The discipline of innovation. 1985

How much of innovation is inspiration, and how much is hard work? The answer lies somewhere in the middle, says management thinker Peter Drucker. In this HBR classic from 1985, he argues that innovation is real work that can and should be managed like any other corporate function. Success is more likely to result from the systematic pursuit of opportunities than from a flash of genius. Indeed, most innovative business ideas arise through the methodical analysis of seven areas of opportunity. Within a company or industry, opportunities can be found in unexpected occurrences, incongruities of various kinds, process needs, or changes in an industry or market. Outside a company, opportunities arise from demographic changes, changes in perception, or new knowledge. There is some overlap among the sources, and the potential for innovation may well lie in more than one area at a time. Innovations based on new knowledge tend to have the greatest effect on the marketplace, but it often takes decades before the ideas are translated into actual products, processes, or services. The other sources of innovation are easier and simpler to handle, yet they still require managers to look beyond established practices, Drucker explains. The author emphasizes that innovators need to look for simple, focused solutions to real problems. The greatest praise an innovation can receive is for people to say, "That's so obvious!" Grandiose ideas designed to revolutionize an industry rarely work. Innovation, like any other endeavor, takes talent, ingenuity, and knowledge. But Drucker cautions that if diligence, persistence, and commitment are lacking, companies are unlikely to succeed at the business of innovation.     

The discipline of innovation.

As managers recognize the heightened importance of innovation to competitive success, they face an apparent paradox: the orderly and predictable decisions on which a business rests depend increasingly on the disorderly and unpredictable process of innovation. How can managers expect to plan for--or count on--a process that is itself so utterly dependent on creativity, inspiration, and old-fashioned luck? Drawing on his many years' experience studying innovative and entrepreneurial companies, the author argues that this paradox is apparent only, not real. Most of what happens in successful innovations is not the happy occurrence of a blinding flash of insight but, rather, the careful implementation of an unspectacular but systematic management discipline. At the heart of that discipline lies the knowledge of where to look for innovation opportunities and how to identify them. It is to this study of the sources of innovation that Mr. Drucker here addresses himself.     

Knowing a winning business idea when you see one

Identifying which business ideas have real commercial potential is fraught with uncertainty, and even the most admired companies have stumbled. It's not as if they don't know what the challenges of innovation are. A new product has to offer customers exceptional utility at an attractive price, and the company must be able to deliver it at a tidy profit. But the uncertainties surrounding innovation are so great that even the most insightful managers have a hard time evaluating the commercial readiness of new business ideas. In this article, W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne introduce three tools that managers can use to help strip away some of that uncertainty. The first tool, "the buyer utility map," indicates how likely it is that customers will be attracted to a new business idea. The second, "the price corridor of the mass," identifies what price will unlock the greatest number of customers. And the third tool, "the business model guide," offers a framework for figuring out whether and how a company can profitably deliver the new idea at the targeted price. Applying the tools, though, is not the end of the story. Many innovations have to overcome adoption hurdles--strong resistance from stakeholders inside and outside the company. Often overlooked in the planning process, adoption hurdles can make or break the commercial viability of even the most powerful new ideas. The authors conclude by discussing how managers can head off negative reactions from stakeholders.     

Fair process: managing in the knowledge economy

Unlike the traditional factors of production--land, labor, and capital--knowledge is a resource that can't be forced out of people. But creating and sharing knowledge is essential to fostering innovation, the key challenge of the knowledge-based economy. To create a climate in which employees volunteer their creativity and expertise, managers need to look beyond the traditional tools at their disposal. They need to build trust. The authors have studied the links between trust, idea sharing, and corporate performance for more than a decade. They have explored the question of why managers of local subsidiaries so often fail to share information with executives at headquarters. They have studied the dynamics of idea sharing in product development teams, joint ventures, supplier partnerships, and corporate transformations. They offer an explanation for why people resist change even when it would benefit them directly. In every case, the decisive factor was what the authors call fair process--fairness in the way a company makes and executes decisions. The elements of fair process are simple: Engage people's input in decisions that directly affect them. Explain why decisions are made the way they are. Make clear what will be expected of employees after the changes are made. Fair process may sound like a soft issue, but it is crucial to building trust and unlocking ideas. Without it, people are apt to withhold their full cooperation and their creativity. The results are costly: ideas that never see daylight and initiatives that are never seized.     

