CEO political preference and credit ratings

This study investigates whether a CEO's personal political ideology, as captured by his or her political contributions, is associated with a firm's credit ratings. Republican CEOs, we find, are associated with higher credit ratings, especially when their firms are headquartered in conservative areas. In addition, the link between political ideology and credit rating is more pronounced in firms that exhibit high financial distress or weak corporate governance. Changes in political ideology are associated with changes in credit rating. Our results support the behavior consistency, upper echelon, and social identity theories, as well as the risk acceptance hypothesis, and are robust to a number of alternative specifications as well as when alternate approaches and measures of credit risk are introduced. Using Republican CEOs as a proxy for conservative CEOs, our evidence implies that credit rating agencies justifiably view a CEO's political ideology and conservatism as indicative of corporate policies and, therefore, as an important determinant of the firm's credit ratings.     

Corporate lobbying,CEO political ideology and firm performance

In this paper, we investigate the influence of CEO political orientation on corporate lobbying efforts. Specifically, we study whether CEO political ideology, in terms of manager-level campaign donations, determines the choice and amount of firm lobbying involvement and the impact of lobbying on firm value. We find a generous engagement in lobbying efforts by firms with Republican leaning-managers, which lobby a larger number of bills and have higher lobbying expenditures. However, the cost of lobbying offsets the benefit for firms with Republican CEOs. We report higher agency costs of free cash flow, lower Tobin's Q, and smaller increases in buy and hold abnormal returns following lobbying activities for firms with Republican managers, compared to Democratic and Apolitical rivals. Overall, our results suggest that the effects of lobbying on firm performance vary across firms with different managerial political orientations.     

Top executive gender diversity and financial reporting quality

We examine whether gender diversity of chief executive and chief financial officers (CEOs and CFOs) is associated with financial reporting quality. The CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies are both required to certify the appropriateness of their financial statements and annual disclosures. We argue that gender diverse dyads (groups) of executives can bring different perspectives and professional skepticism to financial reporting. Using a sample of different CEO/CFO gender dyads during 2006–2019, we postulate and find evidence of higher accruals quality among firms led by gender-diverse dyads compared to accruals quality reported by firms led by all-male CEO/CFO pairs. Additional analyses reveal that the auditors of firms with gender-diverse executive dyads issue audit reports later, charge higher audit fees, and are more likely to be one of the Big 4 firms. These findings support the view that top executive gender diversity enhances financial reporting quality, which has important implications for corporate governance mechanisms.     

The effect of political visibility on audit effort and audit pricing

This study examines whether auditors adjust their effort and pricing decisions for political visibility. We argue, from the behavioural literature, that political visibility will create the need for more justification by auditors. Using data on actual audit fees, hours and billing rates for a sample of New Zealand public sector companies, we find that total audit fees are positively related to the number of press mentions (our proxy for political visibility). Consistent with our expectations we find that audit fees are monotonically related to audit fees. We also find that auditors increase the hours spent on the audit but not billing rates, which further suggests defensive bolstering by auditors.     

Relation between external audit fees, audit committee characteristics and internal audit

This study examines whether the existence of an audit committee, audit committee characteristics and the use of internal audit are associated with higher external audit fees. Higher audit fees imply increased audit testing and higher audit quality. We find that the existence of an audit committee, more frequent committee meetings and increased use of internal audit are related to higher audit fees. The expertise of audit committee members is associated with higher audit fees when meeting frequency and independence are low. These findings are consistent with an increased demand for higher quality auditing by audit committees, and by firms that make greater use of internal audit.     

Knowledge spillover from other assurance services

We argue that services which are complimentary and closer aligned to the annual report audit provide greater insight about risk and are more likely to exhibit the existence of economies of scope (knowledge spillover) through a positive association with audit fees. Specifically, we consider the potential for knowledge spillover from the auditing of triennial Long-Term Plans (LTP) to the annual report audit for a large sample of New Zealand municipals over the period 2005–2013. We find the LTP audit fees are positively related to municipal annual report audit fees and other fees (audit of for-profit subsidiaries, non-audit services) are not. This suggests that knowledge spillovers are dependent on the nature of the additional services. We also find evidence of higher fees for private sector auditors for both the annual report and the LTP audit. The LTP (forecast) audit fee is associated with municipal size, complexity, and political competition.     

