Female leadership and borrowing constraints: Evidence from an emerging economy

This study investigates the differences in credit access between male-managed and female-managed firms using two Enterprise Censuses in Vietnam. Our findings reveal that women-managed firms are less likely to borrow from commercial banks than their male counterparts, even when controlling for other determinants such as CEO education and experience, firm size, and ownership. No difference in credit access is documented for firms borrowing from non-commercial banks. Once we control for firm characteristics and CEO demographic factors, approved loan size is higher for firms managed by female CEOs regardless of the borrowing source. Using decomposition analysis, we find firm size contributes most in explaining the difference in credit access between female and male-managed companies.     

Portfolio manager home-country culture and mutual fund risk-taking

I find that home-country culture affects portfolio managers’ investment risk-taking and performance. I focus on security value, which measures the degree to which people in a country assign importance to security, safety, and stability. Funds managed by managers from countries with higher security value exhibit lower fund return volatility, trade less frequently, and follow benchmarks more closely. These funds also tend to avoid lottery-type stocks and hence perform significantly better. However, the impact of home-country security value decays as managers spend more time away from their home countries.     

Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity?

This paper examines mutual fund managers' ability to time market-wide liquidity. Using the CRSP mutual fund database, we find strong evidence that over the 1974–2009 period, mutual fund managers demonstrate the ability to time market liquidity at both the portfolio level and the individual fund level. Liquidity timing predicts future fund performance and the difference in the risk-adjusted returns between top and bottom liquidity-timing funds is approximately 2% per year. Funds exhibiting liquidity-timing ability tend to have longer histories, higher expense ratios, and higher turnover rates.     

Portfolio manager ownership and fund performance

This paper documents the range of portfolio manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to managerial ownership, with performance improving by about 3 basis points for each basis point of managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making portfolio allocation decisions.     

What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?

Using a unique database of UK fund manager changes over the period from 1997 to 2011, we examine the impact of such changes on fund performance. We find clear evidence to suggest that a manager change does affect the benchmark-adjusted performance of UK mutual funds. In particular we find a significant deterioration in the benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were top performers before the manager exit and, conversely, a significant improvement in the average benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were poor performers before the manager exit. Our use of the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model reveals that the improvement in average post manager exit performance is accompanied by a reduction in market risk, a slight reduction in exposure to small cap stocks, and an increase in exposure to value and momentum stocks. Overall, our results suggest that UK fund management companies have been relatively successful in replacing bad managers with better managers, but relatively unsuccessful at finding equivalent replacements for their top performing managers. We believe that regulators should therefore try to ensure that all efforts are made by fund management companies to inform all of their investors about a change in management.     

Dividend policy,signaling, and discounts on closed-end funds

We test the predictions of dividend signaling models using closed-end equity funds that adopt explicit policies committing them to pay minimum dividend yields. These policies represent deliberate attempts to reduce share price undervaluation relative to NAV. Funds that adopt minimum dividend policies experience reductions in their share price discounts, trade at smaller discounts than other funds, earn greater excess returns following policy adoption, and their managers survive longer than other managers do. The results are broadly consistent with the predictions of dividend signaling models, and suggest that high quality closed-end funds can reduce undervaluation via dividend policy.     

THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Despite the substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. corporations in the past 20 years, there is little evidence that institutional investors have acquired the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in the corporate governance process. Institutional ownership remains widely dispersed among firms and institutions in large part because of significant legal obstacles that discourage institutional investors both from taking large block positions and from exercising large ownership positions to control corporate managers. Thus, although much of the growth of institutional ownership since 1980 has been accounted for by the growth of mutual funds and private pension funds, there continue to be strong deterrents to the accumulation and use of large ownership positions to influence corporate managers. Another potentially important factor discouraging concentrated investments are incentive schemes that effectively reward money managers for producing returns that do not vary much from the S&P 500 (or whatever sector the manager is supposed to be representing). Using a very different incentive scheme that offers managers a share of the excess returns (as well as penalties for failure to meet benchmarks), a relatively new class of “hedge funds” has emerged that provides both more concentrated ownership positions and higher risk‐adjusted rates of return. To encourage mutual funds to take a more activist corporate governance role and to behave more like hedge funds, the authors recommend that current legal restrictions on mutual funds be relaxed so that mutual funds have a greater incentive to hold large ownership positions in companies and to use those positions to more effectively monitor corporate managers. In particular, the “five and ten” portfolio rules applicable to mutual funds could be repealed and replaced with a standard of prudence and diligence more in keeping with portfolio theory; mutual funds could be given greater freedom to adopt redemption policies that would be more conducive to holding larger ownership positions; and institutional investors could be permitted to employ a variety of incentive fee structures to encourage fund managers to pursue more pro‐active investment strategies. The prospect of actively involving institutional fund managers in the corporate governance process may be our best hope for improving U.S. corporate governance.     

