Real options and contingent convertibles with regime switching

We consider a firm with no assets in place but an option to invest in a project. The investment is irreversible but delayable in a regime-switching economy. The firm issues equity, straight bonds (SBs) and contingent convertibles (CoCos). We provide the closed-form prices for the firm׳s securities and the pricing and timing of the option. Our numerical analyses discover that issuing CoCos instead of SBs induces much less agency cost of debt. The agency cost is higher in a boom economy than in recession but the difference is small. There is a unique CoCos׳ conversion ratio such that the agency cost arrives at the minimum value zero. The inefficiencies arising from asset substitution and debt overhang are much more significant in recession than in boom. Only if the conversion ratio is not too small, the two inefficiencies disappear during boom periods. While the effects of the conversion rate on optimal capital structure and firm value and those of supervision and jump intensity on optimal CoCos׳ coupon are ambiguous and weak, the stricter the supervision or the longer the economy remains in recession, the less the option value and the optimal SBs׳ coupon.     

Asset specificity,capital intensity and capital structure: An empirical test

Capital investment and capital financing decisions interact. To resolve current controversies in investment-leverage-growth relationships requires an integrated industrial organization/financial economics empirical model of profit margins, capital investment intensity, leverage and risk. Using cumulative future losses in discontinued operations to measure the asset specificity of the firm's investments, empiricai results support a complementary (positive) relationship between debt and investment, the debt financing of verifiable contemporaneous growth, equity financing of future growth and the debt financing of specific assets. This evidence rejects the transactions cost theory of capital structure in Fortune 500 firms.     

Catering to investors through capital expenditures: Testing assets substitution problem around financing

We test the catering theory, which describes how investor preferences might influence individual firms' investment financing decisions. To the best of our knowledge, our study may well be the first that directly connects catering with asset substitution to contrast the magnitude of catering by bondholders and shareholders. And indeed, it is interesting to find that although catering behavior is found to exist among both corporate bond and seasoned equity offering (SEO) managers, the coexistence of both appears to offset the abnormal investment phenomena of either underinvestment or overinvestment. The study results further reveal that firms engage in overinvestment when catering to conversion holders of existing convertible bonds. Taken together, we find that support for the asset substitution and abnormal investment argument is strong from a stockholder–bondholder conflict.     

Debt and Development

This paper examines incentive and valuation effects of debt financing on land investment. When land is debt financed, the landowner holds both a development option on the land and a default option on the debt. Because development typically devalues the default option, investment may be delayed past the point at which efficient investment would otherwise proceed. The incentive to underinvest is shown to be more pronounced as debt level increases, i.e., as the debt becomes riskier. This agency problem provides an explanation as to why land is generally difficult to debt finance and may also explain why debt levels are relatively low for “land-intensive” real estate firms. Novel comparative statics show that debt value may increase for a given increase in asset volatility as well as for a given increase in interest rate. Renegotiation and restrictive contract provisions are considered as mechanisms to promote efficient investment policy in the presence of debt financing.     

Prices,debt and market structure in an agent-based model of the financial market

We develop an agent-based model in which heterogeneous and boundedly rational agents interact by trading a risky asset at an endogenously set price. Agents are endowed with balance sheets comprising the risky asset as well as cash on the asset side and equity capital as well as debt on the liabilities side. A number of findings emerge when simulating the model: we find that the empirically observable log-normal distribution of bank balance sheet size naturally emerges and that higher levels of leverage lead to a greater inequality among agents. Furthermore, greater leverage increases the frequency of bankruptcies and systemic events. Credit frictions, which we define as the stickiness of debt adjustments, are able to explain a key difference in the relation between leverage and assets observed for different bank types. Lowering credit frictions leads to an increasingly procyclical behavior of leverage, which is typical for investment banks. Nevertheless, the impact of credit frictions on the fragility of the model financial system is complex. Lower frictions do increase the stability of the system most of the time, while systemic events become more probable. In particular, we observe an increasing frequency of severe liquidity crises that can lead to the collapse of the entire model financial system.     

Foreign capital inflows and poverty linkages in South Asia: Do the forms of capital inflows matter?

The relationship between foreign direct investment and poverty reduction has received modest attention in the empirical literature. However, little is known about the relative significant impact of different forms of capital inflows on poverty reduction. This study attempts to investigate the impact of different forms of capital inflows (foreign direct inflows, portfolio equity and portfolio debt inflows) on poverty reduction in major South Asian economies during the post-reform period. The capital inflows-poverty nexus is explored using panel econometric methods robust to cross-sectional dependence. Our empirical results show that while portfolio equity inflows exert a favorable impact on poverty reduction, foreign direct inflows and debt inflows fail to influence poverty. The panel causality results demonstrate that portfolio equity inflows also support poverty alleviation via stimulating economic growth and trade openness. The findings of our study highlight the importance of considering the differential welfare impacts of different forms of capital inflows while implementing capital account liberalization.     

