The cost of living,threshold bargaining and incomes policy1

For trade union bargainers one of the infallible laws of political economy is that wages lag behind prices. This means that in an inflationary era the real value of the wage to which their members are entitled will be eroded, and some compensation will have to be made for this at the next round of wage negotiations. Therefore, changes in the cost of living since the last settlement will be regarded by trade unions as one of the most important factors to be taken into account in arriving at a new settlement. This is implicit in the statement made by the TUC in 1971 that “it requires pay increases of at least 10 per cent simply to restore the real disposable pay of a union's previous settlement 12 months earlier”. Economists, on the other hand, argue that once an inflation is under way, then economic agents will develop an inflationary psychology—that is, they will expect it to continue and will adjust their behaviour accordingly. If this is correct, trade union bargainers will attempt to anticipate inflation by trying to fix the money wage at a higher level than they would aim for if the price level were more stable.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year earnings growth fell below the lowest rates of increase experienced in the 1980s. At the time this was seen as primarily the result of the deflationary squeeze produced by ERM membership. It was too early to proclaim a new era of responsible wage bargaining until the recovery had occurred. Since then not only has sterling lost its E m anchor, and suffered a sharp depreciation, but an upswing in activity has also been established. However, in spite of the revival in potential inflationary forces, earnings growth has continued to decelerate in 1993. It is clear that the last recession has had a more pronounced effect on nominal wages than its predecessor. In terms of real wages, however, there appears to have been little change, implying that the fall in nominal wages is due solely to lower price inflation. The important question for the present pay round is how will the labour market respond to the recovery? Have the supply-side policies pursued in the 1980s had a decisive effect, allowing the UK to make the transition to low, stable inflation rates in the 1990s? Or will there be a reversion to traditional inflationary practices?     

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm-specific labor

We develop a DSGE model with firm-specific labor where wage and price setting are subject to Calvo-type staggering. This is in general an intractable problem due to complicated intertemporal dependencies between price and wage decisions. However, the problem is significantly simplified if we, in line with empirical evidence, assume that prices can be changed whenever wages are. We show that the price- and wage-setting relationships are substantially altered by the introduction of firm-specific labor. Specifically, the inflation response is substantially dampened, whereas the wage inflation response is increased as compared to models with freely mobile labor. These distinctive features of the model with firm-specific labor are supported by empirical evidence from a structural VAR.     

Polish Stabilization: What can we learn from the I(2) Cointegration Analysis?

This paper investigates an array of nominal systems for the Polish economy, of domestic price level, import prices, exchange rates, money stock, nominal wages, and real output, and conducts I(1) and I(2) cointegration analyses. Post-stabilization monthly data are used, 1991:5–1999:12.A test for the presence of a price-wage spiral is performed, and the stabilization package is compared to its realization. The long-run homogeneity hypothesis, the impact of monetary and incomes policies, and of external sector variables on long and medium run price development are studied. It is found that in Poland, contrary to some earlier studies, the external sector is not important for the long run price development. On the contrary, very strong evidence is found of the cost-push inflation.     

Testing the Structural Interpretation of the Price Puzzle with a Cost‐Channel Model*

We estimate a variety of small‐scale new‐Keynesian DSGE models with the cost channel to assess their ability to replicate the ‘price puzzle’, i.e. the inflationary impact of a monetary policy shock typically arising in vector autoregression (VAR) analysis. To correctly identify the monetary policy shock, we distinguish between a standard policy rate shifter and a shock to ‘trend inflation’, i.e. the time‐varying inflation target set by the Fed. Our estimated models predict a negative inflation reaction to a monetary policy tightening. We offer a discussion of the possible sources of mismatch between the VAR evidence and our own.     

