Institutional investors and the limits of arbitrage

The returns and stock holdings of institutional investors from 1980 to 2007 provide little evidence of stock-picking skill. Institutions as a whole closely mimic the market portfolio, with pre-cost returns that have nearly perfect correlation with the value-weighted index and an insignificant CAPM alpha of 0.08% quarterly. Institutions also show little tendency to bet on any of the main characteristics known to predict stock returns, such as book-to-market, momentum, or accruals. While particular groups of institutions have modest stock-picking skill relative to the CAPM, their performance is almost entirely explained by the book-to-market and momentum effects in returns. Further, no group holds a portfolio that deviates efficiently from the market portfolio.     

Institutional investors and corporate environmental and financial performance

We propose a conceptual framework to illustrate that when three conditions hold, institutional investors moderate a positive relation between corporate financial performance and corporate environmental performance. We explore heterogeneities across institution types to demonstrate the importance of each condition. The moderating effect works through the channels of expert consulting and effective monitoring. Our results have important policy and practical implications given the global trend of ownership concentration in institutional investors and the projection that by 2025, one out of three dollars under professional management will be invested in corporate social responsibility assets.     

Institutional investors and stock returns volatility: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the impact of institutional investors on stock market returns dynamics. The Polish pension system reform in 1999 and the associated increase in institutional ownership due to the investment activities of pension funds are used as a unique institutional characteristic. Performing a Markov-switching-GARCH analysis we find empirical evidence that the increase of institutional ownership has temporarily changed the volatility structure of aggregate stock returns. The results are interpretable in favor of a stabilizing effect on index stock returns induced by institutional investors.     

Institutional investors and bank governance: An international analysis of bank earnings management

Despite the growing importance of institutional investors in global capital markets and the link between bank earnings management and financial crash risk, little is known about the role of institutional investors in mitigating bank earnings management. We conduct the first international analysis of this issue using a broad sample of banks and institutional investors. We find a negative relation between institutional ownership and bank earnings management, after controlling for the stringency of a country's bank regulations and other relevant bank and country characteristics. Additionally, institutional ownership is more negatively related to earnings management in countries with more-stringent bank disclosure requirements or when ownership is held by domestic rather than foreign institutional investors. Institutional ownership is also more negatively related to earnings management in countries in which insiders extract more private benefits or when ownership is held by institutional blockholders. Our findings have important policy implications regarding institutional investors' engagement with banks.     

Institutional investors,intangible information,and the book-to-market effect

This paper establishes a robust link between the trading behavior of institutions and the book-to-market effect. Building on work by Daniel and Titman (2006), who argue that the book-to-market effect is driven by the reversal of intangible returns, I find that institutions tend to buy (sell) shares in response to positive (negative) intangible information and that the reversal of the intangible return is most pronounced among stocks for which a large proportion of active institutions trade in the direction of intangible information. Furthermore, the book-to-market effect is large and significant in stocks with intense past institutional trading but nonexistent in stocks with moderate institutional trading. This influence of institutional trading on the book-to-market effect is distinct from that of firm size. These results are consistent with the view that the tendency of institutions to trade in the direction of intangible information exacerbates price overreaction, thereby contributing to the value premium.     

Reactions of dissatisfied investors: exit,voice or loyalty

This study examines the reactions of individual investors that have invested in the stocks of companies that have been eventually delisted from the stock market due to bankruptcy and/or bad governance. Data to determine reaction styles of investors are collected through a well-established questionnaire to a sample of 67 investors of Borsa Istanbul. Multinomial logistic regression analysis concludes that investors’ perceived knowledge about the stock market is the most important factor affecting how investors react. More specifically, the higher the knowledge perceived, the higher the tendency of the investors to keep investing (loyalty) as the reaction. Further, more experienced investors are found to complain/ask for their rights (voice) more.     

Birds of a feather flock together: Institutional investors with disciplinary history and financial reporting

This study examines the role of financial misconduct of institutional investors on financial reporting quality of investee firms. We find that the firms held by institutional investors with disciplinary history (IDH) are more likely to engage in financial misreporting. Our results are not driven by institutional investor characteristics such as activism, incentives to monitor, investment horizon, or portfolio size. The impact of IDH is stronger in the firms that are more likely to engage in financial misreporting (i.e., the firms that barely meet analysts’ expectations and with CEOs with higher career concerns). IDH have stronger impact on financial misreporting when the institution reports multiple disciplinary events, the disciplinary event is recent, or disciplinary action is taken against the institutional investor company rather than just its affiliates. Results continue to hold after implementing various statistical tests to address potential endogeneity issues and alternative measures of financial misreporting.     

Institutional investors and corporate environmental costs: The roles of investment horizon and investor origin

Using an international data set that quantifies corporate environmental costs, we analyze the influence of institutional investor ownership, particularly investment horizon and investor origin, on the monetized environmental impact generated by their investee firms. Institutional investor ownership is negatively related to corporate environmental costs. This effect is driven by long-term foreign institutional investors, especially investors from advanced economies. Corporate environmental costs are negatively correlated with firm valuation and positively correlated with the cost of equity. Since corporate environmental costs are not reflected in environmental, social and governance ratings, our results shed new light on the role of institutional investors in shaping corporate environmental impact.     

Momentum or contrarian investment strategies: Evidence from Dutch institutional investors

This paper analyses investment strategies of three types of Dutch institutional investors - pension funds, life insurers and non-life insurers - over the period 1999-2005. We use balance sheet and cash flow data, including purchases and sales of equity, fixed income and real estate. We trace asset reallocations back to both active trading and revaluations and link investment decisions to firm-specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Overall, our results indicate that all three investor types tend to be contrarian traders, i.e. they buy past losers and sell past winners. Especially pension funds showed this behaviour in the most turbulent part of the sample - the crash of 2002 and early 2003 - implying that these institutions have a stabilising impact on financial markets when this is needed most. Life insurers tend to be contrarian traders when they have a high proportion of unit-linked policies, while non-life insurers are contrarian when they have a more risky business model.     

