The curse of the superstar CEO

When struggling companies look for a new chief executive today, the one quality they prize above all others is charisma. But once they've recruited a larger-than-life leader, they often find that their troubles only get worse. Indeed, as the author's new research painfully reveals, the widespread belief in the powers of charismatic CEOs can be problematic. Why? First, Khurana says, there's no conclusive evidence that charismatic leadership affects an organization's performance. And yet--as Kodak's story over the past decade reveals--when a company is faltering, boards feel compelled to oust the incumbent chief executive and bring in a corporate savior. Second, the insistence on finding a charismatic leader, combined with the undefinable nature of charisma, results in selection processes that are overly conservative and even irrational. Boards end up considering only candidates who have already achieved the rank of CEO or president at a high-performing, high-profile company, even if they are not right for the job. Third, charismatic leaders deliberately destabilize organizations. This can result in a more vibrant company, as it did at General Electric during Jack Welch's tenure, but it can also leave a troubled legacy for the organization to overcome, as GE, Ford, and Enron have all found. Faith in a company, a product, or an idea can unleash tremendous innovation and productivity. But the extravagant hopes invested in charismatic CEOs resemble not mature faith but a belief in magic. If we are willing to reconsider our notion of leadership, this age of faith can be followed by an era of faith and reason.     

Almost ready: how leaders move up

Most designated CEO successors are talented, hardworking, and smart enough to go all the way--yet fail to land the top job. What they don't realize is, the qualities that helped them in their climb to the number two position aren't enough to boost them to number one. In addition to running their businesses well, the author explains, would-be CEOs must master the art of forming coalitions and winning support. They must also sharpen their self-awareness and their sensitivity to the needs of bosses and influential peers because they typically receive little performance feedback once they're on track to become CEO. Indeed, the ability to pick up on subtle cues is often an important part of the test. When succession doesn't go well--or fails altogether--many people pay the price: employees depending on a smooth handoff at the top, investors expecting continuous leadership, and families uprooted when jobs don't pan out. Among those at fault are boards that do not keep a close watch on the succession process, human resource organizations that should have the capacity to help but are not up to the task, and CEOs who do a poor job coaching potential successors. But the aspiring CEO also bears some responsibility. He can dramatically increase his chances of success by understanding his boss's point of view, knowing his own limitations, and managing what psychologist Gerry Egan has called the "shadow organization"--the political side of a company, characterized by unspoken relationships and alliances--without being labeled "political." Most of all, he must learn to conduct himself with a level of maturity and wisdom that signals he is ready--not almost ready--to be chief executive.     

Ending the CEO succession crisis

The CEO succession process is broken. Many companies have no meaningful succession plans, and few of the ones that do are happy with them. CEO tenure is shrinking; in fact, two out of five CEOs fail in their first 18 months. It isn't just that more CEOs are being replaced; it's that they're being replaced badly. The problems extend to every aspect of CEO succession: internal development programs, board supervision, and outside recruitment. While many organizations do a decent job of nurturing middle managers, few have set up the comprehensive programs needed to find the half-dozen true CEO candidates out of the thousands of leaders in their midst. Even more damaging is the failure of boards to devote enough attention to succession. Search committee members often have no experience hiring CEOs; lacking guidance, they supply either the narrowest or the most general of requirements and then fail to vet eitherthe candidates or the recruiters. The result is that too often new CEOs are plucked from the well-worn Rolodexes of a remarkably small number of recruiters. These candidates may be strong in charisma but may lack critical skills or otherwise be a bad fit with the company. The resulting high turnover is particularly damaging, since outside CEOs often bring in their own teams, can cause the company to lose focus, and are especially costly to be rid of. Drawing on over 35 years of experience with CEO succession, the author explains how companies can create a deep pool of internal candidates, how boards can consistently align strategy and leadership development, and how directors can get their money's worth from recruiters. Choosing a CEO should be not one decision but an amalgam ofthousands of decisions made by many people every day over years.     