How should monetary policy respond to changes in the relative price of oil? Considering supply and demand shocks

This paper examines optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model where supply and demand shocks affect the price of oil. Optimal policy fully stabilizes core inflation when wages are flexible. The nominal rate rises (falls) in response to the demand (supply) shock. With sticky wages core inflation falls (rises) in response to the demand (supply) shock. Impulse response functions from a VAR estimated with post-1986 U.S. data show minimal movement in core inflation in response to both shocks. The federal funds rate rises (falls) in response to the demand (supply) shock, consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model for policy that stabilizes core inflation.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: EARNINGS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CAR INDUSTRY: THE BEST AND WORST OF BRITISH INDUSTRY

The Chancellor has described the cost in terms of lost output and higher unemployment of getting inflation down as ‘well worth paying’. Yet the trade-off so far is a miserable 1.25 per cent off the underlying rate of growth of earnings for an unemployment increase approaching 600,000, some 2–3 per cent off the underlying rate of inflation for a 3 per cent drop in GDP and a 7 per cent fall in manufacturing output. The question is clear: why is it that in the UK we seem to have to pay such a high price in terms of lost output and higher unemployment to make only modest progress on reducing wage and price inflation? One possible answer is in terms of the NAIRU; another stems from the way in which we measure retail price inflation. Using the example of the car industry as a backdrop, we examine the relationship between unemployment and inflation and ask whether there is a role for government to play in improving the trade-off. Our conclusion is that the present non-interventionist stance is probably appropriate but that the government should be doing more to educate both sides of the wage bargain - a challenge picked up by the Prime Minister in his recent speech to the CBI. This is especially appropriate at the present time, because price inflation is falling but wage inflation is lagging behind. It is not a cut in real wages that is required but an equi-proportionate deceleration in both wages and prices. By joining the ERM, we will ultimately obtain German rates of inflation; low wage settlements would both shorten the time-scale and reduce the unemployment cost of convergence.     

Product Market Competition,Monetary Policy Regimes and Inflation Dynamics: Evidence from a Panel of OECD Countries

We empirically analyze the impact of product market competition on the responsiveness of inflation to macroeconomic imbalances. If competition is high the response of inflation to lagged inflation, unemployment and import prices is reduced, while inflation is more responsive to changes in productivity growth in countries in which competition is above the OECD average. Given the (‘good luck’) macroeconomic trajectories of the 1990s–2000s, the structural reforms that made goods markets more competitive improved the ability of OECD economies to smooth (dis)inflationary shocks, while changes in the monetary policy framework had a modest role in taming inflation during the Great Moderation.     

THE REAL WAGE GAP

Over the past year a gap has opened up between the growth of manufacturing productivity and that of real wages. This gap cannot persist indefinitely, but it can be closed in many different ways. The best that can happen is that wage settlements fall while output and productivity accelerate. The worst outcome would be continued stagnation of real output and no deceleration of wages, in which case the required productivity improvement would have to come about through renewed labour shedding. There are worrying signs that this has started to happen. An intermediate solution might involve a fall in the exchange rate, with some improvement in competitiveness boosting real output (so that UK producers get a larger share of buoyant consumer spending) and some rise in prices holding back real wages.
We continue to believe that the most likely outcome is a rise in output and a fall in the rate of wage settlements. In our June forecast this occurs despite a fall in the real exchange rate. In these circumstances we expect the growth of unit labour costs to fall back from its current high level so that the current 3 per cent inflation rate becomes a true "core" rate. But a moderate fall in the real exchange rate may prove hard to achieve, especially if the oil price continues to weaken. We therefore explore what would happen if the required depreciation happens more rapidly, so that interest rates have to remain high to prevent it getting out of control. In this case we would expect lower growth and higher inflation than we forecast in June.     

A New Keynesian model with staggered price and wage setting under learning

This paper provides a study of the implications for economic dynamics when the central bank sets its nominal interest rate target in response to variations in wage inflation. I provide results on the existence, uniqueness, and stability under learning of rational expectations equilibrium for alternative specifications of the manner in which monetary policy responds to economic shocks when nominal rigidities are present. Monopolistically competitive producers set prices via staggered price contracts, and households set nominal wages in the same fashion. In this setting, the conditions for determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibrium differ from a model where only prices are sticky. I find that when the central bank responds to wage and price inflation and to the output gap, a Taylor principle for wage and price inflation arises that is related to stability under learning dynamics. In other words, a moderate reaction of the interest rate to wage inflation helps to avoid instability under learning and indeterminacy.     

