Are hedge fund managers skilled?

This study measures the skill of hedge fund (HF) managers by calculating the value added that they extract from capital markets. Applying bootstrapping to control for luck, we find that HF managers are skilled, with the magnitude of the value added depending on the benchmark. Compared to the Vanguard S&P 500 Index Fund and a set of eight Vanguard index funds, HF managers add on average $3.24 million per year and $2.88 million per year, respectively, although these values were higher before the financial crisis of 2007–2008 than afterwards. Finally, we find no evidence that HF managers share this value added with their investors.     

Are hedge fund managers systematically misreporting? Or not?

A discontinuity, or kink, at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution has been interpreted as evidence of managers manipulating returns to avoid showing small losses. Instead, we propose alternative explanations for this phenomenon. In particular, we show that incentive fees can mechanistically create a kink in the net return distribution. This mechanism accounts for almost the entire kink observed in the large, liquid Long-Short Equity style. Furthermore, we show that asset illiquidity and the bounding of yields at zero can generate distribution discontinuities as well. Therefore, we conclude that the observed hedge fund return discontinuities are not direct proof of manipulation.     

Are mutual fund fees excessive?

There is a long running debate over whether competition in the mutual fund industry limits the ability of investment advisors to charge fees that are disproportionate to the services they provide. We posit that disproportionately high fees are prevalent in funds with multiple share classes and those with weak governance structures. Using a comprehensive sample of index mutual funds for the from 1998 to 2007, we find that internal governance mechanisms matter primarily for funds with relatively small share classes where investors often face increased search costs and/or restricted access to competitive mutual funds. Additionally, we find that funds managed by publicly held sponsors are associated with disproportionately higher fee spreads (about 28 basis points). The results are robust to the inclusion of board characteristics, share class structure, and investment objectives. Overall, our findings suggest that competition and agency considerations are important determinants in the pricing of mutual funds.     

The tactical and strategic value of hedge fund strategies: a cointegration approach

This paper analyzes long-term comovements between hedge fund strategies and traditional asset classes using multivariate cointegration methodology. Since cointegrated assets are tied together over the long run, a portfolio consisting of these assets will have lower long-term volatility. Thus, if the presence of cointegration lowers uncertainty, risk-averse investors should prefer assets that are cointegrated. Long-term (passive) investors can benefit from the knowledge of cointegrating relationships, while the built-in error correction mechanism allows active asset managers to anticipate short-run price movements. The empirical results indicate there is a long-run relationship between specific hedge fund strategies and traditional financial assets. Thus, the benefits of different hedge fund strategies are much less than suggested by correlation analysis and portfolio optimization. However, certain strategies combined with specific stock market segments offer portfolio managers adequate diversification potential, especially in the framework of tactical asset allocation.

Are college education and job experience complements or substitutes? Evidence from hedge fund portfolio performance

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine, for various educational characteristics of hedge fund managers, the performance profile of hedge fund portfolios along their...     

Are hedge funds' charitable donations strategic?

We study whether hedge funds make charitable donations to further their business interests. We find that donations are driven by poor fund flows and performance. Post-donation, donor funds experience lower outflows compared to matched non-donors. One-off donations and donations to charities which hold fundraising events catering to the hedge fund community are more likely to mitigate outflows after poor performance. These findings are consistent with strategic motivations driving at least some donations. While the economics of donations initially appear quite favorable to the hedge funds, the benefits from donations are not scalable. Moreover, investors punish donors through greater redemptions if poor performance persists post-donation.     

Are hedge funds active market liquidity timers?

This paper investigates liquidity timing behaviour of hedge funds that invest globally in foreign investment assets. We expect these hedge funds to manage currencies exposure differently, depending on the extent they treat them as an asset class. In this paper, we investigate if actively timing foreign exchange (FX) liquidity adds value to hedge funds' investments. Unlike the existing studies where fund managers are assumed to either time or not time the market over the entire study period, we argue that fund managers may strategically choose to be active market liquidity timers based on the market condition at the time. To test this hypothesis, we develop a state-dependent liquidity timing model embedded with a Markov regime switching process and identify changes in the FX liquidity timing behaviour among the Global Derivatives hedge funds over an eighteen-year period. Our findings reveal that such regime changes in timing behaviour are driven by the underlying FX liquidity condition. A further analysis to compare the changes in the timing behaviour over time shows that hedge funds that are active market liquidity timers outperform those that engage in liquidity timing less frequently in all strategies categories.     

