Incentives for Loan Repayments: Evidence from a Randomized Field Study

This field experiment tests an innovative approach for helping automobile loan borrowers make their loan payments on time. Borrowers were randomly assigned to a loan with an interest rate reduction after three on‐time payments; borrowers assigned to this loan show fewer late payments compared to a control group. While the financial incentive of the interest rate reduction was small, the offer of a rate reduction appears to result in borrowers attending to due dates. This result illustrates that lenders can use simple mechanisms to encourage more positive repayment patterns among borrowers with a history of late payments.     

Commitment lending under asymmetric information: Theory and tests on U.K. startup data

U.K. business startup data is used to examine the role of contract parameters in solving the bank's problem of lending under asymmetric information. Margins are found to be a direct function of the probability of failure and an inverse function of security (for given loan size) consistently with collateral being invoked to solve the Moral Hazard problem. Business survival is also found to be enhanced by owner equity inputs (for given debt) again consistent with a requirement for owner financial inputs to enhance (unobservable) effort. Security rises along with loan size and survival chances, a finding consistent with (a) a firm loan size effect (larger borrowers have lower marginal admin cost to the bank), and with (b) positive borrower self-selection (better borrowers offer collateral because they are less likely to experience forfeiture.) Observable business characteristics are found to play an important intermediary role in the solution to the moral hazard problem. More mature proprietors have more experience, business commitment, assets for borrowing and the willingness to use them for loan collateral. Their contract parameters reflect these facts.     

Equilibrium with Default and Endogenous Collateral

We study a two‐period general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and default. We make collateral endogenous by allowing each seller of assets to fix the level of collateral. Sellers are required to provide collateral whose first‐period value, per unit of asset, exceeds the asset price by an arbitrarily small amount. Moreover, borrowers are also required to be fully covered by the purchase, in the first period, of state‐by‐state default insurance. These insurance contracts are offered by lenders. The insurance cost or revenue is a linear charge and plays the role of a spread penalizing borrowers who will incur in default and benefiting lenders who will suffer default. Under these assumptions, equilibrium always exists.     

Collateral,relationship lending and family firms

Prior research suggested that relationship lending could play a role in solving asymmetric information problems between borrower and lender. Other studies suggest a relationship between family ownership and the shareholder–bondholder agency conflict. The present paper investigates the impact of relationship characteristics, family ownership and their interaction effects upon the use of collateral in SME lending. We examine the determinants of collateral as well as the determinants of the choice between business and personal collateral using decision tree analysis. The results reveal that relationship characteristics have a significant influence, but not always in the direction as expected. Moreover, they do not seem to be the primary determinants in our classification models. The most important determinants in both classification models seem to be the loan amount, total assets and the family versus non-family firm distinction. In addition, we differentiate between line-of-credit and non-line-of-credit loans and find significant differences between these decision trees.     

抵押担保、置信威胁与融资选择

我国由于法律环境不完善、信用情况较差等原因形成了大量的银行不良资产.为降低不良资产比率,目前抵押担保在我国商业银行贷款中被普遍地使用.本文构建了拥有不同抵押担保品和自有资本的微观融资主体的借贷模型,通过分析借款者和贷款者的最优选择,推导得出了不同类型企业的最优融资模式,并指出银行为了切实降低不良贷款比率,不能只把抵押担保作为一种贷款前的风险甄别机制,作为借款人违约后弥补贷款损失的补救手段,更重要的是要在监管过程中利用抵押担保对借款人实行置信的威胁,以迫使其努力经营,从而实现有效的监管.文章最后结合模型对我国融资现状作了一些分析并相应提出了几点政策建议.     

Complementarity between Relationship Lending and Collateral in SME Access to Bank Credit: Evidence from Ethiopia

ABSTRACT

Despite their contribution to job creation, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are financially constrained. Lenders view SMEs as high risk borrowers and hence demand collateral, but lack of collateral inhibits SMEs access to credit. Relationship lending is believed to lessen collateral requirement and increase SMEs access to credit. However, recent studies question substitutability of relationship lending and collateral. The present study adds to the debate by drawing on the survey of 102 randomly selected manufacturing SMEs in Ethiopia. Our binary logistic regression results suggest that banks in Ethiopia are cautious in extending credit to SMEs, evidenced by simultaneous usage of relationships, collateral and other criteria, suggesting complementarity between collateral and relationship lending.     

