How do banks adjust their capital ratios?

We analyze the dynamics of banks’ regulatory capital ratios. Using monthly regulatory data of large German banks, we estimate the target level and the adjustment speed of the capital ratio for each bank separately. There exists a target level for a substantial percentage of banks. Unlike with panel regressions, we can estimate individual adjustment speeds and find large variation across banks. Adjustments on the liability side are most effective, although adjustment rates on the asset side are higher. Private commercial banks (neither state-owned nor cooperative) and banks with a high level of proprietary trading are more likely to adjust their capital ratio tightly. Banks with a target capital ratio compensate for low target ratios with low asset volatilities and high adjustment speeds. They seem to care mainly about the resulting probability to comply with the regulatory minimum. Assuming low variation of this probability explains most of the large cross-sectional variation of bank capital.     

What makes a bank risky? Insights from the optimal capital structure of banks

Assessing the risk of bank failures is the paramount concern of bank regulation. This paper argues that in order to assess the default risk of a bank, it is important to consider its financing decisions as an endogenous dynamic process. We provide a continuous-time model, where banks choose the deposit volume in order to trade off the benefits of earning deposit premiums against the costs that occur at future capital structure adjustments. The bank’s asset value may suffer from shocks and follows a jump-diffusion process.     

Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix

While bank capital requirements permit a bank to freely substitute between equity and subordinated debt, lenders and investors view debt and equity as imperfect substitutes. It follows that, after controlling for the level of regulatory capital, the mix of debt in capital isolates the role that the market plays in disciplining banks. I document that the mix of debt in capital affects bank behavior, but only when investors can impose real constraints. In particular, the mix of debt reduces the probability of failure and future distress for BHC-affiliated institutions (where the investor has control rights through an equity position) and for stand-alone banks before the Basel Accord (when debt issues included restrictive covenants). However, substituting equity for subordinated debt at the bank holding company level or in stand-alone banks since the Basel Accord (where the investor has few protections) only increases the probability of distress and failure.     

Integrated models of capital adequacy – Why banks are undercapitalised

With the majority of large UK and many US banks collapsing or being forced to raise capital over the 2007–9 period, blaming bankers may be satisfying but is patently insufficient; Basel II and Federal oversight frameworks also deserve criticism. We propose that the current methodological void at the heart of Basel II, Pillar 2 is filled with the recommendation that banks develop fully-integrated models for economic capital that relate asset values to fundamental drivers of risk in the economy to capture systematic effects and inter-asset dependencies in a way that crude correlation assumptions do not. We implement a fully-integrated risk analysis based on the balance sheet of a composite European bank using an economic-scenario generation model calibrated to conditions at the end of 2007. Our results suggest that the more modular, correlation-based approaches to economic capital that currently dominate practice could have led to an undercapitalisation of banks, a result that is clearly of interest given subsequent events. The introduction of integrated economic-scenario-based models in future can improve capital adequacy, enhance Pillar 2’s application and rejuvenate the relevance of the Basel regulatory framework.     

Does foreign bank penetration affect the risk of domestic banks? Evidence from emerging economies

We investigate whether foreign bank penetration affects the risk of domestic banks in emerging economies. By using bank-level data from 35 markets during the period of 2000–2014, we find significant evidence that the risk of domestic banks increases with the presence of foreign banks in the host economy, and this finding is shown to be consistent in a series of robustness tests. We also find that the incidence of such effects is more pronounced for domestic banks which are less efficient and less based on traditional activities. Foreign banks exert more pronounced impacts on domestic banks’ risk when they enter the host market via M&A, as opposed to greenfield investments, and when they belong to foreign conglomerates which provide strong internal support.     

Do different forms of government ownership matter for bank capital behavior? Evidence from China

This study attempts to reconcile the conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006–2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the government’s role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital ratios.     

Are good or bad borrowers discouraged from applying for loans? Evidence from US small business credit markets

This paper takes the concept of a discouraged borrower originally formulated by Kon and Storey [Kon, Y., Storey, D.J., 2003. A theory of discouraged borrowers. Small Business Economics 21, 37–49] and examines whether discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism. Using US data it finds riskier borrowers have higher probabilities of discouragement, which increase with longer financial relationships, suggesting discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism. It also finds low risk borrowers are less likely to be discouraged in concentrated markets than in competitive markets and that, in concentrated markets, high risk borrowers are more likely to be discouraged the longer their financial relationships. We conclude discouragement is more efficient in concentrated, than in competitive, markets.     

Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?

This study investigates the interrelationship between bank regulatory capital and bank diversification. We argue that regulatory capital might act as a substitutive mechanism of diversification to alleviate a bank's default risk. As a result, regulatory capital is likely to discourage firms from excessive diversification, which might in turn indirectly improve bank value. Using a sample of listed banks in developed countries from 2011 to 2017, we find that total regulatory capital is inversely associated with bank diversification. Narrower regulatory capital ratios only have a significant association with income-based but not with asset-based diversification. Our results also reveal an indirect effect of regulatory capital on bank value mediated by bank diversification (i.e. indirect-only mediation). Overall, our study provides novel insights into the complementarity of the institutional and strategic domains so as to understand the far-reaching implications of regulation reforms for the strategic behaviour of banking companies.     

Does regulatory forbearance matter for bank stability? Evidence from creditors’ perspective

Regulatory forbearance in times of corporate distress has been a common practice in many countries to achieve bank stability, particularly so in the absence of a unified bankruptcy code, yet very little is known in the context of emerging market economies. Exploiting variation of membership across banks in a corporate debt restructuring programme (CDR) sponsored by the central bank in India, this paper finds that the banks that made use of regulatory forbearance (RF) on the restructured corporate loans could increase their stability significantly due to the extension of low provisioning on restructured loans. However, the positive effect of RF diminishes at higher levels of market power, highlighting that member banks with higher market power tend to originate riskier assets (as reflected in their risk-weighted assets) under the auspices of this programme. Our results remain robust to different estimators (including propensity score matching), ownership structure, and alternative measures of bank stability.     

Do loan loss reserves behave like capital? Evidence from recent bank failures

Regulatory capital guidelines allow for loan loss reserves to be added back as capital. Our evidence suggests that the influence of loan loss reserves added back as regulatory capital (hereafter referred to as “add-backs”) on bank risk cannot be explained by either economic principles underlying the notion of capital or accounting principles underlying the recording of reserves. Specifically, we observe that, in sharp contrast to the economic notion of capital as a buffer against bank failure risk, add-backs are positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the recent economic crisis. Furthermore, the positive association of add-backs with bank failure risk is concentrated among cases in which the add-backs are highly likely to increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. The evidence cannot thus be fully explained by accounting principles either, since the role of loan loss reserves according to those principles does not depend on whether the reserves generate a regulatory capital increase. Additional analysis suggests that the observed influence of loan loss reserves on bank failure risk may be an unintended consequence of their regulatory treatment as capital.     

Are capital buffers pro-cyclical?: Evidence from Spanish panel data

We estimate the relationship between the Spanish business cycle and the capital buffers held by Spanish commercial and savings banks in an incomplete panel of institutions covering the period 1986–2000, which comprises a complete cycle. After controlling for other potential determinants of the surplus capital we find a robustly significant negative relationship between the position in the cycle and capital buffers. From a quantitative standpoint, an increase of 1 percentage point in GDP growth might reduce capital buffers by 17%. This relationship is, moreover, asymmetric, being closer during upturns.     

What determines the profitability of banks? Evidence from Spain

This paper empirically analyses the factors that determine the profitability of Spanish banks for the period of 1999–2009. We conclude that the high bank profitability during these years is associated with a large percentage of loans in total assets, a high proportion of customer deposits, good efficiency and a low doubtful assets ratio. In addition, higher capital ratios also increase the bank’s return, but only when return on assets (ROA) is used as the profitability measure. We find no evidence of either economies or diseconomies of scale or scope in the Spanish banking sector. Finally, our study reveals differences in the performance of commercial and savings banks.     

Are RiskMetrics forecasts good enough? Evidence from 31 stock markets

Academic research has highlighted the inherent flaws within the RiskMetrics model and demonstrated the superiority of the GARCH approach in-sample. However, these results do not necessarily extend to forecasting performance. This paper seeks answer to the question of whether RiskMetrics volatility forecasts are adequate in comparison to those obtained from GARCH models. To answer the question stock index data is taken from 31 international markets and subjected to two exercises, a straightforward volatility forecasting exercise and a Value-at-Risk exceptions forecasting competition. Our results provide some simple answers to the above question. When forecasting volatility of the G7 stock markets the APARCH model, in particular, provides superior forecasts that are significantly different from the RiskMetrics models in over half the cases. This result also extends to the European markets with the APARCH model typically preferred. For the Asian markets the RiskMetrics model performs well, and is only significantly dominated by the GARCH models for one market, although there is evidence that the APARCH model provides a better forecast for the larger Asian markets. Regarding the Value-at-Risk exercise, when forecasting the 1% VaR the RiskMetrics model does a poor job and is typically the worst performing model, again the APARCH model does well. However, forecasting the 5% VaR then the RiskMetrics model does provide an adequate performance. In short, the RiskMetrics model only performs well in forecasting the volatility of small emerging markets and for broader VaR measures.     

