The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective

This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure.     

Agency costs,corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis

This paper examines the impact of governance and ownership variables on agency costs for a panel of large UK quoted companies. We use three measures of agency costs: the ratio of sales-to-total assets, the interaction of free cash flows and growth prospects and the number of acquisitions. We employ a range of techniques to analyse the data: fixed-effects, instrumental variables, and Tobit regressions. We find that the changes in board structures that have occurred in the post-Cadbury period have not, generally, affected agency costs. This suggests a range of mechanisms is consistent with firm value maximisation. We also find that having a nomination committee increases agency costs, which indicates that there are costs associated with certain governance mechanisms. Increasing board ownership also helps to reduce agency costs. We also find that debt reduces agency costs. Our results raise questions about the usefulness of the information sent to shareholders when firms adopt a recommended governance framework.     

The operation and management of agency workers in conditions of vulnerability

This article focuses on the operation and management of agency labour by employers and observes that there are strong contradictions between the employers' stated reasons for using agency labour and the employment agencies' perceptions of why such labour is utilised. While discussing agency labour generally, the article also takes account of the position of migrant workers within the agency sector, since agencies have represented a significant route into employment for migrant labour. It draws primarily on 22 in‐depth interviews with employers and employment agencies mainly in the food processing, cleaning and care sectors. The research revealed that while some employers were using agency staff to cover for specific peaks in production, others had used it as an alternative method of dealing with vacancies that otherwise might have resulted in permanent employment.     

股权结构、隧道挖掘与公司价值的实证研究

本文应用大小股东之间代理冲突的理论分析框架,研究了股权结构对于大股东隧道挖掘行为以及公司价值的影响。研究发现,大股东的隧道挖掘行为与其持股比例成显著的倒U型关系,股权制衡能够抑制隧道挖掘行为和缓解大、小股东之间的代理冲突;公司价值与第一大股东持股比例成显著的U型关系,股权制衡能在一定程度上提升公司价值,但效果不显著。研究结果证明,投资者能够识别股权结构所代表的代理问题,并给代理问题较大的公司予以较低的定价。     

Effects of agency risks and procedural justice on board processes in venture capital-backed firms

This paper builds a model of the effects of agency risk and procedural justice in the boards of directors of venture capital-backed firms. Such boards are unique in that they consist of managers and outside owners with significant power and incentive to be highly involved in venture governance. The authors integrate agency theory and procedural justice perspectives to develop propositions regarding the effects of agency risk and board processes on the responses to poor performance and conflicts of interest. This integrated perspective suggests that factors that increase perceived agency risks will increase outsiders' tendency to focus efforts on monitoring and controlling board decisions and their propensity to resort to formal means to resolve conflicts. However, the authors suggest that through their effects on trust and positive attributions, fair procedures and interactions will reduce these tendencies. A discussion of the practical and theoretical implications of the proposed model concludes the paper.     

强制分红政策与公司代理成本:博弈模型与DID检验

不同于公司自觉的现金分红行为，强制分红政策在矫正公司分红行为的同时，会激起高管的消极抵制，所以它能否有效降低公司代理成本，尚难预料。为此，建立了一个混合策略完全信息静态博弈，说明了强制分红政策影响代理成本的作用机制，并将2011年出台的强制分红政策视为一个准自然实验，实证检验强制分红政策能否降低上市公司的代理成本。实证研究发现，强制分红政策能够显著抑制企业的代理成本。异质性检验结果表明，相对于中小板和微股利的上市公司而言，强制分红政策可以更加显著地降低那些主板上市公司和正常发放股利的公司的代理成本。研究结果不仅支持了股利代理成本理论，而且为进一步完善公司股利政策和保护中小股东权益提供了经验证据。     

Agency costs and dividend payments: The case of bank holding companies

This paper examines the hypothesis that agency costs are a primary factor motivating dividend payments. Norohna et al. (1996) present evidence that the agency cost rationale is context specific and that dividends will not be driven by agency costs when other mechanisms exist for controlling agency problems. We argue that regulation of bank holding companies involves a context specific case where agency costs may be less relevant. Using an empirical methodology similar to Born and Rimbey’s (1993), we find that the abnormal returns associated with dividend announcements by bank holding companies are not related to their external financing activities. The monitoring activities of the capital markets are not a rationale for dividend payments in the presence of bank regulation. Our results are robust to an alternative explanation involving the signaling role of new equity financings.     

