On the exposure of insurance companies to sovereign risk—Portfolio investments and market forces

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe).     

中国的“影子保险”:来自监管自然实验的证据

影子保险在金融稳定中扮演着重要角色,但现有文献较多关注影子银行,对影子保险关注不足。“影子保险”即保险公司通过再保险方式将保险业务转移给不受监管或者受监管较弱的关联企业的活动,这会推高其真实的杠杆水平,增加金融体系脆弱性。然而,由于影子保险的不透明性和缺少自然实验,现有研究仅基于有限数据或模型给出简单的特征事实或结构性估计,很少能从因果关系上清楚地识别影子保险活动及其机制。本文利用中国加强对中资保险公司(处理组)再保险关联交易监管的政策冲击这一自然实验,使用微观数据和双重差分方法,识别了中国金融体系中的影子保险活动。研究发现,相关监管有效降低了影子保险活动,这一效应对集团公司的影响尤为显著;在机制方面,相关监管通过影响中资保险公司资产负债表两端的结构性调整进而降低了其风险承担行为,提高了经营稳定性。本文方法对识别金融机构的监管套利和防范系统性金融风险具有一定参考意义。     

Extreme Uncertainty and Forward‐looking Disclosure Properties

This study investigates the effect of extreme uncertainty on disclosure behaviour by analyzing the quality and quantity of forward‐looking disclosures during the global financial crisis and pre‐crisis periods, controlling for other determinants of disclosure behaviour. Prior research has struggled to distinguish between the quality and quantity dimensions of forward‐looking disclosures. Also, the impact of the recent financial crisis on these forward‐looking disclosure attributes has not yet been examined systematically. We address this gap by exploiting the unique setting of German publicly traded firms. These firms must provide forward‐looking information within their audited financial statements, although relevant regulation is sufficiently vague to allow great variation in the quality, scope and quantity of forward‐looking disclosures actually observed. Using hand‐collected data from 2005 to 2009, we provide evidence of a significantly negative association between crisis and disclosure quality. This finding is robust to several different disclosure quality proxies and regression specifications. In contrast, we find no negative significant relation between crisis and disclosure quantity; rather, there is evidence that reported volume increases during the crisis. Our results are consistent with extreme uncertainty, as occurring during times of crisis, negatively affecting the quality of voluntary disclosures, while firms maintain or increase disclosure quantity, ultimately diluting the information density of forward‐looking disclosures.     

我国保险业在后危机时代的风险管理

美国次贷危机引发的华尔街金融风暴席卷全球,危机延伸到保险业导致美国保险巨头美国国际集团AIG由政府接管,金融危机使得人们更深层次地意识到风险管理对于金融业的重大意义。保险作为一种风险管理方式,其行业自身的风险管理尤为重要。本文借鉴国外保险公司的风险管理策略,并结合我国构建风险管理体系的经验与实际情况,提出关于构建我国保...     

Systemic risk of insurers around the globe

We study the exposure and contribution of 253 international life and non-life insurers to systemic risk between 2000 and 2012. For our full sample period, we find systemic risk in the international insurance sector to be small. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to the fragility of the financial system peaked during the recent financial crisis. In our panel regressions, we find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the insurance sector to be a significant driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily driven by the insurers’ leverage.     

Insurance companies’ trading behaviour during the European sovereign debt crisis: Flight home or flight to quality?

This paper empirically investigates if insurers exhibited a flight home or flight to quality during the European sovereign debt crisis and other stages of the financial crisis. Our dataset consists of over sixty insurance companies, for which we separately observe trading behaviour and portfolio revaluations at a quarterly frequency during 2006–2013. When explaining insurers’ trading behaviour we explicitly control for country risk and momentum strategies. The results show that insurers exhibited a flight to quality during the European sovereign debt crisis, while we find no evidence of a flight home. The flight to quality was not present before the European sovereign debt crisis and disappeared after ECB chairman Draghi's speech mid-2012. Interestingly, supervisory data suggests that the observed flight to quality was not driven by regulatory solvency constraints.     

On Litigation Risk and Disclosure Complexity: Evidence from Canadian Firms Cross-Listed in the US

We find that D&O insurance premiums for Canadian firms cross-listed in the US are more than twice those of Canadian-only listed firms, and audit fees are approximately 50% higher. While this supports the view that both service-providers view the US as a more litigious environment, our findings also suggest that these differentials for cross-listed firms reflect premia for both litigation risk and the complexity of firms' financial disclosures. In particular, we show that D&O liability insurers charge differently for cross-listed firms that have different levels of disclosure; while D&O premiums are significantly higher for all cross-listed firms, they increase and then decrease with increased disclosure complexity. In contrast, audit fees increase monotonically as the filing complexity increases. We also find that auditors appear to price abnormal premiums charged by D&O insurers. Thus, audit fee premia for cross-listed firms appear to capture aspects of both litigation risk and increased disclosure complexity.     