Fund selection,style allocation,and active management abilities: Evidence from funds of hedge funds’ holdings

This study examines whether funds of hedge funds (FOHFs) provide superior before-fee performance through managers’ fund selection, style allocation, and active management abilities. Using reported holdings of Securities and Exchange Commission–registered FOHFs, we find that FOHF managers have fund selection abilities, as hedge funds held by FOHFs outperform their style indices and over half of the individual hedge funds in the Lipper Trading Advisor Selection System (TASS) database. We also find that FOHF managers add value through active management of FOHFs’ holdings, while evidence on their style allocation abilities is mixed. Our findings suggest that FOHFs generate superior before-fee performance and that FOHF managers’ skillset is broader than previously documented. Thus, our study helps explain why FOHFs continue to survive and suggests that FOHF fee structure reform merits consideration.     

Pension fund manager skills over the economic cycle: the (non-)specialization cost

We study whether pension fund managers, as professionals of important social and financial products, are able to add value for their clients and adapt to economic changes. To this end, we analyze the performance and skills (market timing and stock picking) over the economic cycle from both pension fund and manager perspectives. This double analysis allows examining whether skills reside in managers and/or funds and control for manager substitutions. Despite the long-term nature of pension funds, we find that both fund and manager skills vary with market conditions, showing better evidence of stock-picking in booms, and of market timing in recessions. Nonetheless, top (bottom) funds and managers exhibit both (incorrect) skills in booms and in recessions. Some of the top (bottom) funds and managers are the best (worst) in both abilities in the same periods, but not in different periods, showing that not all managers have the ability to adapt to market conditions. Additionally, managers with limited skills tend to specialize because diversification requires multi-task skills and the non-specialization of these managers usually results in incorrect skills.     

Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds

This paper examines the effect of incentive fees on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Funds with incentive fees exhibit positive stock selection ability, but a beta less than one results in funds not earning positive fees. From an investor's perspective, positive alphas plus lower expense ratios make incentive-fee funds attractive. However, incentive-fee funds take on more risk than non-incentive-fee funds, and they increase risk after a period of poor performance. Incentive fees are useful marketing tools, since more new cash flows go into incentive-fee funds than into non-incentive-fee funds, ceteris paribus.     

The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm?s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.     

What determines mutual fund trading in foreign stocks?

We examine the portfolio rebalancing, measured by the equity churn rate, of mutual funds from 29 countries based on annual stockholdings over the 1999–2006 period. We find that funds more often trade the stocks of companies located in countries with higher degree of information asymmetry and are less familiar to fund managers, after we control for the effects of stock market development and investor protection. Consistent with the behavioral bias, fund managers more often rebalance stocks in foreign markets that perform well. This bias is exacerbated when fund managers are less familiar with and less informed about those markets.     

Tailored versus Mass Produced: Portfolio Managers Concurrently Managing Separately Managed Accounts and Mutual Funds

Using a matched sample of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and mutual funds (MFs) with the same portfolio manager and investment style, we find that concurrently managed MFs consistently underperform their SMA counterparts and generate more negative return gaps. Fund characteristics and liquidity betas fail to fully explain the underperformance. An event‐study analysis finds that the weights placed into top (bottom)‐performing stocks increase for existing SMAs (MFs) and negative return gaps increase for the MFs after the onset of concurrent management. We find that higher compensation collected by SMA fund managers are associated with more unseen managerial actions which positively contribute to the SMA return gap. Our results suggest that when managers concurrently manage both SMAs and MFs, they favor SMA performance over their MF performance.     

What's in Your 403(b)? Academic Retirement Plans and the Costs of Underdiversification

Sponsors of defined contribution retirement plans typically limit the investment choices of plan participants to a small number of investment managers and a limited number of investment vehicles. Such restrictions may limit excessive risk-taking by participants but also may preclude opportunities for efficient diversification. Many college and university 403 (b) plans have restricted investment choices to the retirement annuities offered by TIAA-CREF, the current manager of over half of all 403(b) contributions. Using 10 years of historical data, we study the efficiency of this TIAA-CREF opportunity set relative to a larger set that includes several standard index funds. Extrapolations must be interpreted -with caution. Assuming optimal rebalancing, depending on loss aversion and diversification constraints, the historical sample of returns implies that over a 20-year remaining work life, an employee -with an expanded menu that includes standard index funds could gain over 40% in terminal wealth compared to one who is restricted to TIAA-CREF retirement annuities. Even when a naive diversification strategy of equally weighting (1/n) all available funds is used, the expandedmenu outperforms the restricted portfolio by more than 25% over20years. These differences generally are significant at conventional levels based on parametric and nonparametric testing and do not appear to result from idiosyncratic market performance durinz the sample period.     

