The endowment game when n = 2

This paper considers a well defined problem in the implementation literature: A planner wants to re-allocate goods among two agents but she does not know each agent’s initial endowment of goods. We completely characterize social choice functions that can be implemented by feasible mechanisms in Nash equilibria in this n = 2 case.     

New unit root asymptotics in the presence of deterministic trends

Recent work by Phillips (Econometrica 66 (1998) 1299) has shown that stochastic trends can be validly represented in empirical regressions in terms of deterministic functions of time. These representations offer an alternative mechanism for modelling stochastic trends. It is shown here that the alternate representations affect the asymptotics of all commonly used unit root tests in the presence of trends. In particular, the critical values of unit root tests diverge when the number of deterministic regressors K→∞ as the sample size n→∞. When they are appropriately recentered and standardized, unit root limit distributions are shown to be normal as K→∞.     

An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments

Let M be a set of m players, m≧3, and let Γ be the set of all (finite) games (without side payments) that have a non-empty core. When M is finite, the following four (independent) axioms fully characterize the core on Γ: (i) non-emptiness, (ii) individual rationality, (iii) the reduced game property, and (iv) the converse reduced game property. If M is infinite, then the converse reduced game property is redundant.     

The concept of weak exchangeability and its applications

A finite sequence of binary random variables is called a weak exchangeable sequence of order m if the sequence consists of m random vectors such that the elements within each random vector are exchangeable in the usual sense and the different random vectors are dependent. The exact and asymptotic joint distributions of the m-dimensional random vector whose elements include the number of successes in each exchangeable sequence are derived. Potential applications of the concept of weak exchangeability are discussed with illustrative examples.     

Bilateral redistribution

We explore the implications of three basic and intuitive axioms for income redistribution problems: continuity, no transfer paradox and stability. The combination of the three axioms characterizes in the two-agent case a large family of rules, which we call threshold rules. For each level of total income in society, a threshold is considered for each agent. It is impossible for both agents to be below their respective thresholds. If an agent’s income is below the threshold, the difference is redistributed from the other agent; otherwise, the rule imposes laissez-faire.     

Myopia and monetary equilibria

In an infinitely lived, representative individual economy, important properties of competitive equilibria, such as determinacy and the non-existence of monetary equilibria, are not robust to the introduction of myopia. An individual is myopic if, at each date, he plans consumption only for that date and few periods that immediately follow; that is, his planning horizon, n, is finite. Equilibria with myopia can display real indeterminacy and allow for monetary as well as non-monetary steady states; thus, they share some of the features of equilibria in economies of overlapping generation. The equilibrium price dynamics (but not the consumption dynamics) of an exchange economy with extreme myopia, n = 1, are identical to the dynamics of an overlapping generation economy with two-period lives.     

Towards a credit network based early warning indicator for crises

This paper presents an agent based model which underlines the importance of credit network and leverage dynamics in determining the resilience of the system, defining an early warning indicator for crises. The model reproduces macroeconomic dynamics emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous banks and firms in an endogenous credit network. Banks and firms are linked through multiple credit relations, which derive from individual target leverage choices: agents choose the more convenient leverage level, according to a basic reinforcement learning algorithm. Simulations are calibrated on balance sheet data of banks and firms quoted in the Japanese stock-exchange markets from 1980 to 2012.     

Best response dynamics with level-n expectations in two-stage games

This paper analyzes behavior in repeatedly played two-stage games, where players choose actions in both stages according to best replies using level-n expectations about the opponent׳s actions in both stages. Level-n expectations are recursively defined in a way that a player holding level-n expectations correctly predicts the action of an opponent holding level-(n−1) expectations. A general conceptual framework to study such dynamics for two-stage games is developed and it is shown that, contrary to results for single-stage games, the fixed points of the dynamics depend on the level of the expectations. In particular, for level-0 expectation, fixed points correspond to a Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous move version of the game, whereas (under certain conditions) fixed points converge towards the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game if the level of expectations goes to infinity. The approach is illustrated using a two-stage duopoly game, where firms in the first stage invest in activities reducing their marginal costs and in the second stage engage in Cournot competition. Conditions for local stability of the fixed points are derived for different levels of expectations and it is shown that level-2 expectations are sufficient to move the fixed-point of the dynamics to a close neighborhood of the subgame perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that although firms benefit from unilateral increases in the level of expectations, an increase of n by all firms reduces all profits.     