The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance Regulation

This article considers the role of American International Group (AIG) and the insurance sector in the 2007–2009 financial crisis and the implications for insurance regulation. Following an overview of the causes of the crisis, I explore the events and policies that contributed to federal government intervention to prevent bankruptcy of AIG and the scope of federal assistance to AIG. I discuss the extent to which insurance in general poses systemic risk and whether a systemic risk regulator is desirable for insurers or other nonbank financial institutions. The last two sections of the article address the financial crisis's implications for proposed optional and/or mandatory federal chartering and regulation of insurers and for insurance regulation in general.     

The use of the Internet for corporate reporting in the Mercosur (Southern common market): The Argentina case

This study examines disclosure practices on the websites of companies listed on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange. We perform content analysis to provide evidence on Internet reporting practices by 84 publicly traded firms. We also identify the characteristics of firms that communicate financial and non-financial information on the Internet. We find that companies in the financial and insurance, services and mining industries disclose more financial and non-financial information on their websites than companies in other industries. The average concentration of ownership is 68%, with 27% of the companies being controlled by foreign groups. Those companies with higher concentration disclose more financial and non financial information than companies with less concentration. Companies in the financial and insurance and service industries, utilize their websites for commercial purposes to facilitate access to customers to their accounts and also to sell services. This e-commerce usage of websites is less developed in other industries. About 71% of companies in the financial and insurance industry are included in the Merval25 index and are audited by Big 4. These companies are both larger in size and less profitable than companies in other industries. We find that profitability and leverage do not have significant effect on corporate Internet reporting practices and that growth has negative effect on corporate Internet reporting practices. We also find that companies in the mining sector provide significantly more disclosure about social responsibility indicating a desire to improve the public image of harming the environment. The results documented, herein, extend the literature on voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial information using the Internet in emerging markets.     

Systemic Risk,Financial Crisis,and Credit Risk Insurance

Differing from conventional insurance firms whose underwriting business does not contribute to systemic risk, credit risk insurance companies providing credit protections for debt obligations are exposed to systemic risk. We show that credit risk insurers (CRIs) underperformed conventional insurance companies during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and such underperformance is attributed to the greater systemic risk of CRIs. We also find that the credit spreads of insured bonds increase significantly after their insurers are downgraded or put in the negative watch list. We control for alternative factors affecting bond credit spreads and the result is robust.     

我国保险资金境外投资风险防范探析

随着保险业发展速度的加快,保险投资资金的不断增多,使保险资金境外投资逐步成为国内保险机构扩展投资领域、提高保险资金投资收益的重要途径。但与境外投资高收益相伴的是不容忽视的高风险,2008年下半年以来,随着美国次级债风波演变为百年难遇的全球性金融危机,国际金融形势风云突变,对外投资形势日趋严峻,我国保险资金对外投资面临着严峻的风险。本文通过对当前我国保险业保险资金境外投资面临的风险分析,采取理论与案例相结合的方式,从保险监管方式、内部风险控制、资产负债匹配、投资比例限制及投资人才储备等方面提出我国保险资金境外投资风险的具体策略和措施。     

Managing Capital via Internal Capital Market Transactions: The Case of Life Insurers

The movement of capital within insurance groups is important for understanding insolvency risk management, as well as regulatory policies regarding capital standards and group supervision. Panel data estimates indicate that, on average, a dollar decrease in performance (net income plus unrealized capital gains) when performance is negative is associated with a $0.26 increase in capital contributions to life insurers from other entities in the group, and that a dollar increase in performance when performance is positive is associated with a $0.56 increase in the amount of internal shareholder dividends paid by life insurers to other entities in the group. Moreover, the sensitivity of internal dividends to performance is higher during the financial crisis than the noncrisis period. Also, insurers with low (high) risk‐based capital ratios receive more (less) internal capital contributions than other insurers, holding other factors constant.     

Systemic risk and diversification across European banks and insurers

The mutual and cross company exposures to fat-tail distributed risks determine the potential impact of a financial crisis on banks and insurers. We examine the systemic interdependencies within and across the European banking and insurance sectors during times of stress by means of extreme value analysis. While insurers exhibit a slightly higher interdependency in comparison with banks, the interdependency across the two sectors turns out to be considerably lower. This suggests that downside risk can be lowered through financial conglomeration.     

How Does Information Disclosure Affect Bank Systemic Risk in the Presence of a Deposit Insurance System?

