The Kyoto Protocol,market power,and enforcement

The Kyoto Protocol aims to limit aggregate carbon emissions by participating countries to 1990 emissions levels in aggregate. It also allows for the creation of a permit market in which countries will be able to buy and sell the right to emit carbon dioxide. This paper investigates how market power, held by the countries of the former Soviet Union, and enforcement of the carbon emission limits might affect the abatement and the cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. To do so, it uses a modified version of the van Egteren–Weber (1996 Van Egteren, H and Weber, M. 1996. Marketable permits, market power, and cheating. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30: 161–74. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) model to investigate a permit market in the presence of both market power and enforcement difficulties. It then simulates the model, finding that if meeting abatement targets is the goal, regulating the supply side of the market and convex fine schedules are the most effective tools.     

A comparative engineering-economic analysis of the evolution of the Soviet mainline freight locomotive

While there has been a much larger increase in the work output of the Soviet mainline locomotive fleet than in that of the United States (from the late 1920s to the mid-1970s), the United States-Soviet difference in the mainline freight-locomotive unit's ability to do work has increased rather than decreased. This paper summarizes the findings of the author's (Boncher, 1976) investigation that documents and examines the causes of this development. An attempt is made to identify the essential differences in the controlling United States and Soviet technological decision-making processes.     

Mixture periodic GARCH models: theory and applications

This paper discusses mixture periodic GARCH (M-PGARCH) models that constitute very flexible class of nonlinear time series models of the conditional variance. It turns out that they are more parsimonious comparatively to MPARCH models. We first provide some probabilistic properties of this class of models. We thus propose an estimation method based on the expectation-maximization algorithm. Finally, we apply this methodology to model the spot rates of the Algerian dinar against euro and US dollar. This empirical analysis shows that M-PGARCH models yield the best performance among the competing models.     

Freedom,barriers to entry,entrepreneurship, and economic progress

While entrepreneurs benefit from unrestricted free entry into markets, they have a time-inconsistent incentive to lobby for government entry restrictions once they become successful. Bad political institutions yield to these demands, and growing barriers are placed on domestic and international competition. Good institutions do not, and this effort is instead channeled toward further wealth creation. We find that productive entrepreneurship depends on both the freedom to succeed and discipline of failure that free markets provide. Trade barriers result in fewer combinations of goods and inputs attempted, and less productive entrepreneurial resource use. We also provide evidence on the value of business failure.

Online networks,social interaction and segregation: an evolutionary approach

There is growing evidence that face-to-face interaction is declining in many countries, exacerbating the phenomenon of social isolation. On the other hand, social interaction through online networking sites is steeply rising. To analyze these societal dynamics, we have built an evolutionary game model in which agents can choose between three strategies of social participation: 1) interaction via both online social networks and face-to-face encounters; 2) interaction by exclusive means of face-to-face encounters; 3) opting out from both forms of participation in pursuit of social isolation. We illustrate the dynamics of interaction among these three types of agent that the model predicts, in light of the empirical evidence provided by previous literature. We then assess their welfare implications. We show that when online interaction is less gratifying than offline encounters, the dynamics of agents’ rational choices of interaction will lead to the extinction of the sub-population of online networks users, thereby making Facebook and similar platforms disappear in the long run. Furthermore, we show that the higher the propensity for discrimination of those who interact via online social networks and via face-to-face encounters (i.e., their preference for the interaction with agents of their same type), the greater the probability will be that they all will end up choosing social isolation in the long run, making society fall into a “social poverty trap”.     

Decentralization and the command principle—some lessons from Soviet Experience

Since 1965 the Soviet economy has been characterized by some radical experiments in decentralization and modification of the command principle in certain subsectors. Generally these experiments have not been a success; they have all now been discontinued or seriously modified. It is argued that the main reason for this failure has been the reluctance of the Soviet authorities to back up specific experiments with a significant degree of overall decentralization. Continued overcentralization has meant survival of crude planning rules of thumb, like the ratchet principle, which tend to produce perverse reactions to the easing of traditional Soviet planning procedures in specific subsectors.     