Effect of climate-related risk on the costs of bank loans: Evidence from syndicated loan markets in emerging economies

Based on a novel dataset that combined syndicated loans originated in the emerging market economies with greenhouse gas emission intensity data of borrowers, this study examines whether and to what extent banks in these emerging markets have factored in climate transition risk in their lending decisions. On loan pricing, our results suggest that banks in these emerging markets have started to price-in climate transition risk for loans to emissions-intensive sector since the Paris Agreement. This could reflect their increased awareness of a climate-transition risk towards such firms. The extent of the transition risk premium is also found to be dependent on the environmental attitude of banks. Specifically, green banks are found to charge a higher loan spread than other banks, when lending to the same brown firm after the Paris Agreement. Apart from pricing a transition risk premium in the loan spread, we find evidence that banks may also consider imposing more stringent non-pricing contractual terms, such as shortening loan tenor and imposing collateral requirement, on brown firms especially when the associated credit risk impacts on these firms are more uncertain.     

Do Binary Collateral Outcome Variables Proxy Collateral Levels? The Case of Collateral from Start-ups and Existing SMEs

This paper is designed to test whether the factors which affect the decision to collateralise business loans affect the level of collateralisation in the same manner. If the level of collateralisation does matter, the provision of collateral becomes more than a goodwill gesture to placate banks and more a device to ameliorate the risk of lending. We use a thitherto unseen dataset from a U.K. retail bank comprising 4,618 transfers and start-ups (TS group) who applied for business loans and overdrafts between January 1998 and January 2000. The control sample comprised 9,596 existing businesses from the same period. Our unique dataset permits an analysis of this kind for the first time because it contains a continuous variable for collateral unlike previous studies. Existing businesses exhibit a higher frequency (binary outcome) and level (tobit outcome) of collateral than the businesses who are start-ups or have transferred from another bank only when distortions within the data are not controlled for. These distortions negate the value of binary collateral variables. Factors such as business type and loan purpose are useful at explaining the likelihood of a borrower having his loan collateralised and the level of collateralisation for borrowers who provided collateral or not.     

Why discouraged borrowers exist? An empirical (re)examination from less developed countries

Using the fourth-round database of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (2008/09 BEEPS), this study examines the determinants of discouragement in less developed countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The results show that whereas firms' opaqueness, demographic factors, and distance between lenders and borrowers better explain the discouragement due to tough loan prices and/or loan application procedures, firm risk and banking concentration explain the incidence of discouraged borrowers due to the fear of rationing. Innovator status, the legal protection of creditors and lenders in the event of default, and the coverage of information sharing instruments help explain discouragement in a transversal way.     

Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership on Foreign Bank Lending: Some Evidence for Emerging Markets

Despite the large literature on developed countries, little is known about the interactions between corporate governance, foreign ownership, and foreign bank lending in developing countries. Using data from five Latin American countries from 2001 to 2008, we provide one of the first pieces of evidence of how foreign ownership affects the loan cost of borrowers in emerging markets. We find that in terms of foreign bank lending, the cost of debt financing is significantly higher for firms whose largest shareholder is a foreign institutional one. The results support the hypothesis that because of potential agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, having block institutional shareholders tend to increase the borrowers’ debt burden. There is further evidence supporting this agency conflict hypothesis as we find that the effects of large institutional shareholders on borrowing costs become larger (smaller) when the conflicts are aggravated (mitigated).     

Bargaining power and information in SME lending

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are informationally opaque and bank dependent. In SME lending, banks largely rely on soft information, because the scale and scope of hard information are limited. We analyze whether and how hard and soft information affects the borrower??s bargaining power vis-à-vis its bank. We use the fact that, for a given credit rating, certain borrowers obtain better loan terms than others to define measures of relative bargaining power. Using SME loan data from the USA and Germany, we find that more favorable soft information (management skills and character) increases borrower bargaining power. We also show that more favorable soft than hard information improves borrower bargaining power. The results are not driven by manipulation or statistical limitations of the credit ratings. Our study suggests that soft information represents an important and direct determinant of borrower bargaining power, affecting the outcomes of the loan contracting process.     

State intervention and the microcredit market: the role of business development services

We analyze in this paper how various forms of state intervention can impact microfinance institutions’ lending behavior. Using a simple model where entrepreneurs receive individual uncollateralized loans, we show that, not surprisingly, state intervention through the loan guarantee increases the number of entrepreneurs receiving a loan. However, after modeling business development services (BDS) provided by the microfinance institution, we show that the loan guarantee can have a counterproductive effect by reducing the number of entrepreneurs benefiting from such services. We therefore analyze an alternative policy: BDS subsidization. We show that if BDS are efficient enough and are targeted toward less performing borrowers, then—for fixed government expenditures—such subsidies do better in terms of financial inclusion than the loan guarantee. Moreover, we argue that—under similar conditions—BDS subsidization alone does better in terms of financial inclusion than a mix of policies.     