ABSTRACT

This article establishes a dynamic game with incomplete information to theoretically analyze the influence mechanism of information disclosure on systemic risk in the presence of a deposit insurance system. To verify the mechanism, we use panel data on 247 global banks in 41 countries during the period 2006 to 2015 in an empirical analysis. Our article finds that a high degree of information disclosure can reduce deposit insurance premiums and weaken the negative incentive from a bailout by regulatory authorities. Moreover, the effect of deposit insurance on financial stability is not apparent, but the synergistic effect of deposit insurance and information disclosure reduces bank systemic risk. Furthermore, different deposit insurance designs affect bank behavior, so it is crucial for bank supervisors to create proper deposit insurance systems, which are helpful in strengthening market discipline and preventing moral hazard thus contributing to a stable financial environment. Therefore, under the deposit insurance system, regulatory authorities should strive to improve the standard of information disclosure to ensure systemic stability.     

Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises

We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank‐specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises. Under this policy, however, information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals, which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information. This commitment problem precludes a disclosure policy that provides ex ante optimal insurance against aggregate shocks, and can result in excess opacity that increases the likelihood of a systemic crisis.     

Empirical Evidence on the Value of Group‐Level Financial Information in Insurer Solvency Surveillance

The existing empirical research on insurer insolvency relies almost exclusively upon individual insurance company financial data, even though the insurance industry is dominated by group‐affiliated firms. This is the first study to evaluate the benefit of using group‐level data to predict insurer insolvencies for group‐affiliated insurers. The study uses financial ratios from the NAIC FAST scoring system, measured at both the company level and group level, as potential predictor variables. The results indicate that group‐level financial information substantially improves the predictive power of an insolvency prediction model relative to a model that uses only the analogous company‐level variables. In fact, the group‐level variables are found to often be substantially more powerful than company‐level variables in predicting individual insurer insolvencies. These results suggest that future insolvency analysis should, whenever feasible, include group‐level information to obtain higher predictive accuracy.     

The Determinants of Private Debt Holdings: Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry

Life insurers hold the majority of private debt. Lenders in the private debt market must have the ability to evaluate the credit quality of borrowers and to perform ongoing risk monitoring. The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of private debt holdings in the life insurance industry. The results suggest that larger insurers, insurers with higher financial quality, mutual insurers, publicly traded insurers, insurers facing stringent regulation, and insurers with greater cash holdings are more prevalent lenders in the private debt market.     

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE BY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRALIAN LIFE INSURERS PROMOTING INVESTMENT-RELATED CONTRACTS

Voluntary financial disclosure by Australian life insurers promoting investment-related contracts is predicted to be related to fees, funds under management, investment risk and return, liability risk and marketing costs factors. The decision to voluntarily disclose various forms of financial data in documents promoting investment-related contracts was studied during 1989-90. Life insurance managers providing financial disclosures tend to: (a) charge lower fees, (b) hold larger funds under management, (c) are exposed to higher investment risk, (d) are exposed to lower liability risk and (e) bear lower marketing costs. This evidence supports Mayers and Smiths' [1981] positive theory of insurance-related contracting.     

Determinanten der Liquidität in der deutschen Schaden- und Unfallversicherungsindustrie: Bedeutung,Erklärungskraft und Auswirkung der Finanzkrise

The aim of this paper is to analyze the corporate liquidity and its determinants for the German property-liability insurance industry using company-level data for the period 2002–2014. We first investigate the differences in cash holdings across insurers. We then quantify the relative importance of firm-level determinants compared with macroeconomic determinants in explaining insurers’ cash holding choices. In addition, we examine whether the financial crisis of 2008 has an impact on the liquidity situation of insurers. Our results indicate that cash holdings vary significantly across German property-liability insurers. The firm-level determinants size, group affiliation and reinsurance utilization explain more than 50% of the variation. We also find that macroeconomic conditions appear to have negligible effects on the liquidity situation of insurers. In addition, we do not find evidence that the liquidity of German property-liability insurers is influenced by the financial crisis of 2008. The proportion of cash remains relatively stable at 6% of the total assets.     

The Capital Structure of Firms Subject to Price Regulation: Evidence from the Insurance Industry

Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers who sell insurance in both competitive and/or regulated markets. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that insurers subject to price regulation will choose to hold less capital. In addition, we hypothesize insurers subject to more stringent regulatory pricing constraints will choose even higher degrees of leverage because the benefits of holding additional amounts of capital are suppressed. We conduct empirical tests using cross-sectional data on insurers and find evidence consistent with both hypotheses. These findings have important implications for insurance price and solvency regulation. Stricter price regulation increases the default risk (i.e., reduces the financial quality) of insurance contracts purchased by individuals and firms.