Investment and capital structure decisions of foreign subsidiary with international debt shifting and exchange rate uncertainty

This paper examines the impact of international debt shifting and exchange rate uncertainty on investment and capital structure decisions of foreign subsidiary. We find that debt shifting induces earlier investment, earlier default, higher leverage, and larger ex ante firm value of foreign subsidiary. When debt shifting is not so costly, the optimal leverage of foreign subsidiary increases as the tax rate differential increases. Moreover, when the correlation between exchange rate and foreign cash flow uncertainties is positive (negative, respectively), foreign investment advances as exchange rate uncertainty increases (decreases) as well as the correlation increases. These results reveal that the impact of debt shifting and exchange rate uncertainty on investment and capital structure policies cannot be ignored, supporting existing empirical findings.     

Cost efficiency and value driver analysis of insurers in an emerging economy

This study investigated cost inefficiencies and its relationship with value drivers of insurers in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The study revealed that there were 21–33% cost inefficiencies in these insurers under different model specifications of stochastic frontier and DEA; value drivers such as lower leverage risk, lower capital risk significantly improved cost efficiencies consistent with Basel II norms; ROE positively influenced cost efficiencies with further trade off between increased profit margin, decreased asset utilization and/or reduced equity multiplier by the insurer managements to achieve a target‐ROE; and the trend of cost efficiency was improving during 2000–2004. The study suggests that stock insurers could overcome their cost inefficiencies through adoption of efficient measures such as risk mapping of clients, risk prioritization besides ALM techniques. The study has direct implications for individual and institutional investors in making their portfolio investment decisions in insurance sector, policymakers, and regulators to closely monitor inefficient insurers consistent with Basel II norms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

地方国企非效率投资来源选择：债权资金优先还是股权资金优先？

以2001—2009年地方国有上市公司为样本对地方国企非效率投资来源选择进行研究,结果显示：地方国企非效率投资来源选择首先是债权资金,其次才是股权资金;当拥有较多长期贷款时,企业会更倾向使用债权资金代替股权资金,并且这种选择是理性和不可逆的;在产权保护较强和信贷配置市场化程度较低的地区,企业选择债权资金替代股权资金的动机更强;随着政府干预的增强,债权资金对股权资金的替代作用减弱。     

Corporate borrowing and growth option value: The limited liability effect

A firm issues bonds before undertaking a risky continuous investment project that is costly to later either expand or contract. The firm’s existing debt load causes it to install a smaller capacity because equity has limited liability. This lowers debt value, but such a cost should be borne by equityholders because debtholders will rationally anticipate equityholders’ future behavior. The firm’s choice of debt levels balances this agency cost against the tax shield benefit. As the firm incurs higher costs to later expand capacity, its growth option value becomes lower. The simulation results of this article are in line with Myers’ conjecture (1977), which states that a firm’s debt capacity is inversely related to its growth option value.     

Distressed exchange,bargaining power,and prior capital structure

Financially troubled companies often make Distressed Exchange (DE) offers to its creditors, to postpone costly bankruptcy reorganization. We derive the optimal terms and timing of a DE offer consisting of debt reduction and an equity stake in the restructured firm. The DE terms and timing are affected by shareholder bargaining power, with greater shareholder bargaining power resulting in earlier DE offer, smaller debt reduction and smaller equity stake. The impact of shareholder bargaining power is greater when bankruptcy cost is larger and tax rate is higher. We also show that renegotiability of debt increases ex-ante firm value and results in a higher optimal leverage ratio. Both firm value and optimal leverage ratio are decreasing functions of shareholder bargaining power.     

Cyclical capital structure decisions

Past literature has documented clear trends in the leverage ratio and other capital structure choices made by US firms. We expand this line of research by showing that aggregate capital structure ratios of US firms, during the last decades, are characterised not only by time trends but also by clear cycles. We set the start and end dates of these cycles using a ‘classical approach’. The cycles relating to the ratio of new shares versus debt are shorter and are more intense than the cycles regarding the term of the new debt obligations. The cycles that describe the ratio of retained earnings versus new equity issues are wider in relative terms and with similar duration to the cycles of decisions on external versus internal financing. This means that the decision to substitute debt for shares (or vice versa) is much more common, frequent and significant, than the decision term debt.     

