Effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on Bank Capital Requirements for SMEs

Using data from three countries (US, Italy and Australia) and surveying related studies from several other countries in Europe, we investigate the effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on bank capital requirements for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). We find that, for all the countries, banks will have significant benefits, in terms of lower capital requirements, when considering small and medium sized firms as retail customers. But they will be obliged to use the Advanced IRB approach and to manage them on a pooled basis. For SMEs as corporate, however, capital requirements will be slightly greater than under the existing Basel I Capital Accord. We believe that most eligible banks will use a blended approach (considering some SMEs as retail and some as corporate). Through a breakeven analysis, we find that for all of our countries, banking organizations will be obliged to classify as retail at least 20% of their SME portfolio in order to maintain the current capital requirement (8%). JEL classification: G21, G28     

Credit Risk Versus Capital Requirements under Basel II: Are SME Loans and Retail Credit Really Different?

Under Basel II, retail and SME credit (R&SME) receive special treatment because of a supposedly smaller exposure to systemic risk. Most research on this issue has been based on parameterized credit risk models. We present new evidence by applying Carey's (Carey, Mark. “Credit Risk in Private Debt Portfolios.” Journal of Finance 53, no. 4 (1998), 1363–1387.) nonparametric Monte-Carlo resampling method to two banks' complete loan portfolios. By exploiting that a sub-sample of all borrowers has been assigned an internal rating by both banks, we can compare the credit loss distributions for the three credit types, and compute both economic and regulatory capital under Basel II. We also test if our conclusions are sensitive to the definitions of R&SME credit. Our findings show that R&SME portfolios are usually riskier than corporate credit. Special treatment under Basel II is thus not justified. JEL classification: C14, C15, G21, G28, G33.     

Pricing Sovereign Credit Risk of Poland: Evidence from the CDS Market

We analyze the market assessment of sovereign credit risk using a reduced-form model to price the credit default swap (CDS) spreads, thus enabling us to derive values for the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) from the quotes of sovereign CDS contracts. We compare different specifications of the models allowing for both fixed and time-varying LGD, and we use these values to analyze the sovereign credit risk of Polish debt throughout the period of a global financial crisis. Our results suggest the presence of a low LGD and a relatively high PD during a recent financial crisis.     

美国信用评级市场与监管变迁及其借鉴

美国信用评级业发展已经有上百年的历史。市场高度垄断、严重的"顺周期"现象、利益冲突、金融市场及监管当局对评级的严重依赖是当今美国信用评级市场存在的四大问题。目前美国信用评级业形成了以行业自律为基础、NRSRO注册与美国证券交易委员会(SEC)直接监管相结合的信用评级监管体系。美国信用评级市场发展及监管变迁对我国的启示是:应逐步打破国际评级市场完全由美国评级机构垄断的现有格局,必须逐步构建有中国自身特色的本土评级体系,并将本土评级体系的培育与国内债券市场建设、"走出去"战略及人民币国际化战略结合起来,降低国内监管部门及市场主体对外部评级机构的依赖。     

借鉴美国经验 防范我国CRMA风险

全球性金融危机将信用衍生品推上了风口浪尖,出于防范信用风险而设计的金融产品是危机的导火索。在经历了市场的深刻反省后,全球的信用衍生品规模又创新高,我国也适时推出了CRMA（信用风险缓释合约）系列信用衍生品,但在我国市场机制还不成熟的条件下对其监管是对监管部门的考验。本文分析了信用衍生产品市场的发展及其风险,指出我国金融监管当局应加强对CRMA风险的防范。     

CRT市场信用风险传染机制研究

本文依据信用风险相关理论和信用风险转移的已有研究成果,从CRT市场上信用风险本身和CRT交易过程中的潜在风险、信息不对称下微观银行CRT行为中的道德风险和逆向选择问题以及金融监管、货币政策和金融创新等宏观因素波动3个方面对CRT市场上信用风险传染的作用机理和生成机制进行了深入的理论探讨,以期为我国CRT市场发展和理论研究的进一步深入提供新的思路。     

Potential Competitive Effects of Basel II on Banks in SME Credit Markets in the United States

We examine the likely competitive effects of implementation of Basel II capital requirements on banks in the market for credit to SMEs in the U.S. Similar competitive effects from Basel II may occur for other credits and financial instruments in the U.S. and other nations. We address whether reduced risk weights for SME credits extended by large banking organizations that adopt the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (A-IRB) approach of Basel II might significantly adversely affect the competitive positions of other organizations. The analyses suggest only relatively minor competitive effects on most community banks because the large A-IRB adopters tend to make very different types of SME loans to different types of borrowers than community banks. However, there may be significant adverse effects on the competitive positions of large non-A-IRB banking organizations because the data do not suggest any strong segmentation in SME credit markets among large organizations. JEL classification: G21, G28, G38, L51     

中小企业信贷可得性的影响因素

本文利用中国人民银行征信系统的相关数据,实证研究湖南地区中小企业信贷可得性的影响因素,以检验银行对中小企业的贷款技术。实证结果表明:大型和跨区域性银行对中小企业未采取关系型贷款;贷款银行对中小企业的财务特征不太重视;大型和跨区域性银行对中小企业贷款主要采用信用评分技术。作者建议:第一,整合信息资源,发展独立的信用评估机构对中小企业进行信用评估,降低大型和跨区域性银行对中小企业贷款成本和信息不对称程度;第二,大力发展区域性中小商业银行,并鼓励其形成和充分发挥对中小企业进行关系型贷款的比较优势。     

