The effects of CEO equity ownership and firm diversification on risk taking

This research explores the effects of CEO equity ownership and corporate diversification on firms' risk‐taking and risk avoidance behaviors. Hypotheses regarding these effects are tested through econometric analysis of mergers in the U.S. cable television industry. Risk taking and avoidance are measured as horizontal expansion through acquisitions and as the divestiture of assets, respectively, in the face of increasing environmental turbulence. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

TAKEOVER DEFENSES,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND STOCK RETURNS IN THE NETHERLANDS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This study empirically examines the relationships between a firm’s takeover defenses and its ownership structure and stock returns. Analyzing data of Dutch listed companies, we find that multiple antitakeover defenses are increasingly adopted when firms are characterized by relatively lower ownership concentration. The evidence supports the hypothesis that more concentrated ownership of shares provides more effective monitoring of managers. As defense by issuing preferred share has recently been the most widely adopted mechanism in the Netherlands, its impact on shareholders’ wealth is also analyzed. We observe the presence of two opposing effects of this antitakeover measure. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: a longitudinal view

Strategy and finance research suggests that managerial ownership results in increased incentive alignment and therefore is negatively related to corporate diversification. Using a longitudinal approach, we develop arguments to examine whether managerial ownership is associated with subsequent changes in diversification and/or if diversification is associated with subsequent changes in ownership. The results indicate that levels of managerial ownership in one time period are not associated with subsequent changes in corporate diversification, which raises incentive alignment questions. We also find that higher levels of corporate diversification are associated with changes in managerial ownership, which suggests support for the employment risk‐reduction perspective. This study provides important reasons to reassess the longitudinal implications of the managerial ownership‐corporate diversification link from both theoretical and managerial perspectives. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest european companies

The paper examines the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in 435 of the largest European companies. Controlling for industry, capital structure and nation effects we find a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market‐to‐book value of equity) and profitability (asset returns), but the effect levels off for high ownership shares. Furthermore we propose and support the hypothesis that the identity of large owners—family, bank, institutional investor, government, and other companies—has important implications for corporate strategy and performance. For example, compared to other owner identities, financial investor ownership is found to be associated with higher shareholder value and profitability, but lower sales growth. The effect of ownership concentration is also found to depend on owner identity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Control,collaboration, and productivity in international joint ventures: theory and evidence

This study analyzes the following unresolved questions: In international joint ventures (IJVs) in a developing country, how could different IJV structures address control and collaboration considerations, and what is the likely effect of such different structures on IJV productivity? Theoretically, we suggest that the ambiguity surrounding these questions reflects the tendency of researchers to view control and collaboration as opposing objectives, studying one or the other; in contrast, we provide a more integrative perspective that blends the two objectives, focusing on common underlying issues relating to enhancing partner commitment, ensuring partner knowledge contributions, and reducing partner risks. We address the most salient design consideration for IJV partners, that is, IJV ownership structure, to posit that joint consideration of the control benefit of a higher foreign ownership level in IJVs and the collaboration benefit of a more balanced IJV ownership structure results in an expected inverted U‐curve relationship between foreign ownership and IJV productivity. Additionally, we posit and test how three environmental contingencies, by affecting the need for control and collaboration in IJVs, would further influence the specific shape of the inverted U‐curve relationship. We find strong support for our theory using an extensive longitudinal dataset of over 5,000 IJVs in China from 1999–2003. We discuss the value of our approach and findings both for researchers and for IJV partners seeking the dual benefits of control and collaboration. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Much Does Ownership Form Matter?

Research summary : Previous studies have emphasized firm and industry effects on variation in firm performance, but the relationship between forms of ownership and firm performance has been the focus of limited research. This article examines the extent to which ownership form (i.e., public or private ownership) and ownership structure (including diffused ownership and blockholding) affect firm performance. The results of an analysis of 30,525 European Union (EU) firms indicate that form of ownership is an important explanatory factor in the difference in performance among firms. These results underscore the need to study firms characterized by different ownership arrangements and to provide empirical evidence for the study of firm ownership in strategic management. Managerial summary : Motivated by growing evidence on the involvement of different types of owners in the strategies of firms, we studied the extent to which a firm's ownership form (type of legal incorporation, such as public and private ownership forms) and ownership structure (diffused ownership and blockholding) affect its performance. Our study of more than 30,000 firms from the European Union shows that ownership form differences explain some of the performance differences between firms. Our results also indicate that firms with different ownership forms are differently affected by their competitive environment. Overall, the study suggests that choosing the right ownership form can have important strategic consequences. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of managerial ownership on international and business diversification: Balancing incentives and risks

