Regulation FD and analysts’ vs. investors’ weightings of the cash components of earnings

This paper investigates whether investors’ bias in processing the information contained in the cash components of annual earnings has been reduced, and whether the difference in bias between financial analysts and investors has decreased subsequent to Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter, Reg FD). We compare analysts’ and investors’ weightings of the three cash flow components of earnings, defined by Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2008), from 1985 to 2008, using historical weightings as benchmarks. Our results show that, in the post Reg FD period, the magnitude of investors’ (analysts’) mis-weightings has decreased (increased), and the differences between analysts’ and investors’ mis-weightings have become smaller. Overall, these results suggest that financial analysts’ information advantages over investors declined after Reg FD took effect, and that investors consequently are less biased in assessing the persistence of the cash flow components of earnings following the implementation of Reg FD.     

Earnings Management in Australian Corporations

This article surveys the literature examining the earnings management behaviour of Australian corporations. While numerous motivations for earnings management are proposed in this literature, current period CEO turnover is the only phenomenon for which there is consistent empirical support. A number of studies report discontinuities in the distribution of earnings around benchmarks such as the zero profit level. However, there is no evidence that these discontinuities are associated with abnormal accrual behaviour. Evidence regarding the ability of various governance mechanisms to constrain earnings management is also mixed. While several studies report a negative relation between auditor size and earnings management, no Australian studies attempt to control for the likely endogenous nature of this relationship. Papers report that board independence and audit committee independence constrain earnings management in Australian corporations, although evidence is not consistent across studies. The article shows that many Australian studies of earnings management use very noisy and, in some cases, biased measures of abnormal accruals which may partly explain the inconsistency of results across studies, adding further uncertainty regarding the implications of this field of research for standard setters, investors and scholars.     

Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.     

Institutional ownership stability and real earnings management

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management. Our findings indicate that firms held by more stable institutional owners experience lower real activities manipulation by limiting overproduction. We further examine how the stability in the shareholdings of pressure-sensitive and insensitive institutional investors affect target firms’ use of real earnings management, respectively. Unlike pressure-sensitive institutional investors, the stability in the share ownership of pressure-insensitive institutional investors (i.e., investment advisors, pension funds and endowments) mitigates target firms’ use of real earnings management. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that institutional investors presence acts as a monitor on target firms’ use of real earnings manipulation activities.     

Can earnings fixated investors survive in a competitive securities market? Implications for sustained price anomalies and mark-to-market accounting

We model the dynamic survival of earnings fixated investors in a competitive securities market that allows for learning and arbitrage and that is populated by heterogeneous investors. Our model is distinct from those based on aggressive trading by overconfident investors. We prove that in the absence of noise traders, rational investors will drive out earnings fixated investors from the market in the long-run. More interestingly, we show that in a market with noise traders, some proportion of earnings fixated investors survive in long-run equilibrium for all feasible model parameter values. Furthermore, under no circumstances can the earnings fixated investors be driven out of the market completely. On the contrary, for some parameter values, the earnings fixated investors drive out the rational investors entirely. These results rationalize the long-run sustainability of common pricing anomalies. They also highlight potential benefits to society of mark-to-market accounting.     

How does earnings management influence investor’s perceptions of firm value? Survey evidence from financial analysts

Survey evidence shows CFOs to believe that earnings management can enhance investor valuation of their firms. This evidence raises the question of correspondence between the beliefs of CFOs and investors. Surveying financial analysts to gain insight into how earnings management influences investor perception of firm value, we find analysts’ and CFOs’ beliefs to be generally consistent. We find that analysts perceive meeting earnings benchmarks and smoothing earnings to enhance investor perception of firm value and all earnings management actions to reach a benchmark, save share repurchases, to be value destroying. CFOs, however, are reluctant to repurchase shares, preferring to use techniques viewed by analysts as value destroying (e.g., reductions in discretionary spending). Analysts’ inability to unravel such techniques perhaps explains CFOs’ preferences.     

Institutional investor type,earnings management and benchmark beaters

This paper classifies institutional investors into transient or long-term by their investment horizons to examine the association between institutional investor type and firms’ discretionary earnings management strategies in two mutually exclusive settings – firms that (do not) use accruals to meet/beat earnings targets. The results support the view that long-term institutional investors constrain accruals management among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat earnings benchmarks. This suggests long-term institutional investors can mitigate aggressive earnings management among these firms. Transient institutional ownership is not systematically associated with aggressive earnings management and is evident only among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat their earnings benchmarks. This indicates transient institution-associated managerial myopia may not be as prevalent as posited by critics. This study highlights the importance of explicitly considering the type of institutional investor and the specific setting when investigating the association between institutional ownership and corporate earnings management.     

