Who Is “Misleading” Whom in Real Estate Transactions?

The observation that real estate agents sell their clients' homes cheaper and faster than their own homes has been well identified in the literature and interpreted as evidence of an agency problem originated from information asymmetry. This article studies whether this well‐known result holds true for all types of agents and clients, and whether information asymmetry is the full story. By using the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data from Indiana, we find that, after controlling for observables, mainly homes owned by institutional clients are sold cheaper and faster than agent‐owned homes, and the differences are mainly driven by less and moderately experienced agents. Besides information asymmetry, we also find evidence of motivation heterogeneity—institutions themselves are very motivated to sell, and therefore are willing to sell cheaper in order to sell faster.     

Mass or Only “Niche Customization”? Why We Should Interpret Configuration Toolkits as Learning Instruments

In order to configure individual products according to their own preferences, customers are required to know what they want. While most research simply assumes that consumers have sufficient preference insight to do so, a number of psychologically oriented scholars have recently voiced serious concerns about this assumption. They argue that decades of consumer behavior research have shown that most consumers in most product categories lack this knowledge. Not knowing what one wants means being unable to specify what one wants—and therefore, they conclude, the majority of customers are unable to use configuration toolkits in a meaningful way. In essence, this would mean that mass customization should rather be termed “niche customization” as it will be doomed to remain a concept for a very small minority of customers only. This pessimism stands in sharp contrast to the optimism of those who herald the new possibilities enabled by advances in communication and production technologies as the dawn of a new era in new product development and business in general. Which position is right? In order to answer this question, this research investigates the role of the configuration toolkit. Implicitly, the skeptic position assumes that the individual customers' knowledge (or absence of knowledge) of what they want is an exogenous and constant term that does not change during the interaction with the toolkit. However, learning theories suggest that the customers' trial‐and‐error interaction with the configuration toolkit and the feedback information they receive should increase their preference insight. If this was true and the effect size strong, it would mean that low a priori preference insight does not impede customers to derive value from mass customization. Three experiments show that configuration toolkits should be interpreted as learning instruments that allow consumers to understand their preferences more clearly. Even short trial‐and‐error self‐design processes with conventional toolkits bring about substantial and time‐stable enhancements of preference insight. The value of this knowledge is remarkable. In the product category of self‐designed watches, the 10‐minute design process resulted in additional preference insight worth 43.13 euros on average or +66%, measured by incentive‐compatible auctions. A moderator analysis in a representative sample shows that the learning effect is particularly strong among customers who initially exhibit low levels of preference insight. These findings entail three contributions. First, it becomes evident that the interaction with mass customization toolkits not only triggers affective reactions among customers but also has cognitive effects—a response category not investigated before. Second, it suggests that the pessimism regarding the mass appeal of these toolkits is not justified—mass customization has the potential to truly deserve its name. The prerequisite for this, and this normative conclusion is the final contribution, is that the toolkit should not be interpreted as a mere interface for conveying preexisting preferences to the producer. Rather, it should be treated as a learning instrument. Several suggestions are made for how firms employing this innovative business model could design their toolkits towards this end.     

When can you trust “trust”? Calculative trust,relational trust,and supplier performance

Our research empirically assesses two distinct bases for trust: calculative trust, based on a structure of rewards and penalties, versus relational trust, a judgment anchored in past behavior and characterized by a shared identity. We find that calculative trust and relational trust positively influence supplier performance, with calculative trust having a stronger association than relational trust. Yet, important boundary conditions exist. If buyers invest in supplier‐specific assets or when supply side market uncertainty is high, relational trust, not calculative trust, is more strongly associated with supplier performance. In contrast, when behavioral uncertainty is high, calculative trust, not relational trust, relates more strongly to supplier performance. These results highlight the value of examining distinct forms of trust. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is there a “Dark Side” to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness

