Inter‐temporal economies of scope,organizational modularity,and the dynamics of diversification

The question of whether corporations add value beyond that created by individual businesses has engendered much debate in recent years. Some of this debate has focused on the pros and cons of related vs. unrelated diversification. A standard explanation of the benefits of related diversification has to do with the ability to obtain intra‐temporal economies of scope from contemporaneous sharing of resources by related businesses within the firm. In contrast, this paper deals with inter‐temporal economies of scope that firms achieve by redeploying resources and capabilities between related businesses over time, as firms exit some markets while entering others. The transfer of resources due to market exit distinguishes our treatment of inter‐temporal economies of scope from standard intra‐temporal economies of scope. In addition, these inter‐temporal economies can benefit from a decentralized and modular organizational structure. This ability to obtain inter‐temporal economies of scope via organizational modularity and recombination suggests that corporations do not necessarily need a high degree of coordination between business units in order to benefit from a strategy of related diversification. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Within‐industry diversification and firm performance—an S‐shaped hypothesis

This study shows that the interplay between “adjustment costs”, “coordination costs” and within‐industry diversification benefits, results in an S‐shaped relationship between within‐industry diversification and firm performance. At low levels of within‐industry diversification, coordination costs are negligible but “adjustment costs” are higher than the synergy benefits of a limited product scope, hence leading to negative performance outcomes. At moderate levels of within‐industry diversification synergies between related product categories substantially increase and outweigh the rise in adjustment and coordination costs, resulting in positive performance outcomes. Yet, extensive within‐industry diversification gives rise to considerable coordination costs, which, coupled with adjustment costs, outweigh synergy effects and hamper performance. The study further shows that a greater change rate of within‐industry diversification results in negative performance outcomes. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intra‐industry diversification and firm performance

We study how intra‐industry product diversity affects firm performance by analyzing the implications of expanding a firm's product line within its core business. We conjecture that increases in product diversity initially undermine performance because of negative transfer effects but then improve it due to economies of scope. We further theorize that this U‐shaped effect of product diversity becomes more pronounced as the firm increases the intensity of its technology investment, yet is likely to be attenuated by the firm's accumulated experience with intra‐industry diversification. Data on 156 U.S.‐based software firms operating from 1990 to 2001 furnish support for these conjectures. Our study advances emerging research on intra‐industry diversification by underscoring some of its contingent performance effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Customer‐specific synergies and market convergence

We use an analytical model to study the effects of customer‐specific synergies, i.e., synergies that arise when firms sell multiple products to the same customers. At the firm level, we show that the profitability of a customer‐specific synergy depends upon cross‐market correlation of customer preferences, differs when the synergy is cost‐based versus differentiation‐based, and can even be negative when the synergy is kept proprietary to a single firm. We also show that returns to imitating such a synergy may decline as it strengthens. At the industry level, we find that exploiting customer‐specific synergies causes endogenous market convergence at a point that depends upon whether the synergy is cost‐based or differentiation‐based and whether it is imitated. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

De novo venture strategy: arch incumbency at inaugural entry

By definition, de novo industry ventures do not share many market‐contact points with incumbents—itself an important source of competitive ‘stability’ through mutual forbearance. As such, these ventures are often subject to aggressive retaliation at the outset, which could threaten their very survival. In this study, the notion of an arch incumbent is developed, hypothesizing that, in general, a large market overlap with an incumbent lowers the survival odds of a de novo entrant. However, a large market overlap with the arch incumbent combined with an aggressive inaugural market entry or a different market positioning reduces the probability of retaliation by the arch incumbent (and subsequently other incumbents as well), and hence increases the probability of survival for a de novo entrant. The empirical experience of de novo ventures in the intra‐European passenger airline industry supports these hypotheses. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multimarket contact and sales growth: evidence from insurance

Research on pricing, profits, and firm survival has shown that multimarket contact causes mutual forbearance against competition, but has not considered the consequences of imperfect observability of competitive moves. Here, predictions are developed to explain how mutual forbearance occurs—but sometimes fails—in markets with imperfect observability. Mutual forbearance means that firms do not seek to take market share from each other through price cuts or nonprice competition, and thus that sales grow at uniform rates. Firms defect from mutual forbearance, and hence have higher sales growth, if the potential rewards are high and the likelihood of being discovered is low. This theory is tested on a panel of firms operating in the Norwegian general insurance industry. The evidence suggests that sales growth is most rapid in firms that do not meet many multimarket competitors in a given market and firms that are economically troubled. Growing or highly concentrated markets have higher heterogeneity of growth rates. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interfirm differences in scale economies and the evolution of market shares

