税收中介:环状模型

中介是介于供给者和消费者,制定宏观政策的中央政府和按个人理性行事的万千个体之间的组织或机制.该文在税收中介的特定框架下,提出了一个模型以讨论中介问题,表述了中介有效性定理,简要讨论了中介的有效配置,并以农村税收问题为例,进行了经验讨论.该文表明了中介问题的重要性及其研究价值.     

税收中介：环状模型

中介是介于供给和消费，制定宏观政策的中央政府和按个人理性行事的万千个体之间的组织或机制。本在“税收中介”的特定框架下，提出了一个模型以讨论中介问题，表述了“中介有效性定理”，简要讨论了中介的有效配置，并以农村税收问题为例，进行了经验讨论。本表明了中介问题的重要性及其研究价值。     

一个人工税收CGE模型示例

税收ＣＧＥ模型是当前税收政策分析研究的前沿内容之一。本文将介绍一个人工税收ＣＧＥ模型,对其建模全过程进行详细分析,并以这个人工模型的基本结构为基础,对其进行可计算性、可扩展性研究。在成功得到均衡解的基础上,对解进行分析,有力地证明了税收ＣＧＥ模型,可以精确地预计税收收入、度量个体与社会福利损失及评价税制等重要作用,并为建立简单的税收ＣＧＥ实用模型做好理论与技术准备。     

相似性:创造性思维的中介

文章从相似性是实现创造思维的前提的基础,创造思维中的原理,创造性思维中的作用三个方面论述任何发明创造都是在有所继承的"同"的基础上加以"变异"的产物。这种同与变异的相似性运动还广泛存在于自然、社会和思维诸领域。实证相似性是实现创造思维的中介并采用了思维科学的方法对结果进行分析。     

税收计划与税收法治

文章从宏观经济运行的角度 ,运用实证分析的方法 ,深刻分析了我国目前税收计划与税收法治之间的矛盾 ,提出税收计划编制应适应市场经济发展规律 ,依法治税是税收工作必须长期坚持的基本原则     

论我国农业税收的规范化管理

农业税收管理规范化是提高我国农业税收管理效率的必然选择，地方政府行为规范化是农税管理规范化的基本前提，完善地方分税制财政体制是农税管理规范化的制度保证，依法治税是农税管理规范化的基本措施。     

地方政府纵向税收竞争能力:失衡与失控

本文以地方政府为研究视角,引入税收竞争能力这一概念,认为我国地方政府在制度框架内税收自主权存在着缺失,而在正式制度框架外税收自由裁量权过大,从而导致竞争的失控。因此规范税权划分,赋予地方政府制度内的筹集收入的自主权,建立长期稳定的对中央政府与地方政府具有双向约束的税收管理体制,才能使纵向税收竞争趋于有序。     

CIGARETTE TAXATION AND DEMAND: AN EMPIRICAL MODEL

This paper evaluates the impact of taxation on cigarette consumption, using a recursive model that includes a retail price equation and a dynamic demand equation. The analysis is based on panel data for 11 western states over the period 1967–1990. Results indicate that cigarette consumption is price-sensitive, with a demand elasticity of –0.40 in the short run and –0.48 in the long run. A tax increase, such as that imposed in California in January 1989, can have a strong effect of reducing cigarette consumption by between 11.2 percent in the short run and 13.4 percent in the long run. These results support the theory of rational addiction and the hypothesis that, as a part of their oligopoly behavior, the tobacco companies often do raise end-market prices by more than the amount of the increase in tax rates .     

POSITIONAL CONCERNS IN AN OLG MODEL: OPTIMAL LABOR AND CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION*

This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two‐type OLG model when individuals’ relative consumption matters. Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels: (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low‐ability type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low‐ability type becomes substantially smaller, than in the conventional model. In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption, we also address within‐generation and upward comparisons.     

MAKING CARBON TAXATION A GENERATIONAL WIN WIN

Carbon taxation is mostly studied in social planner or infinitely lived‐agent models, which obscure carbon taxation's potential to produce a generational win win. This article's large‐scale, dynamic 55‐period, overlapping generations model calculates the carbon tax policy delivering the highest uniform welfare gain to all current and future generations. Our model features coal, oil, and gas, increasing extraction costs, clean energy, technical and demographic change, and Nordhaus' carbon/temperature/damage functions. Assuming high‐end carbon damages, the optimal carbon tax is $70, rising annually at 1.5%. This policy raises all generations' welfare by almost 5%. However, doing so requires major intergenerational redistribution.     

SUNK COSTS AND PROFIT TAXATION: A SOURCE OF TAX NON-NEUTRALITY

This Paper uses a two-period Von Stackelberg model to study the effects of profit taxation on the behaviour of a monopolist, when the entry of a potential competitor is threatened. A barrier to entry, consisting of a sunk cost, is assumed. If the potential competitor decides to enter, thus making a loss, deduction is allowed in the following period. This model shows that these tax deductions can make profit taxation be distortive.     

FISCAL POLICY AND OPTIMAL TAXATION: EVIDENCE FROM A TAX SMOOTHING EXERCISE

Testing the tax smoothing hypothesis for the EU‐15, we hypothesise that the introduction of the 3%‐deficit rule of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 may have inhibited tax smoothing as European Union (EU)‐member states are no longer capable of letting the deficit grow as much as implied by expected decreases in government expenditure. Our results show that for some countries this fiscal rule may have indeed changed the validity of the tax smoothing hypothesis, thus implying that EU accession has caused welfare losses.