Should I stay or should I go? Agency nursing work in the UK

There are competing perspectives as to whether agency represents the desire to be a ‘free agent’ in terms of greater flexibility and control, or whether it represents a reluctant retreat from permanent employment. This paper explores the reasons why nurses in the UK work on an agency basis through surveys of two nursing agencies and asks: to what extent do supply-side preferences contribute to the decision for nurses to work on an agency basis? How does working on an agency basis affect the work-life balance and career aspirations of nurses? Two surveys were conducted; one with a ‘generalist’ nurse agency; and one with a ‘specialized’ agency, in order to examine the impact of rare/specialized skills on pecuniary motives. It is found that while nurses who also have a permanent job are more likely to report pecuniary factors as influencing the decision to work through agencies, nurses who solely work agency are more likely to emphasize work-life balance issues and escaping ‘office politics’ as key factors. Importantly, the findings point to the continued appeal of agency work as a means to exit the nursing workplace, suggesting that government reforms to increase the appeal of nursing as a profession have only partially addressed the concerns of nurses.     

基于多案例的中国民营企业控制权代理特征研究

本研究旨在探索中国民营企业控制权代理行为的特征,为中国民营企业突破成长困境、实现可持续发展提供理论启示。本研究采用扎根理论方法有效捕捉到了中国民营企业控制权代理特征的内涵,并通过问卷法进行了数据检验。结果显示:中国民营企业控制权代理特征包括授权、自我效能和适应三个维度,其中授权是代理行为的基础和动力,自我效能是代理人的行为特征,适应反映了民营企业控制权代理行为的持续机制;另外,这三个维度在不同行业类型、企业规模和战略类型的民营企业中存在显著差异。     

Online channel introduction under contract negotiation: Reselling versus agency selling

This study investigates manufacturers' online channel introduction strategies by considering two typical retailing formats, namely, reselling and agency selling. Online spillover effect and contract negotiation are considered to make the model more consistent with practice. We find that with a strong bargaining power, the manufacturer will always be profitable when it introduces online channels, whether it is reselling or agency selling. Meanwhile, agency selling is always profitable for the manufacturer than reselling. Interestingly, we find that an incentive alignment exists when two online channels are introduced, where agency selling is profitable for both the manufacturer and the e-commerce platforms (EPs).     

Agency workers and organisation's commitment to its workers

This study explores the understanding that Dutch agency workers (i.e. workers affiliated with a temporary-help service firm) have of organisation's commitment to its workers (OCW). Semi-structured interviews with 33 Dutch agency workers aimed to answer two questions: (1) what do agency workers believe the agency and the client should offer if they are aiming for perceived OCW and (2) who are the potential messengers of agency and client OCW? If agencies and clients want to get rewarded by agency workers with perceived OCW, they have to carry a shared responsibility for many aspects of fair and favourable human resource management. However, agency workers link some aspects exclusively to one of the two organisational parties: agency workers seem to associate promotion with the client organisation, and certain aspects of job characteristics (e.g. autonomy and performance feedback) solely with the client OCW. Other elements related to job characteristics were only associated with agency OCW (current and future person–task fit, job-satisfaction concerns and job-related problems), as well as keeping in touch and problem solving (e.g. job dissatisfaction) solely with agency OCW. Moreover, agency workers personify all the mentioned responsibilities: organisational member's actions concerning these responsibilities represent OCW. Agency consultants seem to be the sole representatives of perceived agency OCW, whereas several agents (e.g. top managers, direct supervisors, co-workers, clients' ‘clients’) serve as potential representatives of client organisations' commitment.     

Incentives Management During Privatization: An Agency Perspective

abstract    This paper explains, through a field study and from an agency perspective, how monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms change to support the interests of a privatized firm's new ownership. In this case, privatization led to important changes in the board of directors and to more formal performance evaluation and compensation systems for top managers, as profitability and financial control gained relevancy with the firm ownership change. Our results show that differences in incentives management before and after privatization are due to different agency relations in the two periods. We also argue that in a privatization framework the relation between monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms is complex, not simply substitutive as agency theory would predict, and this finding allows us to refine and extend agency theory for this specific context.     