Strategy as simple rules

The success of Yahoo!, eBay, Enron, and other companies that have become adept at morphing to meet the demands of changing markets can't be explained using traditional thinking about competitive strategy. These companies have succeeded by pursuing constantly evolving strategies in market spaces that were considered unattractive according to traditional measures. In this article--the third in an HBR series by Kathleen Eisenhardt and Donald Sull on strategy in the new economy--the authors ask, what are the sources of competitive advantage in high-velocity markets? The secret, they say, is strategy as simple rules. The companies know that the greatest opportunities for competitive advantage lie in market confusion, but they recognize the need for a few crucial strategic processes and a few simple rules. In traditional strategy, advantage comes from exploiting resources or stable market positions. In strategy as simple rules, advantage comes from successfully seizing fleeting opportunities. Key strategic processes, such as product innovation, partnering, or spinout creation, place the company where the flow of opportunities is greatest. Simple rules then provide the guidelines within which managers can pursue such opportunities. Simple rules, which grow out of experience, fall into five broad categories: how- to rules, boundary conditions, priority rules, timing rules, and exit rules. Companies with simple-rules strategies must follow the rules religiously and avoid the temptation to change them too frequently. A consistent strategy helps managers sort through opportunities and gain short-term advantage by exploiting the attractive ones. In stable markets, managers rely on complicated strategies built on detailed predictions of the future. But when business is complicated, strategy should be simple.     

Is a share buyback right for your company?

Contrary to popular wisdom, buybacks don't create value by raising earnings per share. But they do indeed create value, and in two very different ways. First, a buyback sends signals about the company's prospects to the market--hopefully, that prospects are so good that the best investment managers can make right now is in their own company. But investors won't see it that way if other, negative, signals are coming from the company, and it's rarely a good idea for companies in high-growth industries, where investors expect that money to be spent pursuing new opportunities. Second, when financed as a debt issue, a buyback is essentially an exchange of equity for debt, conferring the traditional benefits of leverage--a tax shield and a discipline for managers. For such a buyback to make sense, a company would need to have taxable profits in need of shielding, of course, and be able to predict its future cash flows fairly accurately. Justin Pettit has found that managers routinely underestimate how many shares they need to buy to send a credible signal to the markets, and he offers a way to calculate that number. He also goes through the iterative steps involved in working out how many shares must be purchased to reach a target level of debt. Then he takes a look at the advantages and disadvantages of the three most common ways that companies make the actual purchases--open-market purchases, fixed-price tender offers, and auction-based tender offers. When a company's performance is lagging, a share buyback can look attractive. Unfortunately, a buyback can backfire--unless executives understand why, when, and how to use this powerful and risky tool.     

The post-capitalist executive. Interview by T George Harris

For half a century, Peter F. Drucker has influenced senior executives across the globe with his rare insight into socioeconomic forces and practical advice for navigating often turbulent managerial waters. In his latest contribution to HBR, Drucker discusses the impact of the ideas in his latest work, Post-Capitalist Society, on the day-to-day lives and careers of managers. Drucker argues that managers must learn to negotiate a new environment with a different set of work rules and career expectations. Companies currently face downsizing and turmoil with increasing regularity. Once built to last like pyramids, corporations are now more like tents. In addition, businesses in the post-capitalist society grow through many and varied complicated alliances often baffling to the traditional manager. Confronted by these changes, managers must relearn how to manage. In the new world of business, information is replacing authority as the primary tool of the executive. And, Drucker advises, one embarks on the road toward information literacy not by buying the latest technological gadget but by identifying gaps in knowledge. As companies increasingly become temporary institutions, the manager also must begin to take individual responsibility for himself or herself. To that end, the executive must explore what Drucker calls competencies: a person's abilities, likes, dislikes, and goals, both professional and personal. If executives rise to these challenges, a new organizational foundation will be built. While a combination of rank and power supported the traditional organization, the internal structure of the emerging organization will be mutual understanding and trust.     

