Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information

Summary. A condition is given that is equivalent to balancedness of all NTU-games derived from an exchange economy with asymmetric information when endowments are variable. The condition is applicable to the ex-ante model with expected utilities, but also to the more general model of Arrow-Radner type economies without subjective probabilities. Differences in the interpretation of measurability assumptions between these two models are discussed, and another model with information consistent utility functions is developed in which the result would also hold. Received: December 12, 2001; revised version: November 1, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"I thank two anonymous referees whose comments led to an improvement of the paper.     

Effects of changes in outputs and in prices on the economic system: an input–output analysis using the spectral theory of nonnegative matrices

The (physical) output adjustment model and the price adjustment model are presented. By the two models we quantitatively analyze the influences of alterations of one sectoral (physical) gross output and of one sectoral price on another sectoral (physical) gross output and on another sectoral price, respectively. Hence, a basic nature of the Ghosh inverse and a fundamental character of the monetary Leontief inverse are obtained. The proposition that a matrix of intermediate output (input) coefficients alters if the vector of output (price) adjustment coefficients is nontrivial holds, if and only if this matrix is C-irreducible. It is impossible that (i) the adaptation of output system causes all sectoral final output rates (or input multipliers) either to rise or to fall collectively, or (ii) an adjustment of price system causes all sectoral value-added rates (or output multipliers) either to increase or to decrease jointly. However, maybe (i) a change of output system enables some sectoral final output rates (or input multipliers) to rise (fall) and all others to be constant, and (ii) an alteration of price system enables some sectoral value-added rates (or output multipliers) to increase (decrease) and all others to be fixed, whose necessary and sufficient condition is that the matrix of intermediate output (or input) coefficients has at least one non-final (or non-initial) class. The proposition that the vector of final output rates (or input multipliers) changes if the vector of output adjustment coefficients is nontrivial is true, if and only if the matrix of intermediate output coefficients has only one final class. The proposition that the vector of value-added rates (or output multipliers) alters if the vector of price adjustment coefficients is nontrivial holds, if and only if the matrix of intermediate input coefficients has only one initial class. The necessary and sufficient conditions and the matching economic explanations for possibility and uniqueness of the economic adjustment that enables (i) all sectors to have a uniform final output rate (or input multiplier), and (ii) all sectors to have the same value-added rate (or output multiplier) are respectively given. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

谈任务设计变量对输出效果的影响

任务设计是任务型教学法中非常重要的环节,而任务设计变量的把握是任务设计成败的关键。任务设计变量包括任务输入变量、任务条件变量和任务结果变量,每个变量又包含一些任务设计因素。大量的研究结果表明：任务设计变量及其所包含的任务设计因素对任务的输出效果产生直接或间接的影响。本文结合国外相关研究结果探讨这些变量在准确度、流利度和复杂度方面对输出效果的影响,以期有助于教师在设计任务时选择和控制这些变量以达到期望的输出效果。     

Applying DEA, MPI, and grey model to explore the operation performance of the Taiwanese wafer fabrication industry

The study applies data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist productivity index (MPI) to explore the operation performances of the Taiwanese wafer fabrication companies from 2004 to 2007. The input variables are total assets, operation costs, and selling and administrative expenditures, while the output variable is net sales. The results show that if Taiwanese wafer fabrication companies want to increase their operation performances, they should improve their CRS and VRS efficiencies not scale efficiency. Furthermore, this paper utilizes GM (1,1) - one order and one variable in the grey model - to forecast the growth trend of the Taiwanese wafer fabrication industry from 2008 to 2010, and then employs GM (1,N) - one order and N variables in the grey model - to measure the influences of the input variables upon the output variable. This study demonstrates that the most influential factor for the output variable, net sales, is selling and administrative expenditures.     

The genuine savings criterion and the value of population

Summary. In any dynamic model of the economy with changing population, the latter should properly be one of the state variables of the system. It enters both in the maximand, at least under total utilitarianism, and into the production function in one way or another. If population growth is exponential and constant returns prevails, then a simple transformation to per capita variables can be used to eliminate one state variable, but this ceases to be true if growth is not exponential, as it obviously is not and cannot be. If the growth of population is exogenous, then introducing it into the system does not affect the optimal policy. However, if one asks whether the system is sustainable, in the sense of at least maintaining total welfare (integral of discounted utilities), then the criterion is that that the value of the rates of change of the state variables is non-negative, so that the shadow price of population becomes relevant. In this paper, we derive explicit formulas in a simple model, showing that the rate of growth of per capita capital is not the correct formula but must have another terms added to it. We also study the question under an alternative criterion of long-run average utilitarianism. Received: June 1, 2002; revised version: September 27, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"Research support was provided by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a celebration of Mordecai Kurz's 66th birthday at Stanford University, 1–3 August 2002. Correspondence to: K.J. Arrow     

