An Empirical Investigation of the Demand for Bank‐Owned Life Insurance

Key employee life insurance in the banking industry is called bank‐owned life insurance (BOLI). Banks use BOLI to provide financial support to help reduce disruptions due to the death of a key executive and as a part of the executive compensation package. We investigate the characteristics of banks related to the amount of BOLI purchased. We find that BOLI purchases are positively related to bank size and leverage and negatively related to tax rates and employee salaries. We also find that BOLI purchases are related to bank ownership structure and profitability.     

我国商业银行危机处置与存款保险立法模式选择

本文对我国商业银行风险处置的价值定位及有关市场退出的法律体系进行了梳理,探讨提出了我国存款保险机制的主要框架,对存款保险立法的四种模式进行了比较选择,建议尽快制定《存款保险条例》,并通过司法实践逐步完善存款保险机制与银行破产退市程序的有效衔接。     

DOES BOARD INDEPENDENCE MATTER FOR CORPORATE INSURANCE HEDGING?

We test the effect of board independence on corporate purchases of property insurance. We find that board independence increases the incidence of property insurance use but does not have a significant effect on the extent of property insurance use given that a firm decides to insure its assets. These findings are consistent with the argument that: (1) more independent boards view it necessary to have property insurance to manage asset‐loss risks and (2) excessive insurance or insurance purchases induced by managerial risk aversion and/or self‐interest does not benefit shareholders and so may not be supported by independent boards.     

Long-Term Care Insurance and Life Insurance Demand

This article investigates the interaction between life insurance and long-term care insurance markets on the demand side. In the model utility depends on both consumption and bequest, and utility from consumption is contingent on the state of health. While the demand for life insurance increases both with decreasing income and with a rising degree of altruism, the influences of these two parameters on the demand for long-term care insurance are ambiguous. If the utility shock arising from disability declines, both insurance demands will rise.     

Directors' and officers' liability insurance and loan spreads

We analyze the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the spreads charged on bank loans. We find that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with higher loan spreads and that this relation depends on loan characteristics in economically sensible ways and is attenuated by monitoring mechanisms. This association between loan spreads and D&O insurance coverage is robust to controlling for endogeneity (because both could be related to firm risk). Our evidence suggests that lenders view D&O insurance coverage as increasing credit risk (potentially via moral hazard or information asymmetry). Further analyses show that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with greater risk taking and higher probabilities of financial restatement due to aggressive financial reporting. While greater use of D&O insurance increases the cost of debt, we find some evidence that D&O insurance coverage appears to improve the value of large increases in capital expenditure for firms with better internal and external governance.     

On the Effects of Deposit Insurance and Observability on Bank Runs: An Experimental Study

We study the effects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of a bank, who decide between withdrawing or keeping their money deposited. We have three treatments with different levels of deposit insurance which reflect the losses a depositor may incur in the case of a bank run. We find that different levels of deposit insurance and the possibility of observing other depositors’ actions affect the likelihood of bank runs. When decisions are not observable, higher levels of deposit insurance decrease the probability of bank runs. When decisions are observable, this need not to be the case. These results suggest that (i) observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit insurance and (ii) the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.     

“偿二代”监管体系下寿险公司风险管理研究

随着经济发展进入新常态,已有的监管体系"偿一代"已无法适应当前以及未来寿险业风险管理的要求.2016年,以全面风险管理为导向的"偿二代"正式实施,给我国寿险公司的风险管理带来了深刻影响.为此,本文从负债端、资产端和公司风险管理三个方面分析"偿二代"对寿险公司风险管理的作用路径及影响.研究发现:在"偿二代"下寿险公司在负债端的风险管理重点应在于着力优化并调整产品结构,使得长期期缴业务成为核心;在资产端的风险管理重点应在于提升权益投资和另类投资比例;在公司的风险管理上应逐步加强完善风险管理框架,不断提高全面风险管理能力.     

银保协作、ART保险与银行信用风险转移

在分析银保协作与可选择性风险转移(Alternativ Risk Transfer,即 ART)保险的内在逻辑基础上,进一步分析 ART 保险实现银行信用风险转移的内在机理,并以此为依据设计银保信贷系统的 ART 保险机制。结果表明,ART 保险可以有效分担银保信贷系统的信用风险,降低银保信贷系统的风险运营成本,提升银保信贷系统的运营效率,并实现商业银行信用风险转移目标。可见,推行银保协作型信贷模式,对于治理信贷配给,从而提升信贷市场效率具有重要意义。     

银行代理保险业务的洗钱风险及防范对策

近几年来，我国银行代理保险业务发展迅猛，给我国的经济金融注入了新的活力，但由于对洗钱风险认识不足，业务人员反洗钱技能不高，内控制度不健全等，使得银行代理保险业务中存在较高的洗钱风险，应予以关注。     

Bank Capital Adequacy versus Deposit Insurance

This paper re-evaluates the Diamond-Dybvig analysis of deposit insurance by constructing a model in which an agent not in need of liquidity sets up a financial intermediary to sell liquidity insurance to other agents who desire such insurance. This intermediary resembles a real-world bank in that it is financed by both demand deposits and equity. It also dominates the Diamond-Dybvig intermediary, which is funded only by demand deposits. Provided the intermediary has adequate capital, it also is perfectly safe. Deposit insurance then is both unnecessary and incapable of achieving a superior outcome to that which private agents could achieve on their own.     