A buyer's guide to the innovation bazaar

Companies seeking new ideas or product concepts from outside sources may find the "innovation bazaar," with its wide array of choices and methods of acquiring them, a confusing, chaotic place. Nambisan and Sawhney have crafted a conceptual guide for managers who understand the importance of going outside their firms for innovation but are uncertain about how to do it. The authors' "external sourcing continuum" shows at a glance how shopping for, say, raw ideas compares with shopping for market-ready products in terms of cost, risk, multiplicity of options, and speed of commercialization. Raw ideas, whether acquired directly from the inventor or through a patent broker, licensing agent, or some other intermediary, tend to be low cost but high risk and take a long time to bring to market. Market-ready products, often acquired as stand-alone businesses through a venture capitalist or business incubator, are more expensive and narrow one's choices, but they can be launched quickly and with less risk. Between these two approaches lies a third, facilitated by the "innovation capitalist." This new kind of intermediary provides client companies with access to a broad range of innovative product or technology ideas that are nearly market ready, thereby mitigating early-stage risks and lowering the time to market without significantly increasing acquisition costs. The authors compare the advantages and disadvantages of using intermediaries associated with the three approaches and provide a checklist of factors to consider when placing your company on the external sourcing continuum. If you've been oriented toward one end of the continuum or the other, you can increase your options and your flexibility by expanding into the middle.     

The new productivity challenge

"The single greatest challenge facing managers in the developed countries of the world is to raise the productivity of knowledge and service workers," writes Peter F. Drucker in "The New Productivity Challenge." Productivity, says Drucker, ultimately defeated Karl Marx; it gave common laborers the chance to earn the wages of skilled workers. Now five distinct steps will raise the productivity of knowledge and service workers--and not only stimulate new economic growth but also defuse rising social tensions.     

Strategy as revolution

How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.     

Managing in an age of modularity

Modularity is a familiar principle in the computer industry. Different companies can independently design and produce components, suck as disk drives or operating software, and those modules will fit together into a complex and smoothly functioning product because the module makers obey a given set of design rules. Modularity in manufacturing is already common in many companies. But now a number of them are beginning to extend the approach into the design of their products and services. Modularity in design should tremendously boost the rate of innovation in many industries as it did in the computer industry. As businesses as diverse as auto manufacturing and financial services move toward modular designs, the authors say, competitive dynamics will change enormously. No longer will assemblers control the final product: suppliers of key modules will gain leverage and even take on responsibility for design rules. Companies will compete either by specifying the dominant design rules (as Microsoft does) or by producing excellent modules (as disk drive maker Quantum does). Leaders in a modular industry will control less, so they will have to watch the competitive environment closely for opportunities to link up with other module makers. They will also need to know more: engineering details that seemed trivial at the corporate level may now play a large part in strategic decisions. Leaders will also become knowledge managers internally because they will need to coordinate the efforts of development groups in order to keep them focused on the modular strategies the company is pursuing.     

Creating new market space.

Most companies focus on matching and beating their rivals. As a result, their strategies tend to take on similar dimensions. What ensues is head-to-head competition based largely on incremental improvements in cost, quality, or both. The authors have studied how innovative companies break free from the competitive pack by staking out fundamentally new market space--that is, by creating products or services for which there are no direct competitors. This path to value innovation requires a different competitive mind-set and a systematic way of looking for opportunities. Instead of looking within the conventional boundaries that define how an industry competes, managers can look methodically across them. By so doing, they can find unoccupied territory that represents real value innovation. Rather than looking at competitors within their own industry, for example, managers can ask why customers make the trade-off between substitute products or services. Home Depot, for example, looked across the substitutes serving home improvement needs. Intuit looked across the substitutes available to individuals managing their personal finances. In both cases, powerful insights were derived from looking at familiar data from a new perspective. Similar insights can be gleaned by looking across strategic groups within an industry; across buyer groups; across complementary product and service offerings; across the functional-emotional orientation of an industry; and even across time. To help readers explore new market space systematically, the authors developed a tool, the value curve, that can be used to represent visually a range of value propositions.     

What is a global manager?

To compete around the world, a company needs three strategic capabilities: global-scale efficiency, local responsiveness, and the ability to leverage learning worldwide. No single "global" manager can build these capabilities. Rather, groups of specialized managers must integrate assets, resources, and people in diverse operating units. Such managers are made, not born. And how to make them is--and must be--the foremost question for corporate managers. Drawing on their research with leading transnational corporations, Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal identify three types of global managers. They also illustrate the responsibilities each position involves through a close look at the careers of successful executives: Leif Johansson of Electrolux, Howard Gottlieb of NEC, and Wahib Zaki of Procter & Gamble. The first type is the global business or product-division manager who must build worldwide efficiency and competitiveness. These managers recognize cross-border opportunities and risks as well as link activities and capabilities around the world. The second is the country manager whose unit is the building block for worldwide operations. These managers are responsible for understanding and interpreting local markets, building local resources and capabilities, and contributing to--and participating in--the development of global strategy. Finally, there are worldwide functional specialists--the managers whose potential is least appreciated in many traditional multinational companies. To transfer expertise from one unit to another and leverage learning, these managers must scan the company for good ideas and best practice, cross-pollinate among units, and champion innovations with worldwide applications.     