Can machine learning models save capital for banks? Evidence from a Spanish credit portfolio

We study the impact of machine learning (ML) models for credit default prediction in the calculation of regulatory capital by financial institutions. We do so by using a unique and anonymized database from a major Spanish bank. We first compare the statistical performance of five models based on supervised learning like Logistic Lasso, Trees (CART), Random Forest, XGBoost and Deep Learning, with a well-known model like Logit. We measure the statistical performance through different metrics, and for different sample sizes and features available. We find that ML models outperform, even when relatively low amount of data is used. We then translate this statistical performance into economic impact by estimating the savings in capital when using an advanced ML model instead of a simpler one to compute the risk-weighted assets following the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach. Our benchmark results show that implementing XGBoost instead of Logistic Lasso could yield savings from 12.4% to 17% in terms of regulatory capital requirements.     

Are banks using hidden reserves to beat earnings benchmarks? Evidence from Germany

Section 340f of the German Commercial Code allows banks to provision against the special risks inherent to the banking business by building hidden reserves. Beyond risk provisioning, these reserves are implicitly accepted as an earnings management device. By analyzing financial statements of German banks for the period 1997–2009, we see these hidden reserves being used to (1) avoid a negative net income, (2) avoid a drop in net income compared to the previous year, (3) avoid a shortfall in net income compared to a peer group, and (4) reduce the variability of banks’ net income over time. Our analysis also shows that if bank managers are unable to reach the targets as set out in (1)–(3), they are more inclined to keep the hidden reserves for use in future periods.     

Does bank loan supply affect the supply of equity capital? Evidence from new share issuance and withdrawal

We examine the hypothesis that fluctuations in the aggregate supply of bank loans influence the supply of new equity capital. Using residual lending standards as a clean measure of aggregate loan supply and a VAR framework to aid identification, we find that a one-standard-deviation shock to lending standards results in 15% fewer IPOs. Shocks elicit strong responses from IPO-firms that are highly dependent on external capital and increase the number of withdrawals, strengthening the interpretation that the above is driven by changes in the supply of equity. Our results suggest that credit conditions are important to a well-functioning IPO market.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Are US founding families expropriators or stewards? Evidence from quasi-natural experiment

We use board structure changes brought by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX; 2002) and subsequent listing standards as a natural experiment to investigate if founding families are expropriators or stewards of shareholder value. We hypothesize gain in a firm's value post-SOX if founding families are expropriators and a value loss if they are stewards. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that family firms that did not meet the requirements of SOX-related, board independence provisions before 2002, suffered significant value loss post-SOX. Our results favor the steward role for founding families.     

Does central bank governors term in office matter for macroprudential policies? Evidence from MENA banks

Using a comprehensive dataset on MENA banks, we examine whether CB governors use of macroprudential instruments affect bank risk. The findings indicate that the CB governors’ use of such instruments does not significantly reduce bank risk. We propose two hypotheses as to why CB governor are inclined to employ such instruments. Based on the findings, it appears that the decision to use such instruments is dictated more by macroeconomic considerations as opposed to peer pressure concerns.     

Does better capitalization enhance bank efficiency and limit risk taking? Evidence from ASEAN commercial banks

This paper assesses the dynamic causal relationships among bank risk, capital, and efficiency. Using a panel dataset of commercial banks in five ASEAN countries from 2005 to 2015, we employ panel vector autoregression analysis to take into account the endogeneity and interdependencies of these three variables while holding other shocks constant. We find that in general, better capitalized banks in ASEAN countries are more efficient and take less credit risk. However, high-efficiency banks tend to maintain low levels of capital, whereas low-efficiency banks have higher capital ratios. We also analyze the sensitivity of the relationships among capital, risk, and efficiency to ownership structure, bank size, and the periods before and after the 2008 crisis.