Research has examined the effects of managerial share ownership on business diversification, typically from the incentive alignment perspective. Yet, share ownership also shifts risk to managers (the efficient managerial contracting perspective). Furthermore, the effects of managerial ownership on international diversification are unexplored. We examine how managerial ownership influences both international and business diversification in light of the trade‐off between incentive alignment and risk bearing. Based on the differing risk profiles of the two types of diversification, we argue that incentive contracts with higher levels of managerial ownership will be inefficient, i.e., counter to shareholder interests—reducing international diversification and increasing business diversification. Our findings support our arguments for international diversification. We find no significant effect for business diversification after accounting for endogeneity and serial correlation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy

This research investigated how the ownership structure is related to the firm's overall compensation strategy. The findings extend previous research that focused primarily on CEO compensation strategy. We show that there are significant differences in the compensation practices that apply to all employees as a function of the ownership structure. The results show that for owner‐controlled firms and owner‐managed firms there is significant pay/performance sensitivity for all employees. In management‐controlled firms, changes in pay are related to changes in size of the firm. These findings lead us to conclude that ownership structure not only affects upper management's pay, but also the pay of all employees through substantial differences in the firm's compensation practices. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Today's state‐owned enterprises of China: are they dying dinosaurs or dynamic dynamos?

This paper raises the question and provides empirical evidence regarding the status of the evolution of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China today. In this study, we compare the SOEs to domestic private‐owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign‐controlled businesses (FCBs) in the context of their organizational cultures. While a new ownership form, many of the POEs evolved from former collectives that reflect the traditional values of Chinese business. Conversely, the FCBs are much more indicative of the large global MNCs. Therefore, we look at the SOEs in the context of these two reference points. We conclude that the SOEs of today have substantially transformed to approximate a configuration desired by the Chinese government when it began the SOE transformation a couple of decades ago to make them globally competitive. The SOEs of today appear to be appropriately described as China's economic dynamic dynamo for the future. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board composition,share ownership,and ‘underpricing’ of U.K. IPO firms

Using a sample of 251 IPOs in the United Kingdom, this paper examines interlinks between executive and nonexecutive characteristics, share ownership, and short‐term performance measured in terms of share offer ‘underpricing.’ It argues that executives' power and previous experience directly affect ex ante choice of nonexecutive directors and their ownership interests in the firm. These endogenously developed governance factors may be used by IPO teams strategically to reduce the extent of underpricing. However, there is a selective response of investors to different board characteristics and share ownership structure. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agency theory and the influence of equity ownership structure on corporate diversification strategies

We articulate the agency theory view of managerial decision making and its implications for corporate diversification strategies. From agency theory, we generate testable predictions for the relation between equity ownership structure and diversification strategies and review the existing evidence on this relation. On balance, the evidence strongly supports the view that ownership structure influences corporate strategy. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organizational ownership,competitive intensity,and firm performance: an empirical study of the Indian manufacturing sector

Emerging countries are using privatization as a key strategy in their drive to become free market economies. Although these ownership changes are rapidly gaining prominence, the academic literature has been equivocal about the performance benefits of private vs. state ownership. The lack of clarity in findings can be largely traced to the underspecification of the models that prior studies have examined. Specifically, prior studies have mostly ignored the central role of competitive rivalry. This paper proposes a model that centers around the interactive, inseparable effects of ownership and competitive rivalry on firm performance. Results of the empirical examination set in India show that competitive intensity moderates the relationship between ownership and performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agency hazards and alliance portfolios

Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. In this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic investments in Japanese corporations: do foreign portfolio owners foster underinvestment or appropriate investment?

This paper investigates the effect of foreign ownership on strategic investments in Japanese corporations. Foreign owners are typically portfolio investors who frequently buy and sell shares and hold diversified portfolios of small stakes in many firms. Prior research has presented two conflicting perspectives on the role of such investors: (a) their frequent trading leads to pressure for short‐term returns that fosters underinvestment; (b) their active trading fosters appropriate investments. We investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and strategic investments using dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of 146 Japanese manufacturing firms from 1991 to 1997. We found that foreign ownership enhances strategic investments (in R&D and capital intensity) to a greater extent when firms have growth opportunities than when they lack such opportunities. We conclude that foreign ownership fosters appropriate investment. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of mobile handsets in advanced network service evolution: Evidence from Japan