Corporate employment,red flags,and audit effort

U.S. regulatory agencies and congressional oversight committees have expressed concerns that auditors often neglect red flags embedded in the operating characteristics of firms that misstate their financial reports. This study examines whether labor employment decisions, a major part of a firm’s operations, help predict accounting improprieties and consequently play a role in audit planning and pricing. We find that negative abnormal employment changes are associated with a higher likelihood of subsequent financial restatements, accounting irregularities, and lawsuits related to accounting fraud, and generally require greater effort from auditors as manifested by higher audit fees and longer audit report lags. Positive abnormal employment changes are associated with subsequent restatements and longer audit report lags, but not associated with fraud or audit fees. Taken together, the results are consistent with auditors recognizing the individual misstatement risks pertaining to companies’ employment decisions. These results suggest that standard setters, regulators, and practitioners should devote more attention to operational statistics to identify potential red flags.     

The color of shareholders' money: Institutional shareholders' political values and corporate environmental disclosure

In this study, we investigate whether and to what extent institutional shareholders' political values influence their investees' environmental disclosure and performance. Using employees' political donation data, we construct institutional investors' political ideology score, which higher (lower) value represents a more Republican- (Democratic)-leaning culture. We find that firms led by institutional shareholders with a more Republican-oriented political ideology are less likely to issue environmental reports. Such a negative effect is more pronounced for firms with institutional shareholders with long-term horizons, with high corporate Republican ideology scores, and without an environmental committee. We further find that institutional shareholders' Republican-oriented political values are negatively associated with their investee firms' environmental performance and green innovations. Overall, our results indicate that institutional shareholders' internal political polarization significantly influences corporate environmental disclosure policies.     

Internal control risk and audit fees: Evidence from China

This study examines the association between internal control risk and audit fees under the voluntary adopting regime of the Basic Standard of Enterprise Internal Control in China. We find that audit fees are positively related to disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICWs). In particular, they are significantly associated with non-financial reporting-related, but not with financial reporting-related, ICWs.Our results also indicate that voluntary assurance in internal control reports can mitigate higher audit fees associated with ICWs. Our study provides timely evidence relating to the debate on whether the scope of internal control should be expanded to non-financial reporting-related areas.     

How do auditors perceive CEO's risk‐taking incentives?

Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock‐return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that auditors charge higher audit fees when standard audit procedures do not allow auditors to reduce audit risk including the risk arising from higher business risk. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and audit fees. We also find a negative relation between CEO portfolio deltas and the issuance of going‐concern audit opinions (GCO).     

Code of ethics quality and audit fees

Using a sample of U.S. firms from 2003 to 2018, we examine the effect of an audit client’s code of ethics quality on audit fees. We find that clients with a lower code of ethics quality pay significantly higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors perceive such clients as riskier and charge greater risk premiums. We also find that such clients have higher litigation risk and auditors spend greater effort when auditing such clients. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of a client’s code of ethics quality in audit pricing. Overall, our findings are consistent with codes of ethics being useful to auditors in assessing managers’ financial representations and providing value to firms.     

How do auditors respond to low annual report readability?

We show that increased audit effort is associated with lower annual report readability to compensate for a perceived increase in the risk of financial misstatement for United States (US) firms. In particular, we find that lower annual report readability is associated with longer audit delays and higher audit fees for Form 10-K for US auditors, suggesting that auditors spend more effort auditing clients when annual reports have lower readability. We also find that low readability increases the likelihood of auditors using more explanatory language in unqualified audit reports.     

Changes in audit effort and changes in auditors’ disclosures of risks of material misstatement

This paper investigates whether auditors' year-to-year modification to risks of material misstatements (RMMs) in extended auditors' reports (EARs) are associated with changes in underlying audit effort, as proxied by changes in audit fees. We examine the dynamics of RMMs over time in terms of adding or dropping specific RMMs. Our main results show that, on average, audit fees increase more from the previous year's fees when more RMMs are added to the current year's EAR. This increase is partially offset by dropping RMMs that were disclosed in the previous year, but changes in audit fees are not significantly affected by dropping RMMs without adding new RMMs. Further analysis suggests the effect of added RMMs is attributable to “new” RMMs originating with the auditor and that added RMMs that were previously known, based on related disclosures in the prior year's audit committee report, do not significantly impact on changes in audit fees. Overall, our results suggest that changes in the choice of RMMs included in EARs reflect changes in underlying audit effort.     

