Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater

This paper examines monopoly power in the market for groundwater (irrigation water extracted by private tubewells), a market characterized by barriers to entry and spatial fragmentation. In Pakistan's Punjab region, groundwater and tenancy contracts are often interlinked, with share-tenants gaining access to water through the use of their landlord's tubewell. An analysis of groundwater transactions shows that tenants of tubewell owners are charged lower prices than other customers. Tubewell owners and their tenants also use considerably more groundwater on their plots than other farmers. Using detailed price and quantity data, the efficiency and distributional implications of this monopoly power are explored.     

International Competition and the Degree of Monopoly in Australian Manufacturing

Pricing behaviour in open economies is examined by adapting Kalecki's analysis of pricing in closed economies. The parameters of the resulting pricing equation are estimated using data for a sample of Australian manufacturing industries. These estimates are then used to calculate measures reflecting the degree of monopoly for an open economy, which are compared with the ratio of aggregate proceeds to aggregate direct costs as a measure reflecting the degree of monopoly for a closed economy.     

The Cost of Monopoly in Australian Manufacturing

This article looks at the deadweight loss arising from monopoly elements in Australian manufacturing under various assumptions and its relationship with the level of concentration.     

Innovation and Performance: Benchmarking Australian Firms

This article empirically analyses the link between innovation and performance using a sample of large Australian firms, with a specific aim of developing benchmarking tools. Innovation is measured by firms' investment in R&D and applications for patents, trademarks and designs. An innovation index is constructed to provide one method of benchmarking. The index incorporates a firm's innovative activities into a single figure after accounting for firm size. The index provides a ranking of the most innovative firms in Australia. A second method of benchmarking uses a stochastic production frontier. This type of analysis identifies the firms which are located closest to a ‘best practice innovation frontier’.     

Analysing Firm‐level Price Effects for Differentiated Products: The Case of Australian Wine Producers

The paper discusses and illustrates estimation methods for identifying and modelling the influence of producers on the prices for a differentiated product. A two‐step fixed effects approach is contrasted to the random effects specification. The techniques are employed to analyse prices for over 260 Australian premium wine producers. The fixed effects specification is preferred given significant correlation between wine attributes and random producer effects. The estimation of fixed producer price effects identifies statistically significant price premiums and discounts, which average 15%. Fixed producer price effects are estimated to depend on the quality reputation of the producer, its level of experience, producer size and the use of multibrands by conglomerates. In part, results indicate that price discounts are associated with producers who have low‐quality reputations, are small and recently established.     

垄断行业定价的博弈分析--以铁路票价制定为例

铁路行业被认为是典型的自然垄断行业。长期以来中国政府对铁路部门实行较为严格的管制政策。但近年来铁路部门已经逐渐实行自主定价,并在春节等节假日上浮票价,引发很多争论。用博弈论方法对铁路票价制定和消费者购买行为进行经济学分析,提出铁路票价制定有其利益趋向依据,但为规范其行为,应当实行价格听证制度和严格的审计监察制度。     

Price Regulation and Public Service Obligations under International Arbitrage

National regulation generates price differentials between countries stimulating arbitrage by international distributors. Harmed manufacturers counteract using vertical price-squeeze or non-price discrimination. We show that: (i) either under regulatory commitment or discretion, there are non-linear relationships between technology/market conditions and the first-movers pricing strategy; (ii) public service obligations on distributors allow regulators to manipulate parallel exports so as to improve national welfare; (iii) to prevent sabotage, regulation should provide manufacturers with adequate countervailing incentives; (iv) coordinating national agencies alleviates negative regulatory and market externalities. Therefore, static and dynamic efficiency concerns may arise within a regional exhaustion regime of intellectual property rights.We are grateful to the Editor Michael A. Crew, an anonymous referee, and Luigi Buzzacchi for valuable comments and suggestions. We have benefited from financial support granted by MIUR-FIRB Project MAIS.     

日本行政垄断规制改革及启示

日本是"政府主导性"市场经济国家,其政府对行政垄断行业的规制事无巨细.但在20世纪80年代后,日本为适应国内变化了的经济形势,对其规制进行了以"原则上实行经济自由化"为目标的规制改革,其改革采取了渐进式改革方式.日本对规制的改革对我国的国有企业改革和非国营经济进入行政垄断行业以及促进经济竞争、提高行政垄断行业的效率具有启示意义.     