Research summary: W e investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A ) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997 to 2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a “raise all boats” view of monitoring. We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double‐edged sword that limits CEO discretion to undertake both value‐destroying M&A deals and value‐creating ones. Our findings indicate that the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed. Rather than “raising all boats” in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains . Managerial summary: M ergers and acquisitions (M&A s) are a quintessential corporate activity. There were $3.8 trillion worth of M&A deals in 2015, despite scholars and practitioners reporting that M&A s often perform poorly. We question the widespread belief that more vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and large shareholders will raise M&A performance, overall. Put differently, does monitoring constrain CEO s' discretion to pursue bad deals, while simultaneously encouraging them to pursue good ones? We find that monitoring limits both large M&A losses and large M&A gains. Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that constraining executives' ability to pursue value‐destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or enable CEO s to pursue value‐creating deals . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“We do what we must,and call it by the best names”: Can deliberate names offset the consequences of organizational atypicality?

Research summary: This article focuses on organizational naming as a strategic choice organizations make to overcome liabilities of atypicality. We argue that, in markets presenting an “illegitimacy discount,” atypical organizations may use deliberate names—names that communicate the market categories to which organizations claim membership—to offset the consequences of atypicality. Using data from the global hedge fund industry, we show that atypical hedge funds are more likely than typical funds to have deliberate names. Importantly, the selection of a deliberate name is economically significant. First, funds with deliberate names grow faster than funds without deliberate names, especially among atypical funds. Second, while atypicality heightened the likelihood of failure during the recent financial crisis—even after controlling for fund performance—having a deliberate name mitigated this effect. Managerial summary: Differentiation is a core element of many organizations' competitive advantage. Nevertheless, as differentiation implies being atypical among one's competitors, differentiation strategies can also lead to an “illegitimacy discount” whereby differentiators are at risk of being misunderstood, miscategorized, and ignored by consumers. Here we investigate how atypical hedge funds—funds that differentiate themselves from their competitors by investing in notably unique ways—use names to offset the potential consequences associated with the “illegitimacy discount.” Our analysis of more than 12,000 hedge funds over 12 years highlighted a trend whereby atypical hedge funds were more likely to choose names that unambiguously associated them with a known investment strategy—for instance, choosing the name “Apex Global Macro Capital” over simply “Apex Capital.” Importantly, name selection proved to be economically significant. For example, among atypical hedge funds, those with unambiguous names grew faster than those without. Furthermore, while being atypical increased the level of disinvestment during the recent financial crisis, having an unambiguous name reversed this effect. Organizational names play an important communication role with consumers, which, while highly symbolic, may also help resolve the dual organizational need to both conform to consumer expectations and differentiate from market competitors. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

壳牌统一亮相BICES201

10月15日-18日,壳牌统一携工程机械全系产品亮相第十二届中国（北京）国际工程机械、建筑机械及矿山机械展览与技术交流会（即B1CES2013）。     

201O年建筑业发展统计分析

在翔实的统计数据基础上，从建筑业支柱产业地位、产业规模和效益、房屋施工面积、新签合同额、企业数量和从业人员、对外发展等方面对2010年建筑业总体情况进行了分析。总结出2010年中国建筑业地区发展差异较大、建筑市场分布相对集中等6个特点。从专业类别、资质等级、注册地区和登记类型4个角度，对2010年中国建筑业特级、一级企业的主要指标增长率、总产值比例、利润比例和新签合同额比例等基本情况进行了分析。     

泰勒斯阿莱尼亚航天公司将建造Nilesat-201通信卫星

据泰勒斯阿莱尼亚航天公司网站2008年6月3日报道,该公司与埃及卫星公司Nilesat签署了为后者提供Nilesat－201广播通信卫星及相关服务与地面站的合同。泰勒斯阿莱尼亚航天公司作为主承包商,将负责卫星的设计、制造、试验与在轨验收,还将为位于开罗和亚历山大的Nilesat地面站提供任务控制系统。