Does International Accounting Network Membership Affect Audit Fees and Audit Quality? Evidence From China

Regulators suggest that small audit firms join international accounting networks to reduce their resource constraints in serving large clients and providing high-quality service. Bills, Cunningham, and Myers (2016) investigate the issue in the United States and find that both audit fees and quality are higher for members of international accounting networks (i.e., member audit firms). We investigate the effects of network membership on audit fees and quality in China, a relatively weaker institutional environment than the United States. Using data of Chinese listed companies audited by non-Big N audit firms from 2001 to 2010, we find that member audit firms charge 3.9% higher fees than nonmember audit firms, much lower than the 30% fee premiums charged by U.S. member audit firms. We do not find consistent evidence that audit quality is higher for member audit firms. Overall, our results demonstrate that China's weak institutional environment may overwhelm the quality control brought by international accounting networks and that it may weaken or even offset the benefits of audit firms' participation in these networks, resulting in smaller or even no effects of membership on audit fees and quality.     

Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees

Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.     

Audit Effort and Stock Price Crash Risk

We examine how stock price crash risk is affected by audit effort, as measured by audit hours. Using a unique dataset of audit hours in China, we find that audit effort is negatively related to crash risk. The negative impact of audit effort on crash risk is more pronounced for listed firms that have higher inherent risks and weaker external monitoring of their information environment. Our findings are robust to various tests, including a two-stage regression analysis, controlling for listed firm-fixed effects and audit firm-fixed effects, and using alternative measures of crash risk. In addition to audit output measures, audit effort has an incremental influence on crash risk. The effects of audit effort on crash risk continue to hold after controlling for auditor industry expertise and auditor tenure.     

Resolving the Presidential Puzzle

Many financial economists are puzzled by the fact that stock returns are higher under Democratic than Republican presidencies. In this paper, we test whether this return differential is explained by risk using a conditional version of the Fama and French (1993) model that allows risk to vary across political cycles. We find that the presidential puzzle can be explained when risk is properly taken into account. Much of the return differential can be attributed to the fact that Democratic presidencies are associated with higher market and default risk premiums than their Republican counterparts.     

Independent audit committee members’ board tenure and audit fees

An independent audit committee is an audit committee on which all members are independent directors. This study examines whether independent audit committee members’ board tenure affects audit fees. On the basis of the prior literature, we formulate an unsigned hypothesis. This is because on the one hand, long board tenure audit committee members (defined as members with board tenure of 10 or more years) have greater incentives to protect their reputational capitals by purchasing increased audit effort, which positively affects audit fees. On the other hand, audit pricing reflects audit committee quality. Long board tenure audit committee members may have less need for increased audit effort because they can effectively oversee the financial reporting process themselves, which negatively affects audit fees. We find that audit fees are negatively associated with the proportion of long board tenure directors on the independent audit committee, consistent with the notion that audit committee members’ long board tenure results in lower audit effort.     

Disclosure of fair value measurement in goodwill impairment test and audit fees

Recent increases in the occurrence and magnitude of goodwill impairment charges highlight the increasing importance of the role of the auditor in goodwill accounting. This study examines the association between disclosures about the fair value measurement of goodwill and audit fees. We find that goodwill-related disclosures are positively related to audit fees, consistent with the idea that auditors increase their audit efforts to mitigate potential reputational and litigation losses (“audit risk effect”). Additionally, our results indicate that the information asymmetry and investor scrutiny moderate the association between goodwill-related disclosures and audit fees. One possible explanation is that auditors take goodwill-related disclosures as a signal of truthful goodwill accounting and this “signaling effect” partially offsets the “audit risk effect” of goodwill-related disclosures when information asymmetry or investor scrutiny is perceived as high.     

The impact of customer firm data breaches on the audit fees of their suppliers

This study investigates whether audit risks that accompany data breaches of major customer firms can spillover into the supply chain and affect audit fees of their suppliers. Based on the economic bond that exists between supplier firms and their major customers, we predict that data breach incidents of customer firms will lead to higher audit fees for their respective suppliers. Consistent with customer breaches increasing the audit risk to the supplier, we observe a positive association between breach disclosures made by major customers and audit fees of the supplier firm. This association exists for both internal and external data breaches. We further find that audit fees are increasing with the number of major customers disclosing a breach in a given year. Our results are robust to both a matched sample design and a difference-in-difference approach. Interestingly, we find that while supplier auditors appear to price the risks associated with customer breaches, the breaches do not appear to affect audit quality. The findings of this study are timely and relevant to academics, practitioners, and regulators as supply chains continue to become larger and more complex.