Earnings expectations,investor trade size,and anomalous returns around earnings announcements

We provide evidence that identifiable subsets of investors use significantly different information sets. Investors initiating large trades respond to analysts’ earnings forecast errors, while investors initiating small trades respond to a less-sophisticated signal that underestimates the implications of current earnings innovations for future earnings levels. This suggests small investors exhibit the behavior that Bernard and Thomas [Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, 305–340] theorize causes post-earnings announcement drift. We also use analysts’ forecasts to significantly improve the predictability of returns around earnings announcements previously documented by Bernard and Thomas. Finally, results attempting to link return predictability to the prevalence of small-investor trading are mixed.     

An analysis of the reasons for the asymmetries surrounding earnings benchmarks

Several studies report an asymmetry in the distribution of earnings around specified benchmarks. However, doubt has arisen over whether the observed ‘kink’ in the distribution of earnings is solely caused by earnings management. We use a ratio analysis approach to examine a range of specific accruals for evidence of earnings management. We find little evidence that firms immediately above the benchmark have abnormal receivables, inventories or provisions. However, they do increase cash‐from‐customers and reduce inventory. Thus, our results support the recent research that suggests that firms engage in real actions to meet earnings benchmarks.     

Do corporations manage earnings to meet/exceed analyst forecasts? Evidence from pension plan assumption changes

A significantly larger number of firms increase the expected rate of return on pension plan assets (ERR) to make their reported earnings meet/exceed analyst forecasts than would be expected by chance. In the short run, the stock market reacts positively to these firms’ earnings announcements, suggesting that investors fail to recognize that earnings benchmarks are achieved through ERR manipulation. In the long run, however, firms that employ this earnings management strategy significantly underperform control firms in both stock returns and operating performance.     

Earnings seasonality,management earnings forecasts and stock returns

We examine whether management earnings forecasts (MEFs) help reduce the stock return seasonality associated with earnings seasonality around earnings announcements (EAs) in Chinese A-share markets. We find that firms in historically low earnings seasons outperform firms in high earnings seasons by 2.1% around MEFs. Firms in low earnings seasons also have higher trading volume and return volatility than their counterparts around EAs and MEFs. MEFs significantly reduce the ability of historical seasonal earnings rankings to negatively predict announcement returns, volume and volatility around EAs. The reduction effects are stronger when MEFs are voluntary or made closer to EAs. The evidence suggests that MEFs facilitate the correction of investors’ tendency to extrapolate earnings seasonality and its resulted stock mispricing.     

Earnings management and accounting income aggregation

Quarterly earnings allow aggregation into annual earnings in four different ways. Fiscal year earnings is one measure of annual earnings, the others being earnings for annual periods ending at interim quarter-ends. We investigate earnings management in fiscal year earnings relative to these alternative measures of firms’ annual earnings. We confirm prior findings in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 99–126) of discontinuities around zero and prior year earnings in histograms of earnings. Subsequent research questions whether these discontinuities are evidence of earnings management. Using histograms of our alternative annual earnings measures, we offer evidence suggesting earnings management is responsible for the discontinuities.     

The effect of restatements on trading volume reactions to earnings announcements

This paper examines whether restatements affect trading volume reactions to subsequent earnings announcements. It closely follows the theoretical model developed by Kim and Verrecchia (J Account Econ 24:395–419, 1997) that decomposes the trading volume reactions around earnings announcements into the effects of pre-disclosure and event-period private information, and examines whether restatements change the trading volume reactions to earnings announcements in the post-restatement period. We find that restatements increase the degree of differential event-period information, leading to more divergent interpretation of earnings announcements subsequent to restatements. We also find that investors have less differential pre-disclosure private information in the post-restatement period, consistent with the view that investors’ beliefs converge when facing higher uncertainty in the information environment. Finally, focusing on irregularity restatement firms, we document that the effect of restatements on trading volume is more pronounced for firms announcing restatements after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and after dismissing auditors and experiencing executive turnover. Overall, these results indicate that restatements affect investors’ behavior in forming judgments regarding earnings announcements.     

Earnings Management? Erroneous Inferences Based on Earnings Frequency Distributions

A vast literature following Hayn [1995] and Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] attributed the so-called "discontinuities" in earnings distributions around zero to earnings management. Despite recent evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by other factors, researchers and teachers continue to point to the shapes of these distributions as evidence of earnings management. We provide three sets of further evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by factors other than earnings management: (1) we provide, as an example, a detailed analysis of the severe effects of sample selection in a recent study; this study erroneously concludes that the shape of an earnings distribution is evidence of earnings management, (2) we provide a simple explanation for the shape of the earnings distribution that is most often cited as evidence of earnings management; the relation between earnings and prices differs with the magnitude and the sign of earnings, and (3) we provide further examples that support the main point of our paper; evidence beyond the mere shape of a distribution must be brought to bear before researchers can draw conclusions regarding the presence/absence of earnings management.     