Targeted by an activist hedge fund,do the lenders care?

Do banks worry about expropriation when an activist hedge fund targets their borrowers or are they reassured that their borrowers will perform better after such targeting? We study 1435 events during the 1996–2013 period in which an activist targeted a US corporation, to examine what happens to loan contract terms post-targeting. We present two new results. First, we show that when a firm is targeted by an activist hedge fund, the lenders of that firm charge a significantly higher rate on future loans and demand collateral more frequently than the loans made to risk- and industry-matched non-targeted firms. Second, we find that this increase in loan rate and the likelihood of collateral demand is limited only to those targets that experience a large positive announcement return when the news of an activist's involvement is first announced. We argue that higher interest rates and greater collateral requirements reflect the increased credit risk for these borrowers due, in part, to the possibility of wealth expropriation by the shareholders. Thus, we provide empirical evidence that an increase in equity value due to an activist's targeting may partially be due to wealth expropriation from creditors.     

A unique view of hedge fund derivatives usage: Safeguard or speculation?

We study the common equity and equity option positions of hedge fund investment advisors over the 1999–2006 period. We find that hedge funds' stock positions predict future returns and that option positions predict both volatility and returns on the underlying stock. A quarterly tracking portfolio of stocks based on publicly observable hedge fund option holdings earns abnormal returns of 1.55% through the end of the quarter. Net of fees, hedge funds using options deliver higher benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns and lower risk than nonusers. The results suggest that hedge fund positions reflect significant timing and selectivity skill.     

What do mutual fund managers’ private portfolios tell us about their skills?

I study a registry-based dataset of Swedish mutual fund managers’ personal portfolios. The majority of managers do not invest personal wealth into the very same funds they professionally manage. The managers who do invest personal money into their funds subsequently outperform the managers who do not. The results suggest that fund managers, in contrast to regular investors, are certain about their ability to generate an abnormal return, or lack thereof, and invest their personal wealth accordingly.     

Who benefits in a crisis? Evidence from hedge fund stock and option holdings

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the tech bubble (1999–2001) and financial crisis (2007–2009). Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and noncrisis periods. Managers of hedge funds with locked-up capital trade opportunistically against flow-motivated trades of non-lockup managers, consistent with a hypothesis of rent extraction in providing crisis era liquidity. The success of this opportunistic trading is concentrated during periods of high borrowing costs, in less liquid stock markets, and is enhanced by hedging in the equity option market.     

Are commodity futures a hedge against inflation? A Markov-switching approach

This study examines the inflation hedging ability of various commodity futures using Markov-switching vector error correction models (MS-VECM). We find that total commodity futures fail to provide a hedge against inflation over the sample period between January 1983 and December 2021. However, industrial metals and precious metals are able to hedge against inflation. Other sub-indexes, including energy, agriculture, and livestock, do not have a significant inflation hedging ability. The inflation hedging capacity of industrial metals exhibits substantial variation over time, with most of the inflation hedging power occurring during the relatively longer and more common regimes covering the Great Moderation, the post-subprime crisis, and the periods after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. We further evaluate the inflation hedge ability of commodity futures by including stocks and bonds in the model. Our results suggest that industrial metals are more reliable inflation hedges.     

Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?

Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) alpha explains hedge fund flows better than alphas from more sophisticated models. This suggests that investors pool together sophisticated model alpha with returns from exposures to traditional (except for the market) and exotic risks. We decompose performance into traditional and exotic risk components and find that while investors chase both components, they place greater relative emphasis on returns associated with exotic risk exposures that can only be obtained through hedge funds. However, we find little evidence of persistence in performance from traditional or exotic risks, which cautions against investors’ practice of seeking out risk exposures following periods of recent success.     

Factor exposures and diversification: Are sustainably screened portfolios any different?

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management - We analyze the performance, risk, and diversification characteristics of global screened and best-in-class equity portfolios constructed according to...     

Buy Smart,Time Smart: Are Takeovers Driven by Growth Opportunities or Mispricing?