基金业绩排名与基金经理的冒险行为

本文利用2005-2010年间开放式股票型和混合型基金的数据,研究年度基金业绩排名对基金经理冒险行为的影响。与相对业绩排名激励机制会导致基金经理过度冒险的假设相一致,本文发现,年中业绩排名靠后的基金经理(输家)在下半年提高所持有资产组合的风险的程度要大于年中业绩排名靠前的基金经理(赢家)。进一步研究发现,基金经理提高下半年所持有资产组合的风险并不能显著提高下半年基金的业绩。特别是在熊市中,提高下半年所持有资产组合的风险反而显著降低了基金下半年的业绩。     

Investment manager characteristics, strategy, top management changes and fund performance

The present study examines the performance of Australian investment management organisations with direct reference to their specific characteristics and strategies employed. Using a unique information source, performance is evaluated for actively managed institutional balanced funds, Australian share funds and Australian bond funds. For balanced mandates, performance is evaluated with respect to the investment strategy adopted, the experience and qualifications held by investment professionals, and the tenure of the key investment professionals. The present study examines the performance of top management and the impact on returns when turnover arises. The research documents that a significant number of active Australian equity managers earned superior risk-adjusted returns in the period, however, active managers perform in line with market indices for balanced funds and Australian bond funds. A number of manager characteristics are also found to predict risk-adjusted returns, systematic risk and investment expenses for balanced funds.     

Trades of the living dead: Style differences, style persistence and performance of currency fund managers

We make use of a new database on daily currency fund manager returns over a three-year period, 2005–2008. This higher frequency data allows us to estimate both alpha measures of performance and beta style factors on a yearly basis, which in turn allows us to test for persistence. We find no evidence to support alpha persistence; a manager’s alpha in one year is not significantly related to his alpha in the prior year. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence for style persistence; funds that rely on carry, trend or value trading or with a long/short bias toward currency volatility are likely to maintain that style in the following year. In addition, we are able to examine the performance of managers that survive through the entire sample period, versus those that drop out. We find significant differences in both the investment styles of living versus deceased funds, as well as their realized alpha performance measures. We conjecture that both style differences and ineffective market timing, rather than market conditions, have impacted performance outcomes and induced some managers to close their funds.     

Fund portfolio networks: A climate risk perspective

Within Europe, investment funds are more exposed to climate-sensitive economic sectors than banks, insurers, and pension funds. However, few climate-related financial risk assessments of the fund sector have been conducted. We use 8 trillion EUR of fund portfolio holdings to help fill this gap, using the network of portfolio overlaps. Funds with more polluting portfolios (brown funds) invest across more firms than funds with cleaner portfolios (green funds). This apparent diversification hides a concentration risk: brown funds are more closely connected with each other (have more similar portfolios) than green funds, which tend to herd less (have less similar portfolios with each other). This suggests that, in the event of a widespread climate-related financial shock, brown funds will face greater stress levels than green funds. A climate risk scenario exercise confirms this: among total system losses of 443 billion EUR, brown funds' losses are typically between two and three times higher than green funds' losses. Brown funds also have more systemic impact: because they play a more central role in the investment fund network, brown funds contribute twice as much towards system-wide losses as green funds. These findings suggest that, despite the growing attention paid to sustainable investing, systemic vulnerabilities remain and many funds' portfolio diversification approaches do not yet adequately incorporate climate risk.     

Time-varying fund manager skills of socially responsible investing (SRI) funds in developed and emerging markets

We examine stock selectivity and timing abilities in the market-wide return, volatility and liquidity of SRI fund managers. We find that multi-dimensional fund manager skills are time-varying and persistent in the short run, with developed market funds exhibiting longer persistence in all dimensions. Fund manager skills tend to be affected by fund characteristics (i.e., expense ratio, fund size, turnover and management tenure) and market characteristics (i.e., ESG market capitalization, mandatory ESG regulation and 10–2 yield spread). Fund managers of developed (emerging) market funds outperform (underperform) the market indices. For both fund types, fund managers possess exceptional volatility and liquidity timing despite poor return timing. Moreover, fund managers focus more (less) on timing the market’s return and less (more) on picking stocks when the prospect of recession keeps increasing (decreasing). Interestingly, if fund managers attempt to time the market-wide return or liquidity, stock selectivity will be worsened by their timing behavior.     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。