The costs of lead bank–distressed borrower relationships: evidence from commercial lending in Taiwan

This is the first study to investigate the impact of the adjudication of a borrower's reorganisation filing on the shareholder wealth of the lead bank. The results reveal that the market is acutely sensitive to adverse information and the reorganisation adjudication of a borrower's plan has a detrimental effect on the reputation and wealth of the lead bank. Further, while both are positively associated with wealth effects, the RATE of the loan-level variable is more highly related than the LEVERAGE of the borrower-level variable to wealth loss. Additionally, large lenders experience less wealth loss. The higher the bank debt of a firm, the higher the adverse abnormal returns to the lead bank. Higher collateral and rates on loans are used to compensate for the greater risk of the loan portfolio. Likewise, the market may view lead banks with high loan loss reserves as banks that are not particularly adept at identifying creditworthy borrowers.     

Factors Determining Credit Worthiness of Low Income Consumers

The purpose of this study was to identify variables that can be used in granting credit to low income consumers. Credit behavior, as exemplified by loan repayment, was examined with respect to economic, demographic, and socioeconomic characteristics of borrowers from a credit union that had been established to serve low income people in Columbus, Ohio. Findings indicate that early warning signals—default and delinquency—are given by borrowers when a loan is going bad. Consumer education and financial counseling might help eliminate this problem.     

Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems

We investigate what determines the maturity of lines of credit to small businesses. Our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that shorter loan maturities serve to mitigate the problems associated with borrower risk and asymmetric information that are typical of small business lending. We find that maturity is shorter for firm owners that have poor credit histories, are older, and less experienced, and for firms that are more informationally opaque. Supporting the notion that collateral and maturity are substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems, we also find strong evidence that maturity increases with collateral pledges, that personal collateral is associated with longer maturities than business collateral, and that collateral types that better mitigate agency problems reduce the sensitivity of loan maturity to informational asymmetries and risk. Finally, while it is argued that relationship lending may mitigate information asymmetry, we find no relation between loan maturity and stronger firm-creditor ties.

Lending technologies,lending specialization,and minority access to small-business loans

We investigate minority access to small-business loans using a probit model of loan application denial that recognizes two loan types (line-of-credit loans and non-line-of-credit loans) made by two lender types (commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions). We estimate our model on data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances. We find evidence consistent with minority equal access to bank credit lines and nonbank non-line-of-credit loans in highly competitive loan markets; in less competitive markets we find evidence consistent with unequal access to these loans. We also find evidence consistent with unequal minority access to bank non-line-of-credit loans, regardless of loan market competitiveness. Our findings differ from previous research which treats small-business loans as a homogenous product and finds evidence consistent with unequal minority access to small-business loans generally. We argue that the existence of multiple small-business lending technologies and loan specialization by lenders account for our findings and demonstrate the need to treat small-business loans as a heterogeneous product when investigating equal access to small-business credit.     

Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance

I analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare. However, with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs. private lenders' profits. Multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem — that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit.     

Small‐Dollar Credit Lending: The Effect of Financial Burden on Personal Asset Misvaluation

Small‐dollar credit lenders offer consumers quick access to cash in the form of products, such as pawn loans. The consumers who tend to use these small‐dollar credit products are more likely to face financial burden and potential for default—particularly when loan‐to‐value ratios are high. However, the cognitive effects of financial burden can impair financial decision making. If financial literacy educators are to empower consumers, more consumer‐centric evidence is necessary to determine how small‐dollar credit consumers make decisions when purchasing loans. One critical decision consumers make is accepting how lenders value their assets in exchange for credit. Three lab studies assess how consumers facing financial burden value their own assets. We find that, due to cognitive constraints of financial burden, consumers can undervalue functional assets and overvalue symbolic assets. Importantly for financial literacy efforts, however, we show that framing a symbolic asset in terms of other‐benefit construal helps attenuate asset overvaluation.     

中小企业融资中的自有资金信贷机制

银行贷款收益取决于贷款利率和贷款风险两个因素。在贷款利率受到管制时,理性的银行为了实现期望利润最大化,要求企业提供足够抵押来规避贷款风险。我国中小企业由于自身特征及所处信贷环境的原因,银行向其贷款风险大,且得不到足够抵押品,也没有第三方提供担保,这就导致中小企业贷款难现象。因此,我国商业银行应该灵活运用抵押、担保、关系贷款和自有资金多种手段,积极构建中小企业的多层次信贷机制体系。