Excessively high pricing by bidders and targets can be explained by new growth opportunities created by the merger or by irrational overpricing in financial markets. We integrate both explanations through a new decomposition of firm value and investigate whether it is “true” growth value or mispricing that drives takeover waves. We find that “bidders buy smart.” Bidders primarily have high market values because of growth opportunities and overpricing, and select targets that are less overpriced with similar fundamental growth value. Bidders also seem to “time smart.” Takeover activity increases when bidders are more overpriced, in order to cushion against price corrections.     

Asset management in an inflationary environment—Are commodities a useful hedge?

The 2008 German investment act now allows insurers to buy commodities. Taking the perspective of a German investor and using techniques of cointegration analysis this paper aims to investigate whether commodity investments can be a useful hedge against inflation. A financial asset can only be considered to be a hedge against inflation if its price is cointegrated with the general price level. The results of the study seem to imply that commodity investments may be considered as a hedge against inflation for German insurers, but only to a limited extend.     

Are intraday reversal and momentum trading strategies feasible? An analysis for German blue chip stocks

The success of trading strategies that lead to abnormal excess returns based on annual/monthly investment periods has recently declined significantly. We adopt the original frameworks of De Bondt and Thaler (J Finance 40(3):793–808, 1985) and Jegadeesh and Titman (J Finance 48(1):65–91, 1993) to an intraday reversal as well as momentum strategy scheme based on 5-min stock returns. We analyze 16 reversal and momentum strategies each with ranking and holding periods of 60, 120, 180 or 300 min (reversal strategies) and 15, 30, 45 or 60 min (momentum strategies) from a retail investor’s perspective. We find no indications for momentum in stock prices but strong indications for reversals. Our results are furtherly robust regarding to market adjustment, portfolio sizes and skipping periods between ranking and holding periods. Our results show that the returns of the reversal strategies are statistically significant, however, yet too small to be economically significant. Our results also confirm the efficiency on the stock markets.

     

Are gold,USD, and Bitcoin hedge or safe haven against stock? The implication for risk management

This study investigates whether gold, USD, and Bitcoin are hedge and safe haven assets against stock and if they are useful in diversifying downside risk for international stock markets. We propose a combined GO-GARCH-EVT-copula approach to examine the hedge and safe haven properties of gold, USD, and Bitcoin. We then examine the attractiveness of these assets in reducing stock portfolio risk by using downside risk measures estimated by the proposed approach and other competing models. We also evaluate the relative performance of the proposed model in reducing downside risk with the competing models. The findings of the study indicate that the USD is the most valuable hedge and safe haven asset closely followed by gold, while Bitcoin is the least valuable. It is also observed that the proposed combined approach performs best in reducing the portfolio downside risk. The findings of this study are of significance for portfolio managers and individual investors who wish to protect the portfolio value during market turmoil.     

Does hedge disclosure influence cost of capital for European banks?

Upon extracting and quantifying relevant hedge information from the narrative section of European banks annual reports, this paper examines the impact of such information on cost of capital [as measured by weighted average cost of capital (WACC), cost of equity (COE) and cost of debt (COD)]. Using a sample of 1885 bank-year observations from 19 countries, we find that textual hedge disclosure leads to a significant reduction in WACC, COE, and COD; thus explains a substantial portion of variation in cost of capital. Further, we find that these results are stronger in countries with high corruption and financial openness. Our results are robust to several controls and model specification. Collectively, our findings enrich prior evidence which examines the economic consequences of hedge disclosure.     

Are common stocks a good hedge against inflation? Evidence from the Pacific-rim countries

We explore whether the observed real stock return–inflation relations in the U.S. and 10 Pacific-rim countries for the sample period of 1970–1997 can be explained by the interaction between real and monetary disturbances. Ten countries exhibit a negative relation between real stock returns and inflation. Malaysia is the only country that exhibits a positive relation. For nine countries, real output disturbances drive a negative stock return–inflation relation, while monetary disturbances yield a positive relation. In addition, real shock components appear to be relatively more important than monetary shock components for these countries, and as a result the observed relation between stock returns and inflation is negative. Neither the tax hypothesis nor the monetary regime hypothesis seems to be easily compatible with the diverse experiences of the Pacific-rim countries.