Does Investor Sentiment Affect Earnings Management?

I hypothesize and find that earnings management via accruals is driven partially by the prevailing market‐wide investor sentiment. Managers inflate earnings in periods of higher sentiment, but report more conservatively during periods of low sentiment. Moreover, the likelihood of income‐increasing earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises is also positively associated with investor sentiment. These results are robust to: (i) controls for time‐varying firm characteristics such as growth, investment opportunity sets, future profitability, leverage and size; (ii) macroeconomic variables such as future inflation, GDP growth, and growth in industrial production; (iii) multiple proxies for investor sentiment; and (iv) discretionary revenues as alternative measure of earnings management. Cross‐sectional analyses reveal that firms whose stock returns co‐move more with investor sentiment are more (less) likely to manage earnings upward via abnormal accruals in quarters of higher (lower) sentiment. The findings of managers’ strategic use of abnormal accruals show the need for increased attention from boards of directors, auditors and regulators to heightened managerial incentives to overstate earnings and to report optimistic earnings numbers during periods of high investor sentiment.     

Does the Presence of Female Executives Curb Earnings Management? Evidence from Korea

We investigate the role of female executives in curbing earnings management behaviour in Korea, a country known for its strong male‐dominant culture. In a sample of Korean firms from 2002 to 2010, we find that female presence in top management is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that gender diversity in senior management deters opportunistic financial reporting even in a highly male‐dominant corporate environment. Further, this association is primarily observed in firms with stronger (weaker) female (male) dominance. This finding is consistent with the idea that female executives can exert more influence on corporate decisions in a more female‐friendly environment. These findings have implications for academics and practitioners seeking to understand the impact of the role of top executive gender diversity in corporate accounting practices.     

Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation

Prior research has documented a kink in the earnings distribution: too few firms report small losses, too many firms report small profits. We investigate whether boosting of discretionary accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable explanation for this kink. Overall, we are unable to confirm that boosting of discretionary accruals is the key driver of the kink. We caution the use of the ratio of small profit firms to small loss firms as a measure of earnings management. We investigate and discuss a number of alternative explanations for the kink.     

Discussion of “Earnings Management and the RevelationPrinciple”

Review of Accounting Studies -     

Does Mandatory Adoption of IFRS Guarantee Compliance?

In this study, we examine whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS by Turkish listed companies in 2005 was successful in practice and what role firm and country level factors played in the adoption. We determine the firm-specific factors that affect the degree of change in both measurement and disclosures by conducting a multivariate analysis. Further, we conduct interviews with external auditors to throw light on the challenges associated with adoption and the outcomes of adoption. We find that while the standards clearly impact certain accounts, adoption is not uniform across accounts. The overall measurement change is positively associated with auditor prominence and gearing, and negatively associated with the degree of free float. With regard to disclosures, we find that although there are some improvements, the vast majority of the disclosure items required by IFRS were not disclosed. Auditor type, size, and the degree of foreign ownership of shares exert a positive impact on the overall improvement in disclosures. Our interview analysis reveals that the dominance of tax laws, the lack of enforcement, corporate governance issues, and inadequate management information systems were all significant constraints to the successful adoption of IFRS.     

Earnings Management? Erroneous Inferences Based on Earnings Frequency Distributions

A vast literature following Hayn [1995] and Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] attributed the so-called "discontinuities" in earnings distributions around zero to earnings management. Despite recent evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by other factors, researchers and teachers continue to point to the shapes of these distributions as evidence of earnings management. We provide three sets of further evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by factors other than earnings management: (1) we provide, as an example, a detailed analysis of the severe effects of sample selection in a recent study; this study erroneously concludes that the shape of an earnings distribution is evidence of earnings management, (2) we provide a simple explanation for the shape of the earnings distribution that is most often cited as evidence of earnings management; the relation between earnings and prices differs with the magnitude and the sign of earnings, and (3) we provide further examples that support the main point of our paper; evidence beyond the mere shape of a distribution must be brought to bear before researchers can draw conclusions regarding the presence/absence of earnings management.     

