefits that redistribute income over the life cycle of individual taxpayers rather than redistribute resources across people. This finding and similar results for other countries provide a rationale for financing part of social insurance via mandatory individual savings accounts. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory individual savings accounts for social insurance and survey some recent alternative proposals for such accounts.      

Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance

A model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed. The model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. Qualitatively, for some agents, incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non-employment. Calibrating the model to a stylized version of the U.S. economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions. The optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1.94% relative to the current U.S. system, an additional 0.87% of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard.     

关于中国失业保险费率调整机制改革的思考

中国实行统一的失业保险费率,在失业保险基金累积结余不断增长的背景下,各地区也开始探索失业保险费率调整机制。目前中国部分省市试点的失业保险费率调整机制分为失业保险费率统一调整机制和浮动调整机制两类。分析表明失业保险费率浮动调整机制更为科学,本文结合失业保险经验税率制度发展经验,提出完善中国失业保险费率调整机制的对策建议:将失业保险金支出作为调整失业保险费率的依据;规范费率调整比例计算方法;确立合理的失业保险费率调整上下限。     

论信用保险项下重复保险制度的构建

信用保险在我国是一个新兴的保险种类,根据我国《保险法》对于保险的基本分类,信用保险属于财产保险的一种,但实际上信用保险较之一般的财产保险存在诸多特殊之处,特别是在重复保险问题上更是难以适用《保险法》针对财产保险所设计的相关制度,同时,也不能按照人身保险生命无价原理确定和解决重复保险问题。当信用保险市场开放时,各保险人就会面对重复保险如何界定和分担责任的问题。本文对这一问题提出了一些解决思路。     

Demand for insurance in a portfolio setting

This paper takes an additional step toward analyzing the demand for insurance in the context of a portfolio model. An investor is endowed with a portfolio containing a risky and riskless asset that can be augmented by purchasing insurance. Here, insurance is paid for by reducing the quantity of the risky insurable asset, holding the quantity of the riskless asset fixed. In the standard insurance demand model, insurance is paid for by reducing the amount of the riskless asset. This distinction leads to a different insurance demand function because the opportunity cost of purchasing insurance is now random.     

创建大学生失业保险制度刍议

当前,大学生失业现象已成为社会关注的热点问题。它不仅对个人、家庭和社会产生了巨大的负面影响,也造成各种资源的极大浪费。本文在对大学生失业的现状、原因及其后果分析的基础上,认为创建大学生失业保险势在必行,并对大学生失业保险制度提出了一些建议。     

政策性农业保险中的保险公司激励机制研究

中国政策性农业保险采取了政府推动、市场运作模式。保险公司的逐利性与政策性农业保险的非赢利性存在矛盾,并且政府与保险公司在政策性农业保险中形成委托代理关系。为了激发保险公司参与政策性农业保险的经营管理、控制保险公司道德风险,提高农业保险运作效率,应根据政府与保险公司的风险偏好,构建由低风险报酬和高风险报酬共同组成的激励机制。     

政策性农业保险中的非物质补偿问题

我国农业自然灾害频发,在政策性农业保险试点的补偿过程中,政府的主导作用没有得到充分发挥,只重视物质补偿,忽视非物质补偿的研究和运用。人在灾害面前,除了物质的需要,还有心灵的重建;在农业生产自救和灾后重建过程中,除了需要物质补偿,还需要政策支持和技术指导;在商业性保险补偿中,由于农业风险信息的严重不对称,道德风险因素增加,商业保险公司在进行农业风险事故赔偿时,迫切需要政府进行道德干预以减少道德风险。     

