The Copeland rule and Condorcet’s principle

Summary. The purpose of this note is to shed some light on the relationship between the Copeland rule and the Condorcet principle in those cases where there does not exist a Condorcet winner. It will be shown that the Copeland rule ranks alternatives according to their distances to being a Condorcet winner.Received: 30 July 2003, Revised: 31 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D70, D71.Christian Klamler: I am very grateful to Daniel Eckert and Nick Baigent for their helpful comments.     

On economic disequilibrium and free lunch

There is a sharp disagreement between mainstream economists and advocates of energy efficiency as regards the potential for free lunches or no regrets policies to cut greenhouse gas emissions. From an economics perspective, the critical question is whether the economic system is — or is not — close to a Pareto-optimum equilibrium state. If so, it follows that most technological systems now in place are optimum, or nearly so, from an economic perspective. If not, there may be many sub-optimal technologies in place, with corresponding opportunities for very high returns on appropriate investments. This paper presents some of the evidence supporting the latter thesis.     

Climate Policy without Tears CGE-Based Ancillary Benefits Estimates for Chile

This study examines a hithertoneglected set of benefits from climate policy,viz., the reduction in emissions of localair pollutants and the associated healthbenefits, in this case for residents ofSantiago de Chile. By using an economy-widemodel, we are able to compare these monetisedbenefits to the direct costs of carbonabatement, thereby determining the scope for no regrets CO₂ reductions. Sensitivityanalysis is performed in recognition of theuncertainty surrounding certain key parameterand exogenous variable values – notably,households' willingness to pay (WTP) forreduced mortality and morbidity risk, and thesubstitution elasticities among energy sourcesand between energy and other inputs. Ourresults suggest that, even with the mostconservative assumptions (low WTP, lowelasticities), Chile could reduce CO₂emissions by almost 20% from the 2010 baselinewith no net welfare loss, though a 10%reduction is closer to optimal. If insteadChile were to target a 20% reduction inparticulate concentrations, a particulate taxwould incur slightly lower costs than anequivalent carbon tax to achieve the samehealth benefits. While the latter is asecond-best method of addressing localpollution, the welfare loss of choosing thisinstrument could be fully compensated by carboncredit sales at a world market price of$20/tC.     

Bankruptcy games and the Ibn Ezra’s proposal

Summary. This paper explores an old solution for bankruptcy problems, described by Ibn Ezra in the XII century. Particularly, we introduce a new way of extending the Ibn Ezras proposal, the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution, by imposing that the general distribution principle from which it is inspired remains fixed. In this context, we follow the interpretation of bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games given in ONeill (1982), and propose the analysis of the Transition Game associated to bankruptcy problems to provide a characterization for the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution.Received: 14 October 2003, Revised: 26 May 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C71, D63, D71. Correspondence to: José Alcalde: alasur@merlin.fae.ua.esWe are grateful to Carmen Herrero, Juan de Dios Moreno, William Thomson and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Authors work is partially supported by the Institut Valenciá dInvestigacions Económiques. Alcalde and Silva acknowledge support by FEDER and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura under project BEC 2001-0535. Marco acknowledges support by the Fundación Séneca, and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura under projects SEC2000-0838 and BEC 2001-0781.     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule

Summary. A series of financial anomalies motivated the development of new theories that modify the rational expectations ideal. Two possibilities have been systematically explored. The literature on behavioral finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws of probability and assume, instead, that simpler heuristic rules are used. Another stream of the literature assumes that agents process information according to Bayes rule, but do not posses sufficient information to know the true data generating process. In this paper, Bayesian and Behavioral agents coexist and trade in a standard dynamic asset pricing model. A long-standing conjecture is demonstrated. It is shown that, under suitable assumptions, Bayesian agents drive Behavioral, non-Bayesian agents out of the market. Hence, asset prices are eventually determined under the Bayesian paradigm.Received: 3 June 2004, Revised: 17 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83.Preliminary versions have circulated under the titles Markets Favor Bayesian Models and Market Selection of Empirical Models under Limited Information. I thank Larry Blume, David Easley, Larry Epstein, Armando Gomes, Bruce Hansen, Lars Hansen, Richard Kihlstrom, Grace Koo, George Mailath, Werner Ploberger, Andrew Postlewaite and Shakeeb Khan for useful comments. I also thank participants at the NBER GE meetings, Evolutionary Finance conference in Zurich, Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada, the theory seminar at Brown, Chicago, Harvard-MIT, Minnesota, Penn and Wisconsin. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SES 0109650.     

Two new proofs of Afriat’s theorem

Summary. We provide two new, simple proofs of Afriats celebrated theorem stating that a finite set of price-quantity observations is consistent with utility maximization if, and only if, the observations satisfy a variation of the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference known as the Generalized Axiom of Revealed PreferenceReceived: 12 June 2003, Revised: 9 October 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, C60.Correspondence to: A. Fostel     

Productivity and Employment in the Information Economy: What Kaldor’s and Verdoorn’s Growth Laws Can Teach the US

During the last decade of the 20th century the US economy experienced the longest economic boom since World War II. Information and communication technologies (ICT) are seen as one of the main reasons for this development and it is still an open question how ICT will affect growth and employment in the future. To evaluate this process Kaldors growth laws, especially Verdoorns law are reconsidered. It will be discussed which changes in the Verdoorn-Coefficient (VC) and the employment threshold (ET) can be expected due to ICT. Induced technical progress and increasing returns to scale could make future economic growth to be less labor-intensive. A simple OLS estimation using data for the US non-farm sector indicates that the VC increased in the second half of the 1990s. Thus, more output growth is required to keep employment constant.The author gratefully acknowledges the most valuable comments from two anonymous referees and the participants of the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association (NOeG) at the Vienna University of Economics (WU), May 21–22, 2004. Any remaining errors are my own.     

Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Summary. An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at -majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a -majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that -majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller s.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D21, D52, D71, G39. Correspondence to: Hervé CrésThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Danish Research Councils and hospitality of HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Mich Tvede and support from Fondation HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Hervé Crés.     

Satisficing behavior, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem and Nash Equilibrium

Summary. We show that Nash Equilibrium points can be obtained by using response maps or reply functions that simply use better responses rather than best responses. We demonstrate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium as the fixed point of a better response map and since the better response map is continuous the fixed point can be established by simply using Brouwers fixed point theorem. The proof applies to games with a finite number of strategies as well as to games with a continuum of strategies. In case the games have a continuum of strategies the payoff functions have to be continuous on the action sets and quasi concave on the players action set.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 31 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D00, D40. Correspondence to: Robert A. BeckerWe have benefited from comments on an earlier draft made by participants at Indiana Universitys Microeconomics workshop (October 2002) and the Midwest Economic Theory Conference held at the University of Pittsburgh (May 2003). We also thank Roy Gardner for comments on earlier versions. We thank the Associate Editor, Mark Machina, for his detailed comments and suggestions. This project began when Subir Chakrabarti was a visitor in the Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington in the Spring of 2002. He thanks that department for its support.