Factor Market Oligopsony and the Production Possibility Frontier

The authors consider a model with two final goods, one intermediate good, and two primary factors. One final good and the intermediate good are produced using primary factors, labor and capital. The other final good is produced using labor and the intermediate input. Producers of the second final good exert oligopsonistic market power on the intermediate input, which captures real world phenomena prevalent in the food processing and other manufacturing industries. If the capital/labor ratio in one final‐good sector is in between those of the intermediate‐input sector and the combined intermediate‐input and the other final‐product sectors, and if the oligopsony power is sufficiently large, the model generates results that are not adherent to the standard two‐sector Heckscher–Ohlin model. Results that deviate from the H–O model include the relationships between factor prices and commodity prices, the price–output effect, tangency between the price line and the PPF, and the curvature of the PPF.     

Existence and optimality of oligopoly equilibria in linear exchange economies

Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy, one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic existence result for the Cournot-Walras. Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged. Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau     

Real exchange rate determination: Empirical observations from East-Asian countries

In this paper the models for the real exchange rate determination are re-examined between Japan and five East-Asian countries. Two important findings are reported. First, the real interest rate-bias model is valid for Korea-, Malaysia-, Indonesia-, and Philippines-Japan, and the productivity-bias model is valid for Indonesia-, and Philippines-Japan: that is, the coefficients of relative variables are stable and statistically significant. Second, there is no evidence that the political risk premium model is valid. First version received: September 2000/Final version received: April 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  This paper was presented at the Tohoku University Economics Conference April 1999. I acknowledge Yoshihiko Tsukuda, Hiroya Akiba, Tadashi Kuriyama, Jiro Akita and Hiroyuki Ozaki for their helpful comments. Also, I am very grateful to two referees of this journal for many valuable comments. The research was supported by the Nomura foundation for Social Science in 2000.     

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE NAIRU: A BAYESIAN APPROACH

This paper estimates the United States and euro area NAIRU in a Bayesian framework. We set out a simple structural model explaining unemployment by demand and supply factors, which are treated as unobserved variables that have observable effects on measured unemployment, output and inflation. The model allows for unemployment persistence and a time-varying core inflation rate. The results show that although cyclical shocks are very persistent, most of the increase in European unemployment is driven by structural factors. The degree of persistence is lower in the United States but demand shocks seem to be more important in explaining variation in unemployment.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING AND STRATEGIC CHOICE: THE COURNOT‐BERTRAND MODEL

Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot‐Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot‐Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.     

Equilibrium Tariff Schedules In Commercial Policy Games Under Uncertainty

Abstract A partial two country equilibrium model is built in which two different exogenous random shocks may occur. the governments simultaneously choose tariff functions relating their specific tariff to the level of an observable variable (volume of trade or international price). In the case of a “volume of trade shock” the Nash equilibria of this game are more protectionist the larger the possible trade swings and autarky is always an equilibrium outcome. In the case of a “terms of trade shock”, constant tariffs, at their Nash equilibrium in specific tariff levels are the only sensible equilibrium outcome.     

Dictatorial domains

Summary. In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three. Received: July 12, 2000; revised version: March 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their detailed comments. Correspondence to: A. Sen     

科技金融、企业创新投入与产出耦合协调度及不协调来源

运用耦合协调模型对中国省域科技金融、企业创新投入与产出的耦合协调度进行测度，结果显示，除北京外的中国内地省域耦合协调度整体偏低。进一步运用DEA模型进行测度发现：初始创新投入系统中各要素无效率省域分布比较复杂，企业创新禀赋无效率均值最高；创新中间产出与投入系统中，发明专利与商标权产出有效率，但以此作为中间投入的无效率均值高、省域分布广；最终产出系统中，某些省域新产品销售收入产出不足和技术市场成交额产出不足情况比较突出。据此提出创新初始投入系统协调发展观、创新中间投入与产出质量观和创新最终产出知识产权盈利模式观，以改善创新投入与产出不协调的状况，助力企业转型升级。     

Perfect versus imperfect direct advertising,and market performance

We present a model of economic growth driven by horizontal innovation in which, unlike the existing literature, the final output sector employs a non-specified, non-CES, additive production function. Our motivation in conducting such analysis is based on the recognition that the use of a CES aggregate production function in the final output sector leads to the unrealistic conclusion that the gross markup of price over marginal costs set in the monopolistically-competitive intermediate sector is constant. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium with perfect competition in the final output market to exist even in the presence of a non-CES technology. These conditions generalize the usual properties of the CES case. We also analyze the long-run relation between economic growth and variable markups.     

