中国上市公司融资偏好的治理分析

在特定的政策环境和不健全的市场环境下,中国上市公司具有强烈的股权融资偏好,存在典型的异常优序融资现象,这种现象使上市公司存在明显的融资负效应;控制人主导是中国上市公司股权融资偏好形成的主要特征,控制人剥夺其他投资者利益是中国上市公司融资行为的主要特点,这已经严重影响到中国证券市场的融资功能;应从强化公司治理入手,以制衡控制人的权力为着眼点,将推进资本市场制度建设作为治理上市公司融资偏好的总体思路。     

融资结构对创业板公司业绩影响的实证研究

融资结构可分为债务融资和股权融资,债务融资又有不同融资成本、不同融资途径、不同债务期限。债务融资下融资成本、融资途径、债务期限和股权融资与企业绩效有何关系呢？基于此,本文运用2010～2015年创业板上市公司实证研究债务融资和股权融资对公司绩效的影响。研究结果表明：股权融资与公司业绩正相关;债务融资下资产负债率、债务期限结构与公 司业绩正相关,而银行借款率与公司业绩负相关。     

Do analysts add value when they most can? Evidence from corporate spin‐offs

This article investigates how securities analysts help investors understand the value of diversification. By studying the research that analysts produce about companies that have announced corporate spin‐offs, we gain unique insights into how analysts portray diversified firms to the investment community. We find that while analysts' research about these companies is associated with improved forecast accuracy, the value of their research about the spun‐off subsidiaries is more limited. For both diversified firms and their spun‐off subsidiaries, analysts' research is more valuable when information asymmetry between the management of these entities and investors is higher. These findings contribute to the corporate strategy literature by shedding light on the roots of the diversification discount and by showing how analysts' research enables investors to overcome asymmetric information. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

最优股权结构设计的博弈分析

股权相对集中是现代股份制度的典型特征。从发起人控股股东角度看,如何实现股权价值最大化是其进行投资及融资的主要目标。为了能够以较低成本进行外源性股权融资,发起人控股股东必须接受外部大股东的适度监督。从外部监督股东看,为了减少发起人控股股东转移公司价值,必须对其予以监督,因而必须持有最低限度的股权比例才有助于实现自身价值最大化。所以,发起人控股股东进行股权融资时,必须设计最优股权结构,最终实现股权融资的激励相容。     

中国上市公司股权融资与债权融资成本实证研究

本文对中国上市公司IPO后的股权与债权的融资成本进行了实证研究。影响企业市场价值变化的主要因素是行业因素以及企业的初始市值,于是我们选取了家庭耐用消费品行业以及纺织和服装行业的上市公司,对同行业问各组匹配公司进行直接比较,从而发现：站在上市公司股东利益的角度考虑,债权融资成本低于股权融资成本。这主要是股权融资的软约束造成的企业经营业绩下滑,进而导致企业进行多次股权融资行为后市场价值下跌。     

我国企业资本结构二元化趋势研究

我国上市公司凭借其上市的优势更多地依赖于股权融资方式，而非上市公司尤其是中小企业，只能通过银行贷款或内部积累融入资金，从而使不同的企业组织形成了股本注入为主与债务注入为主的二元化资本结构。要转变资本结构的二元化趋势，需要建立多层次的资本市场体系，调整失衡的公司治理结构，优化企业资金结构，并通过建立新型的银企关系解决中小企业融资难的问题。     

企业并购的信号博弈分析

井购是市场经济体制下的一种产权交易活动，是并购双方在追求各自利益最大化前提下所进行的信号博弈过程。由于企业井购双方信息不对称性所导致的逆向选择，企业并购市场会出现分离均衡、混同均衡和准分离均衡三种状态，其中只有分离均衡是最理想和最有效率的均衡。文章建立了目标企业与并购企业之间的信号传递博弈模型，提出克服并购双方信息的不对称性和对目标企业进行合理估价是实现分离均衡的最有效方法。     

Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

股权集中、再融资与定向增发的选择——基于创业板的检验

在股权集中公司的治理中,大股东成为上市公司经营与财务决策的实际控制者。本文从我国资本市场的实际出发,以我国创业板上市公司定向增发的选择动机为实证对象,研究了历史业绩、股权集中度、信息不对称、未来经营风险4个因素对股权再融资方式选择的影响,结果表明股权集中度对定向增发影响显著,即股权集中度越低的上市公司越具有定向增发动机,而增发门槛低以及西方信息不对称、监督效应等定向增发动机的理论并没有得到我国创业板市场的实证支持。     

民间资本参与基础设施建设若干问题研究

从民间资本参与我国基础设施建设的整体情况来看，效果并不乐观，各种障碍限制了民间资本参与基础设施建设的热情。文章分析了民间资本参与基础设施建设所遇到的问题，并提出解决这些问题的各种对策。     

山东省农业保险中的逆向选择问题分析

农业保险发展缓慢的主要原因是由于保险公司内部原因,以及弱质农业本身在面临市场和自然双重风险威胁时,为农业保驾护航的农业保险却陷入了信息不对称引起的逆向选择问题。本文将运用经济学知识,对山东省农业保险逆向选择问题的原因进行分析,并提出相关的对策。     

The state's role in financing agricultural research

Recent declines in public agricultural research funding in developing countries may not be as severe or as universal as widely perceived, although some research systems are clearly constrained. An analysis of the economic characteristics of agricultural research suggests that there may be some crowding-out of private finance, but the harnessing of additional private resources depends critically on enhancing the profitability and appropriability of research benefits, while the case for increasing levels of public funding on research with greater public good characteristics remains strong. However, the justifiable scrutiny of the state's role in financing agricultural research should not be at the expense of continued efforts to improve the efficiency of agricultural research delivery and the management of existing funds.     

BOT项目融资模式推广应用的探讨

基于BOT(建设-运营-移交)模式在我国逐步推广应用中遇到诸多问题,如人们认识、法律和投资环境不健全、管理体制、价格体制及外汇问题等,对该模式的特点作了回顾,对遇到的问题进行了总结分析。针对我国实情提出相应对策,如开辟各种融资渠道,制定相应政策鼓励国内民营资本参与BOT项目投资,政府加强在BOT项目融资中的主导地位,以及创造适应BOT融资的投资环境等。