THE 1990-91 WAGE ROUND

The 1990-91 pay round could hardly have started against a less propitious background. Retail price inflation -still the principal target for wage negotiators despite its unreliability as a measure of inflation -is at 10 per cent and rising. The shock to oil prices will boost prices and add to wage demands -the natural desire to seek recompense in higher wages will be little impressed by the economist's argument that it is not possible to offset the real income shock to oil consumers by raising nominal incomes. And while cost pressures are pushing up prices, almost every other factor is working in the opposite direction. Domestic demand is at last responding to high interest rates, while the recovery in the pound has worsened UK competitiveness by 10 per cent since the start of the year and this is now taking its toll of exports, hitherto the only buoyant component of demand. The CBZ is warning forcibly that recession is beckoning. How will wages respond to a situation where a backward-looking view points to higher settlements but a forward-looking view indicates the need for wage moderation?     

House Prices, Housing Investment and Demography Forecasts from the LBS/Abbey National Model of the UK Housing Market

A new housing sector has been incorporated into the London Business School model. This article outlines the new housing model, summarizes the research which has gone into its construction, and presents a forecast of the UK housing market. Using the new housing model, we forecast a moderate recovery in the housing market in the later part of 1991 and 1992. This recovery is however short-lived and does not result in such high rates of house price increase as previous house price booms (Chart 1).
Cuts in interest rates following entry to the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS prompt a recovery in house prices from the middle of 1991. House price inflation then peaks with an increase in average UK house prices in 1992 of 11 per cent over the previous year. Increases in real personal disposable income are modest, by the standards of the 1980s, and for this reason the recovery does not develop the momentum of previous house price booms. House price inflation moderates again in 1993 falling back to around 7 per cent. Housing starts and housing investment recover only slightly from their present depressed levels.
the recovery in house prices is weaker than that foreseen in our April Forecast Release. This is because real personal disposable income is now forecast to grow more slowly during 1991. Sterling's membership of the ERM is followed by a fall in interest rates, but it is the timing of interest rate cuts rather than their magnitude which differs from the earlier forecast. The changed profile of interest rates has altered the house price forecast only marginally.     

Input–Output Based Measures of Underlying Domestic Inflation: Empirical Evidence from Denmark 1903–2002

The paper presents input–output based time-series data for the underlying domestic inflation in Denmark 1903–2002 and analyses the inflationary development during the last century. More conceptual issues in relation to the interpretation and use of input–output based domestic inflation measures are also discussed. The purpose of such inflation measures is to track the development in the domestic market-determined inflation, which is closely related to the price of gross value added in the domestic market-based private business sector. A price index for value added often displays a different short-term development than the headline CPI. Such differences can be useful in an assessment of the current inflationary environment and in relation to an interpretation of the historical inflation development.     

UK INFLATION: DOWN BUT NOT OUT

The release of the December retail prices index showed a rise in both the headline and the underling rate of inflation. That was not altogether unexpected with higher fuel and tobacco duties feeding through from the Budget. But it provides a reminder that inflation can go up as well as down. Looking ahead, inflation can go up as well as down. Looking ahead, inflation will be subject to conflicting pressures over the remainder of this year. Worldwide, inflationary pressures are weak. But, on the domestic scene, a Mortgage rate cuts which have helped to bring down the headline rate of retail price inflation will be less helpful. Indirect tax increases will push up the RPI directly. And employees may look for some compensation for direct tax increases in the next pay round. This assessment looks at the likely impact of these forces on inflation and the future course of interest rates.     

Inflation, output, and stock prices: Evidence from two major emerging markets

Research in economics and finance documents a puzzling negative relationship between stock returns and inflation rates in markets of industrialized economies. The present study investigates this relationship for Korea and Mexico. We show that the negative relationship between the real stock returns and unexpected inflation persists after purging inflation of the effects of the real economic activity. Johansen and Juselius cointegration tests verify that the long-run equilibrium between stock prices and general price levels is weak. However, in both economies, stock prices and general price levels seem to show a strong long-run equilibrium with the real economic activity. This paper benefited from the constructive suggestions of an anonymous referee. The remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. Financial support from the Dr. Robert B. Pamplin, Jr., School of Business Administration, University of Portland, is greatly appreciated.     

