Some effects of business environment on retail firms

This paper empirically tests how formal retail entrepreneurs’ perception about the business environment in Cameroon affects the performance of the retail sector. I use business owners’ responses from the 2009 Enterprise Survey to estimate an econometric model that corrects for heteroscedasticity. The results show that regulation costs, corruption, credit constraints, and lack of infrastructure negatively affect the gross margins of firms. In contrast, the competition of the informal sector – perceived by many formal entrepreneurs as a major constraint – is positively associated with the gross margins of formal firms. Policy implications are discussed.     

正式制度与非正式制度如何驱动社会创业——基于效率驱动型国家的QCA研究

社会创业已成为解决社会问题的重要手段,然而对于如何驱动社会创业尚未有定论。以23个效率驱动型国家为研究样本,整合正式制度与非正式制度的5个前因条件,应用QCA方法,探讨了影响国家社会创业活跃度的多重并发因素与复杂因果机制。研究发现：①高社会创业活跃度的驱动机制分为两条路径,即政策-规范-价值观型和规范-价值观-教育型。第一条路径是正式制度与非正式制度要素间的联动匹配,第二条路径是非正式制度要素间的联动匹配;②非正式制度在影响人们社会创业选择时具有重要作用,影响程度甚至超过了正式制度;③政府政策与创业教育之间具有替代作用,即当社会规范与文化价值观水平较高时,只要拥有完善的政府政策,或者良好的创业教育,就能驱动形成较高的社会创业活跃度;④非高社会创业活跃度的驱动机制分为4条路径,且与高社会创业活跃度的驱动路径存在非对称性关系。     

Exploring differences in corruption: the role of neighboring countries

The aim of this paper is to study whether corruption spreads across neighboring countries. Spatial econometric techniques are used to analyze corruption interactions, testing whether the perception of corruption in neighboring countries affect a country’s own corruption once other variables are controlled for. For a given country it is found that corruption varies neither with the behavior of its neighbors (there is no endogenous interaction) nor with their exogenous characteristics (there is no contextual interaction). Corruption is therefore not contagious, but neighboring countries tend to show similar levels of corruption because they face similar characteristics and similar institutional environments.     

INTRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL KNOWLEDGE FLOWS: EFFECTS ON THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS

This article studies the effects of international and intranational knowledge flows. Contributions include comparing the effects of knowledge flows on the formal and informal sectors and determining multilateral spatial spillovers of innovation. Results show that formal entrepreneurs respect intranational intellectual property rights, but benefit from international spillovers, especially from patents granted. In contrast, informal entrepreneurs somewhat respect intranational patents granted, but not patent applications and citations. International spillovers to the informal sector are mainly from patents granted. Spillover magnitudes are greater internationally than intranationally, and greater in the informal sector than the formal sector (except for trademarks). (JEL O33, L26, K42)     

Common political culture: Evidence on regional corruption contagion

Although there are indications of common regional corruption characteristics, empirical studies of corruption have assumed that influences on corruption are country-specific. In this paper we report evidence based on a cross-section of 123 economies confirming that, with few specific exceptions, corruption is a regional phenomenon. Institutional change that reduces corruption in one country affects, therefore, neighboring countries.     

Religion and unproductive entrepreneurship: The role of risk aversion

Institutions can shape the reward structure in the economy and thereby influence the allocation of entrepreneurship between productive and unproductive activities. This paper investigates the effect of religion, one important component of informal institutions, on unproductive entrepreneurship. Using a nationally representative survey on private enterprises in China, we find that religious entrepreneurs devote more of their resources, both in terms of money and time, to unproductive activities such as building social relations than their nonreligious peers. We further find that religion plays a significant role only in regions with weak regulatory institutions and/or for entrepreneurs vulnerable to institutional risks. Drawing on the close link between risk-aversion and religion, our results suggest that religious entrepreneurs engage in unproductive activities so as to reduce institutional risks in their business operations.     

Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy

The present note develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing dominant moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially. The existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate. We show that there may arise a case where an increase in the supply of formal credit results in an increase in the informal interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This shows that apart from (i) asymmetric information on the part of informal sector lenders (Bose, 1998), (ii) an increase in the probability of default of all informal sector lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1997), and the (iii) possibility of informal lenders to collude (Floro and Ray 1997), the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor responsible for the policy of vertical linkage to break down.     

