Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans

Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests has an inverted U‐shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors.     

Financial Distress and Bank Lending Relationships

We use a unique data set of bank loans to examine the wealth effects on lead lending banks when their borrowers suffer financial distress. We find a significant negative announcement return for the lead lending bank when a major corporate borrower announces default or bankruptcy. Banks with higher exposure to the distressed firm have larger negative announcement-period returns. The existence of a past lending relationship with the distressed firm results in larger wealth declines for the bank shareholders. Finally, financial distress also has a significant negative effect on borrower's returns.     

Board quality and the cost of debt capital: The case of bank loans

We analyze the relation between comprehensive measures of board quality and the cost as well as the non-price terms of bank loans. We show that firms that have higher quality boards with a greater advisory presence borrow at lower interest rates. This relation exists even after controlling for ownership structure, CEO compensation policy, and shareholder protection, as well as the size and financial characteristics of the borrower and of the loan. We also show evidence that board quality and other governance characteristics influence the likelihood that loans have covenant requirements, but the relations differ by covenant type. When we combine the direct and indirect costs of bank loans we find that firms with large, independent, experienced, and diverse boards and lower institutional ownership borrow more cheaply. Overall, the evidence indicates that board quality impacts the cost of bank debt.     

The Pricing of Sequential Bank Loans

The theory of financial intermediation assigns banks a unique role in the resolution of information asymmetry. Banks, in general, obtain private information about the borrower and the project during the screening of loan applicants and during the monitoring of loan recipients. Incumbent banks, in particular, utilize information obtained while monitoring previous loan extensions to resolve information asymmetry when granting subsequent loans. We examine the rate on a sequence of loans to a borrower and find that the incumbent bank information advantage has finite magnitude and is quickly reflected in the pricing of the second loan. We also find that the lending relationship does not deteriorate to the detriment of the borrower. This study also provides further evidence supporting the hypothesis that an incumbent bank resolves information asymmetry during the monitoring of loan extensions.     

Beyond the Transaction: Banks and Mortgage Default of Low‐Income Homebuyers

We evaluate the effects of the lending institution and soft information on mortgage loan performance for low‐income homebuyers. We find that even after controlling for the propensity of a borrower to get a loan from a local bank based on observable characteristics, those who receive a loan from a local bank branch are significantly less likely to become delinquent or default than other bank or nonbank borrowers, consistent with an unobserved information effect. These effects are most pronounced for loans originated to borrowers with marginal credit, where soft information may have a stronger effect. These findings support previous research on information‐driven lending, and provide additional explanation for observed differences in mortgage loan performance between bank and nonbank lenders.     

Do Information Rents in Loan Spreads Persist over the Business Cycles?

In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for information rents in loan spreads by analyzing a sample of UK syndicated loan contracts for the period from 1996 to 2005. We use various measures for borrower opaqueness and control for bank, borrower and loan characteristics and we find that undercapitalized banks charge approximately 34 bps higher loan spreads for loans to opaque borrowers. We further analyze whether this effect persists throughout the business cycle and find that this effect prevails only during recessions. However, we do not find evidence that banks exploit their information monopolies during expansion phases.     

The influence of loan officers on loan contract design and performance

We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing us to systematically disentangle borrower, bank, and loan officer fixed effects. We find that loan officers have significant influence on interest spreads, loan covenant design, and loan performance. Inclusion of borrower fixed effects increases our power to rule out the alternative that loan officer fixed effects reflect the matching of officerds to borrowers based on time-invariant borrower characteristics. We document heterogeneity in loan officers’ influence across loan contract terms, with loan officers exerting stronger influence over covenant package design than over interest spreads, but marginal influence on loan maturity. Lead officers have greater influence than participant officers over covenant package design and loan performance, but less robust differential influence on interest spreads.     

The role of bank lenders in firm leverage adjustments

In this article we examine the impact of bank loan characteristics on firm leverage adjustments, with a special focus on the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. The results show that, on average, more bank loans slow down leverage adjustments. The subsample analysis reveals that bank loans slow down leverage adjustments in underlevered firms but speed up adjustments in overlevered firms. This finding suggests that bank lenders are able to limit their risk exposure in borrowers and protect their own rights. Further evidence indicates that the effect of bank loans is more notable during the global financial crisis and when a firm is financially constrained. Bank loan concentration and maturity have a significant impact on leverage adjustments as well.     

Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives

We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.     

Strategic loan defaults and coordination: An experimental analysis

This paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank’s expected strength is low, although loan repayment is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers’ expected repayment capacity is low, regardless of banks’ fundamentals. We show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers’ coordination problem, and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults. For the individual borrower, loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment, suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress.     

Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market

Direct bank ownership is a common practice in emerging markets. The current paper studies how bank ownership affects firm performance through corporate executive perquisites (perks) in China, a leading emerging economy. In addition to common factors known to influence the level of executive perks, we find a significantly positive link between bank ownership of company shares and executive perquisites. Further analyses suggest that higher level of executive perquisites hurt firm operating efficiency. Specifically, perks are positively associated with interest rate paid by the firms. We find some evidence consistent with the notion that the conflict of interests that banks face as both lenders and shareholders in the emerging markets induces banks to play less effective monitoring if they are concerned with the security of their loans or aim to obtain better arrangement for their loans. Our results reveal a particular mechanism through which bank ownership influences firm decisions and performance.     

The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy

This paper examines the impact of bank ownership concentration on two indicators of bank riskiness, namely banks’ non-performing loans and capital adequacy. Using balance sheet information for around 500 commercial banks from more than 50 countries averaged over 2005–2007, we find that concentrated ownership (proxied by different levels of shareholding) significantly reduces a bank’s non-performing loans ratio, conditional on supervisory control and shareholders protection rights. Furthermore, ownership concentration affects the capital adequacy ratio positively conditional on shareholder protection. At low levels of shareholder protection rights and supervisory control, ownership concentration reduces bank riskiness.     