Forecasting Credit Spread Volatility: Evidence from the Japanese Eurobond Market

Different approaches to forecasting the volatility associated with the credit spreads on Yen Eurobonds are investigated. The actual volatility, historical volatility and estimated conditional volatility on spreads derived from a regression-based model with a GARCH and ARMA specification are compared within an adaptation of Black’s (J. Finance, 31, 1976, 361–367) option-pricing model. Surprisingly, the regression forecast over a medium forecasting horizon suggests that historic volatility provides the better forecast. The implications of these results for volatility forecasting and credit spread modelling are also discussed.JEL Classification: C32; G15     

Modelling Credit Risk for Innovative SMEs: the Role of Innovation Measures

Small-medium enterprises (SMEs) encounter financial constraints when they try to obtain credit from banks. These constraints are particularly severe for innovative SMEs. Thus, developing models for innovative SMEs that provide reliable estimates of their probabilities of default (PD) is important because the PDs can also serve as ratings. We examine the role of innovative assets such as patents in credit risk modelling due to their signaling value. Specifically, we add to a logit model two innovation-related variables in order to account for both the dimension and the value of the patent portfolio. Based on a unique data set of innovative SMEs with default years of 2005–2008, we show that, although the value of the patent portfolio always reduces the PD, its dimension reduces the firm’s riskiness only if coupled with an appropriate equity level.     

The Sensitivity of the Loss Given Default Rate to Systematic Risk: New Empirical Evidence on Bank Loans

We verify the existence of a relation between loss given default rate (LGDR) and macroeconomic conditions by examining 11,649 bank loans concerning the Italian market. Using both the univariate and multivariate analyses, we pinpoint diverse macroeconomic explanatory variables for LGDR on loans to households and SMEs. For households, LGDR is more sensitive to the default-to-loan ratio, the unemployment rate, and household consumption. For SMEs, LGDR is influenced by the total number of employed people and the GDP growth rate. These findings corroborate the Basel Committee’s provision that LGDR quantification process must identify distinct downturn conditions for each supervisory asset class.

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.     

美国金融危机的深层次原因分析及对中国银行业的启示——兼论金融危机与新资本协议的关系

内容一场次贷危机引发的金融危机正在影响着世界经济。本文从四个方面对危机发生的深层次原因进行了分析,也对其与新资本协议的关系进行了阐述。在经济全球化和金融一体化的大格局下,中国银行业为应对危机,实现可持续的科学发展,必须认真做出选择。     

网贷模式的信用风险探析征信视角下 P2P

近年来,我国 P2P 网络贷款作为互联网金融创新模式获得爆发式增长,但同时在信息不对称、征信主体权益保护等方面存在的信用风险问题也日益突出。为促进 P2P 网络贷款等互联网金融的发展,应加强征信管理与服务,将 P2P 网贷平台纳入征信管理范畴,强化 P2P 网贷平台信用管理和平台资金流动监管,加大网贷平台信用信息保护力度。     

我国中小企业信贷风险识别因子的有效性分析——基于北京地区中小企业的信贷数据

中小企业在世界多国经济发展中占有举足轻重的地位,逐步成为商业银行主要的信贷对象,巴塞尔资本协议Ⅱ(BaselⅡ)由此对中小企业作出了重要性规定,以提高银行对中小企业客户信贷风险管理的重视。鉴于我国中小企业信贷数据缺失和质量较差的现状,本文以北京地区中小企业信贷数据为基础,利用二项逻辑回归(binary logistic)分析,比较定量数据和定性数据在我国中小企业信用风险识别中的重要性,并探求我国中小企业信用风险判别中较为重要的变量。本文的结论也将对与中国具有相似中小企业信贷现状的发展中国家具有一定程度的借鉴意义。     

内地与香港股票市场信用风险的比较

我国股市近几年一直在低谷中徘徊,其根本原因在于市场的各个主体—从上市公司、中介机构到监管者都存在不同程度的信用缺失,从而导致了投资者对股市信心的丧失。如果不消除股票市场的信用危机,那么投资者对内地股票市场长期稳定发展的信心就难以恢复。信心不恢复,股市就没有活力,就不会成为一个健康的、可持续发展的资本市场。内地股票市场的信用风险主要表现在上市公司信用危机和投资者信心危机这两个方面,而信用危机和投资者信心危机分别是由上市公司股权结构不合理和股票市场自身结构的不健全所造成的。因此,解决股票市场信用风险问题是我国股市健康发展的关键。     

信用风险防范视角下的数字金融探析

随着科学技术在金融领域的飞速发展,数字金融正在逐渐取代传统金融模式而成为经济社会的主要金融服务方式,然而,数字金融是一把"双刃剑",给我们带来便利的同时也带来了信用风险.在对数字金融与传统金融进行比较分析的基础上,总结数字金融信用风险的形成原因和重要特征,梳理了数字金融信用风险评估的理论与模型,最后结合我国数字金融发展...     

波动率风险及风险价格——来自中国A股市场的证据

本文应用Fama-Macbeth估计方法,以1997年2月至2009年6月中国A股股票为样本,考察股票市场波动率风险及其风险价格的特征。研究表明:波动率风险是一个显著的横截面定价因子,其风险价格为负,该结论不受流动性及市场偏度因子、待检资产改变、波动率模型设定的影响;在资产定价模型中引入波动率风险因子有利于解释规模效应和账面市值比效应异象。波动率的风险因子可以涵盖部分宏观经济变量的定价信息,规模因子是波动率风险因子的代理变量。     

Quantifying the Interest Rate Risk of Banks: Assumptions Do Matter

This paper analyses the robustness of the standardised framework proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004b) to quantify the interest rate risk of banks. We generalise this framework and study the change in the estimated level of interest rate risk if the strict assumptions of the standardised framework are violated. Using data on the German universal banking system, we find that estimates of the interest rate risk are very sensitive to the framework's assumptions. We conclude that the results obtained using the standardised framework in its current specification should be treated with caution when used for supervisory and risk management purposes.