Earnings Response Coefficients and Dividend Policy Parameters

In a seminal paper. Ball and Brown (1968) documented a positive statistical association between earnings surprises and stock returns around an earnings announcement. They concluded that accounting earnings conveyed ‘useful’ information to the market. However, the question of how accounting earnings convey useful information is still being understood. Recent work on this topic has found that current accounting earnings aid investors and analysts in predicting future accounting earnings. Few studies, however, have examined the usefulness of current earnings for predicting other value-relevant attributes. A model by Ohlson (1989a) suggests that investors are also interested in the relationship between current earnings and future dividends. Ohlson's model is supported by empirical tests in this paper which show that the relationship between current earnings and future dividends is significant in explaining cross-sectional variation in earnings response coefficients (ERCs). A second result of interest is that information in dividends substitutes for that in accounting earnings. We find that dividend policy parameters reflect information contained in current earnings. These results add new insights on the information revealed through the analysis of ERCs. Consistent with logic presented here, a symmetrically opposite result is found with respect to dividend response coefficients. The informativeness of earnings (dividends) is found to be negatively (positively) related to the information content of dividends.     

Loss aversion,asymmetric market comovements,and the home bias

Loss aversion has been used to explain why a high equity premium might be consistent with plausible levels of risk aversion. The intuition is that the first-order-different utility impact of wealth gains and losses leads loss-averse investors to behave similarly to investors with high risk aversion. But if so, should those agents not perceive larger gains from international diversification than standard expected-utility investors with plausible levels of risk aversion? They might not, because comovements in international stock markets are asymmetric: correlations are higher in market downturns than in upturns. This asymmetry dampens the gains from diversification relatively more for loss-averse investors. We analyze the portfolio problem of such an investor who has to choose between home and foreign equities in the presence of asymmetric comovement in returns. Perhaps surprisingly, in the context of the home bias puzzle we find that loss-averse investors behave similarly to those with standard expected-utility preferences and plausible levels of risk aversion. We argue that preference specifications that appear to perform well with respect to the equity premium puzzle should be subjected to this “test”.     

Insider trading,future earnings,and post-earnings announcement drift

This paper examines the association between insider trading prior to quarterly earnings announcements and the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We conjecture and find that insider trades reflect insiders’ private information about the persistence of earnings news. Thus, insider trades can help investors better understand and incorporate the time-series properties of quarterly earnings into stock prices in a timely and unbiased manner, thereby mitigating PEAD. As predicted, PEAD is significantly lower when earnings announcements are preceded by insider trading. The reduction in PEAD is driven by contradictory insider trades (i.e., net buys before large negative earnings news or net sells before large positive earnings news) and is more pronounced in the presence of more sophisticated market participants. Consistent with investors extracting and trading on insiders’ private information, pre-announcement insider trading is associated with smaller market reactions to future earnings news in each of the four subsequent quarters. Overall, our findings indicate insider trading contributes to stock price efficiency by conveying insiders’ private information about future earnings and especially the persistence of earnings news.     

The real-time information content of macroeconomic news: implications for firm-level earnings expectations

This paper investigates the usefulness of the real-time macroeconomic news-flow as a leading indicator of firm-level end-of-quarter realized earnings. Using recent advances in macroeconomics, I develop a nowcasting model for quarterly earnings and provide two main findings. First, I show that my model provides out-of-sample expectations that are as accurate as analysts’ forecasts. Second, macroeconomic news embedded in my nowcasts is not fully incorporated into investors’ earnings expectations and predicts future abnormal returns around earnings announcements. These findings have three main implications for capital markets research. First, real-time macroeconomic news can be used to update earnings expectations in real-time. Second, there are economic benefits of doing so, as evidenced by the magnitude of risk-adjusted returns around earnings announcements. Third, after three decades of almost nonexistent research on time-series models for quarterly earnings, the door is open again for fruitful research in this area.     

Informed trading before positive vs. negative earnings surprises

This paper investigates whether institutional investors trade profitably around the announcements of positive or negative earnings surprises. Using Korean data over the period of 2001–2010, we find that information asymmetry is larger before negative earnings surprises (earnings shock) among investors and that the trading volume decreases only before earnings shock announcements due to the severe information asymmetry. We also find that institutions sell their stocks prior to earnings shock announcements whereas individual and foreign investors do not anticipate bad news. Finally, we find that institutional trade imbalance is positively related to the post-announcement abnormal returns of negative events. This study complements and extends prior literature on informed trading around earnings announcements by documenting evidence that domestic institutions exploit their superior information around particularly earnings shock announcements.     

Measuring investors’ assessment of earnings persistence: do investors see through smoothed earnings?

Prior studies document that investors value persistent earnings more than transitory earnings. This argument offers incentives to managers to smooth their reported earnings and make them look more persistent. This study examines whether investors are misled by management’s income-smoothing behavior and whether they can correctly assess the persistence of smoothed earnings. Using a simple theoretical model, this paper shows that investors’ assessment of earnings persistence can be derived from their reactions to reported earnings, which is the ratio of the coefficient on earnings change relative to the coefficient on earnings level in the return–earnings relation. Empirical results show that investors’ assessment of earnings persistence is negatively associated with the level of income smoothing after controlling for time-series persistence of earnings and hence suggest that investors understand that the high persistence of smoothed earnings is not real and they discount the persistence of smoothed earnings when they react to such earnings news.