PCAOB international inspection access and debt contracting: Evidence from American Depositary Receipt firms

We examine whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB’s) international inspection access affects the usage of accounting-based debt covenants in bank loan contracts of American Depositary Receipt (ADR) borrowers. We show that there is an increase in the use of financial covenants in debt contracts after the auditor of an ADR borrower becomes subject to PCAOB inspections. We also document that lenders increase the usage of financial covenants only in loans to ADR borrowers domiciled in countries with weak home country intuitions, and the increase is more pronounced for ADR borrowers from countries without a local auditor regulatory oversight body. These findings suggest that PCAOB regulatory oversight enhances the perceived credibility of accounting numbers for debt contracting and serves as a substitute for the weak monitoring of auditors for ADR borrowers domiciled in countries with weak country institutions.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

The market reaction to debt announcements: UK evidence surrounding the global financial crisis

We examine the stock market response to announcements of public, bank and privately placed debt issuance by large UK firms surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008. Prior to the crisis, we find that stock prices respond positively to announcements of bank debt issuance only. This is restricted to the sub-sample of syndicated bank loans and this is suggestive of the certification from multiple lenders conveying a signal of creditworthiness. We find that abnormal returns on the announcement of bank loans have declined since the financial crisis, both in absolute terms and in comparison to alternative borrowing sources. Overall, our results suggest that surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008, bank loans have become less informative as a signal of the creditworthiness of borrowing firms.     

Correlated leverage and its ramifications

This paper develops a theory in which housing prices, the capital structures of banks (mortgage lenders) and the capital structures of mortgage borrowers are all endogenously determined in equilibrium. There are four main results. First, leverage is a “positively correlated” phenomenon in that high leverage among borrowers is positively correlated with high leverage among banks, and higher house prices lead to higher leverage for both. The intuition is that first-time homebuyers with fixed wealth endowments must borrow more to buy more expensive homes, whereas higher current house prices rationally imply higher expected future house prices and therefore higher collateral values on bank loans, inducing banks to be more highly levered. Second, higher bank leverage leads to greater house price volatility in response to shocks to fundamental house values. Third, a bank’s exposure to credit risk depends not only on its own leverage but also on the leverage decisions of other banks. Fourth, positive fundamental shocks to house prices dilute financial intermediation by reducing banks’ pre-lending screening, and this reduction in bank screening further increases house prices. Empirical and policy implications of the analysis are drawn out, and empirical evidence is provided for the first two main results. The key policy implications are that greater geographic diversification by banks, tying mortgage tax exemptions to the duration of home ownership, and increasing bank capital requirements when borrower leverage is high can help reduce house price volatility.     

Institutional Differences and International Private Debt Markets: A Test Using Mandatory IFRS Adoption

Institutional differences between countries result in additional information risks between borrowers and lenders in cross‐border private loans. This study examines the effect of these information risks on the structure of optimal debt contracts in international (cross‐border) versus domestic private debt markets. Using mandatory IFRS adoption as an indicator for institutional changes that reduced differences between countries, I compare attributes of international versus domestic loans before and after IFRS adoption. I find that, in the pre‐IFRS period, international loans are associated with a higher credit spread, a weaker relationship between the bank and the borrower, a more diffuse loan syndicate, and less reliance on accounting‐based covenants than domestic loans. These results are consistent with incremental information risks in international debt markets that make it more costly for lenders to screen and monitor borrower credit quality, resulting in a more arm's‐length relationship between borrowers and lenders. Many of these associations attenuate after IFRS adoption, suggesting that the pre‐IFRS differences in contract terms are driven by incremental information risks related to institutional differences between countries. My findings imply that incremental information risks result in a different optimal contract in international debt contracts compared to domestic debt contracts.     

Do Bank‐Affiliated Analysts Benefit from Lending Relationships?

This paper investigates whether private information from lending activities improves the forecast accuracy of bank‐affiliated analysts. Using a matched sample design, matching by affiliated bank or borrower, we demonstrate that the forecast accuracy of bank‐affiliated analysts increases after the followed firm borrows from the affiliated bank. We also find that the increase in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for borrowers with greater information asymmetry and bad news, and for deals with financial covenants. Last, we find that the informational advantage of bank‐affiliated analysts exists only when the affiliated banks serve as lead arrangers, not merely as participating lenders. Overall, our evidence suggests that information flows from commercial banking to equity research divisions within financial conglomerates.     

Relationship Banking and Loan Syndicate Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors

Using a sample of syndicated loans to private equity (PE)‐backed initial public offering companies, we examine how a third‐party bank relationship influences the syndicate structure of a loan. We find that a stronger relationship between the lead bank and the borrower's PE firm enables the lead bank to retain a smaller share of the loan and form a larger and less concentrated syndicate, especially when the borrower is less transparent. A stronger PE‐bank relationship also attracts greater foreign bank participation. Our findings suggest that the lead bank's relationship with a large equity holder of the borrower facilitates information production in lending.     

Maturity and Corporate Loan Pricing

We investigate the relation between corporate loan spreads and maturity to test whether lenders are compensated for longer maturity loans (tradeoff hypothesis) or limit their exposure by forcing riskier borrowers to take short‐term loans (credit‐quality hypothesis). Earlier studies reject the tradeoff hypothesis. We use the LPC DealScan database to create a matched sample of pairs of loans to the same borrower on the same day holding credit quality constant. We perform mean of difference tests and cross‐sectional and regression analyses, and find evidence supporting both the tradeoff and credit quality hypotheses.