基于资产专用性的企业融资决策研究

本文采用Williamson的思路,建立了资产专用性与交易成本、生产成本因素在内的综合交易成本分析模型。分析发现,相对于债务融资而言,股权融资有利于避免按市场规则强行清算带来的专用性资产价值损失,运用包络定理证明专用性程度高的资产具有削减生产成本的作用,专用性程度高的资产以股权融资为佳。     

债务期限结构对过度投资的影响研究——基于非金融类上市公司的数据

债务期限结构对公司治理绩效有着非常重要的影响,通过就948家A股非金融类上市公司债务期限结构对过度投资的影响进行实证分析后发现：从债务期限结构治理功能的静态视角来看,债务期限结构可以减少“内部人”的资产替代行为,抑制过度投资,进而有利于保护投资者的利益;股权结构同债务期限结构的‘‘组合机制”可以有效抑制企业的过度投资行为;随着市场化程度的深入,债务期限结构的治理绩效得到逐步优化;随着自由现金流水平的提高,公司过度投资行为会变得更加严重。     

Excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt

This paper analyses the effect of short term debt on equityholders' risk taking decisions. We show that if short term debt limits the expropriation of debtholders, it also implies a lower leverage, which prevents the firm from increasing tax shields. We then examine the incentive of equityholders to increase the firm risk when debtholders hold the option to swap a perpetual coupon bond with short term debt. We find that this option mitigates equityholders' risk shifting incentives. Compared to standard short term debt, this restructuring option deters debtholders expropriation, it increases leverage and it reduces the loss in tax shields due to asset substitution.     

Asset sale,debt restructuring,and liquidation

This paper considers a dynamic model in which shareholders of a firm in distress have a choice of whether the firm proceeds to debt restructuring or direct liquidation at an arbitrary time. In the model, we show the following results. Fewer asset sales, lower financing, debt renegotiation, and running costs, a lower premium to the debt holders, a lower cash flow volatility, and a higher initial coupon increase the shareholders׳ incentive to choose debt restructuring to avoid full liquidation. In the debt renegotiation process, the shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity financing to retire a part of the debt value to the debt holders. The timing of debt restructuring always coincides with that of liquidation without debt renegotiation. Most notably, the shareholders do not prefer asset sale in debt restructuring even if they face high financing costs. The possibility of debt renegotiation in the future increases the initial leverage ratio in the optimal capital structure.     

Determinants of capital structure choice: A structural equation modeling approach

In their seminal research on the determinants of capital structure choice using structural equation modeling (SEM), Titman and Wessels [Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. Journal of Finance, 43, 1–19] obtain weak results and hence call for further investigation. We apply a Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model, with refined indicators, to a pooled sample for the period 1988–2003 and find more convincing results than those obtained by Titman and Wessels. With the capital structure measured simultaneously by the ratios of long-term debt, short-term debt, and convertible debt to the market value of equity, our results show that growth is the most important determinant of capital structure choice, followed in order by profitability, collateral value, volatility, non-debt tax shields, and uniqueness. Moreover, we find that long-term debt is the most important proxy of capital structure, followed by short-term debt, and then convertible debt.     

Leverage and the price volatility of equity shares in equilibrium

The traditional valuation formulas for corporate debt, which are derived in a complete market setting and are based on the no-arbitrage principle, imply that equity prices become more volatile as leverage increases. If the asset structure is incomplete, the presence of corporate debt affects the linear subspace spanned by the payoffs of the existing assets, and the pricing of corporate debt and shares of levered firms becomes a simultaneous valuation problem. This paper characterizes the relationship between the price of corporate debt and the share price of a levered firm in an equilibrium framework where corporate debt is a non-redundant asset. While, in the absence of bankruptcy, higher leverage always implies riskier equity, it does not necessarily mean more volatile equity prices. In fact, the link between leverage and equity price volatility depends in a particular way on investors’ preferences towards risk.     

The Risk Structure of Land Markets

Real property as an asset class represents over half of the wealth in the United States. Nevertheless, the structure of risk in real property markets is poorly understood. This paper develops a model of urban and agricultural land prices that integrates spatial and asset pricing theories and characterizes the spatial and temporal risk structure of the land market. Urban land is priced by a CAPM and agricultural land is priced by a real option to convert into urban land. We show that the price of land awaiting conversion increases with the growth rate of urban rents and unsystematic risk but decreases with risk aversion. However, it may be increasing or decreasing in systematic risk. The free boundary for exercise determines city size, which increases with the growth rate of urban rents but decreases with systematic and unsystematic risk.     

Interdependent capital structure choices and the macroeconomy

This study shows that capital structure choices of US corporations are interdependent across time. We follow a two-step estimation approach. First, using a large cross-section of firms we estimate year-by-year average capital structure choices, i.e., the average firm’s percentage of new funding that is secured through debt, its term composition, and the percentage of new equity represented by retained earnings. Second, these time series are included in a Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive model in which three factors representing real economic activity, expected future funding conditions, and prices, are included. We test for the interdependence between optimal capital structure decisions and for the influence exerted by macroeconomic conditions on these decisions. Results show there is a hierarchical order in which firms make capital structure decisions. They first decide on the share of debt out of total new funding they will hire. Conditional on this they decide on the term of their debt and on their earnings retention policy. Of outmost importance, macroeconomic factors are key for making capital structure decisions.