Inflation,output and stock prices: evidence from Latin America

Research in economics and finance documents a puzzling negative relationship between stock returns and inflation rate in markets of industrialized economies. The present study investigates this relationship for the developing markets of Peru and Chile. Fama's model of linkages between inflation and real economic activity constitutes the theoretical framework of this paper. The study tests whether the negative relationship between equity returns and inflation is a result of a ‘proxy effect’, namely, a negative relationship between inflation and real economic activity. The evidence for Peru and Chile does not provide strong support for Fama's hypothesis. It is shown that the negative relationship between the real stock returns and unexpected inflation persists after purging inflation of the effects of the real economic activity. The long‐run equilibrium between stock prices and general price levels is weak, as indicated by the findings of the Johansen and Juselius co‐integration tests. However, in both economies, stock prices and general price levels seem to show a strong long‐run equilibrium with the real economic activity. These findings suggest that in the long‐run, Fama's propositions A and B are supported for Peru and Chile. The disparity between traditional regression and co‐integration test results suggest that it may be prudent to re‐examine the proxy effect in the framework of a long‐run relationship before denying its validity. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

In the course of 1984 growth rates in the major economies came together. This reflects a slowdown in the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, from the middle of the year and continuing recovery in Europe. This convergence is expected to continue in 1985 when total output in the OECD area is forecast to increase by 3 per cent. Within this total it is likely that the US, West Germany and the UK all achieve about 3 per cent; Japan should grow more quickly, France more slowly. In spite of a rapid recovery in output from the late-1982 trough, inflationary pressures remain weak. Measured in dollar terms, non-oil commodity prices have fallen and the oil price is under considerable down wards pressure. We expect inflation to stay at about its preset level in the US, West Germany, Japan and the UK and decline further in France, Italy and other countries where policy reaction to the 1979-80 oil price shock was delayed. In the medium term we expect the world economy to experience steady growth combined with a constant or slightly increasing inflation rate. This reflects a stable policy environment and falling real oil prices. After the excesses of the 1970s and early 1980s it is possible that the rest of the decade will experience u greater stability than at any time since the 1960s.     

Price Inflation in the UK: Has Anything Changed?

Since leaving the ERM, the UK has had low inflation while unemployment has fallen substantially. This suggests that wage and price behaviour may have changed over the recent past. In this article, Ken Coutts and Brian Henry review the evidence for such change, particularly in pricing behaviour, but find little convincing evidence of a major structural shift. Rather, low inflation can be attributed to the effect of weak demand and low capacity utilisation on prices (and wages) which are larger and longer lasting than is generally believed, together with beneficial effects from low world inflation. On leaving the ERM, the government also instituted a classic combination of expenditure-switching and expenditure-reducing policies which played an essential part in promoting recovery without increasing inflation.     

Price effects of steel commodities on worldwide stock market returns

We analyze the price effects of steel commodities on stock market returns in emerging and developed economies. These commodities have recently attained increased media exposure due to the rise in the U.S. steel import tariffs, which pose the threat of reducing global demand for steel products and, consequently, lowering prices abroad. However, little has been investigated on the impact of steel commodity prices on worldwide stock market returns. By performing structural VAR and GARCH techniques on a weekly-frequency time series from 2002 to 2015, we find positive and statistically significant effects of linear and non-linear steel commodity price shocks on real stock returns in the commodity markets. In the highly diversified financial markets such as U.S. and Germany, real stock returns do not significantly respond to steel commodity price shocks, although we find highly significant positive responses from developed economies such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. Results are robust to different model specifications. Our evidence suggests that higher tariffs on steel imports represent a larger disadvantage to commodity markets which are more largely impacted by steel commodity prices. We provide economic policy implications based on recent literature.     

Monetary effects on nominal oil prices

The paper presents a theory of nominal asset prices for competitively owned oil. Focusing on monetary effects, with flexible oil prices the US dollar oil price should follow the aggregate US price level. But with rigid nominal oil prices, the nominal oil price jumps proportionally to nominal interest rate increases. We find evidence for structural breaks in the nominal oil price that are used to illustrate the theory of oil price jumps. The evidence also indicates strong Granger causality of the oil price by US inflation as is consistent with the theory.