Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Do Analyst Stock Recommendations Piggyback on Recent Corporate News? An Analysis of Regular‐Hour and After‐Hours Revisions

Analysts often update their recommendations following corporate news. Questions have been raised regarding analysts’ ability to generate new information beyond recent corporate events. Employing a comprehensive database on corporate news, we show that only a small minority, or 27.9%, of all recommendation revisions directionally confirm the information in the preceding corporate events and even these “confirming revisions” facilitate the information discovery of corporate events and thus cannot simply be dismissed as “piggybacking.” Our analysis further shows that analysts not only facilitate price discovery to corporate news through issuing trending revisions but also help reverse prevailing market sentiments following corporate news by issuing contrarian revisions. Our study is the first to investigate short‐window intraday market reactions to revisions issued after hours, which account for 70% of all recommendation revisions in our sample period. Analysts’ incentives to issue revisions after hours appear to reflect demands from large institutional clients, who dominate after‐hours trading. More importantly, we show that the after‐hours revisions are associated with significantly greater price reactions and different price reaction patterns than revisions issued during regular trading hours. Collectively, our evidence indicates that analysts are a significant source of new information beyond recent corporate news and they also help shape the market's assessment of corporate disclosures.     

Disclosure frequency and earnings management

We examine the relation between disclosure frequency and earnings management, and the impact of this relation on post-issue performance, for a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We contend that firms with extensive disclosure are less likely to face information problems, leading to less earnings management and better post-issue performance. Our results confirm that disclosure frequency is inversely related to earnings management and positively associated with post-issue performance. We also find that transparency-reducing disclosure is concentrated in firms that substantially, but temporarily, increase disclosure prior to the offering. Such firms exhibit more earnings management and poorer post-SEO stock performance, on average.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.     

Asymmetrical return on equity mean reversion and catering

Using a momentum threshold autoregression model, we find evidence showing that there is an asymmetrical mean reversion behavior in return on equity (ROE). Results show that the speed of adjustment of ROE towards the long-term mean is slower in the ROE increasing regimes than in the ROE decreasing regimes. Additional results indicate that investor earnings optimism is significantly related to change in abnormal ROE. These results are consistent with predictions from catering theory.     

Unsophisticated Arbitrageurs and Market Efficiency: Overreacting to a History of Underreaction?

Prior research has documented that arbitrage activity significantly reduces or eliminates stock market anomalies. However, if anomalies arise due to unsophisticated investors’ behavioral biases, then these same biases can also apply to unsophisticated arbitrageurs and thereby disrupt the arbitrage process. Consistent with a disruption in the arbitrage process for the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly, I document that the historically positive autocorrelation in firms’ earnings announcement news has become significantly negative for firms with active exchange‐traded options. For these easy‐to‐arbitrage firms, the firms in the highest decile of prior earnings announcement abnormal return (prior earnings surprise), on average, underperform the firms in the lowest decile by 1.59% (1.43%) at their next earnings announcement. Additional analyses are consistent with investors learning about the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly and overcompensating. This study suggests that unsophisticated attempts to profit from a well‐known anomaly can significantly reverse a previously documented stock return pattern.     

Do Corporate Governance Analysts Matter? Evidence from the Expansion of Governance Analyst Coverage

T his paper examines the economic consequences of the initiation of governance analyst coverage. Governance analysts process, enhance, and disseminate governance‐related information to capital market participants via, for example, governance reports and ratings. Using an exogenous shock in the United Kingdom, I find that an increase in governance analyst coverage results in increased governance quality, improved liquidity, increased financial analyst following, and improved investor breadth. These findings are consistent with governance analysts creating value for firms via monitoring, information dissemination/production, and investor recognition.     

Information disclosure,CEO overconfidence,and share buyback completion rates

An open market share buyback is not a firm commitment, and there is limited evidence on whether firms repurchase the intended shares. Unlike US studies, we use data from unique UK regulatory and disclosure environment that allows to accurately measure the share buyback completion rates. We show that information disclosure and CEO overconfidence are significant determinants of the share buyback completion rate. In addition, we find that large and widely held firms that conduct subsequent buyback programs and have a past buyback completion reputation exhibit higher completion rates. Finally, we assess whether other CEO characteristics affect buyback completion rates and find that firms with senior CEOs who hold external directorships and have a longer tenure as CEO are more likely to complete the buyback programs. In sum, our results suggest there is a clear relationship between information disclosure, CEO overconfidence, and buyback completion rates.     

Strength of analyst coverage following IPOs

Firms with poor aftermarket performance are given higher target prices and are more likely to receive strong buy recommendations, especially by analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter. This favorable coverage is relatively short lived, typically lasting less than six months. Controlling for the quantity of coverage received, stock prices of newly public firms increase more when the target price ratio is high and recommendation is a strong buy. These results suggest that when a firm goes public, underwriter-affiliated analysts provide protection in the form of “booster shots” of stronger coverage if the firm experiences poor aftermarket stock performance.     

IPOs,clustering, indirect learning and filing independently

IPO underpricing has been attributed to valuation uncertainty, which can be at least partially resolved by the indirect learning associated with IPO clustering [Benveniste, L.M., Ljungqvist, A., Wilhelm, W.J., Yu, X.Y., 2003. Evidence of information spillovers in the production of investment banking services. Journal of Finance 58, 577–608]. We examine why firms might choose not to issue their IPOs contemporaneously with clusters of similar firms, forgoing opportunities to learn from their peers. We find that the willingness to file an IPO without the benefit of indirect learning from peer firm IPOs is directly related to insiders’ needs for portfolio diversification and the firm’s need to raise capital.     

Are there long-run implications of analyst coverage for IPOs?

Analyst coverage has been cited increasingly as an important attribute in the selection of an underwriter for a firm about to go public. However, it has also been alleged that affiliated analysts provide biased research. In this study, we examine these interrelated issues by examining the long-run performance of IPOs with coverage from their managing underwriters in a 1993–2003 sample. We find that (1) analysts’ research coverage from their managing syndicate is not related to long-run performance; (2) long-run performance is not different for firms that receive all-star analyst coverage; and (3) investors are not systematically worse off for following lead underwriter recommendations.