Confessions of a trusted counselor

Advising CEOs sounds like a dream job, but doing so can be perplexing and perilous. At times, the questions you must ask yourself-about your own motivations and loyalty-can be thornier than the organizational problems that clients face. David Nadler knows, because he has been asking himself such questions for a quarter century while advising the chiefs of more than two dozen corporations. If you're an adviser to CEOs, recognizing the pitfalls of your role may help you sidestep them. And understanding a problem's nuances and implications may help you uncover a solution. The challenges facing consultants include the following: The loyalty dilemma: Is my ultimate responsibility to the CEO, who pays for my services, or to the institution, which pays for his? Today's shorter CEO tenures and greater board oversight have diminished the top leader's power and autonomy; it's now routine for a CEO adviser to have conversations with directors about the CEO's performance. To defuse loyalty issues, the adviser should raise them with the executive at the outset of the relationship. The overidentification dilemma: How do I immerse myself in the CEO's worldview without making it my own? CEOs can be enormously persuasive, but if you don't push back, you're not doing your job. The trick is to ask probing questions without shaking the CEO's confidence that you fully comprehend the forces that shape her views. The friendship dilemma: If the CEO and I like each other, can we-should we-become friends? A successful, long-term advisory relationship with a CEO requires a strong personal connection; in some cases, that becomes a friendship. But the best relationships are characterized by the participants' clear-eyed recognition of each other's frailties-tempered, of course, by genuine affection and easy rapport.     

Earnings management around founder CEO reappointments and successions in family firms

This paper studies reappointment of a chief executive officer (CEO) and succession events in listed family firms with an incumbent family CEO. We explore whether family firms with a founder CEO are more likely to engage in earnings management preevent than other family firms. We find evidence of preevent upward earnings management for firms that reappoint their founder CEO but no for other family firms. These findings suggest that the costs and benefits from earnings management change around founder CEO reappointments in family firms. Investors, auditors, policymakers and regulators should be aware of the temptation of founder CEOs to inflate earnings preceding their reappointment.     

A time for growth: an interview with Amgen CEO Kevin Sharer. Interview by Paul Hemp

Fast growth is a nice problem to have--but a hard one to manage well. In this interview, Kevin Sharer, the CEO of biotech giant Amgen, talks about the special challenges leaders face when their companies are on a roll. Sharer, who was also head of marketing at pre-WorldCom MCI and a division head and a staff assistant to Jack Welch at GE, offers insights drawn from his own experience--and from his own self-proclaimed blunders: "I learned the hard way that you need to become credible and enlist support inside the company before you start trying to be a change agent. If you think you're going to make change happen simply by force of personality or position or intellect, you'd better think again." And change there was: Under Sharer's leadership, Amgen overhauled its management team, altered its culture, and launched a couple of blockbuster products. How do chief executives survive in that kind of dizzying environment? "A CEO must always be switching between different altitudes--tasks of different levels of abstraction and specificity," Sharer says. "You might need to spend time working on a redesign of your organizational structure and then quickly switch to drafting a memo to all employees aimed at reinforcing one of the company's values." Having a supportive and capable top team is also key: "A top management team is the most revealing window into a CEO's style, values, and aspirations.... If you don't have the right top team, you won't have the right tiers below them. [The] A players won't work for B players. Maybe with a company like GE, the reputation of the company is so strong that it can attract top people to work for weaker managers. In a new company like Amgen, that won't happen."     

Surviving your new CEO

Almost 50% of the largest American firms will have a new CEO within the next four years; your company could very well be next. Senior executives know that a CEO transition means they're in for a round of firings, organizational reshuffles, and other unwelcome career changes. When your career suddenly depends on the views of a person you may not know, how worried should you be? According to the authors--very. They investigated the 2002-2004 CEO turnover rates of the top 1,000 U.S. companies and interviewed more than a dozen CEOs, each of whom had taken over at least one very large organization. Their study reveals that when a new CEO takes charge, remaining top managers are more likely than not to be shown the door. Those who leave often land in a lower position at a new company, work in a much smaller firm, or retire altogether. The news is not all grim, however. The interviewees offer some pointers on how to create a good impression and maximize your chances of survival and success under the new regime. Some of that advice may surprise you. One CEO pointed out, for instance, that "managers do not realize how much the CEO is looking for teammates on day one. I am amazed at how few people come through the door and say, 'I want to help. I may not be perfect, but I buy into your vision:" Other recommendations are more intuitive, such as learning the new CEO's working style, understanding her agenda, and helping her look good in her new position by achieving positive operating results--and soon. Along with the inevitable stresses, the authors point out, CEO transitions can provide opportunities. Whether you reinvigorate your career within your company or find fulfillment elsewhere, the key lies in deciding what you want to do--and then doing it right.     