Behavioral Timing,Valuation and Postissue Performance of UK Initial Public Offerings

Using a sample of 1,926 UK initial public offerings (IPOs) launched from 1987 to 2007, this study introduces a new angle on testing the behavioral timing hypothesis in the context of UK IPOs via investigating relationships between the magnitude of IPOs misvaluation and postissue stock price and operating performance. IPO misvaluation is measured using (i) an intrinsic value of the firm estimated using residual income valuation model and (ii) intensity of IPO issuance activity. The findings show that stock price and operating underperformance in the postissue are directly linked to the degree of IPOs' misvaluation. Specifically, the stock price and operating performance are found to be significantly and robustly different between hot markets IPOs and cold market IPOs 3 years postissue. We also show that overvalued IPOs have lower long-run stock returns, but outperforming operating performance, than undervalued IPOs do. Our findings are broadly consistent with the behavioral explanations of the poor stock price and operating performance, supporting the U.S. results of Purnanandam and Swaminathan [2004 Purnanandam, A. and B. Swaminathan. “Are IPOs Really Underpriced?” Review of Financial Studies, 17, (2004), pp. 811–848.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] and Loughran and Ritter [2000 Loughran, T. and J. Ritter. “Uniformly Least Powerful Tests of Market Efficiency.” Journal of Financial Economics, 55, (2000), pp. 361–389.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]].     

Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems

We consider one-to-one matching problems when preferences are weak orders and search for (Maskin-)monotonic and implementable solutions. We show that for any coalition structure , the strong -core is monotonic if and only if it is the individually rational solution. We introduce a solution, which we call the “union strong -core”, and show that this solution is the minimal way to expand the strong -core recovering monotonicity. We also show that the union strong -core is implementable.     

The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences

We analyze voting behavior in a large electorate in which voters have adversarial state-contingent preferences with incomplete information about the state of the world. We show that one type of voter can suffer from the swing voter's curse à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer [The swing voter's curse, Amer. Econ. Rev. 86 (1996) 408-424], and go on to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of this model under different parameter values. We prove that unlike settings with nonadversarial preferences, there are equilibria in which in one state of the world, a minority-preferred candidate almost surely wins the election and thus the election may fail to correctly aggregate information. Indeed, we show that the fraction of the electorate dissatisfied with the result can be as large as .     

The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information

We consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically. Specifically, a competitive mechanism is any mapping of traders’ reports about their types to an equilibrium price vector and allocation of the reported economy. In our model, some traders may have non-vanishing impact on prices and allocations regardless of the size of the economy. Although truthful reporting by all traders cannot be achieved, we show that, given any desired level of approximation, there is such that any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of any competitive mechanism of any private information economy with or more traders leads, with high probability, to prices and allocations that are close to a competitive equilibrium of the true economy. In particular, allocations are approximately efficient. A key assumption is that there is small probability that traders behave non-strategically.     

Determinants of contract duration in outsourced services in the defense sector

In this article we analyze the contract duration using Transaction Cost Theory with a sample of 283 outsourced services in the Spanish Army during the period 2009–2014.The analysis results show that the greater the specificity of the service, the greater the duration of the contract. In addition, it is obtained that the greater the uncertainty about the behaviour of the provider, the lower the duration of the agreement. These results are consistent with existing literature and empirical works.

However, in the case of external uncertainty and incompleteness of the contract, they do not affect the contract duration. This may be because less complex services for shorter terms can be specified better and are less affected by external circumstances. Therefore, the uncertainty should be decomposed and analyzed according to their sources.     

On the informational efficiency of the competitive resource allocation process

The purpose of this paper is to formalize the competitive process as a parametric process, and then prove the minimality of its message space among the message spaces for a broad class of parametric processes that includes the class of processes considered by Hurwicz (in “Studies in Resource Allocation Processes” (K. J. Arrow and L. Hurwicz, Eds.), pp. 413–423, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1977), Mount and Reiter (J. Econ. Theory6 (1974), 161–192), and Osana (J. Econ. Theory17 (1978), 66–78). The proof of this result turns crucially on the “asymmetry property” (which is stronger than the well-known “uniqueness property” of Hurwicz) and on an injectiveness lemma which is applicable to parametric processes.     