Evolutionary and resource‐based theories imply that firms in an industry with different resources and capabilities may differ in critical characteristics of their production functions, such as economies of scale. This paper measures these inter‐firm differences in economies of scale and examines how they affect the subsequent evolution of the market share distribution in the money market mutual fund industry. The findings indicate that fund families with larger marginal benefits to increasing their scale do subsequently gain market share at the expense of their rivals, but that this effect diminishes as the fund family ages, perhaps as a consequence of imitation. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multimarket Contact and Rivalry over Knowledge‐based Resources

Research summary: Research shows that multimarket contact (MMC ) reduces rivalry involving downstream activities. Yet, studies showing that MMC can increase the threat of imitation suggest a need to better understand how MMC affects upstream rivalry over knowledge‐based resources. In this study, we argue that MMC increases rivalry over knowledge‐based resources since the deterrent threat of retaliation that typically leads to mutual forbearance in downstream activities will not be sufficient to restrain firms from protecting their knowledge from imitation in upstream activities. In support of these arguments we find that MMC increases the likelihood that a firm initiates patent litigation against a rival. This study suggests the relationship between MMC and rivalry may depend on the competitive domain and the type of resources over which firms are competing . Managerial Summary: How does market overlap or MMC affect rivalry between two competitors? Prior studies have largely found that an increase in market overlap decreases rivalry in less knowledge‐intensive context because of the deterrent threat of retaliation. However, in this paper, we argue that an increase in market overlap may not reduce rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive context because of heterogeneity in capabilities to protect knowledge. We find that a firm is more likely to initiate patent litigation against a rival as market overlap increases. Our findings suggest that the incentive to protect value across multiple product markets may surpass the motivation to cooperate with rivals and that managers should have a more nuanced view of how market overlap with competitors affects rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive contexts . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product‐market strategy and the marketing capabilities of the firm: impact on market effectiveness and cash flow performance

We report on two studies (a single and a multi‐industry) that empirically investigate a nomological network of relationships between strategic business unit product‐market strategy (differentiation, cost‐focus, and product‐market scope), marketing capabilities (architectural and specialized capabilities, as well as their integration), and business unit performance (market effectiveness and subsequent one‐year objective cash flow), along with a series of controls. Addressing important lacunae in the resource‐based view our main research objective is to augment understanding of how critical firm‐level marketing capabilities enable the realization of strategy, thus, further advancing both the resource‐based view and more recent capabilities theorizing. Specifically, we test seven hypotheses and find strong evidence that both architectural and specialized marketing capabilities, and their integration, positively mediate the product‐market strategy and derived business unit performance relationship. In contrast to many extant studies, both survey and objectively measured data are combined, and because the secondary data collected contains both resource‐level (input) data and subsequent one‐year financial data, a higher level of confidence may be attributable to our findings. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Toward greater understanding of market orientation and the resource‐based view

Connor's commentary offers a series of thoughtful comments on the ideas presented in Hult, Ketchen, and Slater (2005). We focus on two of his contentions in our response. First, we argue that the theory underlying our study—the resource‐based view—is not tautological. This is because resources and performance are not directly related. Instead, realizing the potential value of resources depends on those resources being exploited through a firm's strategic actions. Second, we disagree with Connor's contention that market‐oriented and customer‐led firms lie along a continuum. We propose a richer conceptualization centered on a two‐by‐two matrix that contains market‐oriented firms, customer‐led firms, and two additional types. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The performance implications of intra‐ and inter‐regional geographic diversification

Engaging the debate regarding the appropriate level of geographic diversification for multinational enterprises (MNEs), we examine a critical, yet unresolved, question: How is performance impacted by the MNE's level of intra‐ and inter‐regional diversification versus the total level of geographic diversification? Using data from 123 U.S.‐based MNEs over a seven‐year period and leveraging both sales‐based and subsidiary‐based measures for diversification, we find that performance increases at an increasingly higher rate as firms concentrate more heavily on intra‐regional diversification. Regarding inter‐regional diversification and total geographic diversification, we find inverted‐U relationships to exist between firm performance and the level of geographic diversification. Different from recent research on multinationality, our robustness checks indicate no evidence of a sigmoidal relationship between the degree of regional diversification and performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are market pioneers intrinsically stronger than later entrants?