What Do Management Earnings Forecasts Convey About the Macroeconomy?

We decompose quantitative management earnings forecasts into macroeconomic and firm‐specific components to determine the extent to which voluntary disclosure provided by management has macroeconomic information content. We provide evidence that the forecasts of bellwether firms, which are defined as firms in which macroeconomic news explains the greatest amount of variation in the forecasts, provide timely information to the market about the macroeconomy when bundled with earnings announcements. Further, we show that bellwether firms provide timely information about both industry‐specific events and broader economic events. Finally, we document that the macroeconomic news in individual forecasts is more pronounced for bad news and point forecasts.     

Have IFRS Affected Earnings Management in the European Union?

There has recently been considerable discussion of those features of IFRS that are likely to help improve financial reporting in the European Union. However, certain issues may also have a negative impact on the quality of information. This paper focuses on the effect of IFRS on earnings management. Its main purpose is to examine whether the adoption of IFRS in the European Union has increased or decreased the scope for discretionary accounting practices by comparing discretionary accruals in the periods preceding and immediately after the regulatory change. Another objective is to determine which firms' features and country factors may explain the accounting discretion observed before and after IFRS. We consider a sample of non-financial firms listed on 11 EU stock markets. The results obtained show that earnings management has intensified since the adoption of IFRS in Europe, as discretionary accruals have increased in the period following implementation. The variables explaining accounting discretion are the same before and after IFRS (business size, leverage, investor protection and legal enforcement). These results suggest that variations in earnings management might be due to some room for manipulation under international standards when compared with local standards.     

What is the Relationship Between REIT Governance and Earnings Management?

The empirical corporate finance literature claims that better corporate governance constrains earnings management, while others argue that the unique legal and reporting structure of REITs may reduce the need for such internal corporate governance. Using a sample of publicly traded REITs for the 2004–2008 time period, we examine the relationships amongst corporate governance, accruals earnings management, manipulation of Funds from Operations (FFO), and real earnings management. We find that corporate governance quality is unrelated to accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO. At first glance, the findings suggest that managers need less internal oversight because of the more transparent reporting structure of REITs. However, we document that REITs engage in significant real activities manipulation for earnings management purposes. Our empirical findings further show that corporate governance characteristics, in particular board size, independence, number of board meetings and audit committee financial expertise, are essential for constraining such activities. Finally, by focusing on a subset of REITs that act in ways which previous research has identified as more susceptible to earnings management activities, we demonstrate that good corporate governance effectively reduces accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO for these REITs. Overall, our findings indicate that, despite the unique legal and reporting structure, REITs engage in certain forms of earnings management, and that the ability for REITs to manipulate earnings is reduced when corporate governance is more effective.     

Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions? The Case of the United Kingdom

A large number of studies have shown that many companies have made large acquisitions that their own shareholders probably would not have approved if given the opportunity to do so. In this article, which summarizes the findings of their study published recently in the Review of Financial Studies, the authors present evidence that suggests the effectiveness of shareholder voting as a corporate governance mechanism designed to prevent such value‐reducing acquisitions from taking place. The authors' study focused on acquisitions in the U.K. where proposed transactions that exceed a series of 25% relative size (target's as a percentage of the acquirer's) thresholds are defined as “Class 1” transactions and require shareholder approval. The authors found strikingly positive stock market reactions to the announcements of such Class 1 acquisitions—as compared to zero if not negative average announcement returns for Class 2 transactions that were not subject to a shareholder vote. And when the authors extended their analysis to U.S. M&A markets, they found that the larger (again, in relative size) U.S. deals—large enough that they would have required a shareholder vote in the U.K.—provided returns to their shareholders that were negative, and thus significantly lower than those of their U.K counterparts. In terms of the economic significance of their findings, the authors found that Class 1 transactions were associated with aggregate gains to acquirer shareholders of $13.6 billion. By contrast, U.S. transactions of similar size, which again were not subject to shareholder approval, were associated with aggregate losses of $210 billion for acquirer shareholders; and Class 2 U.K. transactions, also not subject to shareholder approval, were associated with aggregate losses of $3 billion. In a further series of tests designed to shed light on how mandatory shareholder voting generates such substantial value improvements for acquirer shareholders, the authors also found evidence suggesting that when faced with the requirement of a shareholder vote, CEOs and boards are more likely to resist the temptation to overpay to close a deal. And the fact that the shareholders of the Class 1 acquirers did not end up blocking a single transaction that was submitted to a vote suggests that this mechanism works without the need for shareholders to actually vote down a deal. In other words, mandatory shareholder voting on acquisitions is a powerful deterrent to “bad deals” because, first of all, the vote is triggered automatically by the relative size tests and, second, CEOs and boards, with the help of their bankers, have a pretty good idea well in advance of the vote whether their shareholders are going to vote “no”—and such a vote would be viewed by top management as a major rejection, a strong vote of no confidence.     

Does Risk Management Add Value? A Survey of the Evidence

The fact that 92% of the world's 500 largest companies recently reported using derivatives suggests that corporate managers believe financial risk management can increase shareholder value. Surveys of finance academics indicate that they too believe that corporate risk management is, on the whole, a valueadding activity. This article provides an overview of almost 30 years of broadbased, stock‐market‐oriented academic studies that address one or more of the following questions:

• ? Are interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks reflected in stock price movements?
• ? Is volatility in corporate earnings and cash flows related in a systematic way to corporate market values?
• ? Is the corporate use of derivatives associated with reduced risk and higher market values?

The answer to the first question, at least in the case of financial institutions and interest rate risk, is a definite yes; all studies with this focus find that the stock returns of financial firms are clearly sensitive to interest rate changes. The stock returns of industrial companies exhibit no pronounced interest rate exposure (at least as a group), but industrial firms with significant cross‐border revenues and costs show considerable sensitivity to exchange rates (although such sensitivity actually appears to be reduced by the size and geographical diversity of the largest multinationals). What's more, the corporate use of derivatives to hedge interest rate and currency exposures appears to be associated with lower sensitivity of stock returns to interest rate and FX changes. But does the resulting reduction in price sensitivity affect value—and, if so, how? Consistent with a widely cited theory that risk management increases value by limiting the corporate “underinvestment problem,” a number of studies show a correlation between lower cash flow volatility and higher corporate investment and market values. The article also cites a small but growing group of studies that show a strong positive association between derivatives use and stock price performance (typically measured using price‐to‐book ratios). But perhaps the nearest the research comes to establishing causality are two studies—one of companies that hedge FX exposures and another of airlines' hedging of fuel costs—that show that, in industries where hedging with derivatives is common, companies that hedge outperform companies that don't.     

Does the Mandatory Bid Rule Add Value to Target Shareholders?

I investigate whether implementation of the mandatory bid rule—the rule that grants all shareholders the right to participate in a takeover transaction at equal terms—affects target announcement returns. I use a difference‐in‐differences approach and the staggered adoption of the rule across 15 European countries. I find that the rule change leads to higher target returns. In full transactions, better accounting standards and shareholder protection norms of the acquirer leads to higher target returns. In majority transactions, greater value transfer from acquirers with weak accounting standards leads to higher target returns. I find weak evidence of overpayment by acquirers.     

