Some results on the weak core of a non-side-payment game with infinitely many players

The present note considers a balanced game without side payments with a continuum of players. A concept of weak core for such games is introduced. Then a non-emptiness theorem for the weak core is proved for a class of games.     

A necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core

In 2004, Predtetchinski and Herings [A. Predtetchinski, P.J.J. Herings, “A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game”, Journal of Economic Theory 116 (2004) 84–92] provided a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game. In this paper, we extend this theorem to its counterpart in fuzzy games and give a necessary and sufficient condition for a non-transferable utility fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core. As a consequence, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the fuzzy core of a TU fuzzy game.     

企业信息化的决策博弈

本文从信息化所带来的价值、需求定义和系统实现的关系、信息系统应用过程和新老系统的取舍四个层面剖析了企业信息化过程中的决策问题。以提示企业正式开始信息化建设前必须要有一个全面的思考、论证和比较过程。     

企业信息化的决策博弈

本文从信息化所带来的价值、需求定义和系统实现的关系、信息系统应用过程和新老系统的取舍四个层面剖析了企业信息化过程中的决策问题.以提示企业正式开始信息化建设前必须要有一个全面的思考、论证和比较过程.     

Rebates in a Bertrand game

We study a price competition game in which customers are heterogeneous in the rebates they get from either of two firms. We characterize the transition between competitive pricing (without rebates), mixed strategy equilibrium (for intermediate rebates), and monopoly pricing (for larger rebates).     

城市开发问题的博弈分析

城市开发活动是开发企业与开发企业、开发企业与行政机构的互动行为 ,而城市开发行为的最优选择也是在各类投资主体之间的互动博弈中形成的。先行投资困境、优势区位问题、行政介入问题和可持续开发问题 ,都反映了投资主体博弈的特定后果。从博弈论的角度来思考 ,我们能对城市开发问题的实质内涵有更为深刻的理解。     

Convergence of a market related game strategy

A special case of the adjustment process for competing firms, introduced elsewhere, is analysed. It is proved that all equilibrium states are characterised by the vanishing of the Jacobian of the payoff functions of the market game, and that under suitable initial conditions the process is a contraction mapping, implying convergence to equilibrium.     

Causal discourse in a game of incomplete information

Notions of cause and effect are fundamental to economic explanation. Although concepts such as price effects are intuitive, rigorous foundations justifying causal discourse in the wide range of economic settings remain lacking. We illustrate this deficiency using an N$N$-bidder private-value auction, posing causal questions that cannot be addressed within existing frameworks. We extend the frameworks of Pearl (2000) and White and Chalak (2009) to introduce topological settable systems (TSS), a causal framework capable of delivering the missing answers. Particularly, TSS accommodate choices belonging to general function spaces. Our analysis suggests how TSS enable causal discourse in various areas of economics.     

Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player i is a best response to the distribution of strategies of his opponents (when they face i) in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.     

The endowment game when n = 2

This paper considers a well defined problem in the implementation literature: A planner wants to re-allocate goods among two agents but she does not know each agent’s initial endowment of goods. We completely characterize social choice functions that can be implemented by feasible mechanisms in Nash equilibria in this n = 2 case.     

The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks

We show the existence of an upper bound for the number of blocks required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that the core can be reached via a bounded sequence of blocks.     

The local stability of an open-loop Nash equilibrium in a finite horizon differential game

We propose a finite time differential game as a model for some economic processes and derive conditions for the Nash equilibrium solution to be locally asymptotically stable. We adopt the traditional ‘Cournot-reaction function’ notion of stability, which in our (continuous time) model becomes a function-to-function, or trajectory-to-trajectory, mapping. The conditions for stability seem to make economic sense. The equilibrium is less stable if the interaction terms in each period are large, if the game has a long duration, and if the discount rate is small.     

Inference in a synchronization game with social interactions

This paper studies inference in a continuous time game where an agent’s decision to quit an activity depends on the participation of other players. In equilibrium, similar actions can be explained not only by direct influences but also by correlated factors. Our model can be seen as a simultaneous duration model with multiple decision makers and interdependent durations. We study the problem of determining the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium stopping strategies in this setting. This paper provides results and conditions for the detection of these endogenous effects. First, we show that the presence of such effects is a necessary and sufficient condition for simultaneous exits. This allows us to set up a nonparametric test for the presence of such influences, which is robust to multiple equilibria. Second, we provide conditions under which parameters in the game are identified. Finally, we apply the model to data on desertion in the Union Army during the American Civil War, and find evidence of endogenous influences.     

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Multiple equilibria in a firing game with impartial justice

In this paper, we argue that firms' firing strategies and the judicial strategy of dismissed employees depend to a large extent on labor judges' ability to shed light on the various cases. The model is cast as a sequential game with imperfect information featuring firms, employees and labor judges. The judges' error margin increases with the congestion of the judicial system. The game presents multiple equilibria which differ in the frequency of good workers fired for unfair motives and the frequency of unreliable workers who abusively sue firms for unfair dismissal. The probability that the judge sits with the employee appears to be positively related to the ratio between the severance payment for economic dismissal and the company fine for abusive dismissal.     

The reversal of large stock price declines: The case of large firms

This paper examines the long-run reversal pattern for a sample of large U.S. firms that experienced significant stock price declines of more than 20 percent during a specific month. The results from the analysis are largely consistent with the overreaction hypothesis and significantly greater in magnitude than those reported by previous studies. Six and 12 months after their initial price decline, the stocks of large firms earn approximately 4 and 12 percent in excess of what was expected, respectively. However, the magnitude and trend of that reversal differs substantially across industries. Technology stocks experience the largest and strongest reversal pattern followed by manufacturing stocks, while service industry stocks exhibit a clear downward drift that lasts up to three years and can be described as investorunderreaction to the large price drop.     

A differential game in a duopoly with instantaneous incentives

In this paper, we study a differential game in which two competing firms exploit a public renewable resource that is relevant from a landscape point of view. We consider a policy maker that provides an instantaneous incentive to the firms in order to prevent the resource exhaustion during the whole extraction period, which coincides with the harvesting license period. We compute an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the differential game, showing that it coincides with a linear feedback Nash equilibrium. Finally, we compute the value of the incentive that leads to the maximization of social welfare considering the incentive both as a pure transfer and as a cost.     

博弈与企业集团财务控制

企业集团的财务控制过程是集团公司各利益相关者的博弈过程.集团公司总部为在各利益相关者的博弈中赢得利益平衡,应从集团公司整体利益出发,进行财务控制的博弈分析,设计解决集团公司财务控制存在问题的途径,从而有效实现集团公司利益最大化的财务目标.