This paper aims at a better understanding of the mechanisms of mobile network service evolution through a closer examination of the context of mobile handsets. It aims first to establish quantitatively that mobile handsets are a determinant of mobile network service evolution patterns, and second, to develop a consistent perspective capable of explaining the evolution of various mobile network services. Despite the fact that mobile handsets are indispensable to users of mobile network services, surprisingly little is known about the role of these handsets in mobile network service evolution. This paper provides quantitative evidence of a positive relationship between intra-network-carrier penetration rates for mobile network service subscribers and mobile handsets designed for these services. The relationship is such that if one network service is diffused more than another, the mobile handsets related to the more diffused service are similarly more widely diffused in the market, and vice versa. The evidence is derived from an analysis of two mobile network services in Japan, mobile Internet and third generation mobile, initiated by NTT DoCoMo and KDDI. There are no existing studies that consistently explain the mechanisms of different mobile network service evolution patterns. Since the positive relationship that emerges from the analysis is consistent for both cases, by examining the mechanisms underlying this relationship, the paper develops an adequate and consistent perspective based on a constituent model reflecting the technological and competition structure of mobile network services. From this perspective, this positive relationship can be explained as the similarity or dissimilarity in essential technology ownership distribution across constituents. This perspective describes mobile network evolution in terms of changes in the distribution of essential technology ownership and, therefore, could be generalised more widely.     

虚拟产权与企业家激励

不同于产权学派现有的观点，文章认为对企业家起激励作用的并非产权本身，而是通过产权带来的剩余索取权。文章提出“虚拟产权”这一概念，并通过一个正式模型比较分析了“虚拟产权”和真实产权在激励作用中的主要区别．结论为在预期最大获利大于预期最大亏损时，真实产权的激励作用不如“虚拟产权”：而在预期最大亏损大于预期最大获利时，“虚拟产权”相对于真实产权激励不足。文章的目的是为企业家激励和国有企业改革提供一个有益的思路。     

A clash of governance logics: Foreign ownership and board monitoring

We ask whether and when shareholder‐oriented foreign owners are likely to change corporate governance logics in a stakeholder‐oriented setting by introducing shareholder‐oriented governance practices. We focus on board monitoring and claim that because the bundle of practices used in a stakeholder context does not protect shareholder‐oriented foreign owners' interests, they seek to introduce their own practices. Our results suggest that board monitoring is only activated when shareholder‐oriented foreign ownership is high and that the influence of foreign ownership is especially strong in firms without large domestic owners, with high levels of risk and poor performance. Our findings uncover the possibility of the co‐existence of different corporate governance logics within a given country, shaped by the nature and weight of foreign owners Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

论国有制的多种有效实现形式

本文首先从理论上论述了国有制和国有制实现形式的关系，指出了现阶段探索国有制实现形式的重要意义。本文把国家资产管理体制改革作为探索国有制实现形式的重要方面，研究了国有资产管理体制改革的若干思路，提出了有效的国有资产管理体制的目标模式和改革建议。最后，本文分析了如何提高各种形式的国有制企业的运行效率问题。     

Asset ownership and incentives in early shareholder capitalism: Liverpool shipping in the eighteenth century

Research summary : We explore captain‐ownership and vessel performance in eighteenth‐century transatlantic shipping. Although contingent compensation often aligned incentives between captains and shipowners, one difficult‐to‐contract hazard was threat of capture during wartime. We exploit variation across time and routes to study the relationship between capture threat and captain‐ownership. Vessels were more likely to have captain‐owners when undertaking wartime voyages on routes susceptible to privateers. Captain‐owned vessels were less readily captured than those with nonowner captains, but more likely to forgo voyage profits to preserve the vessel's safety. These results are consistent with multitask agency, where residual claims to asset value rather than control rights influence captain behavior. This article is among the first to empirically isolate mechanisms distinguishing among major strands of organizational economics regarding asset ownership and performance. Managerial summary : Organizations face an enduring challenge: Owners hire an executive to act on their behalf, but it is difficult to ensure that the executive indeed acts in their interests. In this study, we exploit a useful historical context—eighteenth‐century transatlantic shipping from Liverpool—to explore the cause and effect of a captain's becoming part‐owner of his vessel. Captains became part‐owners for voyages likely to encounter enemy privateers. Captain‐owners were less likely to be captured, but were more willing to forgo cargo profits to preserve the vessel's safety. Our results provide a useful analogy to modern firm owners who must determine whether to award equity to executives, and to managers who must determine whether to provide assets to employees or rely on employee self‐provision of assets (e.g., tools for tradespeople). Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.