Introducing T-shaped managers. Knowledge management's next generation

Most companies do a poor job of capitalizing on the wealth of expertise scattered across their organizations. That's because they tend to rely on centralized knowledge-management systems and technologies. But such systems are really only good at distributing explicit knowledge, the kind that can be captured and codified for general use. They're not very good at transferring implicit knowledge, the kind needed to generate new insights and creative ways of tackling business problems or opportunities. The authors suggest another approach, something they call T-shaped management, which requires executives to share knowledge freely across their organization (the horizontal part of the "T"), while remaining fiercely committed to their individual business unit's performance (the vertical part). A few companies are starting to use this approach, and one--BP Amoco--has been especially successful. From BP's experience, the authors have gleaned five ways that T-shaped managers help companies capitalize on their inherent knowledge. They increase efficiency by transferring best practices. They improve the quality of decision making companywide. They grow revenues through shared expertise. They develop new business opportunities through the cross-pollination of ideas. And they make bold strategic moves possible by delivering well-coordinated implementation. All that takes time, and BP's managers have had to learn how to balance that time against the attention they must pay to their own units. The authors suggest, however, that it's worth the effort to find such a balance to more fully realize the immense value of the knowledge lying idle within so many companies.     

Organigraphs: drawing how companies really work

Walk into any organization and you will get a snapshot of the company in action--people and products moving every which way. But ask for a picture of the company and you will be given the org chart, with its orderly little boxes showing just the names and titles of managers. Now there's a more revealing way to depict the people and operations within an organization--an approach called the organigraph. The organigraph is not a chart. It's a map that offers an overview of the company's functions and the ways that people organize themselves at work. Perhaps most important, an organigraph can help managers see untapped competitive opportunities. Drawing on the organigraphs they created for about a dozen companies, authors Mintzberg and Van der Heyden illustrate just how valuable a tool the organigraph is. For instance, one they created for Electrocomponents, a British distributor of electrical and mechanical items, led managers to a better understanding of the company's real expertise--business-to-business relationships. As a result of that insight, the company wisely decided to expand in Asia and to increase its Internet business. As one manager says, "It allowed the company to see all sorts of new possibilities." With traditional hierarchies vanishing and newfangled--and often quite complex--organizational forms taking their place, people are struggling to understand how their companies work. What parts connect to one another? How should processes and people come together? Whose ideas have to flow where? With their flexibility and realism, organigraphs give managers a new way to answer those questions.     

The innovation value chain

The challenges of coming up with fresh ideas and realizing profits from them are different for every company. One firm may excel at finding good ideas but may have weak systems for bringing them to market. Another organization may have a terrific process for funding and rolling out new products and services but a shortage of concepts to develop. In this article, Hansen and Birkinshaw caution executives against using the latest and greatest innovation approaches and tools without understanding the unique deficiencies in their companies' innovation systems. They offer a framework for evaluating innovation performance: the innovation value chain. It comprises the three main phases of innovation (idea generation, conversion, and diffusion) as well as the critical activities performed during those phases (looking for ideas inside your unit; looking for them in other units; looking for them externally; selecting ideas; funding them; and promoting and spreading ideas companywide). Using this framework, managers get an end-to-end view of their innovation efforts. They can pinpoint their weakest links and tailor innovation best practices appropriately to strengthen those links. Companies typically succumb to one of three broad "weakest-link" scenarios. They are idea poor, conversion poor, or diffusion poor. The article looks at the ways smart companies - including Intuit, P&G, Sara Lee, Shell, and Siemens- modify the best innovation practices and apply them to address those organizations' individual needs and flaws. The authors warn that adopting the chain-based view of innovation requires new measures of what can be delivered by each link in the chain. The approach also entails new roles for employees "external scouts" and "internal evangelists," for example. Indeed, in their search for new hires, companies should seek out those candidates who can help address particular weaknesses in the innovation value chain.     

