科学选择附加险

通常,投保人做出投保主险决定以后,保险人就会向被保险人提供一揽子的附加险供投保人选择.面对保险人提供的琳琅满目的附加保险产品,投保人大有乱花渐欲迷人眼的无所适从的感觉. 其实,投保人在投保主险以后,选择性价比高的附加险当然必不可少,但要在投保的主险种之后如何做到科学、合理配置附加险,笔者以为投保人需要明白附加险对于主险的几个不同点、关注科学选择附加险的七个方面,进而选择好适合自己的附加险为己所用.     

挑选附加险的门道

常常听到有人抱怨,一旦做出投保决定以后,保险代理人就会极为热情地推出一揽子的附加险,面对这些琳琅满目的附加险,投保人大多有无所适从的感觉：选择少了怕寿险保障计划保障不全面,选择多了又怕重复投保,浪费钱财。     

高速公路财产一揽子保险投保、索赔浅析

高速公路财产一揽子保险的投保、索赔是高速公路营运公司不可缺少的一项重要工作。保险属于经济范畴,它不是保证不发生风险,而是在发生风险时,在保险的有效期和保险合同约定的责任范围以及保险金额内,投保人能得到帮助和支持,能按其实际损失金额得到补偿。作者通过多年高速公路财产一揽子保险投保、索赔的工作经验,对高速公路财产一揽子保险从投保到索赔全过程进行全面而重点的分析、总结。     

我国生猪价格保险中的逆选择分析

生猪价格指数保险是生猪养殖业防范价格风险、稳定生产的重要工具。本文在理论分析的基础上,使用我国生猪价格指数保险市场的投保数据,对该市场是否存在逆选择现象进行了实证研究。首先建立Tobit模型来刻画投保选择与各经济变量之间的关系,根据模型得出在市场条件下,投保人选择投保的猪粮比参照值。计算市场猪粮比的相对溢额,并与各期的投保总量进行Granger因果检验。结果显示北京地区的生猪价格指数保险市场不存在逆选择现象,而山东和辽宁由于集中投保,同样无法检验出逆选择现象的存在。基于上述结果,本文认为集中投保、政策性保险等因素使该保险市场不存在逆选择,这有利于保险公司更好地管理市场价格风险。     

车险市场分离道德风险和逆向选择的实证分析

本文的目的是考察国内车险市场中是否存在信息不对称现象,并试图分离道德风险和逆向选择的影响,即分离出二者对信息不对称的贡献。利用国内一家大型财险公司某省份2008~2009年商业第三者责任险数据,论文通过Probit模型验证了信息不对称的存在;同时,论文利用分组控制住了逆向选择（风险异质性）的影响,并利用对照组剔除了学习效应的贡献,证明商业第三者责任险市场中不存在道德风险;因此该市场的信息不对称完全是由逆向选择贡献的。     

保险市场逆选择问题的讨论

保险市场是典型的信息不对称市场,相对于一般市场来说,保险市场的"逆选择"和"道德风险"显得更加突出一些。"逆选择"和"道德风险"妨碍了保险市场的公平竞争。研究保险市场的"逆选择"问题对于维护保险市场的公平竞争,保障保险人和投保人的利益及完善保险制度有着重要的作用。本文对保险市场的"逆选择"问题作了初步的研究。     

保险市场逆向选择的信号传递博弈研究

在保险市场中,投保人比保险人更了解自己的风险状况,保险双方之间的这种信息不对称难以避免地会产生逆向选择问题,于是在保险人混同定价的情形下,低风险投保人要承受过高的费率而受损,高风险投保人因保险成本过低而削弱控制风险的激励,导致整个市场资源配置低效甚至因逆向选择螺旋而崩溃。通过引入信号传递机制来实现保险市场的分离定价,从...     

基于信息不对称条件下的保险管制

保险市场是典型的信息不对称市场,现有研究大多侧重于保险公司处于信息劣势角度,然而保险公司可以利用自身掌握的资源减轻信息劣势程度,因而本文从普通投保人处于信息劣势的角度出发,分析这种信息不对称对保险市场的需求和供给产生的影响,认为保险管制应更多的基于此种信息不对称,解决投保人的信息劣势问题。     

服务人员不专业客户理赔“跑断腿”

一、案情介绍 车某于1998年以其孩子为被保险人投保了某保险公司的重大疾病保险并附加意外伤害医疗保险。附加险条款规定：附加险的保险期间为一年,在主合同有效期内且被保险人七十周岁之前,附加险期限届满时,若投保人按期续保并交付保险费,则附加险继续有效。车某每年都按期续保并交付保险费。     

BMS系统对汽车保险逆向选择的影响研究

BMS系统根据投保人的历史索赔记录来确定保费,在完全弹性条件下,它既是公平的费率系统也是减轻逆向选择的重要措施。本文在投保人期望效用最大化过程中,研究了投保人的保险最优购买量、保险成为劣等品的临界条件,以及低弹性保险成为吉芬品的临界条件,并且把研究的结果用于检验我国2007年新版BMS对逆向选择的影响,结果表明低弹性的BMS系统不仅减少好司机的保险需求而且加大了逆向选择。     