CEO Turnover and Retention Light: Retaining Former CEOs on the Board

Prior CEO turnover literature characterizes the board's decision as a choice between retaining versus replacing the CEO. We focus instead on the CEO's decision rights and introduce a third option in which the incumbent CEO is removed but retained on the board for an extended period, which we call Retention Light. Firms may benefit from Retention Light because former CEOs possess unique monitoring and advising abilities, but the former CEO could also exploit available decision rights for personal benefit. A Retention Light CEO's decision rights generally exceed those of CEOs who exit the firm entirely but fall short of the rights of a retained CEO. We find that when prior firm performance is better, the former CEO is more likely to be retained on the board (Retention Light) than to exit the firm. However, this relation is weaker when the CEO reaches normal retirement age at which time CEO power becomes more important. We also provide evidence on how the nature of the CEO's bargaining power varies with his personal attributes and board characteristics in its influence on the Retention Light decision. Retention Light firms are more likely than CEO‐exit firms to select a successor CEO with relatively weaker bargaining power. Finally, Retention Light involving a nonfounder CEO is negatively associated with the firm's postturnover financial performance. Overall, Retention Light is a distinct CEO turnover option that has important consequences for board decisions and firm performance.     

The tests of a prince

When a CEO takes office, stakeholders dissect his or her intellectual, physical, and emotional capacities as they try to gauge whether the new leader will help them fulfill their aspirations and protect them from trouble. For the heir to a family business, the challenge of turning stakeholders into followers is particularly thorny: He or she must manage many constituencies--family members, directors, senior executives, investors, trade unions--that may not be convinced the successor has earned the right to hold the top spot. Making matters worse, says Lansberg, a family business expert, corporate scions usually ignore or greatly underestimate stakeholders. They don't realize that, particularly after they are formally anointed as CEOs, they must establish their credibility with and authority over these spheres of influence. Smart CEOs understand that their success depends on how well they respond to the iterative testing process that stakeholders use to make judgments about would-be leaders. This article offers a road map for managing the four kinds of tests that constitute iterative testing: Qualifying tests are assessments based on criteria--such as formal education, work experience, and professional awards--that executives can cite as evidence of suitability for the top job. Self-imposed tests are expectations that leaders themselves set and against which they assume stakeholders will measure their performance. Circumstantial tests are unplanned challenges or crises, during which stakeholders can observe the leader coping with the unexpected. And political tests are challenges from rivals who want to enhance their own influence, often by undermining the leader.     

Why do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other's boards?

The reciprocal interlocking of chief executive officers is a non-trivial phenomenon: among large companies in 1991, about one company in seven was in a relationship whereby the CEO of one company sat on a second company's board and the second company's CEO sat on the first company's board. We develop hypotheses to distinguish whether this practice furthers the interests of shareholders or the private interests of the CEOs. Using a sample of large companies, we employ a probit model to test these hypotheses. Our empirical findings are that these reciprocal CEO interlocks primarily benefit the CEOs rather than their shareholders.     

Seven surprises for new CEOs

As a newly minted CEO, you may think you finally have the power to set strategy, the authority to make things happen, and full access to the finer points of your business. But if you expect the job to be as simple as that, you're in for an awakening. Even though you bear full responsibility for your company's well-being, you are a few steps removed from many of the factors that drive results. You have more power than anybody else in the corporation, but you need to use it with extreme caution. In their workshops for new CEOs, held at Harvard Business School in Boston, the authors have discovered that nothing--not even running a large business within the company--fully prepares a person to be the chief executive. The seven most common surprises are: You can't run the company. Giving orders is very costly. It is hard to know what is really going on. You are always sending a message. You are not the boss. Pleasing shareholders is not the goal. You are still only human. These surprises carry some important and subtle lessons. First, you must learn to manage organizational context rather than focus on daily operations. Second, you must recognize that your position does not confer the right to lead, nor does it guarantee the loyalty of the organization. Finally, you must remember that you are subject to a host of limitations, even though others might treat you as omnipotent. How well and how quickly you understand, accept, and confront the seven surprises will have a lot to do with your success or failure as a CEO.     

A game of thrones—Dynamics of internal CEO succession and outcome

We examine the implications of chief executive officer (CEO) succession methods for firm outcomes and executive incentives. Focusing on internal CEO successions, we find that the largest U.S. firms typically rely on two types of succession methods, namely, heir apparent and horse race successions. Although heir apparent and horse race CEO candidates have similar qualifications, the consequences of these two succession methods differ significantly. We find that horse race successions induce conflict and are detrimental to firm performance but not necessarily to the newly appointed CEOs. Our findings suggest succession method influences firm performance, executive incentives and CEO labour markets.     

Does stardom affect the informativeness of a CEO's insider trades?

This study examines whether the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) affects the informativeness of his insider trades. Using three different measures to identify star CEOs in a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that trades of non‐star CEOs predict future abnormal returns and earnings innovations and that trades of star CEOs do not. The predictive power of non‐star CEO trades is mostly attributable to opportunistic trades, not routine trades. We also find evidence suggesting that the abnormal returns associated with non‐star CEO insider trades are due to the lower visibility and consequently less scrutiny of non‐star CEOs compared with star CEOs.     

Should I stay or should I go? Former CEOs as monitors

In the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, it is not uncommon for chief executive officers (CEOs) to become the chairman of the supervisory board of the same firm upon retirement. This practice has been the subject of controversial debate because of potential conflicts of interest. As a member of the supervisory board, the former CEO must monitor his successor and former colleagues and is involved in setting their pay. We analyze a panel covering 150 listed firms over a 10-year period. Consistent with a leniency bias, we find evidence that firms in which a former CEO serves on the supervisory board pay their executives more. We further find weak evidence that the compensation of the members of the supervisory board is also higher. Short-run event study results indicate that the announcement of the transition of a retiring CEO to the supervisory board is considered good news. Thus, despite the increases in executive compensation we document, CEO transitions are not a cause of concern for shareholders.     

Gilt Groupe's CEO on building a team of A players

Ryan believes that a CEO should spend more time on recruiting and managing people than on any other activity, and that the head of HR is one of the most important people in the company. He insists on his freedom to bypass managers and speak with any employee at any time. And he espouses certain talent-management principles, such as that your best people are usually underpaid (reward them with performance pay) and that people leave jobs mainly because they don't like their managers. Recruiting at Gilt Groupe focuses on references more than on résumés and interviews because, Ryan says, resumes only establish basic qualifications for a job, and interviewers can't help being influenced by well-spoken or attractive people. But reference checks need to go beyond the names supplied by a candidate: Employers should dig up people in their networks who are willing to speak candidly.     

The CEO hits the road (and other sales tales)

Kenneth Macke, CEO of Dayton-Hudson, the soft goods and discount store chain, often spends weekends prowling his own and competitors' stores, observing. Edwin Artzt, CEO of Procter & Gamble, once interrupted a global marketing jaunt to work with a division on its promotion plans. These are CEOs in the trenches, a place where they ought to spend a certain amount of their time so that they can learn how the business is going. "A desk is a dangerous place from which to view the world," says John le Carré, as quoted approvingly by the author. Mackay asserts that time spent on the road with the sales force is especially valuable. You will learn: Whether all the sales team knows its prospects and sets reasonable expectations. How much the salespeople know about the product, particularly in ways that differentiate it from the competition. Whether the sellers keep abreast of changes in customers' businesses. If the salespeople feel they have a stake in the business. As a rookie envelope salesman, Mackay was taken in tow by a veteran and shown the value of learning the competition's local customer base intimately. Later, as the CEO with a junior salesperson in tow, he demonstrated the value of learning not only the competition's moves but also the customers'. To close sales, salespeople and the CEO have to look over their customers' shoulders as well as their competitors'.     

A note on assessing the relation between CEO characteristics and stock performance: Alpha Above Replacement

Many studies examine the relation between stock performance and CEO characteristics. We approach the topic in a different way, using the alphas generated by the Fama‐French three‐factor model as the dependent variable in a CEO characteristic model. We find several traits are significantly related to alpha. CEOs who are younger, own a larger fraction of firm equity and hold a graduate degree provide greater alphas. CEOs who are also the founder of the firm deliver larger alphas. Our results provide useful information for boards assessing the performance of CEOs and considering CEO succession.     

Who owns the long term? Perspectives from global business leaders

Day-to-day management is challenging enough for CEOs. How do they manage for the long term as well? We posed that question to four top executives of global companies. According to Maurice Levy, chairman and CEO of Publicis Groupe, building the future is really about building the present and keeping close to the front line--those who deal with your customers and markets. He also attributes his company's success in large part to knowing when to take action: In a market where clients' needs steer your long-term future, timing is everything. UPS Chairman and CEO Mike Eskew emphasizes staying true to your vision and values over the long run, despite meeting obstacles along the way. It took more than 20 years, and many lessons learned, to produce consistent profits in what is today the company's fastest-growing and most profitable business: international small packages. Wulf H. Bernotat, CEO of E.ON, examines the challenges facing business leaders and politicians as they try to balance energy needs against potential environmental damage. He calls for educating people about consumption and waste, and he maintains that a diverse and reliable mix of energy sources is the only way to ensure a secure supply while protecting our environment. Finally, Marianne Barner, the director of corporate communications and ombudsman for children's issues at IKEA, discusses how the company is taking steps to improve the environment and be otherwise socially responsible. For example, it's partnering with NGOs to address child labor issues and, on its own, is working to help mitigate climate change. IKEA's goals include using renewable sources for 100% of its energy needs and cutting its overall energy consumption by 25%.     

Holes at the top. Why CEO firings backfire

When a company does well, its CEO is showered with money and adulation. When it does poorly, the CEO gets the blame--and the boot. For better or worse, investors now view chief executives as the primary determinant of corporate performance. But the reality is that most companies perform no better after they dismiss their CEOs than they did in the years leading up to the dismissals. Worse, the organizational disruption created by a rushed firing can leave a company with deep and lasting scars. Far from being a silver bullet, the replacement of a CEO often amounts to little more than a self-inflicted wound. The blame for such poor results, the author argues, lies squarely with boards of directors. Boards often lack the strategic understanding of the business necessary to give due diligence to choosing a replacement CEO. Concern over restoring investor confidence quickly--rather than doing what's right for the company--drives the selection process. And all too often, companies continue to be dogged by the same old problems after the new CEOs come on board. But a good board can make a CEO replacement pay off if its members first develop a better understanding of the business context, worry less about pleasing the investment community and more about a replacement's strategic fit, and take an active role in overseeing the new CEO and the performance and direction of the company. In the long run, such approaches are likely to foster stability at the helm--making it less likely a company will have to fire its CEO in the first place.     

Solve the succession crisis by growing inside-outside leaders

In his analysis of 1800 successions, Harvard Business School professor Bower found that companies performed significantly better when they appointed insiders to the job of CEO. Other researchers, including Jim Collins in Good to Great, have come to similar conclusions working from different data sets. Yet Bower finds far too many companies have no succession plans; as a result, when the time comes to name a new chief executive, more firms turn to outsiders. Both insider and outsider CEOs have strengths and weaknesses at the start. Insiders know the company and its people but are often blind to the need for radical change. Outsiders see the need for a new approach but can't make the necessary changes because they don't know the organization or industry sector well enough. What companies must do, then, is find a way to nurture what Bower calls inside-outsiders--internal candidates who have outside perspective. Often such executives have spent much of their time away from the mainstream of the organization, and away from headquarters, living with new opportunities and threats. Before becoming CEO, Procter & Gamble's A.G. Lafley, for instance, worked for years building P&G's Chinese cosmetics operation rather than the core detergent business. IBM's Sam Palmisano was a champion of software and open systems at a time when Big Blue was essentially a closed-system, hardware-oriented company. Nascent inside-outsiders should enter the CEO-training process by the time they are 30 and be given the opportunity to manage a whole business, so that they become good insiders. But they also need to be mentored with an eye toward preserving their outsider perspective, so they learn how to turn their new ideas into great businesses and are protected from old-timers who might be inclined to teach them a lesson.