创业团队异质性对创业绩效的影响：团队治理的中介作用

借鉴结构—行为—绩效（SCP）模型，构建创业团队异质性—团队治理—创业绩效的研究框架，从人力资本理论、交易费用理论视角对三者之间的作用机理进行探讨和检验。结果表明，创业团队经验异质性与创业绩效之间显著正相关；创业团队经验异质性水平越高，越倾向于选择契约治理模式；契约治理在创业团队经验异质性与创业绩效之间起部分中介作用。实践中，在组建创业团队时要有意识地保持成员在知识技能、专业职能等经验方面的多样化和互补性，从而获得成长所需人力资本和社会资本。同时，需要在团队运作过程中采取与之相适应的治理模式，以制约由此产生的行为不一致甚至冲突，节约沟通协调成本，提高创业企业绩效。     

A short and intuitive proof of Marshall's Rule

Summary. When the price of an input factor to a production process increases, then the optimal output level declines and the input is substituted by other factors. Marshall's rule is a formula that determines the own-price elasticity for one factor as a weighted sum of the elasticities of output market demand and factor substitution. This note offers a proof for Marshall's rule that is significantly shorter and somewhat more intuitive than existing derivations. Received: February 19, 2001; revised version: April 3, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I thank Charalambos Aliprantis, John Moore, Patrick Schmitz, and the anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Support by the German Academic Exchange Service is gratefully acknowledged.     

Individual accountability in teams

We consider a model of team production in which the principal observes only the team output, but agents can monitor one another (at a cost) and provide reports to the principal. We consider the problem faced by a principal who is prevented from penalizing an agent without evidence showing that the agent failed to complete his assigned actions. We show the first-best (high effort but no monitoring) can be achieved, but only if the principal assigns second-best actions. The principal requires monitoring, but agents do not monitor, and as long as output is high, the principal does not penalize agents who fail to monitor. If the principal has the responsibility for monitoring, the first-best outcome cannot be achieved, thus we identify an incentive for delegated monitoring even when agents have no informational advantage.     

Multiple variable factors,demand uncertainty,and the cooperative firm

It has been shown that the risk averse, cooperative firm producing its output with labor as the only variable input and selling this output in a competitive market will produce more than the cooperative firm operating under condition of certainty. This letter proves that this result may not apply to the case of the cooperative firm facing a stochastic demand and/or employing more than one variable input.     

Does human capital or physical capital constrain output in Japanese prefectures?

This paper develops a dynamic–network DEA (data envelopment analysis) model where total output is jointly produced from two sectors: a human capital sector and a physical capital sector. Each prefecture produces a final output and an intermediate product which is used to augment future physical capital. The optimization method allows future production possibilities to be enhanced if some final output in the current period is foregone so that larger amounts of the intermediate product can be produced. The goal is to choose the amounts of final output and intermediate product so as to maximize the size of the production possibility set. The method also allows identification of whether output is constrained by a lack of physical capital, a lack of human capital or a lack of both types of capital. We apply our method to 47 Japanese prefectures during the period 2007–2009. A key finding is that a lack of human capital is constraining potential output.     

国际人才流入、社会资本对创新效率的影响

构建随机前沿模型，基于2000-2015年中国内地30个省市（除西藏外）数据，分析国际人才流入、社会资本对中间产出及最终产出两类创新效率的影响。研究发现：①相比资本投入，劳动投入对两类创新效率的影响更大；②国际人才流入对两类创新效率均具有正向影响，且对中部（最终产出）、西部（中间产出）影响更大；③认知型社会资本对两类创新效率均呈显著负向影响，东中西部存在差异性，结构型社会资本对最终产出创新效率具有显著负向影响，东部则相反；④国际人才流入对两类创新效率的影响均与认知型社会资本和结构型社会资本有关；⑤最终产出创新效率远低于中间产出创新效率，两者均呈东-中-西下降趋势。