Institutional investors,controlling shareholders and CEO pay‐performance relationship: evidence from China

Using a large sample of China’s listed firms between 2005 and 2015, we find that domestic mutual funds have a positive effect on the CEO pay‐performance relationship, and this effect becomes stronger when their ownership is higher and closer to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. This effect is stronger in non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs), firms facing weaker industry competition incentives, and firms located in more developed regions. However, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) do not have such an influence. Overall, our study contends that the effectiveness of institutional investors’ monitoring role is subject to their identity, controlling shareholders and institutional environments.     

金砖四国的故事:是美好幻想还是理性预测--来自高盛全球经济研究部主管吉姆·奥尼尔的解读

未来有那么一天,人们对G7在一起的关注程度大大降低,取而代之的是对BRICs的关注.BRICs是什么,是金砖四国,哪四国?巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国.为什么关注?一句话,那时金砖四国对整个世界经济的格局影响已经举足轻重.     

Monitoring or colluding: the role of venture capital investors in the IPO process

We argue and provide evidence that instead of playing a monitoring role, venture capital (VC) investors collude with controlling shareholders in the IPO process of Chinese non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We show that VC‐backed IPOs’ applications are more likely to be approved by regulators, especially in firms with excess control rights, but have worse post‐IPO performance. Through investing in firms with excess control rights, VC investors are able to make higher exit returns. We further document that VC investors’ role in the IPO process is stronger when they have political connections, hold higher ownership, and when they make pre‐IPO investment.     

Raiders or saviors? The evidence on six controversial investors

Carl Icahn, Irwin Jacobs, Carl Lindner, David Murdock, Victor Posner, and the late Charles Bluhdorn are usually portrayed as corporate ‘raiders’. The evidence here, however, shows that between 1977 and 1982 when it was first announced that they had purchased stock in a given firm, stock prices on average increased significantly. The investors' activities in target firms for the two years following the initial stock purchase are likewise inconsistent with ‘raiding’. We discuss two hypotheses that are consistent with the evidence: first, these investors improve the management of target firms; second, they are systematically able to identify under-priced stocks.     

Institutional investors and post-ICO performance: an empirical analysis of investor returns in initial coin offerings (ICOs)

We examine the role of institutional investors in initial coin offerings (ICOs). Taking a financial investor's perspective, we assess the determinants of post-ICO performance via buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in a sample of 565 ICO ventures. Conceptually, we argue that institutional investors' superior screening (selection effect) and coaching abilities (treatment effect) enable them to partly overcome the information asymmetry of the ICO context and extract informational rents from their ICO investments. We find that institutional investor backing is indeed associated with higher post-ICO performance. Disentangling selection and treatment effects econometrically, we find that both of these effects explain the positive impact institutional investors have on post-ICO performance. Overall, our results highlight the importance of institutional investors in the ICO context.     

Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.     

Multinationals as Arbitrageurs: The Effect of Stock Market Valuations on Foreign Direct Investment

Empirical evidence of imperfect integration across world capitalmarkets suggests a role for cross-border arbitrage by multinationals.Consistent with multinational arbitrage as a determinant offoreign direct investment (FDI) patterns, we find that FDI flowsincrease sharply with source-country stock market valuations—particularlythe component of valuations that is predicted to revert thenext year, and particularly in the presence of capital accountrestrictions that limit other mechanisms of cross-country arbitrage.The results suggest the existence of a cheap financial capitalchannel in which FDI flows reflect, in part, the use of relativelylow-cost capital available to overvalued parents in the sourcecountry.     

Institutional failure or market failure?

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.     

Making honest men of them: Institutional investors,financial reporting,and the appointment of female directors to all-male boards

In this paper, we theorize that dedicated institutional investors are more likely than transient institutional investors to appoint female directors to investee firms with all-male boards, particularly those with high opacity. We conjecture that dedicated investors appoint female directors as a governance mechanism to improve the financial reporting quality of these investee firms. Specifically, we find that through the appointment of female directors, dedicated institutional investors trigger the release of stockpiled negative accounting information, thereby increasing the likelihood of a stock price crash risk. We also show that dedicated investors, through the appointment of female directors, improve investee firms' corporate disclosure environment by decreasing earnings management. Finally, we find that through continued service on investee firms' boards, female directors reduce the future likelihood of a stock price crash.     

监督抑或跟随：机构投资者治理角色研究——来自舞弊公司机构持股行为的经验证据

文章利用被中国证券监管部门处罚的舞弊公司及未舞弊公司为对象,考察机构投资者在公司治理中是扮演监督者还是跟随者角色。研究发现,从公司舞弊前一季度到后一季度机构投资者并未减持舞弊公司股份,不具备舞弊预测与识别能力;机构投资者倾向于利用分析师评级结果进行投资决策;机构投资者容易被舞弊公司误导,而分析师评级则有助于减轻机构投资者被误导程度。结果表明,目前机构投资者更多扮演着跟随分析师的消极角色而非有效监督者的积极角色,分析师评级具有一定的决策有用性。     

Financialization in commodity markets: A passing trend or the new normal?

In this paper, we show that large inflows into commodity investments, a recent phenomenon known as financialization, has changed the behavior and dependence structure between commodities and the general stock market. The common perception is that the increase in comovements is the result of distressed investors selling both assets during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We show that financial distress alone cannot explain the size and persistence of comovements. Instead, we argue that commodities have become an investment style for institutional investors. Given that institutional investors continue to target funds into commodities, we predict spillovers between commodities and the stock market to remain high in the future.