Are market pioneers more successful because they started with superior skills and resources? The absolute pioneer advantage hypothesis is that because market pioneering is desirable, firms with superior skills and resources naturally choose to pioneer new markets. The comparative advantage hypothesis is that market evolution changes success requirements. Market pioneer skills and resources differ from, but are not superior to later entrants. Empirical results across 171 diversification entrants tend to support the comparative advantage hypothesis. Skill and resource profiles are provided for market pioneers, early followers, and late entrants.     

The Role of Value‐Informed Pricing in Market‐Oriented Product Innovation Management*

Although the positive effect of a market orientation on new product success is widely accepted and the market orientation literature has increased its understanding of how a market orientation leads to performance, the extant literature has overlooked the role of value‐informed pricing in the relationship. Value‐informed pricing is a pricing practice in which the decision makers base the price of the new product on the customers' perceptions of the benefits that the product offers and how these benefits are traded by customers against the price (that has yet to be determined). Considering that pricing mistakes may hit hard on the profitability of product innovations, it is important to firms to have a good understanding of its role. This study develops a framework in which value‐informed pricing is integrated in the relationship between market orientation and new product performance. A distinction is made between customer and competitor orientations, and relative product advantage is also included in the conceptual model. The model is tested on data obtained from managers based on a cross sectional sample of 144 firms. The respondents were involved in a decision‐making process of the pricing of a new product. The model is tested using structural equations modeling. The results show that value‐informed pricing has a strong effect on new product performance. It also reveals that each component of a market orientation fulfills a specific role in a market‐oriented organization. Value‐informed pricing is found to have important mediating effects in the market orientation–new product performance relationship. Results show that firms with a strong customer orientation engage in value‐informed pricing and develop superior benefits to customers in an advantageous product. In turn, both value‐informed pricing and relative product advantage positively affect new product market performance. However, no significant effect of competitor orientation on value‐informed pricing is found. Combined with the finding that competitor orientation negatively affects relative product advantage, this suggests that competitor orientation may hurt new product performance when this orientation is not balanced with a strong customer orientation. The results also portray that value‐informed pricing leads to higher product advantage. Interestingly, this relation is contingent on the degree of interfunctional coordination within the firm. This suggests that the relationship between market orientation and new product performance is strongest if firms integrate value‐informed pricing in the new product development process. In this sense, a market‐oriented firm mirrors the customer value perception that makes a trade‐off between benefits and price.     

Applying “Merger Guidelines” market definition to (de)regulatory policy: Pros and cons

Since initially presented in the 1982 Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines, market definition has been adopted nearly worldwide as a framework to see if a merger would substantially lessen competition. This framework is useful for addressing the similarly counterfactual question of whether forbearance from regulation would lead to an increase in prices. In this context, however, the usefulness of a merger-based market definition is limited. Because the alternative to forbearance is regulation, and since some regulated rates may be below competitive levels, finding that deregulation would lead to market power as defined for mergers need not justify continued regulation. Forbearance in telecommunications highlights market definition questions regarding gross vs. marginal substitutes, dynamic efficiencies, and service bundling. It also reveals ambiguities in the meaning of “geographic market.” Market definition also has limited applicability if regulation exists not to prevent high prices but the abuse of dominance through predatory pricing.     

How do interdependencies among human‐capital deployment,development, and diversification strategies affect firms' financial performance?

Using key insights from the resource‐based view of the firm, we develop and test a theory of how firms can successfully deploy and develop their strategic human assets while managing the trade‐offs in their service and geographical diversification strategies. In a sample of large law firms we find that, even though firms profit from expert human‐capital leveraging strategy and service and geographical diversification strategies individually, pursuing these strategies simultaneously at high levels produces negative interaction effects on firm profitability. In addition, the internally developed, firm‐specific associate human capital strategically fits better with high levels of expert human‐capital leveraging. While lateral hiring helps firms build new knowledge bases and take advantage of growth opportunities, pursuing high levels of both expert human‐capital leveraging and lateral hiring of associates results in lower profitability. To fully capture the economic benefits from strategies of diversification, human‐capital leveraging and lateral hiring, firms should understand and manage the complex interdependencies among multiple levels of strategy. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Opportunity costs,industry dynamics,and corporate diversification: Evidence from the cardiovascular medical device industry, 1976–2004