Culture and innovation: The moderating effect of cultural values on corporate entrepreneurship

In the few last decades researchers have paid attention to the role of entrepreneurship and innovation in productivity, employment, and economic and social development. In addition, literature has focused on the entrepreneurship that occurs within organizations, such as corporate entrepreneurship. Also, the role of culture is crucial for the development of innovation. Consequently, it is vital to understand why some firms are more innovative and develop more entrepreneurial projects than others, and what determines innovation performance. This research uses Institutional Economics as a conceptual framework with the objective of analyzing the environmental factors that condition innovation within the firms. Specifically, the study determines the moderating effect of cultural values on corporate entrepreneurship. The study uses a logistic regression and the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor – GEM – database from the years 2004–2008, with information of 62 different countries (718.758 observations). The main findings highlight the impact of the environmental factors on organizational innovation, specifically on corporate entrepreneurship. Variables such as living in an entrepreneurial culture and media exposure (informal factors), and the number of procedures necessary to create a new business or access to finance (formal factors), appear to be significant for corporate entrepreneurship. Moreover, informal factors behave as moderators between formal factors and corporate entrepreneurship. The article has several implications from both theoretical perspective (advancing in the application of Institutional Economics for the study of innovation within the firms) and from the practical point of view (providing insights for governmental policies interested in fostering innovation and corporate entrepreneurship).     

SEEKING RENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR

Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or rent seeking in the informal sector and raise the pay‐off for those involved in rent‐seeking activities. When the formal sector contracts due to reforms, rent seeking in the informal sector may increase and lower the level of welfare unconditionally. Economic reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, unlike standard conjectures.     

The role of corruption and risk aversion in entrepreneurial intentions

The literature on entrepreneurship has suggested that an individual’s entrepreneurial intention depends on three types of factor: personal characteristics, the individual’s expertise and professional background, and external factors. Our study investigates how corruption, an external factor, and risk aversion, a personal characteristic, may simultaneously affect individuals’ entrepreneurial intentions. With data on 76 203 individuals in 53 countries, our estimation results indicate that risk aversion decreases the individual’s probability of having an entrepreneurial intention by 6.67 percentage points. In addition, an increase in 1 SD in the perceived level of corruption in a country decreases the individual’s probability of having an entrepreneurial intention by 0.96 percentage points.     

Resilience and Dynamism of Embedded Financial Transactions in Cameroon

Following the recent financial crisis, institutional economists have issued a “call” for institutionalist research on alternative financial systems. While suggestions have been forthcoming, (for example, in Volume 48, Issue 4 of the Journal of Economic Issues), most have centered on national-level innovations in advanced capitalist countries, prompting further calls for “community” and individual level anti-capitalist financial relations. With this article, we respond to such calls. We show how networks of finance in Cameroon bridge the formal/informal dualisms in lending/savings activities. We demonstrate that any debates about whether to formalize informal financial institutions or leave them alone weaken in Cameroon because, through networks, people access both formal and informal financial institutions for different purposes and at various stages in the life of these institutions. This dynamism explains why, in spite of the growth of money markets in Cameroon, informal financial institutions have not disappeared, nor declined. In fact, they have expanded, contrary to predictions in existing new institutional economics research. While informal institutions have evolved, they have not necessarily become formal banks, microfinance, or stock markets. Rather, the informal financial institutions have adopted and adapted in terms of both lending and saving practices in a country where growing formal financialization has become the norm. Our findings challenge neoclassical and new institutional economics theories about money, credit, and the actors in the money market.     

Heterogeneity in entrepreneurship in developing countries: Risk,credit, and migration and the entrepreneurial propensity of youth and women

Promoting youth and female entrepreneurship is crucial to inclusive growth and the future economic and social prospects of developing countries. Evidence tends to suggest that young and female entrepreneurs are in a minority, and the extent and generating mechanisms of this outcome tend to be country‐specific. This collection of papers brings together recent empirical contributions exploring key drivers of this heterogeneity entrepreneurial propensity of youth and female in the context of a group of countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, paying special attention to the role of and issues relating to access to credit, attitudes to risk, and migratory status. A common thread in all the papers is the effective role of risk, uncertainty, and asymmetric information in the determination of entrepreneurship and in the demand for and allocation of credit when potential entrepreneurs are from specific groups, that is, women, indigenous women, women and youth in conflict and post‐conflict situations, and migrant youth. Based on these results, the papers explore various challenges in the implementation of public policies designed to promote entrepreneurship within these specific segments of the population.     

The Concept of “Progressive” Institutional Change and Its Implications for Economic Policy Formation

Institutional economics has long shown that entrepreneurship plays a critical role in the pursuit of economic development and wellbeing. At the same time, entrepreneurship is complex and evolving. The path between entrepreneurship and wellbeing is not clear-cut, and not all types of entrepreneurial activity are correlated with economic growth. Failure to acknowledge this heterogeneity has important consequences for entrepreneurship policy and human development, particularly where gender is concerned. The paper treats the complexities involved in defining and conceptualizing entrepreneurship, setting the stage for a focus on the gender dimension. As female entrepreneurial activity has risen in many countries around the world, it is important to acknowledge the diversity of such activity and the ways it does (or does not) correspond to an increase in human freedom. Highlighting the differences between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship, this paper illustrates the formal and informal institutions that shape gender inequity in the entrepreneurial environment. It concludes with some suggestions for addressing this important issue.     

Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy

This paper examines how much of the difference in the size of the informal sector and in per capita income across countries can be accounted by regulation costs and enforcement of financial contracts. It constructs and solves numerically a general equilibrium model with credit constrained heterogenous agents, occupational choices over formal and informal businesses, financial frictions and a government sector which imposes taxes and regulations on formal firms. The benefit from formalization is better access to outside finance. The quantitative exercises suggest that: (i) regulation costs and not the level of enforcement account for differences in the size of the informal sector between United States and Mediterranean Europe; (ii) for a developing country like Peru, however, contract enforcement and regulation costs are equally important in accounting for the size of the informal sector; and (iii) regulation costs and contract enforcement do not account for most of the income differences observed among countries.     

THE RISK PREFERENCES OF ENTREPRENEURS IN INDONESIA

Entrepreneurship is known to be important for innovation and economic growth, but relatively little attention has been paid to entrepreneurs in developing countries. We examined an important aspect of entrepreneurship: risk‐taking. We analysed the Indonesian Family Life Survey and compared risk preferences between entrepreneurs and non‐entrepreneurs. We found that risk tolerant workers were more likely to be entrepreneurs than risk averse workers by about 5 percentage points, or about 20 percent of the proportion of entrepreneurs in the labour force. The results imply that not all entrepreneurs in Indonesia are pushed into the sector; some actively take risks and seek innovations.     

社会创业行为实现路径及内在机理——一项扎根理论的探索

基于8份社会创业者访谈材料，运用扎根理论方法，对社会创业在中国制度环境中的实现路径进行探索性分析。结果表明，社会创业意愿是社会创业的前置因素，制度情景和社会痛点是孕育社会创业意愿的重要土壤；创业者在多重制度逻辑中灵活运用合法性构建和资源拼凑等理性工具，并持续积累与更新创业知识和技巧，发挥社会创业意愿转化为创业行为的工具理性作用；当激励效应反馈到社会创业意愿时，新一轮创业行为将始于新的创业意愿；在整个社会创业意愿实现过程中，情绪特质和突发情节发挥重要调节效应。     

What drives entrepreneurs underground? The role of tax morale

Using novel cross-country data, we examine whether and to what extent tax morale impacts informal entrepreneurship. Employing instrumental variables strategy, we find that countries with higher tax morale enjoy lower informal entrepreneurship.     

Entrepreneurship in the shadows

I develop a dynamic model of forward-looking entrepreneurs, who decide whether to operate in the formal economy or informal economy and choose how much to invest in their businesses, taking government policy as given. The government has access to two policy tools: taxes on formal business activity and enforcement (or policing) discouraging informality. The main focus of the paper is on transitional dynamics under different initial wealth levels. Whether an initially small business will be trapped in the informal economy and remain small forever or grow quickly and become a large formal business depends on tax and enforcement policies. High tax rates accompanied by loose enforcement – which is mostly the case in less-developed countries (LDCs) – induce tax avoidance, discourage investment in formal businesses, and drive the entrepreneurial activity towards the informal sector even though the initial wealth level is high. Lowering taxes on formal activity joined with strict enforcement can help reducing the magnitude of poverty traps in LDCs – such as the MENA region, Latin America and developing Asia.     

Who gains from non-collusive corruption?

Non-collusive corruption, i.e., corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity, is particularly widespread in low-income countries. We build a macroeconomic model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of corruption. We find that credit market imperfections, by generating rents for the incumbent entrepreneurs, create strong incentives for corrupt behavior by state officials. However, non-collusive corruption not only redistributes income from non-officials towards officials but also within the group of potential entrepreneurs. If borrowing is limited, bribes prevent poorer but talented individuals from starting a business. But this is likely to benefit those who may enter anyway; the cost of capital is lower and there is less competition on the goods markets.     

Why should Southern economies stay in the Euro Zone? The role of labor markets

We assume a world of two countries in a fixed exchange rate system. These countries differ in the features of their labor markets. The home country is characterized by a dual labor market, with formal and informal sectors. In the foreign country, a nominal wage rigidity exists. In this context, the situation of the labor markets in each country is not optimal owing to a misallocation of workers between sectors in the domestic economy and unemployment in the foreign economy. We show that a devaluation of domestic currency implies a fall in production in each country and deterioration of labor markets in both countries.