A critique of the new comparative economics

We examine the “new comparative economics” as proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) and their use of the concept of an institutional possibilities frontier. While we agree with their general argument that one must consider a variety of institutions and their respective social costs, including legal systems and cultural characteristics, when comparing the performance of different economic systems, we find various complications and difficulties with the framework they propose. We propose that a broader study of clusters of institutions and such newly emerging forms as the new traditional economy may be better suited as ways to approach the study of comparative economics in the era after the breakdown of the old comparison of market capitalism and command socialism that came to an end with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Mean-dispersion preferences and constant absolute uncertainty aversion

We axiomatize, in an Anscombe–Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f)=μ−ρ(d)$V(f)=\mu -\rho (d)$, where μ is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d   is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and ρ(d)$\rho (d)$ is a measure of (aversion to) dispersion that corresponds to an uncertainty premium. The key feature of these mean-dispersion   preferences is that they exhibit constant absolute uncertainty aversion. This class includes many well-known models of preferences from the literature on ambiguity. We show what properties of the dispersion function ρ(⋅)$\rho (\cdot )$ correspond to known models, to probabilistic sophistication, and to some new notions of uncertainty aversion.     

Real-sector parameter instability and the optimal choice of monetary policy

In this paper we consider the effects of uncertainty upon the optimum choice of monetary policy instrument. Specifically we extend the work of Poole (1970), and others, to allow for the existence of multiplicative as well as additive stochastic coefficients in the structural equations of the standard IS-LM macroeconomic model. We demonstrate that the commonly accepted notion that money-stock control is superior to interest-rate control when the IS schedule is stochastic is not always valid.     

Efficient price and capacity choices under uncertain demand: An empirical analysis

Traditional economic analyses of the peak-load problem typically assume an unrealistic degree of regularity in demand during well-defined peak and off-peak periods. This issue is addressed through a comprehensive statistical model that separates demand into its systematic and stochastic components. This model is combined with a traditional economic model and applied to local telephone service, leading to substantive conclusions relevant for managerial decisions as well as further research, among them:

? Neglecting the systematicand stochastic structure of demand may lead to inefficient tariffs. Efficient measured service structures typically price individual callsbelow incremental capacity cost.

? Industry wide capacity decision rules that are exclusively driven by blockage probability targets during narrowly defined time periods may be economically inefficient.

? For telephone service, spot pricing, which sets high prices during periods ofactual congestion, has the potential to be considerably more efficient than traditional tariffs that set high prices during periods ofexpected congestion.

     

Total factor productivity in postwar Soviet industry and its branches

The Cobb-Douglas production function with a declining rate of technical change or of total factor productivity growth (TFP) emerges as the dominant model for explaining the output-growth retardation in postwar Soviet industry when two sets of output data, from Soviet sources and from the CIA, are used for estimating Cobb-Douglas and CES specifications. Rates of output growth and TFP, though low, are higher with Soviet than with CIA data. However, their relative divergence is smaller in those industrial branches where Soviet output data are not exaggerated and where the CIA sample is representative of the branch output. J. Comp. Econ., March 1985, 9(1), pp. 1–23. Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.     

Social morality and the primacy of individual perspectives

This paper examines themes and concerns about my book, The Order of Public Reason, raised in the three essays in this symposium by Peter Boettke & Rosolino Candela, Michael Munger and Kevin Vallier. The three essays present variations on a common theme: I need to embrace deeper commitments than The Order of Public Reason acknowledges. In my estimation these proposals lead to places that I do not wish to go — nor should anyone devoted to core Hayekian insights. The goal of the book is show how a diversity of moral views can lead to a cooperative social morality while abjuring as far as possible “external” moral claims — claims that do not derive from the perspectives of cooperating individuals. The diverse individual moral perspectives, and what they understand as normative, must be the real engines of social normativity. In this essay I stress the primacy of the individual normative perspectives in generating social morality; this helps show why the urge to embrace deeper commitments should be resisted. Rather than going over the presentation in The Order of Public Reason to stress this point, I sketch a modest recasting of the analysis in terms of models of individual moral interaction.     

The prosumers and the grid

Prosumers are households that are both producers and consumers of electricity. A prosumer has a grid-connected decentralized production unit and makes two types of exchanges with the grid: energy imports when the local production is insufficient to match the local consumption and energy exports when local production exceeds it. There exists two systems to measure the exchanges: a net metering system that uses a single meter to measure the balance between exports and imports and a net purchasing system that uses two meters to measure separately power exports and imports. Both systems are currently used for residential consumption. We build a model to compare the two metering systems. Under net metering, the price of exports paid to prosumers is implicitly set at the price of the electricity that they import. We show that net metering leads to (1) too many prosumers, (2) a decrease in the bills of prosumers, compensated via a higher bill for traditional consumers, and (3) a lack of incentives to synchronize local production and consumption.