Strategy as stretch and leverage

Global competition is not just product versus product or company versus company. It is mind-set versus mind-set. Driven to understand the dynamics of competition, we have learned a lot about what makes one company more successful than another. But to find the root of competitiveness--to understand why some companies create new forms of competitive advantage while others watch and follow--we must look at strategic mind-sets. For many managers, "being strategic" means pursuing opportunities that fit the company's resources. This approach is not wrong, Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad contend, but it obscures an approach in which "stretch" supplements fit and being strategic means creating a chasm between ambition and resources. Toyota, CNN, British Airways, Sony, and others all displaced competitors with stronger reputations and deeper pockets. Their secret? In each case, the winner had greater ambition than its well-endowed rivals. Winners also find less resource-intensive ways of achieving their ambitious goals. This is where leverage complements the strategic allocation of resources. Managers at competitive companies can get a bigger bang for their buck in five basic ways: by concentrating resources around strategic goals; by accumulating resources more efficiently; by complementing one kind of resource with another; by conserving resources whenever they can; and by recovering resources from the market-place as quickly as possible. As recent competitive battles have demonstrated, abundant resources can't guarantee continued industry leadership.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Building an innovation factory

New ideas are the precious currency of the new economy, but generating them doesn't have to be a mysterious process. The image of the lone genius inventing from scratch is a romantic fiction. Businesses that constantly innovate have systematized the production and testing of new ideas, and the system can be replicated by practically any organization. The best innovators use old ideas as the raw materials for new ideas, a strategy the authors call knowledge brokering. The system for sustaining innovation is the knowledge brokering cycle, and the authors discuss its four parts. The first is capturing good ideas from a wide variety of sources. The second is keeping those ideas alive by playing with them, discussing them, and using them. Imagining new uses for old ideas is the third part--some knowledge brokers encourage cross-pollination by creating physical layouts that allow, or even force, people to interact with one another. The fourth is turning promising concepts into real services, products, processes, or business models. Companies can use all or part of the cycle. Large companies in particular desperately need to move ideas from one place to another. Some will want to build full-fledged consulting groups dedicated to internal knowledge brokering. Others can hire people who have faced problems similar to the companies' current problems. The most important lesson is that business leaders must change how they think about innovation, and they must change how their company cultures reflect that thinking.     

The new psychology of strategic leadership

Firms in an industry typically cluster around a few strategic positions, and the intense competition on those occupied "mountaintops" makes it hard for firms to gain attractive returns. Superior opportunities lie on unoccupied mountaintops. Yet because those opportunities are "cognitively distant"--far from the status quo--strategists have trouble recognizing and acting on them. Competition, therefore, is weak. Most managers are trained to analyze economic forces when they want to identify new opportunities. But that approach usually won't uncover the kinds of ideas that overturn the status quo. Recent research on human cognition suggests that leaders would do better to use associative thinking to spot, act on, and legitimize distant opportunities. They should learn to make analogies with businesses in other industries, for example. For example, Charles Merrill launched an extraordinarily successful business when he reimagined banking as a "financial supermarket." This article explores ways to jump-start associational thinking--and to bring stakeholders along on the journey.     

Disruptive change. When trying harder is part of the problem

When a company faces a major disruption in its markets, managers' perceptions of the disruption influence how they respond to it. If, for instance, they view the disruption as a threat to their core business, managers tend to overreact, committing too many resources too quickly. But if they see it as an opportunity, they're likely to commit insufficient resources to its development. Clark Gilbert and Joseph Bower explain why thinking in such stark terms--threat or opportunity--is dangerous. It's possible, they argue, to arrive at an organizational framing that makes good use of the adrenaline a threat creates as well as of the creativity an opportunity affords. The authors claim that the most successful companies frame the challenge differently at different times: When resources are being allocated, managers see the disruptive innovation as a threat. But when the hard strategic work of discovering and responding to new markets begins, the disruptive innovation is treated as an opportunity. The ability to reframe the disruptive technology as circumstances evolve is not an easy skill to master, the authors admit. In fact, it might not be possible without adjusting the organizational structure and the processes governing new business funding. Successful companies, the authors have determined, tend to do certain things: They establish a new venture separate from the core business; they fund the venture in stages as markets emerge; they don't rely on employees from the core organization to staff the new business; and they appoint an active integrator to manage the tensions between the two organizations, to name a few. This article will help executives frame innovations in more balanced ways--allowing them to recognize threats but also to seize opportunities.