The separability principle in bargaining

Summary. We investigate the implications of the separability principle in the context of bargaining. For two bargaining problems with the same population, suppose that there is a subgroup of agents who receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. Moreover, if we imagine the departure of this subgroup with their payoffs, then the remaining agents face the same opportunities in both bargaining problems. The separability principle requires that under these hypotheses, the remaining agents should receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. We begin with investigating the logical relations between separability and two other axioms, contraction independence and consistency. Then, we establish characterizations of the Nash and egalitarian solutions on the basis of separability. Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 22 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78.Youngsub Chun: This work was supported by the Brain Korea 21 Project in 2003. I am grateful to William Thomson, a referee, and an associate editor for their valuable comments.     

Union–firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency

This paper shows that a modified alternating offers Rubinstein model can provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union–firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the parties engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the firm always moves first in the wage bargaining game. The equilibrium wage is, therefore, unique. In the second example, we examine a two-part-tariff alternating offers bargaining protocol, where the parties bargain over the wage and transfer payments. We show that this bargaining protocol has a Pareto efficient, unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, although the parties do not bargain over the level of employment, the outcome under this protocol is, nevertheless, socially optimal.     

Wage differentials and state‐private sector employment choice in Yugoslavia*

In this study we use the newly available Yugoslavian Labor Force Survey data to investigate wage differentials and employment decisions in the state and private sectors in Yugoslavia. For the analysis we use three empirical models that rely on different statistical assumptions. We extend the standard switching regression model to allow non‐normality in the joint distribution of the error terms. After correcting for the sector selection bias and controlling for workers’ characteristics we find a private sector wage advantage. The wage premium is largest for workers with low education levels and declining for workers with higher educational levels. Given the regulatory and tax policies that pushed the private sector into the informal sphere of the economy during the period covered by our data, we argue that the state/private wage gap is likely to grow in the future. This will make it increasingly difficult for the state sector to attract and retain highly skilled employees.     

Nonconvex n-person bargaining: efficient maxmin solutions

Summary. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin solutions for some bargaining problems, there is typically a unique efficient maxmin solution. Received: February 15, 2001; revised version: November 14, 2001     

Marriage and employment participation with wage bargaining in search equilibrium

We build an equilibrium search model where married couples make joint decisions on home production and labour market participation and analyse the implications of our results for a frictional marriage market. A worker's bargaining position reflects their productivity, and the productivity and employment status of their spouse. People sometimes accept transitory jobs only to raise the spouse's long-term wages. Firms sometimes reduce turnover by unilaterally increasing a worker's wage, ensuring that the spouse stays at home.     

From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence

We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs are determined as in the ultimatum game. Otherwise the uninformed second mover states his own demand and payoffs are determined as in the Nash demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly known probability of information transmission. Our main finding is that first movers’ and uninformed second movers’ demands adjust to this probability as qualitatively predicted, that is, first movers’ (uninformed second movers’) demands are lower (higher) the lower the probability of information transmission. JEL Classification C72 · C78 · C92     

On continuous-time Markov processes in bargaining

For bilateral stochastic bargaining procedures embedded in stable homogeneous continuous-time Markov processes, we show unusual limit results when time between rounds vanish. Standard convergence results require that some states are instantaneous.     

Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel

This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two different protocols are considered: the egalitarian protocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with equal probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes. Expected equilibrium payoffs coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition regardless of the protocol. The equilibrium is in mixed strategies and the indifference conditions can be reinterpreted in the language of the kernel.     

Wage and employment effects of a wage norm

Most transition countries used tax‐supported wage norms in the early 1990s, as a part of their market liberalization programmes. This article analyses how a firm‐level tax (or subsidy) on deviations from a pre‐set wage norm may promote employment by rotating the labour demand curve perceived by the workers’ union around the value of the norm. We derive the conditions under which it yields a positive employment effect. We test the effect of the norm on the wages on a sample of Polish firms in 1990 and 1991. The data support the role of the wage norm on the position of the perceived labour demand curve and the role of the tax rate on its slope.     

Union bargaining power, employment, and output in a model of monopolistic competition with wage bargaining

This paper examines the implications of a rise in the bargaining power of workers on the real wage, income distribution, and the levels of employment and output using a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition and worker-owner Nash bargaining at the firm level. It thereby provides optimizing microfoundations to Kalecki's macroeconomic analysis of the positive effect on output of a rise in trade-union power, and contrasts it with the neoclassical view based on the diminishing marginal productivity of labor.     

Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games

We study a majoritarian bargaining model in which players make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players that move first forms with payoffs proportional to the voting weights. This result advances previous analysis in terms of one or more of the following: a) the simplicity of the extensive form (finite horizon with a predetermined order of moves); b) the range of the majority games covered; c) the equilibrium concept (subgame perfect equilibrium is sufficient for a unique prediction).     

FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent‐holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost‐reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view.     

Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs

We provide the existence theorem of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game model with random proposers. Our model contains a bargaining situation where the coalitional game is nonsuperadditive. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy SSPE satisfying the efficiency property when the discount factor is close to one. Furthermore, we provide examples where the delay in agreement occurs, even in a random-proposers model, when the game is nonsuperadditive. I am grateful to Akira Okada and an anonymous referee for their useful comments and helpful suggestions.     

Wage Cyclicality and Composition Bias in the Norwegian Economy*

Using employer–employee register data, I estimate the real wage semi-elasticity of aggregate unemployment for the years 1997–2014 in the Norwegian private sector. An increase of 1 percentage point in aggregate unemployment is associated with an average decrease of 2 percent in (total) daily wages. Although Norway has influential labor market institutions, wages in the Norwegian private sector are quite sensitive to business-cycle fluctuations. Gender differences in wage cyclicality and compositional variation are considerable. Men have significantly more procyclical wages than women, and appear more likely to upgrade procyclically to better-paying firms.     

Union Leaders as Experts: Wage Bargaining and Strikes with Union‐Wide Ballot Requirements*

To avoid strikes and to curb labour militancy, some governments have introduced legislation stating that union leadership as well as wage offers should be decided through union‐wide ballots. This paper shows that members still have incentives to appoint militant union leaders, if these leaders have access to information critical for the members’ voting decisions. Furthermore, conflicts may arise in equilibrium even though the contract zone is never empty and there is an option to resolve any incomplete information. Ballot requirements hence preclude neither militant union bosses nor inefficient conflicts.     

How credit constraints affect small and medium enterprises' strategic employment decisions and employees' labour outcomes: Evidence from Vietnam1

This study makes use of rich firm-level and linked firm-employee datasets that span the 2009–2015 period in Vietnam to examine how SMEs' credit constraints affect their strategic employment decisions and employees' labour outcomes. Our results show that constrained SMEs enlarge total employment by employing relatively more temporary workers and paying their employees relatively lower wages than unconstrained borrowing firms. Meanwhile, discouraged firms, mostly informal businesses, do not behave differently from unconstrained counterparts. In order to maintain a stable employment portfolio, discouraged firms are relatively more willing to reward their employees with an overtime payment.     

Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality

We present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs. We show that both wages and employment are positively associated (a strong form of correlation) across time and agents. We also analyze the decisions of agents regarding staying in the labor market or dropping out. If there are costs to staying in the labor market, then networks of agents that start with a worse wage status will have higher drop-out rates and there will be a persistent differences in wages between groups according to the starting states of their networks.     

The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.     

Offshoring and employment structure in the EU periphery: the case of Spain

The effects of offshoring of production have received a great deal of interest due to their implications on labour markets. However, the main theoretical predictions related to this issue are not always fulfilled in the empirical analysis; according to the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, there seems to be unanimous support for its effects in advanced countries whose production is relocated but not at all for recipient economies of the same. Additionally, there is a lack of empirical evidence in countries specialized in unskilled-labour tasks which are, at the same time, economies with higher relative wages in a global framework such as the Spanish economy. In this sense, the aim of this article is to analyse the effects of material offshoring in the relative composition of employment in the Spanish manufacturing industry during the period 1990–2007. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of immigrant labour and the temporary employment rate due to its increasing relevance in the Spanish economy during the period analysed. Using a generalized methods of moments (GMM) approach, our results suggest that, as opposed to most developed countries, offshoring in Spain has favoured the demand for blue-collar workers. In addition, we confirm that the increase in immigration and the increasing use of temporary contracts have enlarged the share of low-skilled workers.     

Fiscal policy and stock market efficiency: An ARDL Bounds Testing approach

The aim of this paper is to investigate the semi-strong market efficiency hypothesis with respect to fiscal policy information, in the context of the Bucharest Stock Exchange. Taking into account that macroeconomic data series of emerging countries usually have a limited size and may be plagued by inconsistencies and structural breaks, this paper proposes an ARDL Bounds testing approach for studying the relationship between stock returns and lagged macroeconomic variables. Moreover, this approach allows us to examine both the long and short-term relationship between fiscal policy and stock returns. The results indicate that, in the long run, stock prices fully and efficiently reflect information on past fiscal policy. However, in the short run, the Romanian stock market reacts efficiently only to unexpected fiscal policy news, while anticipated fiscal policy information displays a significant lagged relationship with current stock returns. In addition, the results also showed that monetary policy information is not incorporated efficiently into stock prices, both in the short and the long run, and its impact on stock returns is larger than the one exerted by fiscal policy.