The design of an optimal insurance contract for irreplaceable commodities

This paper discusses optimal insurance contract for irreplaceable commodities. To describe the dual impacts on individuals when a loss occurs to the insured irreplaceable commodities, we use a state-dependent and bivariate utility function, which includes both the monetary wealth and sentimental value as two arguments. We show that over (full, partial) insurance is optimal when a decrease in sentimental value will increase (not change, decrease, respectively) the marginal utility of monetary wealth. Moreover, a non-zero deductible exists even without administration costs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a positive fixed reimbursement is optimal if (1) the premium is actuarially fair, (2) the monetary loss is a constant, and (3) the utility function is additively separable and the marginal utility of money is higher in the loss state than in the no-loss state. We also characterize comparative statics of fixed-reimbursement insurance under an additively separable preference assumption. JEL Classification G22 · D86 The author acknowledge funding from National Science Council in Taiwan (NSC93-2416-H-130-020).     

Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market

We consider the problem of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in a repeated moral hazard framework. Unlike existing literature, unemployed individuals can secretly participate in a hidden labor market. This extension modifies the standard problem in three dimensions. First, it imposes an endogenous lower bound for the lifetime utility that a contract can deliver. Second, it breaks the identity between unemployment payments and consumption. And third, it hardens the encouragement of search effort. The optimal unemployment insurance system in an economy with a hidden labor market is simple, with an initial phase in which payments are relatively flat during unemployment and with no payments for long-term unemployed individuals. This scheme differs substantially from the one prescribed without a hidden labor market and resembles unemployment protection programs in many countries.     

寿险营销的创新战略——数据库营销

客户是企业的生命,也是企业唯一诉求的目标.开拓新客户,服务老客户,培养长期的忠诚的客户群,这是企业的价值所在.目前,寿险营销的核心问题就是客户问题.以代理人为主体的行销过程中,存在着准客户积累不足、新客户开拓不足、老客户留存不足、忠诚客户沉淀不足的问题.本文提出了数据库营销的创新战略,从根本上解决了服务客户时的"找不到...     

从失业补偿到就业促进：发展型社会政策视角下中国失业保险制度的改革与发展

在发展型社会政策理论日益兴起的今天,社会保险政策的改革与发展应以该理论的精神内核为指导,重视被保险人人力资本积累和社会资本建设,更加注重社会保险的风险预防和就业促进功能。以此为指导,研究认为中国失业保险应当更加重视制度的发展性功能,通过调整相关制度改革和调整,构建起促进再就业、预防失业与失业救济＂三位一体＂复合功能体系,实现从单一的失业保险制到综合性就业保障机制的转变。     

Optimal insurance contract under a value-at-risk constraint

This study develops an optimal insurance contract endogenously under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. Although Wang et al. [2005] had examined this problem, their assumption implied that the insured is risk neutral. Consequently, this study extends Wang et al. [2005] and further considers a more realistic situation where the insured is risk averse. The study derives the optimal insurance contract as a single deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is redundant or as a double deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is binding. Finally, this study discusses the optimal coverage level from common forms of insurances, including deductible insurance, upper-limit insurance, and proportional coinsurance. JEL Classification G22     

保险金遗产化或非遗产化之立法选择.

对于以死亡为保险事故之保险契约未指定受益人时保险金的处理方式有两种:一是将保险金视为被保险人之遗产,由其法定继承人继承,即保险金之遗产化立法例;二是保险金性质不变而仍为保险金,由被保险人之继承人以保险受益人之身分受领,此即保险金之非遗产化立法例。本文认为,因继承法与保险法各自追求之价值目标不同,故应该以保险金之非遗产化立法例为当,如此才能有利于实现保险法的立法意图和有利于保险业的发展,并更能体现被保险人的真实意愿。     

基于职业教育的保险人才培养模式探讨

中国保险业的发展带来了保险人才需求结构性变化,而保险职业教育是我国保险业破除人才需求瓶颈的有效途径。为了完善保险职业教育人才培养模式,必须构建以保险人才市场需求为导向的课程体系,建立以工作过程为中心的教学模式,完善以职业能力训练为重点的实训教学体系,建设以双师结构为标准的师资队伍。