Does Earnings Quality Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Performance? Empirical Evidence of the Causal Link

The study examines the causal links between earnings quality and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance using a large sample of United States (US) firms from 1992 to 2013. We first find that the association between earnings quality and CSR performance is positive and significant. We then test the flow of causality using Granger's (1969) lead–lag analysis to determine whether changes in earnings quality cause changes in CSR performance or vice versa. Our findings show that changes in earnings quality cause changes in a firm's CSR performance but not vice versa. Further analysis shows that earnings quality reduces the cost of equity capital for firms with higher CSR performance. These findings suggest that one plausible means by which firms with higher earnings quality can maintain better CSR performance is to reduce their cost of equity capital.     

Earnings Announcement Lags and Market Responses—Does the Tone of the News and the Market Sentiment Matter?

We investigate earnings announcement lags (period from the end of the reporting period until the announcement date) for the good and the bad quarterly earnings news across different market sentiment periods as well as market reactions thereto. Companies listed on Baltic stock exchanges exhibit clear signs of strategic timing of earnings announcements. Earnings announcement lags for the bad news tend to be longer than those for the good news. This difference is more pronounced during low market sentiment periods. If the release of the bad news is postponed, abnormal return responses remain lower, as expected.     

Does IFRS Mandatory Adoption Affect Information Asymmetry in the Stock Market?

The purpose of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), adopted mandatorily by European listed firms in 2005, is to increase the transparency and the comparability of accounting information, which should have led to improvements in these firms’ information environments. This study uses market microstructure proxies for information asymmetry to examine the effects of IFRS adoption on the level of information asymmetry in the Spanish stock market. Therefore, we consider a setting with substantial differences between local standards – Spanish Accounting Standards (SAS) ? and IFRS and where the level of enforcement is low. By controlling for conventional determinants of information asymmetry and firms’ characteristics that influence their information environments, we find a reduction of information asymmetry after IFRS adoption. Our findings suggest that the mandatory switch from local accounting standards to IFRS conveys benefits to the market, even when the enforcement level is not strong.     

Do Foreign Directors Mitigate Earnings Management? Evidence From China

In this study, we use a sample of Chinese companies to examine the monitoring role of foreign directors in deterring earnings management. Our findings show that earnings management is significantly negatively associated with the presence and ratio of foreign directors on corporate boards. We further find that, under these conditions, earnings management is less pronounced in state-owned enterprises as compared to others. These findings are robust to various specifications of earnings management as well as to the approach used in matching the treatment and control samples. Interestingly, the negative impact of board membership of foreign directors on earnings management varies with audit quality, IFRS convergence, investor protection and the similarity or difference of the time zones of the foreign directors and China.     

Management quality and the cost of debt: Does management matter to lenders?

This paper investigates the effect of organizational capital, typified by various management practices within a firm, on the cost of external debt financing. Using a sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms in the US, we find that better management practices enhance a firm’s external financing capacity by lowering the firm’s cost of bank loans. We do not find any evidence that the lower loan cost of a high-quality-management firm is associated with more restrictive non-price contract terms such as greater collateral requirements and stricter covenants. These results suggest that banks explicitly take into account the risk arising from poor management practices when pricing and designing debt contracts.     

Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns about the Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?

This study employs a new methodological approach that measuresproduction efficiency in changing trade patterns. It shows thatthe most rapidly growing products in Mercosur's intratrade generallyare goods in which members do not have a comparative advantageand have not been able to export competitively to outside markets.This is consistent with substantial trade diversion within thearrangement. Mercosur's discriminatory tariffs against nonmembers,which are four to six times higher than those in arrangementssuch as the European Union, European Free Trade Area, or NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement, are likely the cause. Recentfurther increases in Mercosur's tariffs against nonmembers arelikely to exacerbate the magnitude of trade diversion.     

Do Publicly Signalled Earnings Management Incentives Affect Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999–2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income‐decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present in current period financial statements. Consistent with prior literature, we find income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of CEO appointment. Earnings management, as a general phenomenon, is found to be significantly related to analyst forecast errors in the period in which the earnings management occurs. However, we present evidence that analyst forecasts for current year earnings are significantly more accurate with respect to earnings management in cases where a CEO is appointed during the current financial period.