The distribution of the maximum of a first order autoregressive process: the continuous case

We give the cumulative distribution function of M _n , the maximum of a sequence of n observations from an autoregressive process of order 1. Solutions are first given in terms of repeated integrals and then for the case, where the underlying random variables are absolutely continuous. When the correlation is positive, $$P \left( M_n \leq x \right)\ =a_{n,x},$$ where $$a_{n,x}= \sum_{j=1}^\infty \beta_{jx}\ \nu_{jx}^{n} = O \left( \nu_{1x}^{n}\right),$$ where {?? _jx } are the eigenvalues of a non-symmetric Fredholm kernel, and ?? _1x is the eigenvalue of maximum magnitude. When the correlation is negative $$P \left( M_n \leq x \right)\ =a_{n,x} +a_{n-1,x}.$$ The weights ?? _jx depend on the jth left and right eigenfunctions of the kernel. These are given formally by left and right eigenvectors of an infinite Toeplitz matrix whose eigenvalues are just {?? _jx }. These results are large deviations expansions for extremes, since the maximum need not be standardized to have a limit. In fact, such a limit need not exist. The use of the derived expansion for P(M _n ?? x) is illustrated using both simulated and real data sets.     

Utility theory based on rational probabilities

Classical utility theory assumes that a preference order is defined for all mixtures αa+(1?α)b of pure prospects a,b for all real numbers α between 0 and 1. If α is irrational such mixtures are hard to interpret intuitively. We show here how to modify the usual axiomatisations to deal with the case where α is restricted to rational values, or even further to values of the form m/2ⁿ corresponding to mixtures built up from even bets.     

Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects to agents, such as dorm rooms to students, or offices to professors, where each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For these problems population-monotonicity, which requires that agents are affected by population changes in the same way, is a compelling property because tentative assignments are made in many typical situations, which may have to be revised later to take into account the changing population. We completely describe the allocation rules satisfying population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and efficiency. The characterized rules assign the objects by an iterative procedure in which at each step no more than two agents “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”     

Cointegration and distance between differenced processes

In this note, it is argued that cointegration augments the distance between the differenced series. If two series, x _t and y _t , are integrated of order one and cointegrated and v _t and w _t are integrated of order one but not cointegrated then, under certain conditions, the distance between ??x _t and ??y _t is more than the distance between ??v _t and ??w _t .     

The boundary spanning capabilities of purchasing agents in buyer-supplier trust development

This study examines how individual purchasing agents function as boundary spanners with suppliers to influence trust development in themselves and the buying firms that employ them. Building upon boundary theory and supply chain cooperation research, we identify three boundary spanning capabilities of purchasing agents and empirically test how these capabilities shape buyer-supplier trust development. Using two samples of data collected from suppliers in the automotive industry and food industry, we found that a purchasing agent's effectiveness in strategic communication with suppliers affects a supplier's trust in the buying firm, while an agent's professional knowledge and ability toreach compromises with suppliers affect a supplier's trust in the purchasing agent representing the firm. Trust in the purchasing agent in turn affects trust in the buying firm. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.     

Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values

This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.     

Evolving densities in continuous strategy games through particle simulations

Many cases of strategic interaction between agents involve a continuous set of choices. It is natural to model these problems as continuous space games. Consequently, the population of agents playing the game will be represented with a density function defined over the continuous set of strategy choices. Simulating evolutionary dynamics on continuous strategy spaces is a challenging problem. The classic approach of discretizing the strategy space is ineffective for multidimensional strategy spaces. We present a principled approach to simulation of adaptive dynamics in continuous space games using sequential Monte Carlo methods. Sequential Monte Carlo methods use a set of weighted random samples, also named particles to represent density functions over multidimensional spaces. Sequential Monte Carlo methods provide computationally efficient ways of computing the evolution of probability density functions. We employ resampling and smoothing steps to prevent particle degeneration problem associated with particle estimates. The resulting algorithm can be interpreted as an agent based simulation with elements of natural selection, regression to mean and mutation. We illustrate the performance of the proposed simulation technique using two examples: continuous version of the repeated prisoner dilemma game and evolution of bidding functions in first-price closed-bid auctions.     