存款保险制度能否抑制银行个体风险承担?

基于2008-2019年我国30家上市银行的财务数据,研究了存款保险制度实施对银行风险承担行为的影响.对选取的经济变量进行单位根检验发现,变量均为平稳变量.利用固定效应模型进行实证回归分析,结果表明:总体上看,存款保险制度的推出增加了银行的风险承担行为;在将银行进行分类后,存款保险制度的实施对大型商业银行的风险承担影响...     

寿险合同复效之立法变动及规范方向

保险合同的中止和复效是因人寿保险合同的保险费交付债务的特殊性而在保险法上的特别规定。其规定在强行性上属于半强性规范,是为保护危险团体成员的利益而设,保险人不能通过格式条款或其他方式予以排除适用,或作出较该规范更不利于危险团体成员利益的规定。为此,需要在立法上增加关于认知和判断半强性规范的效力性规定,同时,也需明确复效的具体条件,以消除保险人在实际上通过协商同意来操控处于效力停止状态的保险合同的命运,使危险团体成员的利益得以落实。     

Insurance demand in the presence of loss-dependent background risk

We analyze insurance demand when insurable losses come with an uninsurable zero-mean background risk that increases in the loss size. If the individual is risk vulnerable, loss-dependent background risk triggers a precautionary insurance motive and increases optimal insurance demand. Prudence alone is sufficient for insurance demand to increase in two cases: the case of fair insurance and the case where the smallest possible loss exceeds a certain threshold value (referred to as the large loss case). We derive conditions under which insurance demand increases or decreases in initial wealth. In the large loss case, prudence determines whether changes in the background risk lead to more insurance demand. We generalize this result to arbitrary loss distributions and find conditions based on decreasing third-degree Ross risk aversion, Arrow–Pratt risk aversion, and Arrow–Pratt temperance.     

寿险营销的创新战略——数据库营销

客户是企业的生命,也是企业唯一诉求的目标.开拓新客户,服务老客户,培养长期的忠诚的客户群,这是企业的价值所在.目前,寿险营销的核心问题就是客户问题.以代理人为主体的行销过程中,存在着准客户积累不足、新客户开拓不足、老客户留存不足、忠诚客户沉淀不足的问题.本文提出了数据库营销的创新战略,从根本上解决了服务客户时的"找不到...     

Why do bank holding companies purchase bank-owned life insurance?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Bank-owned life insurance (BOLI) is life insurance purchased by bank holding companies (BHCs) for key employees, whose proceeds can be shared by the...     

我国人身保险市场结构变化与预测分析

虽然保险业经受了本次金融危机的考验,但是保险业可能成为系统性风险传导链条上的一环,因此,保险监管机构需要转变审慎监管方式,建立适合保险业的宏观审慎监管框架。在这个背景下,对中国人身保险市场结构现状有一个较为清晰和准确的认识就显得十分必要。研究发现:从全国范围来说,我国寿险市场主体数量较少,人身险市场集中度过高,市场结构为寡头垄断,但各地区的人身险市场结构又各有特点,经济发达地区人身险保险市场结构已经过渡到垄断竞争阶段。根据成分数据预测结果分析,在"十二五"期间,我国人身险的市场集中度继续呈下降趋势。     

Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.     

Mortality Risk and the Value of a Statistical Life: The Dead-Anyway Effect Revis(it)ed

In the expected-utility theory of the monetary value of a statistical life, a well-known result found by Pratt and Zeckhauser [1996] asserts that an individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a marginal reduction in mortality risk increases with the initial level of risk. Their reasoning is based on the so-called “dead-anyway effect” which states that marginal utility of a dollar in the state of death is smaller than in the state of survival. However, this explanation is based on the absence of markets for contingent claims, i.e. annuities and life insurance. This paper reexamines the relationship between WTP and the level of risk under more general circumstances and establishes two main results: first, when insurance markets are perfect, for a risk-averse individual without a bequest motive, marginal WTP for survival does increase with the level of risk but this occurs for a different reason, namely an income effect. Secondly, when the individual has a bequest motive and is endowed with a sufficient amount of wealth from human capital, the effect of initial risk on WTP for survival is reversed: the higher initial risk the lower the value of a statistical life. In the imperfect-markets case we interpret this result as a “constrained-bequest effect”.JEL Classification No.: D8, H43, I18     

从风险视角重新检视我国养老保险制度改革

作为防范风险的养老保险制度,研究其本身的风险是很有必要的。本文在识别各种养老方式风险的基础上,考察了我国养老保险制度改革过程中风险的变化,认为这种改革背离了建立该制度的最初目标,不能对“老年风险”提供有效保障,同时又增加了养老金受益人的利率风险与货币贬值风险,这两类风险也是养老保险统筹账户基金出现支付危机的主要原因。