This paper examines how demand conditions across alternative markets impact diversification decisions and firm performance by influencing the opportunity costs of deploying non‐scale free capabilities. Using data within the cardiovascular medical device industry, this study shows that: (1) firms with a larger stock of pre‐entry innovation experience are more likely to diversify; (2) firms in a current market with greater relative demand maturity are more likely to diversify; (3) diversification is associated with a performance decrease in the current market; and (4) diversification is associated with a performance increase at the corporate level. These findings shed new light on the self‐selection process of corporate scope, the conceptualization of firm capabilities, and the connection between industry dynamics and resource deployment. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Market‐oriented is more than being customer‐led

Connor, in ‘Customer‐led and market‐oriented: A matter of balance’, argues, among other things, that we propose that market oriented businesses focus on future customer needs to the neglect of current customer needs, that market oriented businesses over‐emphasize marketing activities in their value chains, that market oriented businesses emphasize generative learning to the neglect of adaptive learning, and that only large companies have the resources to become market oriented. These arguments are largely unfair extrapolations of our position and reflect a superficial understanding of the nature and benefits of being market oriented. We use this response to clarify our position on these issues. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decomposing Pioneer Survival: Implications for the Order‐of‐Entry Effect

In contrast to previous studies of pioneer survival that directly compare the survival of market pioneers with later entrants, this paper proposes that a market pioneer, as the first entrant, operates under two distinctly different survival processes, one during the initial monopoly period and another during the later competition period. The two processes of market pioneers need to be separately estimated and compared with the survival process of later entrants. This paper demonstrates a method for decomposing the pioneer's survival and empirically shows how researchers can compare the pioneer survival in two periods with that of later entrants and identify period‐specific advantages of pioneering. Our empirical analysis using data collected from two different types of industries—a low‐tech (i.e., newspaper) industry and several high‐tech industries—reveals several interesting new findings that illustrate the advantages of decomposing pioneer survival. For example, this paper shows that when treating first‐mover survival as a single process, one can only find an oversimplified pattern showing that first movers have a survival chance equal to that of second movers in the newspaper industry, but a lower one than the second movers in high‐tech industries. However, when analyzing the first‐mover's survival as a sequence of monopoly and competition processes, new insights emerge. In the newspaper industry, the pioneers can have survival advantages in both the monopoly and the competition periods relative to the second movers, and there is a significant survival advantage for those second entrants who delay market entry until the first entrant exits. In contrast, the overall pioneer survival disadvantage identified in the high‐tech industries when treating the survival as a single process comes from the survival disadvantage in the competition period but not in the monopoly period. Furthermore, our empirical analyses using data from two types of industries reveal completely different patterns with regard to the pioneer survival advantage, which suggests that being first can benefit pioneers in both two‐market periods in low‐tech industries but can be extremely risky for pioneers to gain any survival advantages in both two‐market periods in high‐tech industries because the former markets have relatively low market and technology uncertainties, and organizational change is less important; whereas the latter industries have significantly high market and technology uncertainties, technological advances emerge frequently, and firms are required to adapt themselves quickly to a fast‐changing environment.     

Constraints in acquiring and utilizing directors' experience: An empirical study of new‐market entry in the pharmaceutical industry

In this study we provide evidence that firms considering entering new markets are more likely to appoint directors with experience in those markets; and subsequently, we show that directors' market experience increases the likelihood of new‐market entry. Moreover, we explore the presence of constraints in both, acquiring experienced directors and utilizing their experience. Specifically, we find that experienced directors are less likely to join firms with financial restatements in the recent past as well as firms with a lower status than the firms where they currently serve. In addition, we find that interlocking directors' experience is less likely to lead to new‐market entry for firms that lack new‐product development experience and that exhibit a high level of market overlap with interlocked firms. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Foreign entrant survival and foreign market share: Canadian companies' experience in united states medical sector markets

We show that successful foreign market entry is related to the extent of foreign presence in an industry at the time of entry. Survival of 31 Canadian-based businesses that entered 24 U.S. medical sector markets between 1968 and 1989 tended to be somewhat longer in product markets in which foreign-based businesses held a moderate market share when the Canadian businesses entered than in low and high foreign share product markets. The result controls several other industry and business-level factors, including industry concentration, entry year, corporate size, related diversification, entry mode, and service sector status.