公司融资结构对代理成本的影响--关于中国商业企业的实证分析

公司融资结构是影响代理成本的重要因素。本文选取了86家在沪深交易所上市的商业企业作为样本,区分了上市公司负债的期限结构,对公司融资结构与代理成本的关系进行回归分析。结果表明商业企业一般倾向于流动性负债,总资产负债率、流动资产负债率与代理成本负相关。     

资本结构与代理问题研究综述

依据股权结构集散程度,将代理问题分为经营者代理问题和控股股东代理问题。本文对国内外资本结构与经营者代理问题和资本结构与控股股东代理问题的研究进行了回顾,并对其未来的研究进行了展望。     

The trade union response to agency labour in Sweden

This article explores the possibilities for temporary agency workers to gain union representation at workplace level. Using Heery's classification of four different union responses to agency work—Exclusion, Regulation, Replacement and Engagement—we found that, even though the union wishes to represent agency workers, there are institutional conditions obstructing them from succeeding.     

高管薪酬管制、审计意见与审计师选择

本文从高管薪酬管制政策对审计意见的影响入手,系统检验了薪酬管制政策的有效性。研究发现国有企业在实施高管薪酬管制政策的同时,经理人可能通过降低会计信息质量规避社会监督,从而遭受了更多的"非标"审计意见,增大了企业的代理成本。进一步研究发现,国企经理人会通过选择不同质量的审计师来应对增加的代理成本。结论表明,薪酬管制政策只能在短期内和表面上缓解国企过高薪酬的代理问题,需要在实施过程中出台相应的配套措施予以辅助。     

Mutual expectations: a study of the three-way relationship between employment agencies,their client organisations and white-collar agency ‘temps’

This paper examines the mutual expectations of employment agencies, the temporary workers who are placed by them and the client or host companies with whom they are placed. It considers the ambiguities and complexities inherent in the psychological contracts of agency temps, pointing to positive dimensions of the agency relationship with temps coupled with a tough transactional regime. In periods of uncertainty agency temping provided individuals with an illusion of freedom and control.     

Client organizations and the management of professional agency work: The case of English health and social care

A growing reliance on agency workers can lead to significant risks for client organizations, especially in core organizational roles. It has been suggested while these risk can be mitigated through investments in human resource management (HRM) directed at agency workers, in reality these will be hard to implement. This article draws upon Lepak and Snell's (1999) HR architecture model and uses a comparative case study method to explore this issue, focusing on agency working in core nursing and qualified social worker roles. The findings illustrate how client organizations can become more involved in the management of agency workers than has previously been acknowledged. Our analysis also identifies the conditions that shape this client‐side involvement, including the nature of agency worker contracts, the role of temporary work agencies, competing organizational cost‐control priorities, and perceptions of the regulatory context. These conditions are brought together in a general model for understanding the largely neglected role that client organizations play in the HR management of agency workers.     

The trade union response to agency labour in Britain

The growth of agency work in recent years has posed a challenge to trade unions, which must decide if they will accept agency workers as part of their constituency and accept employment agencies as legitimate labour‐market actors. This article analyses the reaction of British unions to agency work and identifies four main responses: exclusion, replacement, regulation and engagement. It concludes with an evaluation of union policies, which stresses the need for unions to secure broad regulation of the agency labour market either through multi‐employer bargaining or employment law.     

The German temporary staffing industry: growth,development, scandal and resistance

In Germany the size of the temporary agency workforce has almost doubled between 2002 and 2012 prompted by deregulation and expansion of temporary staffing agency networks. This article examines the growth of the temporary staffing industry in Germany revealing important milestones in the regulatory framework transformation. The article then explores the role of key actors in the development of temporary staffing industry in the Germany labour market, in particular the shifting positions of trade unions in relation to temporary agency work, as well as intervention from the state with re‐regulation in order to mitigate for exploitative affecting temporary agency workers. The findings highlight that while the growth of the German temporary staffing industry has been substantial, and that the state has been an active agent, it has not been without its controversies and challenges, and that features of the industry remain potential barriers for its future development. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd