我国上市公司控股股东“隧道行为”研究文献综述

我国大多数上市公司的股权是相对集中的;控股股东会倾向于利用手中的投票权控制董事会和公司的投资决策、经营方针以及财务计划等。这样就容易造成公司的控股股东和中小股民之间的利益冲突。但是由于控股股东的"隧道行为"的多样化和隐蔽性,其私有收益的度量和监管一直是一个难题。本文主要从控股股东"隧道行为"产生的根源、影响因素、主要方式、产生的后果等方面系统分析了国内外相关的研究文献。最后,本文结合我国上市公司的股权现状,提出了未来的研究展望。     

上市公司增发中控股股东行为分析

<正>以上市公司作为行为主体的股票增发过程中控股股东的掏空与支持行为之间是否存在相关关系,是一个值得关注的话题。本文对控股股东掏空与支持行为和上市公司增发之间的关系及其经济后果进行了分析。研究发现,为了促进上市公司     

非上市公司选择性信息披露

公司是一种社会性组织，向社会公开披露信息是其社会化属性的必然要求。家族性公司——多股东公司——上市公司，社会化程度依次提高，公开披露信息的意义和要求也依次提高。     

创业板上市公司高管股东股票套现行为博弈分析

本文从博弈论的角度分析了创业板上市公司高管股东股票套现的基本动机与行为策略,并提出了规范这一行为的对策建议。     

创业板上市公司高管股东股票套现行为博弈分析

本文从博弈论的角度分析了创业板上市公司高管股东股票套现的基本动机与行为策略,并提出了规范这一行为的对策建议。     

论上市公司的粉饰行为及其审计风险

我国证券市场上市公司日益出现粉饰行为.这些粉饰行为具有欺骗性和隐藏性,给会计信息使用者造成严重的后果.上市公司的粉饰行为与审计风险有直接的关系,必须引起注册会计师在执业过程中对此种行为的严正关注.     

上市公司收购中少数股东利益保护研究

在上市公州收购的过程中．少数股东利益受到损害的问题极为突出,对少数股东利益的损害不仅会打击其投资的热情．也不利于证券市场的健康发展和社会的和谐稳定。所以说,对于上市公司收购过程中的少数股东利益保护的研究还是非常有必要的。     

股东套利行为与企业融资方式选择

股东的出资行为对企业融资方式的选择具有决定性作用。对于正常经营的企业，为了发挥债务资本的税蔽效应和杠杆作用，股东往往愿意企业负债经营，但是负债的对象不一定是普通债权人，很可能是股东自身；对于陷入财务危机的企业，为套牢普通债权人获得更多的企业重组收益，股东也愿意“自我负债”融资。通过债务性资本与替权益性资本的替换，股东总能够获得套利收益，但同时也损害了普通债权人和政府的收益，因而受到法律的限制。然而，在现实经济中股东的套利空间仍然存在，并对企业的融资方式选择，尤其是对债务资本产生了深远的影响。     

融资环境与我国上市公司融资行为选择

同市场成熟的发达国家企业盛行债务融资不同,我国上市公司偏好股权融资, 造成这种差异的关键是我国特定的融资环境.本文以融资环境为背景,通过分析我国上市公司所处的特定的融资环境,得出结论:我国上市公司偏好股权融资是在既定的融资环境下,做出的"合理"选择.在此基础上,提出了改善上市公司融资环境的综合治理措施,以使上市公司的融资行为朝着理性化方向发展.     

为社会公众股股东表决制度喝彩

12月7日，中国证监会发布《关于加强社会公众股股东权益保护的若干规定》(以下简称〈若干规定》)，并于当日开始正式实施。这一务实的举措，是2004年中国证券市场系列变局的一步完美的“收官”，给正值隆冬的中国股市带来了一丝春的气息!     

Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules

We analyze how shareholders screen management proposals at annualgeneral meetings. First, we use a simple model of strategicvoting to develop a theoretical benchmark of effective informationaggregation through voting. Then, we derive testable implicationsand provide structural estimates of the model parameters. Themain conclusions are that shareholders vote strategically andthat proposal screening increases value. Shareholders largelyneutralize the lock-in effect of supermajority rules, therebypreventing the incorrect rejection of proposals.     

Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock

This paper presents an economic evaluation of common stock voting rights. An index of relative voting rights inequality for different classes of stock of the same corporation is constructed and the empirical relationship between the market premium on a superior-voting stock and the voting inequality index is examined. In only three out of the 25 cases could investors have arbitraged between the two classes of stock, although in one case the arbitrage opportunity persisted for several months.     

Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders

Golden parachutes (GPs) have attracted substantial attention from investors and public officials for more than two decades. We find that GPs are associated with higher expected acquisition premiums and that this association is at least partly due to the effect of GPs on executive incentives. However, we also find that firms that adopt GPs experience negative abnormal stock returns both during and subsequent to the period surrounding their adoption. This finding raises the possibility that even though GPs facilitate some value-increasing acquisitions, they do have, on average, an overall negative effect on shareholder wealth; this effect could be due to GPs weakening the force of the market for control and thereby increasing managerial slack, and/or to GPs making it attractive for executives to go along with some value-decreasing acquisitions that do not serve shareholders' long-term interests. Our findings have significant implications for ongoing debates on GPs and suggest the need for additional work identifying the types of GPs that drive the identified correlation between GPs and reduced shareholder value.     

投资者的权利与责任

对玩弄盈利游戏、粉饰资产负债表的公司说不!对视公司为个人玩物的董事长们说不!对欺世盗名的基金、及其广告说不！对拉抬投资组合价格以虚增收益率的基金经理说不!对有利于券商而不是有利于投资的交易系统与交易行为说不!对网上交易欺诈说不!对每一只股票都作推荐的证券分析师说不！对不关心投资利益的监管说不……这是作为投资的权利与责任。     

Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders

Theory predicts the existence of explicit bilateral contracts between firms and expert shareholders. I assemble and analyze a large-scale data set of these contracts. Using block investments from 1996 to 2018, I find that these contracts involve mainly corporate owners and activist owners, and often specify covenants pertaining to financing, trading, directorships, dividends, joint ventures, corporate investment, financial reporting, and information access. I also find that some of the contract covenants are stated in terms of accounting information, and that the prevalence of these contracts is significantly positively associated with measures of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Overall, this study provides some of the first systematic evidence on explicit bilateral contracts between firms and shareholders.     

Institutional Shareholders and Bank Capital

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership and bank capital. Using a large sample of U.S. banks, we show that banks with greater institutional ownership operate with substantially higher capital ratios. The results are robust to controlling for standard determinants of bank capital structure, including market- and accounting-based risk measures. The results hold both for indexers and non-indexers, indicating that the effect of institutional ownership on bank capital cannot be explained by self-selection. We further address endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable strategy based on the inclusion of banks in the S&P index. We find supporting evidence that the superior monitoring abilities of institutional investors, which reduce the severity of agency costs, is the main explanation for our results.     

投资者保护与控股股东资产偏好

本文从控股股东资产偏好的角度构建了一个在股权集中型公司中研究控股股东侵占中小股东利益的行为决策分析框架。理论分析表明,投资者保护可以缓解因控股股东对流动性资产的偏好而形成的投资不足,但公司现金持有水平取决于公司投资不足和控股股东资产转移两个方面的净效应。实证研究结果证实了较好的投资者保护能够在一定程度上缓解公司投资不足,并抑制控股股东的资产转移动机,从而促使外部投资者对公司所持有的现金予以较高的价值评估。我们还发现中国上市公司控股股东较高的现金流权对应着较高的控制权,其结果是加剧公司投资不足,导致公司现金水平较高而现金价值较低。