Wealth effects of time variation in investor risk preferences

We investigate the source of risk premiums: individual risk preferences. By examining the wealth characteristics of agents of different risk preferences, we study the financial incentive of investors to demonstrate different risk preferences. To accomplish this, we model the stock market utilizing artificial adaptive agents. If investors have incentive to vary their risk preferences, or if investors of a constant risk preference vary the way they participate in the market under different market conditions, this could lead to time variation in market risk premiums. We find that agents have significant incentive to demonstrate different risk preferences under different market conditions.(JEl G12)     

Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses

A house allocation rule should be flexible in its response to changes in agents’ preferences. We propose a specific notion of this flexibility. An agent is said to be swap-sovereign over a pair of houses at a profile of preferences if the rule assigns her one of the houses at that profile and assigns her the other house when she instead reports preferences that simply swap the positions of the two houses. A pair of agents is said to be mutually swap-sovereign over their assignments at a profile if the rule exchanges their assignments when they together report such ‘swap preferences’. An allocation rule is individually swap-flexible if any pair of houses has a swap-sovereign agent, and is mutually swap-flexible if any pair of houses has either a swap-sovereign agent or mutually swap-sovereign agents. We show for housing markets that the top-trading-cycles rule is the unique strategy-proof, individually rational and mutually swap-flexible rule. In house allocation problems, we show that queue-based priority rules are uniquely strategy-proof, individually swap-flexible and envy non-bossy. Varying the strength of non-bossiness, we characterise the important subclasses of sequential priority rules (additionally non-bossy) and serial priority rules (additionally pair-non-bossy and pair-sovereign).     

Asymmetric sequential search under incomplete information

We study a multistage sequential search model with n agents who compete for one job. The agents arrive sequentially, each one in a different stage. The agents' abilities, which are private information, are derived from heterogeneous distribution functions. In each stage, the designer chooses an ability threshold. If an agent has a higher ability than the threshold in the stage in which he arrives, he gets the job and the search is over. The agent's ability is not revealed when he wins the job and the designer has only an estimation of this ability according to the threshold placed by him. We analyze the optimal ability thresholds imposed by the designer who wishes to maximize the ability estimation of the agent who gets the job net of the search cost. We also investigate the relation between the optimal ability thresholds as well as the optimal order of agents in all stages according to the agents' distributions of abilities.     

Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate

A production process involves a principal and two privately informed agents. Production requires coordinated decision making. It might be carried in a centralized organization or through delegated contracting in a hierarchical structure. We compare the performance of different organizational structures when renegotiation of initial contracts is possible. We show that delegated contracting always dominates centralization if the downstream contract between the agents is observable. Contracting (resp. control) should be delegated to the agent with the least (resp. most) important information. If downstream contracts are not observable, we obtain a tradeoff between centralization and delegation.     

Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

We consider a principal who is keen to induce his agents to work at their maximal effort levels. To this end, he samples n days at random out of the T days on which they work, and awards a prize of B dollars to the most productive agent. The principal’s policy (B, n) induces a strategic game Γ(B, n) between the agents. We show that to implement maximal effort levels weakly (or, strongly) as a strategic equilibrium (or, as dominant strategies) in Γ(B, n), at the least cost B to himself, the principal must choose a small sample size n. Thus less scrutiny by the principal induces more effort from the agents.The need for reduced scrutiny becomes more pronounced when agents have information of the history of past plays in the game. There is an inverse relation between information and optimal sample size. As agents acquire more information (about each other), the principal, so to speak, must “undo” this by reducing his information (about them) and choosing the sample size n even smaller.