中国行业垄断的收入分配效应

收入分配差距过大是中国社会发展的难点和热点问题,行业垄断已经成为加剧中国收入分配矛盾的重要原因。为此,本文构建新的垄断-竞争两部门利润分享模型,揭示行业垄断影响收入分配的内在机制,并结合中国的经验数据进行实证分析。研究表明,行业垄断在产品与要素市场中,通过最终产品消费的福利转移、要素的区别定价以及垄断利润在不同就业者之间的非均衡分享导致收入分配差距的扩大;在行业垄断力量对经济干预较多的阶段,收入差距扩大问题较为严重,并且往往表现为劳动总收入的下降。因此,持续提升劳动者收入,保持收入分配的合理化,必须配合行之有效的行政垄断部门改革,打破行业垄断所形成的二元经济结构,降低行业垄断在生产和分配领域中的影响。     

The Case for International Coordination of Electricity Regulation: Evidence from the Measurement of Efficiency in South America

A decade of experience has shown that monitoring the performance of public and private monopolies is the hardest part of electricity sector reform in South America—because operators control most of the information needed for effective regulation. South American electricity regulators can reduce this information asymmetry by increasing international coordination and relying on comparative measures of efficiency. To make it possible for them to do so, countries should harmonize their regulatory databases and develop methodologies for making comparisons. This paper uses data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis to estimate the efficiency of South America's main electricity distribution companies. Both approaches allow regulators to use relatively simple tests to check the robustness of their findings, strengthening their positions at regulatory hearings.     

价格垄断问题的行为经济学分析

价格是市场的基本信号,对资源配置起着基础性作用. 价格垄断会导致市场功能陷入瘫痪,对经济的破坏难以估量,因此必须对价格垄断行为予以关注. 分析近年来价格垄断问题的几种具体行为表现,运用传统经济学的"市场失灵"论、"利润最大化"假说以及"市场结构"论对价格垄断行为进行解释,发现这些解释均存在缺陷,缺乏对企业价格垄断行为心理活动过程的分析. 因而运用行为经济学的预期理论、心理账户理论、"自我约束问题"和信息不对称等理论对价格垄断行为产生原因加以阐释,并进一步提出利用行为经济学规制价格垄断行为的对策.     

自然垄断产业定价机制探析--以电价机制为例

本文以自然垄断产业电力工业为例分析了电力价格现状，在电力企业行为特征基础上建立了成本监督博弈模型，分析了各博弈主体纳什均衡的行为选择和博弈未构成纳什均衡的原因，从制度建设角度提出了多维监督等治理对策，为建立有效的自然垄断产业定价机制进行了理论探索。     

自然垄断规制变迁的传统解释及评析

20世纪70年代后期,西方国家出现了大规模放松规制的浪潮,一直持续到20世纪90年代后期,之后,西方国家出现了放松规制与再规制并存的局面。西方国家的规制实践经历了由强化规制到放松规制、由放松规制到再规制与放松规制并存这样的动态变迁过程,对于规制的这一变迁,既有理论多集中在对"由强化规制到放松规制"的解释,并认为这一变迁是自然垄断产业规制变迁的核心所在。该文集中论述对自然垄断规制变迁的传统解释,并给予评析。     

The Volatility of Real Exchange Rates: The Australian Case

This paper presents an empirical investigation into factors underlying the real U.S.-Australian dollar exchange rate. We find that the random walk model of the real exchange rate can be improved by various GARCH specifications. In particular, we find that the estimated risk premium from a GARCH-M model is not robust to model specification. When the model is extended to include the $US/Yen real exchange rate and an index of commodity prices the GARCH-in-mean term is no longer significant. The additional variables seem to account for the increased volatility of the real exchange rate in the post-1983 period. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that changes in the Australian term spread and US-Australian interest rate differential have little or no explanatory power for the real exchange rate.     

自然垄断产业规制改革过程中的风险研究

我国在社会主义市场经济体制建立过程中,逐步开始了以引入竞争、提高效率为目标的自然垄断产业规制改革.但是,在规制改革过程中,要面临许多不确定的风险.国内外对自然垄断产业的规制经验、教训表明,能否有效地控制规制过程中引发的风险在很大程度上决定了规制改革的绩效,甚至影响到对规制改革本身的评价.引发规制风险的因素很多,但总的来看,主要集中在规制本身、市场、政府规制行为不规范这三个方面.分析了上述三方面所引发的规制风险产生的原因,并根据我国目前自然垄断产业规制现状提出了若干建议,以化解规制改革中面临的风险.     

Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies

This paper considers methods of price structure regulation of electricity transmission in the context of an independent transmission company (TRANSCO). The focus is on two-part tariffs where the variable part would reflect congestion charges (and ancillary services) while the fixed part would reflect capacity costs. The two-part tariffs form a price-cap index, and the firm could rebalance prices, as long as the index satisfies the price-cap constraint. The firm would then have incentives to trade off congestion against capacity expansion in such a way that it becomes profitable to expand, whenever the costs of congestion on average exceed the costs of expansion. However, with chained Laspeyres weights in the price-cap index expansion may be suboptimal. We therefore discuss ways to improve the expansion factor. Implementing the regulatory schemes considered suggests a hybrid approach combining a TRANSCO with an independent system operator (ISO).