An Insurance Market Simulation With Both Adverse and Advantageous Selection

The theory of adverse selection predicts that high‐risk individuals are more likely to buy insurance than low‐risk individuals if asymmetric information regarding individuals’ risk type is present in the market. The theory of advantageous selection predicts the opposite—a negative relationship between insurance coverage and risk type can be obtained when hidden knowledge in other dimensions (e.g., the degree of risk aversion) is present in addition to the risk type. Using the heterogeneity of insurance buyers in either risk type or risk aversion, we first introduce a classroom‐based insurance market simulation game to show that adverse selection and advantageous selection can coexist. We then explain the underlying concepts using two methods: a mathematical framework based on expected utility theory and an empirical framework based on the results of the game itself. The game is easy to implement, reinforces textbook concepts by providing students a hands‐on experience, and supplements current textbooks by bringing their content up to date with current research.     

Risk Aversion and the Willingness to Pay for Insurance: A Cautionary Discussion of Adverse Selection

Textbooks frequently describe adverse selection as an almost inevitable feature of insurance markets with heterogeneous buyers and asymmetric information. But if low-risk applicants are more risk averse than their high-risk counterparts, the former may be as willing or more willing than the latter to purchase insurance at any given price. The present article discusses this possibility in several forms suitable for different levels of instruction, to help bridge the gap between insurance education and current research on this topic.     

社会保险市场上的逆向选择与公共政策干预:国际研究动态述评

随着社会经济的进步与发展,提供社会保险日益成为现代政府的重要任务,而信息不对称带来的逆向选择这一市场失灵问题是政府提供社会保险的主要经济依据之一。由此,近年来国际学术界涌现出一大批关于社会保险市场上逆向选择与公共政策干预问题的研究文献,在将理论与数据相结合以分析公共政策的福利影响方面出现了很多研究进展。本文就尝试对这一领域的研究进行总结与分析,为国内学术研究的开展与公共经济政策的设计提供有益借鉴。     

Adverse Selection With Frequency and Severity Risk: Alternative Risk‐Sharing Provisions

The analysis considers an insurance market with adverse selection where individuals' loss distributions may differ with respect to both the frequency and severity of loss. We show that the combination of deductibles and coinsurance can be used to sort rationed policyholders. Because of their screening properties, coinsurance and deductibles may both be equilibrium forms of risk sharing for a particular insurer facing asymmetric information, with different rationed consumers choosing different risk‐sharing provisions.     

基于Agent的保险系统非对称信息博弈研究

本文基于保险系统复杂性特征和复杂性科学在解决系统非线性和复杂性交互行为方面的优势,针对保险系统中非对称信息的特点,运用博弈数学模型系统分析保险系统非对称信息,通过CAS理论构建了基于Agent的保险系统仿真模型并在swarm平台上实现了关于保险系统逆向选择问题的经典模型的动态仿真。结果表明：信息不对称产生了保险逆向选择和道德风险,妨碍了保险机制顺利运行,使保险系统资源配置效率严重降低。     

The Problem of Asymmetric Information: A Simulation of How Insurance Markets Can Be Inefficient

The concept of adverse selection is discussed in virtually all academic insurance textbooks. However, undergraduate students have rarely had the experience of purchasing insurance which may limit their ability to fully comprehend the market inefficiencies created by asymmetric information. We provide a classroom simulation of an insurance market that highlights the concept of adverse selection and its impact on the insurance industry. Participants are asked to make insurance decisions in pursuit of their own interests under different market conditions. In the absence of perfect information, participants actively observe that a socially optimal outcome does not occur.     

The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed

This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its customers. The resulting equilibrium allocations are compared to the consequences of the standard adverse selection hypothesis. On the positive side, they exhibit the property that low-risk people are better covered than higher-risk people. On the normative side, the article shows that there are two reasons for avoiding excessive risk classification: one is the classical destruction of insurance possibilities, and the other comes from the distrustful atmosphere generated by new asymmetric information.     

深市买卖价差逆向选择成分的估算与分析

本文以深市150家上市公司为样本，估算买卖价差逆向选择成分，研究逆向选择成分与公司特征之间的关系，并探讨其日内变化模式。研究发现信息不对称对深市买卖价差的贡献度为39％。公司规模越大，其股票的逆向选择成分越小；逆向选择成分随着交易量水平的上升而降低；高价股的逆向选择成分比低价股低。总体而言，逆向选择成分在早市呈现“倒U”型，在午市呈现“L”型。逆向选择成分与公司特征之问的关系及逆向选择成分的日内变动模式的实证分析结果，符合信息不对称与公司特征之问的逻辑关系及信息不对称的日内变动模式。     

The Asymmetric Information Problem in Taiwan's Cancer Insurance Market

This paper investigates the problem of asymmetric information in Taiwan’s cancer insurance market. Through the survey data, we find evidence of adverse selection existing in this market. Furthermore, we collect additional information on the individual, and find that the individual’s family cancer history contains additional valuable information. It can not only more accurately predict the probability of contracting cancer, as well as predict the willingness to purchase extended cancer insurance, but it can also help to mitigate the severity of adverse selection in the insurance market.